Sri Ranganathar Tran... v. The Tanjore Co-Opera..., Madras High Court, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Case Number

C.R.P 1038 of 1980

Attorney(S)

Mr. M. Srinivasan for Petr.
Mr. R. Vijayan and Miss K. Manjula for Respt.

Judges

Swamikkannu, J.

Acts

S. 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act (Act 4 of 1939), as amended by Act 56 of 1969,
maintainable,5. S. 57 of the amending Act 59 of 1969
S. 110 of the principal Act, in sub-S.(1)
S. 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act
S. 27 of Act 56 of 1969,

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This civil revision petition arises from a suit brought by the respondent (Tanjore Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd, Tiruvarur) seeking compensation for losses caused by a motor-vehicle collision that occurred at Vijayapuram bazar, Tiruvarur on 25 June 1976 at about 3:45 p.m. The respondent's lorry (regn. MDO 6252) and the defendant's transport bus (regn. MDO 7331, owned by Sri Ranganathar Transports Pte Ltd, Thanjavur) collided. The respondent alleged the defendant's bus, driven in the course of employment, was approaching at high speed and, by rash and negligent driving, struck the respondent's lorry.

The respondent claimed damages totalling Rs. 544.85: Rs. 159.86 for headlight assembly and bulb, Rs. 85 for mudguard repair/ repainting, and Rs. 300 as compensation for loss of income for two days (calculated at Rs. 150 per day).

Procedurally, the learned District Munsif (trial court) held that the civil court had no jurisdiction, relying on provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act (notably S. 110-B and amendments). On appeal the lower appellate court reversed the trial court's finding as to the Rs. 300 loss-of-income claim (holding the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain that part) while confirming dismissal as regards Rs. 244.85 (the vehicle bodily damage claims), and remanded the suit for fresh disposal on the Rs. 300 claim.

The defendant (through learned counsel for the revision petitioner) challenged that appellate conclusion by filing this civil revision petition under Section 115, C.P.C., contending that the Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate all claims arising from such collisions, including the Rs. 300 loss-of-income claim.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages arising from a motor-vehicle collision, or whether such claims must be made only by an application under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act (as amended).
Whether the bar on civil-court jurisdiction contained in Section 110-F (as amended by Act 56 of 1969) extends to a claim for loss of income (Rs. 300) resulting from the vehicle being idle for two days.
Whether claims for physical damage to the vehicle (headlight, mudguard — amounts claimed here) fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal under Section 110 and must be brought under that provision.
Whether, by virtue of the amendment quoted (provision in S. 110 as amended by Act 59 of 1969), a claimant may refer a claim involving property damage exceeding Rs. 2,000 to the civil court at his option, and the relevance of that proviso to the present suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioner (Defendant) — Principal Arguments

The civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain claims arising from the collision because S. 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act (as amended by Act 56 of 1969) bars such jurisdiction and mandates that such claims be made by application under S. 110 to the Claims Tribunal.
Mere characterization of Rs. 300 as compensation for loss of income (two days) does not convert the claim into one outside the ambit of S. 110-F; the phrase "any claim" in S. 110-F includes claims for loss of facilitation/use of the vehicle.
The damage to the vehicle (headlight, mudguard) are ipso facto damages to the vehicle and therefore must be made under S. 110. The Rs. 300 claim is also within the scope of "any claim" and so barred from being brought as a civil suit.
Counsel relied on statutory amendments (S. 110 as amended and S. 110-F) and several precedents to support the submission that the Claims Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction and that the lower appellate court was incorrect in holding otherwise for the Rs. 300 claim.

Respondent (Plaintiff) — Noted Submissions

The respondent's pleadings alleged the defendant's rash and negligent driving caused the collision and the resultant damage and loss of earnings; these factual allegations underpin the claim in the suit.
At the hearing of the revision, the respondent's counsel (Mr. R. Vijayan) accepted that the section (S. 110-F) is clear but urged that the respondent be permitted to file an application before the Claims Tribunal to pursue the claim and that the tribunal be allowed to excuse delay caused by pendency of the suit and appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Thillai Gavindan v. Karuppasami and others. 91 L.W. 563	Ratio decidendi was referred to by the trial court in support of the view on jurisdiction under the Motor Vehicles Act.	The decision was cited as one of the authorities relied upon by the trial court; the revisional court considered it among other authorities in assessing the scope of Tribunal jurisdiction.
Union of India v. Municipal Corporation of City of Ahmedabad	Cited in the course of arguments regarding jurisdictional limits (as part of authorities relied upon).	Referenced by counsel among authorities supporting the construction limiting civil-court jurisdiction where claims fall within the Tribunal's domain.
Madras Motor and General Insurance Co. v. G. Murthi. 1974 2 M.L.J 283 = 87 L.W. 99	Referred to on issues of compensation adjudication under the Motor Vehicles Act.	Used as an authority in argument to show the Tribunal's role in adjudicating claims arising from motor accidents.
M. Ayyappan v. Moktak Singh. A.I.R. 1976 Mys. 67	Addressed related questions of jurisdiction/compensation under motor-vehicle legislation (para 7 cited).	Cited by counsel in support of the contention that Tribunal-exclusive procedures apply to claims arising from collisions.
N.I. Insurance Co. v. Shanti Misra. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 237	Significant for the clear distinction between civil-court jurisdiction and claims that must be pursued before the Claims Tribunal under S. 110-F.	The court treated this decision as particularly significant in demonstrating that S.110-F ousts civil-court jurisdiction and that aggrieved persons must approach the Claims Tribunal.
Union of India v. Labh Chand. A.I.R. 1953 Him. Pr. 12	Referred to concerning interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions regarding jurisdiction.	Placed on record by counsel as one of the authorities supporting the construction of S. 110-F as ousting civil-court jurisdiction.
State of M.P. v. Pehlajrai. A.I.R. 1976 M.P. 208	Referred to in submissions on the scope and effect of S. 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act.	Relied upon in argument to demonstrate the bar on civil-court interference in matters committed to the Claims Tribunal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the statutory provisions (S. 110 as amended and S. 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act, and the amendment provision quoted as "Amendment of S. 110" from the Amending Act) and the factual matrix of the suit.

Key steps in the court's analysis were:

The court recited the facts of the collision and the specific heads of claim (vehicle-body damages and Rs. 300 for two days' loss of income) to identify whether they fall within the statutory scheme for claims under the Motor Vehicles Act.
The court observed that the trial court had held civil courts lack jurisdiction, relying on S. 110-B and the amendments by Act 56 of 1969; the lower appellate court had reversed that finding with respect to the Rs. 300 claim only.
Focusing on the statutory text, the court quoted the proviso to the amended S. 110 (as set out under "Amendment of S. 110") and noted the wording of S. 110-F (as amended by Act 56 of 1969), observing that S. 110-F clearly bars civil-court jurisdiction in respect of claims that may be adjudicated by the Claims Tribunal.
Having regard to the phrase "any claim" in S. 110-F, the court accepted the revision petitioner’s contention that this phrase includes claims relating to the vehicle not being facilitated (i.e., loss of income for non-use), and that therefore the Rs. 300 claim falls within the scope of claims to be made before the Claims Tribunal rather than by civil suit.
The court concluded that all the claims made in the suit (including the vehicle repair items and the loss-of-income claim) can be entertained only by an application under S. 110 to the Claims Tribunal and that S. 110-F bars civil-court jurisdiction over such claims.
Relying on the statutory provision and the cited authorities (including N.I. Insurance Co. v. Shanti Misra for the clear distinction between civil-court jurisdiction and Tribunal jurisdiction), the court held the trial court's conclusion that civil courts lacked jurisdiction was correct and that the lower appellate court's reversal on the Rs. 300 claim was erroneous.
Exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C., the court allowed the revision petition and set aside the appellate court's contrary finding. The court also considered the respondent's request for permission to file a claim before the Tribunal and indicated that the tribunal may consider excusing delay caused by pendency of the suit and appeal.

The court emphasized that the statutory section (S. 110-F) is itself clear and does not require further elucidation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision petition is allowed; the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claims arising from the motor-vehicle collision in this suit and such claims are to be pursued by application under Section 110 before the Claims Tribunal (S. 110-F bars civil-court jurisdiction).

Direct implications for the parties:

The appellate court's finding that the civil court could entertain the Rs. 300 claim was set aside; the proper forum for all claims arising from the collision is the Claims Tribunal under Section 110, subject to the statutory proviso where applicable.
The respondent (plaintiff) was permitted informally (by the court's statement) to present his claim before the Claims Tribunal and to seek condonation of any delay caused by the pendency of the suit and appeal; the tribunal will consider such applications when properly made.
There will be no order as to costs in this revision petition (the court expressly stated "There will be no order as to costs").

Broader implications:

The opinion confines itself to applying the existing statutory scheme (S. 110 and S. 110-F as amended) and to determining the forum for adjudication of the claims in this suit. The court did not purport to lay down any new legal principle beyond the statutory interpretation it applied; therefore, no new precedent beyond this application of the statutory bar is announced in the opinion.

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Sri Ranganathar Transports (P) Ltd., Thanjavur, Rep. By Its Mg. Partner v. The Tanjore Co-Operative Marketing Federation Ltd,, Tiruvarur, Rep. By Its Secretary

1. In this civil revision petition an interesting point has been raised with reference to the jurisdiction of a civil court regarding the claim made in a suit filed by the respondent herein for damages that had been caused to the headlight assembly and the bulb, which came to Rs. 159.86, damage to the mudguard, which was repaired and repainted which came to Rs. 85 and compensation towards the loss of income from the vehicle, namely, the lorry which got damaged, in that it was kept idle for two days, in a sum of Rs. 300, calculating at the rate of Rs. 150 per day. It is interesting to note that the occurrence of the accident claimed had taken place at Vijayapuram bazar, Tiruvarar and the vehicles that collided were a transport bus belonging to the defendant, Sri Ranganathar Transports Pte Ltd, Thanjavur, represented by its partner and the lorry MDO 6252, which was owned by the plaintiff, the Tanjore Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd, Tiruvarur, by its Secretary. The occurrence wherein these two vehicles collided took place at 3-45 p.m on 25th June, 1976. According to the plaintiff, the lorry owned by it was proceeding after filling up diesel in the Indian Oil Petrol bunk at Vijayapuram and, while it was coming towards west and was also turning to the right in order to return to the plaintiff society building, which is situated on the east of the petrol bunk on the opposite row, on seeing the defendant's bus approaching at high speed from the west, was stopped. The defendant is a private limited bus company and is plying between Thanjavur and Nagoor and the defendant's bus was a vehicle bearing registration No. MDO 7331. At that time it was proceeding from west to east in the Tanjore road and was being driven by the defendant's driver in the usual course of his business while in the employment of the defendant. It is the further case of the plaintiff that the defendant's bus, which was approaching at high speed, instead of stopping in order to avoid a collision, came and dashed against the plaintiff's lorry. It is alleged in the plaint that the negligent act of the defendant was responsible for the collision. In other words, it was because of the rash and negligent driving of the bus owned by the defendant that the head-light mudguard, etc, of the plaintiff's lorry got damaged. In addition to the compensation claimed in this suit towards damages that were actually caused to the body of the lorry, the claim of Rs. 300 was also made by the plaintiff, in that the lorry had to be kept without being actually put to use by the plaintiff, the Tanjore Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd, for transporting its commodities dealt with by it, claiming the same as the amount that would have been actually earned by putting the said lorry on road, at the rate of Rs. 150 per day. Thus, the total claim comes to Rs. 544.85

2. The learned District Munsif who took the suit on file held that the civil court has got no jurisdiction, because S. 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act clearly bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in that any claim made with respect to any collision that takes place between two vehicles or damage to any extent as a matter of fact, may be made only by way of application under S. 110 of that enactment as amended by S. 27 of Act 56 of 1969, which came into effect from 2nd March, 1970. As a matter of fact, the very same contention is now raised by the learned counsel for the civil revision petitioner, because the lower appellate court had reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the civil court has got jurisdiction, because it is only compensation claimed for not having facilitated the lorry that got damaged in the accident and as such the said claim has nothing to do with the claim contemplated under the provisions of S. 110 of the Act. It may be noted that the lower appellate court has confirmed the dismissal of the suit with regard to the claim of Rs. 244.85 and set aside the dismissal with regard to the claim of Rs. 300 as compensation for loss of two days’ income and remanded the suit for fresh disposal regarding the claim of Rs. 300.

3. Referring to the provisions under S. 110 as amended by Act 56 of 1969 as well as the provisions under S. 110-F which bars the jurisdiction of the civil court with respect to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area as also the ratio decidendi of the decision in Thillai Gavindan v. Karuppasami and others . 91 L.W 563. referred to by the trial court and the decisions in Union of India v. Municipal Corporation of City of Ahmedabad,2 Madras Motor and General Insurance Co. v. G. Murthi . 1974 2 M.L.J 283=87 L.W 99 S.N M. Ayyappan v. Moktak Singh . A.I.R 1976 Mys. 67 at page 68, para 7;, and N.I Insurance Co. v. Shanti Misra . A.I.R, 1976 S.C 237 at page 240 para 5. it is also pointed out by Mrs. Revathi for Mr. M. Srinivasan, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, herein that the decision in N.I Insurance v. Shanti Misra, is significant so far as the contention raised in this civil revision petition is concerned, because of the clear distinction between jurisdiction of a civil court with respect to a claim and the claim made by an aggrieved person with respect to any accident that takes place on the highway and by virtue of the enactment of the provision under S. 110-F wherein the claims tribunal has been constituted for any area, it has been specifically and mandatorily provided under the said section that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the claims tribunal for that area, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the claims tribunal in respect of the claim for compensation shall be granted by the civil court. Referring to the provision of the above section, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner also refers to the decisions in Union of India v. Labh Chand . A I.R 1953 Him. Pr. 12 at page 15, para 17. and State of M.P v. Pehlajrai . A.I.R 1976 M.P 208.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner further points out that merely on the ground that a sum of Rs. 300 is claimed towards compensation as a loss of income in that the lorry had been kept by the plaintiff without being utilised for the transport of the commodities dealt with by the plaintiff Co-operative society, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of a civil court can be exercised by entertaining the suit with respect to that claim, as held by the lower appellate court, because S. 110-F is certainly a bar to such kind of entertainment of claim by way of suit, especially when it is in clear terms provided that any claim made with respect to any aggrieved person regarding the vehicle or in respect of the injury sustained by him can be only by an application and not by way of any suit. Anyhow, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that subsequent to the amendment by Act 56 of 1969, there cannot be any jurisdiction entertained by any civil court with respect to a claim of this nature, and that is barred, and that the lower appellate court is wrong in having held that the trial court has got jurisdiction to entertain the claim. In this regard, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner also points out that with respect to the two claims, namely, with respect to the dents and damage caused to the headlight of the lorry are concerned, they are exclusively and ipso facto damage to the vehicle and as such should be made and must be made mandatorily only under S. 110 and that so far as the claim regarding two days non-facilitating of the vehicle in that the vehicle was kept without being actually put on the road for the purpose of the owner's use, the said claim can certainly also come under the interpretation of the phrase ‘any claim’ occurring in S. 110-F, I am of opinion that this contention has to be up held in that any claim includes claims with respect to the vehicle not being facilitated and that under the circumstances, the suit is not maintainable,

5. S. 57 of the amending Act 59 of 1969 reads as follows—

“Amendment of S. 110. In S. 110 of the principal Act, in sub-S.(1) for the words ‘motor vehicles’ the following words shall be substituted, namely—motor vehicles, or damages for any property of a third party so arising or both:

Provided that where such claim includes a claim for compensation in respect of damage to property exceeding rupees two thousand, the claimant may at his option, refer the claim to a civil court for adjudication, and where a reference is so made, the claims tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim.”

A clear reading of S. 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act (Act 4 of 1939), as amended by Act 56 of 1969, clearly shows that the claim now made, as a matter of fact, all the claims made in the suit, can be entertained only by way of an application under S. 110 by the Tribunal specially constituted for the purpose of adjudicating upon such claims and S. 110-F clearly bars the jurisdiction of the civil court with respect to such claims by way of suit and as such the trial court is correct in having held that the civil court has no jurisdiction. The lower appellate court has reversed the finding of the trial court with respect to jurisdiction.

6. Therefore, this civil revision petition is one which has to be allowed under the circumstances and it is hereby allowed, because the point raised is one which is quite amenable to the interpretation that can be given for any claim occurring in S. 110-F which bars the jurisdiction of the civil court so far as the claims made with respect to any accident that takes place. Therefore, without further elaborating the matter which involves the simple question as to whether the claim made in the suit can be agitated by way of a suit, this court exercising its revisional jurisdiction under S. 115, C.P.C allows this revision petition.

7. Mr. R. Vijayan, learned counsel for the respondent has stated that further elucidation is necessary with respect to the phrase ‘any claim for compensation’ occurring in S. 110-F. The section itself is very clear and as such further elucidation is not necessary. Mr. Vijayan submits that the respondent herein may be given an opportunity to put forward his claim before the Tribunal and permission may be given by this Court for filing such application after excusing the delay on account of the pendency of this suit before the trial court and the appeal before the lower appellate court. All this will be taken into consideration by the tribunal when a proper claim is made by the respondent. There will be no order as to costs.

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Sri Ranganathar Tran... v. The Tanjore Co-Opera...