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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944);
  • S. 3 of the Tariff Act,
  • 15-A (2) of Excise Act.
  • CUSTOMS TARIFF ACT
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944);
  • S. 3 of the Tariff Act,
  • 15-A (2) of Excise Act.
  • CUSTOMS TARIFF ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner imported 35 cartons of plastic metallised films (shipment Ex S.S. Lyumila Stal) under bill of entry C.R. No. 402/79 No. 68, dated 21-6-1979, with a C.I.F. value of Rs. 80,065/-. The petitioner claimed concessional assessment under Customs Notification No. 228/76 as amended by Notification No. 443-Cus/76, which wholly exempts countervailing duty on articles set out in the notification. The basic customs duty under Item 39.07 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (Rs. 96,066/-) was paid, but an additional levy of duty of Rs. 88,060.50 was disputed by the petitioner. The assessment was made on 6-7-1979. The petitioner filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution without first availing remedies provided under the Tariff Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the imported plastic metallised films fall within the exemption conferred by Customs Notification No. 228/76 (as amended by 443-Cus/76) and are therefore not liable to the additional countervailing duty imposed under Section 3 of the Tariff Act.
  2. Whether the Revenue's classification of the imported goods as falling within "sheets" or "foils" (and thus outside the exemption) is a permissible construction or a perverse interpretation that the court can set aside.
  3. Whether the petitioner could invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 despite not having availed statutory remedies under the Tariff Act (this procedural point is raised but the primary contest concerns classification and exemption).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The imported goods were plastic metallised films and the petitioner claimed exemption under Notification No. 228/76 (as amended by 443-Cus/76) which exempts "articles made of plastics" from countervailing duty except those specified in the Table annexed to the notification.
  • The explanatory note in the Tariff Notification states that "articles made of plastics" shall have the same meaning as in item 15-A(2) of the Excise Tariff; the word "film" is not found in the Table to the Tariff Notification, and therefore the concession should be available to the petitioner.
  • Pointed to administrative practice and prior excise notifications where "films" are specifically mentioned, suggesting that the Government has understood "articles made of plastics" to include films under the phrase "all sorts ... not otherwise specified."
  • Relied on standards (I.S.I.) and tariff chapter notes showing films are recognised as a distinct type of article (e.g., ISI definition of film as sheeting with nominal thickness not greater than 0.25 mm and Chapter 39 references).
  • Alleged discrimination with reference to relief granted to two other importers (petition paragraph 14) and asserted that Customs had been allowing import of films without payment of additional duty previously.

Respondent's (Revenue's) Arguments

  • The word "films" is not specifically listed in Notification No. 228-Customs (as amended), and a countervailing duty at the rate of 50% is leviable under Item 15-A(2) of the Central Excise Tariff; films fall within the description "sheets" or "foils" or "other rectangular ... shapes."
  • Argued that a film, when spread out, is rectangular in shape (citing Brussels Nomenclature Chapter 39.07) and thus can be classified under the items excluded from the exemption.
  • Submitted that when classification is involved it is for the Revenue authorities to decide (relying on the decision cited as (1973) 1 SCC 148 : A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 194), and therefore the petitioner cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction under Article 226 when there is no ambiguity.
  • Denied the allegation of discrimination and contended that past administrative practice did not create entitlement for the petitioner here.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1973) 1 SCC 148 : A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 194 Support for the proposition that, when classification is involved, it is ordinarily for the Revenue authorities to decide. The court acknowledged the principle but treated it in context: it observed that deference to revenue is not absolute and that where revenue's construction is perverse the court may interfere. The precedent was noted but did not preclude relief here.
Collector of Customs v. Ganga Setti — A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1319 Principle that a perverse construction/assessment by Revenue can be set aside by the court. The court invoked this precedent to support the proposition that it could interfere with Revenue's classification where that classification is perverse. This authority was used to justify granting relief to the petitioner.
W.A. 248 of 1979 Was relied upon by Revenue concerning interpretation of a notification and retrospective effect (specific issues in that matter). The court found this decision inapplicable to the present case because the central question there was whether a notification granting exemption could have retrospective effect; thus W.A. 248/1979 did not prevent the petitioner from obtaining the relief sought here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis focused on textual interpretation of the Tariff Notification and its explanatory note, the meaning ascribed to "articles made of plastics" in item 15-A(2) of the Excise Tariff, and the administrative practice reflected in successive excise exemption notifications.

  1. Interpretation of the Tariff Notification: the Tariff Notification expressly states that "articles made of plastics" shall have the same meaning as in item 15-A(2) of the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act (item 15-A(2) is quoted in full in the opinion). The court therefore examined how the Government itself understood item 15-A(2) in practice.
  2. Examination of item 15-A(2) and related excise notifications: item 15-A(2) lists "articles made of plastics, all sorts ... including ... sheets, foils, ... other rectangular or profile shapes, whether ... rigid or flexible ..." but does not expressly mention "films." The court noted that, in several excise exemption notifications over the years (notifications 68/71-C.E., 71/71-C.E., 72/71-C.E., 75/71-C.E., 39/73-C.E., 151/75-C.E.), the word "films" is specifically used when the Government intended to exempt films.
  3. Administrative meaning and "not otherwise specified": the court reasoned that where the Government, in framing excise notifications, had understood that films were encompassed by the expression "all sorts ... not otherwise specified," that understanding bears on how the identical phrase in the Tariff Notification ought to be applied. Because the Tariff Notification adopts the same meaning as item 15-A(2), that construction should govern the tariff exemption as well.
  4. Rejection of Revenue's "rectangular shape" argument: the court found the respondent's attempt to treat films as mere "rectangular" sheets or foils (and thus outside exemption) to be an unreasonable and illogical manner of classifying films (the court gave examples such as cinematograph film or camera film which when spread out would be rectangular but are not sensibly to be equated to sheets/foils for tariff purposes).
  5. Reliance on standards and chapter notes: the court noted supportive material such as the I.S.I. standards (defining film as sheeting with nominal thickness not greater than 0.25 mm) and tariff chapter notes (Chapter 39 mentioning films), reinforcing that "film" is a recognized category and that governmental practice had specifically mentioned films in excise notifications.
  6. On discrimination and administrative practice: the petitioner alleged discriminatory treatment by Revenue in granting relief to other importers; the court observed that Revenue made only a sweeping denial and no particulars were placed before the court to substantiate the denial. The lack of particularized rebuttal weakened Revenue's stance.
  7. Application of precedent and review of Revenue's construction: while one precedent was relied upon by Revenue to suggest that classification questions are for Revenue, the court held that where the Revenue's construction is perverse, judicial interference is appropriate (citing Collector of Customs v. Ganga Setti). The court concluded that the Revenue's construction (that "films" fall outside the exemption solely because of a literal reading that treats them as "sheets" or "foils") was perverse in the circumstances.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed.

Direct consequences and orders made: The court set aside the additional duty imposed upon the petitioner and allowed the writ petition. The petitioner was awarded costs relating to the additional duty imposed; counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 25 (noted in the text as "Rs. 25C").

Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles about classification and judicial review: while classification questions are generally for Revenue, a perverse construction by Revenue can be corrected by the court. The decision resolved the dispute between the parties on the facts before the court but does not purport to create a new precedent beyond applying that principle to the particular interpretation of the Tariff Notification and item 15-A(2). The court's ruling rests on the textual linkage between the Tariff Notification and item 15-A(2) of the Excise Tariff, the Government's prior practice in excise notifications, and recognition of "film" in standards and chapter notes.

Note: This summary is confined to and based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond that opinion.

    Precise Impex (P) Ltd. v. Collector Of Customs, Madras

    1. Petitioner imported 35 cartoons of plastic Metallised films Ex S.S Lyumila Stal under bill of entry C.R No. 402/79 No. 68, dated 21-6-1979 of the C.I.F value of Rs. 80,065/- and claimed concessional assessment for the above imported goods under Customs Notification 228/76, as amended by 443.Cus/76, which wholly exempts countervailing duty on articles set out in the notification. The basic customs duty leviable under item 39.07, of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 at Rs. 96,066/- was paid, but the additional levy of duty at Rs. 88,060.50 was disputed. This writ petition was filed without availing of the remedies provided under the Act. The assessment was made on 6-7-1979.

    2. Respondent takes up the stand that though the word ‘films’ is not specifically mentioned in Notification No. 228-Customs, dated 2-8-1976, as amended by Notification No. 443- Customs of 1976, a countervailing duty at the rate of 50 per cent of the value under Item 15-A (2) of the Central Excise Tariff is leviable. A film being a sheet of plastic of a kind, it falls within the exclusion contemplated in the Notification. Merely because films do not find a place in item 15-A (2) of Central Excise Tariff, it will not be correct to claim that it would fall within the expression Articles made of plastics, all sorts…….including tubes, rods, sheets, foils, sticks, other rectangular or profile shapes, whether luminated or not, and whether rigid or flexible, including lay flat tubings and polyvinyl chloride sheets and other wise specified. Films will fall within the ambit of the words ‘sheets’ and ‘foils’ whether they are rigid or flexible. Merely because the explanatory note to the notification states that for the purpose of this notification the expression ‘articles made of plastics’ shall have the same meaning as in sub-item (2) of item 15-A of the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944); it would not mean that the Notification issued under Tariff Act, should be understood in the same manner. In Brussels Nomenclature Chapter 39.07, films are described as articles of rectangular shape. Merely because in the Notification issued under. Excise Act, films are specifically mentioned, it cannot be treated, for purposes of the Tariff Act, that it is a separate kind of article. When classification is involved, it is undoubtedly for the Revenue authorities to decide in view of the decision in (1973) 1 SCC 148 : A.I.R 1973 S.C 194. There being no ambiguity, petitioner cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Reliance placed on I.S.I has no relevance. When exemption is claimed, the burden is upon the petitioner to show that the imported goods fell within excluded category, and what is more important is not the distinctive descriptive word that may be used in the documents, but what was the type of goods imported. Mr. Habibulla Basha, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that, there is no dispute that the goods imported were plastic metallised films. As for levy of basic duty under Tariff Act, there is no dispute. It is only with reference to levy of additional duty under Sec. 3 of the Act, reliance is placed on the Notification No. 228-Customs, dated 2-8-1876, amended by Notification No. 443-Customs, dated 29-11-1976. It is to the effect that articles made of plastics of all sorts are exempt from payment of so much of duty of the Customs as is leviable thereto under S. 3 of the Tariff Act, but excluding those specified in the Table Annexed thereto. Explanatory Note is to the effect that ‘articles made of plastics’ shall have the same meaning as in item 15-A (2) of Excise Act. The word film is not found in the Table. Hence, the concession is available to the petitioner.

    3. The plea of the revenue is that, the words sheets, foils, whether rigid or flexible, include ‘films’. By referring to Chapter 39.07, in Brussels Nomenclature, Mr. Thyagarajan, learned counsel for the respondent, submits that, a film is an article of rectangular shape and is akin to sheets, strips, foils, etc. This manner of understanding ‘films’ which have been imported, is preposterous. Faced with the difficulty that ‘film’ is not found in the Table, the revenue had come forward to put forth an unreasonable stand and go to the extent of claiming that it has the right to decide against the assessee and construe in favour of the revenue when there is ambiguity as to whether a class of imported goods falls within two items or not. But, as held in Collector of Customs v. Ganga Setti—AIR 1963 S.C 1319, if the construction put upon by Revenue is perverse, then the court was competent to interfere with such an assessment. On this basis, the other materials relied upon and the submissions put forth by the petitioner, are considered hereunder.

    4. In the exemption notification issued under the Tariff Act in the ‘Table’ the word ‘films’ being not mentioned, it is pointed out that in respect of more than one notification issued under Excise Act, the word ‘film’ finds a place whenever the Government considered that it required to be exempted from levy of duty. Item 15-A (2) of Excise Tariff, to which reference is specifically made in the Tariff Exemption Notification, is to the following effect:

    “(2) Articles made of plastics, all sorts……. including tubes, rods, sheets, foils, sticks, other rectangular or profile shapes, whether luminated or not, and whether rigid or flexible including lay flat tubings and polyvinyl chloride sheets not otherwise specified.”

    5. The word ‘films’ is not mentioned in this item. But in the exemption notification issued under Excise Act spread over several years, the word ‘films’ is specifically mentioned. The relevant notifications are:

    “1. 68/71-C.E., dated 29-5-1971

    2. 71/71-C.E., dated 29-5-1971

    3. 72/71-C.E., dated 29-5-1971

    4. 75/71-C.E., dated 29-5-1971

    5. 39/73-C.E., dated 1-3-1973

    6. 151/75-C.E., dated 31-5-1975.”

    6. It is justifiably contended that in spite of the specific use of the following expressions like tubes, rods, sheets, foils, other rectangular or profile shapes, whether luminated or not, and whether rigid or flexible the same Central Government has chosen to understand that when films are made of plastics, they would fall within the expression all sorts………….not otherwise specified. Undoubtedly, notifications issued under such enactment will have to be understood with reference to the provisions of the concerned Act. But, when the Tariff Notification itself states that ‘articles made of plastics’ shall have the same meaning as in item 15A (2); how this item is understood by the Government, has considerable relevancs in properly classifying the goods. With full consciousness of the meaning obtaining for ‘articles made of plastics’, the Traiff Notification having been published, incorporating therein the relevant identical types of goods, and omitting to mention the word ‘films’, Revenue cannot claim that any ambiguity exists, enabling it to take an arbitrary decision. Articles made of plastics, all sorts……….. not otherwise specified having been understood to include films, in respect of item 15A(2), the same meaning has to be applied to the Tariff Notification by virtue of the Explanation found therein.

    7. To add further strength to this plea put forth by petitioner, reliance is placed on I.S.I Standards relating to plastic industry, wherein ‘film’ is described as ‘A sheeting having nominal thickness not greater than 0.25 mm. Further, in Chapter 39 of Tariff Act, Chapter Note 3 sets out the materials to which heading 39.01/06 would apply. It mentions films as a specific item. Yet, another interesting feature pointed out is that, by a Notification issued in 1981, under Excise Act, item No. 15 BB had been inducted dealing with ‘polyester films’. Still, counsel for respondent would plead that, when these films are spread out, they have a rectangular shape. If this sort of understanding the nature of goods imported is permitted, there in respect of cinematograph films, which are several metres in length when spread out will have a rectangular shape. Likewise, if film roll used in a camera is spread out, it takes a rectangular shape. This is, undoubtedly, an illogical manner of categorising the imported goods.

    8. Petitioner also pointedly Refers to relief having been granted in respect of two other importers, as mentioned in paragraph 14, and pleads discrimination. It is also stated that the Customs Department has been allowing the import of films without payment of additional duty hitherto. Except to make a sweeping denial that no discrimination as alleged in paragraph 14 had taken place, no particulars are placed before Court to show that in respect of the two instances referred to by the petitioner, the additional duty had been collected. This only shows that the respondent had not entertained any ambiguity in understanding the scope of the Tariff Notification, but had resorted to give a different interpretation, because Revenue had the right to decide against the assessee pertaining to classification. A perverse classification, as pointed out by Supreme Court, cannot be got over by claiming that ambiguity exists, where it is absent. Respondent would then rely upon the decision in W.A 248 of 1979. But this count have no application because, the primordial point that came up for consideration was whether a notification granting exemption could have retrospective effect or not. In the penultimate paragraph, after referring to item 82(3)(b) it was held that the interpretation put by the Revenue was not wrong because the films imported were only rectangular in shape. The type of goods imported by the petitioner herein and the notification relied upon, having led to consideron as to under what classification these goods fall, the decision of the Division Bench does not stand in the way of the petitioner securing the relief prayed for.

    9. Hence, the contention of the revenue that though the word ‘films’ is not used in the Table to the Tariff Notification, yet, ‘films’ will fall within the ambit of words ‘sheets, and foils whether they are rigid or flexible,’ is a perverse approach, in spite of being fully aware that in respect of ‘articles made of plastics’ or in understanding the notification, the same meaning obtaining in item No. 15-A (2) of First Schedule to Act I of 1944 will have to be applied and implemented. Hence, the writ petition is allowed with costs relating to additional duty imposed upon the petitioner. Counsel's fee Rs. 25C.

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    Comments

    Precise Impex (P) Ltd. v. Collector Of Customs, Madras
    (Jul 27, 1984)