1. The petitioner herein was appointed as a junior electrical engineer under the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, the respondent herein on 6th July, 1955. Later he was promoted as Assistant Engineer (Electrical). While he was working as Assistant Engineer (Electrical) at Thammampatti, Salem District, between 16th April, 1969 and 26th July, 1970 some complaints had been received against him by the respondent. On the basis of the said complaints a charge memo dated 5th June, 1972, containing a list of five charges was served on him on 15th June, 1972 by the respondent while the petitioner was working as Assistant Engineer (Electrical) at Vellore. After the petitioner submitted his explanation to the charges alleged against him in the charge memo, an oral enquiry was conducted. After the conclusion or the oral enquiry, the enquiry officer, one K.U. Krishnan, who was the Divisional Engineer (Electrical), Salem, submitted his report holding that charges 1 to 3 had been proved while the other two charges had not been proved. On receipt of the report, a show cause notice has been issued by the respondent dated 21st September, 1974 and on 7th November, 1974 the petitioner received the same. In the show cause notice the petitioner was called upon to show cause, why he should not be removed from service. The petitioner submitted his representation on 4th December, 1974 and prayed for another personal hearing by the Board. On receipt of the representation, the respondent decided to give the petitioner a personal hearing again and he was asked to appear before the Board 011 10th August, 1976 for personal hearing. But the personal hearing was given by the technical member of the Board and not by the entire Board. After the said personal hearing, the respondent passed a final order dated 30th December, 1976 removing the petitioner from service.

2. The said order removing the petitioner from service has been challenged in this writ petition on the following grounds: (1) The Electricity Board was not legally competent to nominate the enquiry officer, namely, the Divisional Engineer for holding an enquiry as there is no power vested in the Board to delegate its functions to any subordinate authority such as the enquiry officer and, therefore, the nomination of the enquiry officer was without jurisdiction. (2) The enquiry conducted by the enquiry officer was not in accordance with the statutory rules framed for conducting enquiries against the employees of the respondent. (3) The enquiry conducted against the petitioner by the enquiry officer was opposed to the principle of natural justice in that the prosecution witnesses were not recalled for further cross-examination as desired by the petitioner. (4) The findings rendered by the enquiry officer on the three charges which he held proved cannot be sustained on the materials produced at the enquiry, (5) The impugned order terminating the petitioner's services is vitiated for the reasons that the personal hearing offered to the petitioner after the issue of the show cause notice proposing penalty was by the technical member and not by the full Board which alone can hear the petitioner as a punishing authority. (6) The respondent-Board was merely guided by the enquiry officer's report which according to the petitioner is one-sided and biased, in terminating the petitioner's services without independently applying its mind to the materials on record with reference to the charges.

3. As regards the first ground, the respondent in its counter-affidavit has submitted that the Electricity Board being a statutory body is authorised to delegate its powers to any officer of the Board to take action against its employees and to conduct enquiry in relation Jo charges of misconduct. It is said that the Board has on 24th November, 1971 authorised the Chief Engineer (Electricity) to take action against the petitioner, that the Chief Engineer in his turn directed the Superintending Engineer, Mettur Electricity System on 9th December, 1971 to take action against the petitioner and that the Superintending Engineer, Mettur Electricity System in turn appointed the Divisional Engineer (Thiru K.U. Krishnan) as enquiry officer by his proceedings dated 3rd January, 1972 and that is the procedure prescribed for every departmental proceeding. In our view, the respondent being a statutory body consisting of numerous members can delegate its functions of conducting an enquiry against any employee to its subordinates so long as there is no prohibition against such delegation under the statute. The respondent cannot be expected to take even minor steps at the lowest level. In this case the Board has directed its subordinates to take action against the petitioner by framing charges and conducting an enquiry, and the Board which is the punishing authority has passed final orders in the matter. Therefore, the entrustment of the actual conduct of the enquiry to its subordinate officer by the Board cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. As a matter of fact Regulation 8(6) of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Employees' Discipline and Appeal Regulations provides for such delegation and that provision is as follows:

In every case where it is proposed to impose of an employee any of the penalties in items (vi) to (viii) in regulation 5, he shall be given a charge-sheet setting forth the service on which it is proposed to take into consideration passing orders on the case. He shall be required to answer the charge or charges in a written statement within reasonable time not exceeding one month and also to state whether he desires an oral enquiry or to be heard in person or both. An oral enquiry shall be held if the employee desires such enquiry, or if so directed by the authority concerned. At that enquiry oral evidence shall be heard as to such of those allegations as are not admitted. The employee shall be permitted to produce witnesses in his defence and cross-examine any witness on whose evidence the charge rests. The Officer conducting the enquiry may, for special and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. The enquiring officer shall ask, in writing, the delinquent employee immediately after the enquiry is over, whether he had a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case or if he has any complaint in this regard. If there is any complaint in this regard, the enquiring officer will examine the complaint and set right the matter. If it is considered that the alleged denial of reasonable opportunity is made with a view to delay the disciplinary proceedings, the enquiring officer will be competent to ignore the complaint and the reasons for not complying with the request should be recorded. After the enquiry has been completed, the person charged shall be entitled to put in, if he so desires, further written statement of his defence.

After the enquiry, personal hearing referred to in the first sub-paragraph has been completed and after the authority competent to impose the penalty mentioned in that paragraph has arrived at provisional conclusions in regard to the penalty to be imposed, the person charged shall be supplied with a copy of the report referred to in para 1 of the regulation 8(6) of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Discipline and Appeal Regulation and be called upon to show cause, within a reasonable time not ordinarily exceeding one month, against the particular penalty proposed to be inflicted. Any representation shall be based only on the evidence adduced during the enquiry.

Explanation.-An opportunity to show cause against the imposition of any of the penalties referred to in this sub-regulation shall be given, after the authority competent to impose the penalty arrives at a provisional conclusion in regard to the penalty to be imposed either by such authority himself or under his direction, by a subordinate authority who is superior in rank to the employee on whom it is proposed to impose the penalty.

4. As regards the second ground, the counter-affidavit states that the enquiry officer acted fairly and without any bias, and there is no violation of any of the statutory rules. Though the petitioner has alleged in the petition that the statutory rules have not been followed by the enquiry officer, our attention has not been drawn to any specific rule which is said to have been violated by the enquiry officer. Therefore, we are of the view that this complaint has no merit at all.

5. As regards the third ground of attack that the principles of natural justice have been violated by the enquiry officer in not recalling the Board's witnesses, the counter-affidavit admits the refusal by the enquiry officer to recall the witnesses, but it is said that the mere refusal by the enquiry officer to permit recalling of the prosecution witnesses at the whims and fancies of the petitioner will not amount to violation of the principles of natural justice. It is not in dispute that the petitioner cross-examined the prosecution witnesses at the earlier stage of the enquiry. However, the petitioner's request to recall the prosecution witnesses once again for further cross-examination was refused by the enquiry officer presumably on the basis that no recalling of the prosecution witnesses once again was justified. In this case for recalling the witnesses once he has cross-examined the prosecution witnesses extensively at the earlier stage of the enquiry. We are, therefore, of the view that in the circumstances of this case the enquiry officer cannot be taken to have violated the principles of natural justice in refusing to recall the prosecution witnesses once again for the purpose of further cross-examination.

6. On the fourth ground, it is to be remembered that this Court exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot treat itself as an Appellate Court over the findings of the enquiry officer. The findings of the enquiry officer which have been accepted by the disciplinary authority, can be attacked only if there is no material at all to sustain those findings, and they are perverse. In this case the enquiry officer has referred to the evidence of the various witnesses and ultimately given his findings on the basis of the materials. It is not open to this Court to reappraise the oral evidence so as to find whether the appreciation of the evidence by the enquiry officer was correct or not. As this Court cannot interfere with the findings of the enquiry officer on the basis of its fresh appraisal of the evidence, we reject this contention.

7. As regards the fifth ground of attack, it is not disputed by the respondent that the personal hearing given to the petitioner was only by the technical member and not by the lull Board. The question is whether such a procedure can he taken to be valid. According to the petitioner the show cause notice was given by the Board, and he sought an oral hearing only by the full Board and not by one member of the Board and the show cause notice having been given by the Board he has to satifsy the Board as regards his innocence, and as such hearing by one member of the Board cannot be taken to be a heating by the entire Board. It is said that in view of the fact that one member of the Board gave a personal hearing, the Board had been only guided by the impression gathered by that member at the personal hearing and that the petitioner has. therefore, lost a valuable right of making a personal representation to the entire Board and convincing it about his innocence. The counter-affidavit, does not deal with this ground of attack at all. However, we are not inclined to agree with the petitioner that the personal hearing should be given only by the full Board and not by a member of the Board even if he had been specifically authorised to do so by the Board. Though the counter-affidavit is silent on this point, one can presume that the Board has authorised the technical member to give a personal hearing to the petitioner, especially when the Board has called upon the petitioner to appear before the Board for a personal hearing and the hearing has actually given by the technical member. We have to proceed, therefore, on the basis that the technical member has been duly authorised by the Board to give a personal hearing to the petitioner and report the matter to the Board. It has to be pointed out that the petitioner also did not object to the procedure at the time of oral hearing on the ground that the full Board alone should hear him. It is well-established that a statutory body composed of numerous individuals can delegate its authority to an officer or authority subordinate to it to act on its behalf in the matter of conducting a disciplinary enquiry. It is not possible for such a body composing of numerous individuals to hear personally every employee against whom disciplinary proceedings had been taken. Lord Denning, M.R. in Reg v. Race Relation Ex pane P. Selvarajan [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1686, dealing with the functions of the Race Relations Board constituted under the Race Relations Act, 1968 expressed:

In recent years we have had to consider the procedure of many bodies who are required to make an investigation and form an opinion, notably the Gaming Board, who have to enquire whether an applicant is fit to run a gaming club see Reg v. Gaming Board for Great Britain, Ex parts. Benam and Khaida [1970] 2 Q.B. 417 : [1970] 2 All E.R. 528 : [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1009, inspectors under the Companies Act, 1948 who have to investigate the affairs of a company and make a report ; see In re Pergamon Press Ltd. [1970] 3 All.E.R. 535 : [1970] 3 W.L.R. 792 : [1971] Ch. 388 and Commissioners of Inland Revenue who have to determine whether there is a prima facie case ; see Wiseman v. Borneman [1971] A.C. 297 : [1969] 3 All.E.R. 275 : [1969| 3 W.L.R. 706. In all these cases it has been held that the investigating body is under a duty to act fairly ; but that which fairness requires depends upon the nature of the investigation and the consequences which it may have on persons affected by it. The fundamental rule is that, if a person may be subjected to pains or penalties or be exposed, to prosecution or proceedings, or deprived of remedies or redress, or in some such way adversely afflicted by the investigation and report, then he should be told the case made against him and he afforded a fair opportunity of answering it. The investigating body is, however, the master of its own procedure. It need not hold a hearing. It can do everything in writing. It need not allow lawyers. It need not put every detail of the case against a man. Suffice it if the broad grounds are given. It need not name its informants. It can give the substance only. Moreover, it need not do everything itself. It can employ secretaries and assistants to do all the preliminary work and leave much to them. But in the end, the investigating body itself must come to its own decision and make its own report.

The same Law Lord dealing with the power of delegation by the Board of certain functions to some of its members expressed the view thus:

If this had been a judicial body, I do not think this would be right. Every member of a judicial body must have access to all the evidence and papers in the case, he must have heard all the arguments, and he must come to his own conclusion. The maxim delegatus non protest delegate applies strictly to judicial functions. But it is different with a body which is exercising administrative functions or which is exercising administrative functions or which is making an investigation or conducting preliminary inquiries, especially when it is a numerous body. The Race Relations Board has 12 members. The employment committee has seven members. It is impossible to suppose that all of them need sit to determine a matter, or that all of those who sit should have read all the papers or heard all the evidence. But I do not think that two or three, at any rate must have done so. If there is a quorum of, say, three, I should think a quorum must have done so. That is the ordinary accepted method of carrying on business, It should be applied here, also.

Lawton, L. J. expressed his view in the same case thus:

For my part, I can see no reason at all why the board should not delegate to its staff the function of collecting information. It would be impractical for the members of the board themselves to make investigations. How the board does what Parliament has entrusted it to do is not a matter for the Courts to decide as long as it acts fairly and in good faith. It is for the board, not the Courts to decide how much information each of its members should have when considering a particular case. As long as the board or one of its constituent committees has enough information to enable it to make a fair assessment of the case, the Courts will not interfere. How it gets the information is for the chairman and his advisers to decide. He may decide in a particular case that each member of the board, or the committee, should have a copy of the whole file. In another case he may consider that the case can be adequately and fairly dealt with if one member has the file and reports to the others what is in it. In this case, three members of the employment committee had a copy of the complete file. This was enough to enable the committee to deal with the applicant's case fairly.

Scarman, L. J. was of the view that:

The board is, of course, subject to the supervisory powers of the High Court. If it fails to perform a statutory function, mandamus will lie. If it fails to act fairly, the High Court can intervene by certiorari prohibition, or mandamus to ensure that it does. Subject to such supervision (the limits of which in the case of an administrative agency charged with making decisions that directly affect private persons are by now well-known), the Race Relations Board - not the Courts-decides in its field how to go about the task of securing compliance with the law and resolving differences.

In Ved Parkash Malhotra v. State Bank of India I.L.R. (1974) 1 Delhi 660, it has been pointed out that in respect of institutional decisions it cannot be expected that the institution has to act as full body always, and that the institution can devise its own procedure in carrying out its duties. Having regard to the principle laid down in the above cases we are of the view that in this case the mere fact that personal hearing was given by the technical member record of which he had submitted to the Board is not improper. Admittedly the decision has been taken by the full Board in this case and, therefore, the enquiry proceedings cannot be said to be vitiated.

8. However, the last ground that the respondent-Board did not apply its mind independently to the materials on record and that the Board has not strictly acted in accordance with the Regulation 11 seems to have some substance. Regulation 11 dealing with "record of enquiry" says in Clause (a) that the authority imposing any penalty under the regulations shall maintain a record showing ; (i) the allegations upon which action was taken against the person punished ; (ii) the charge framed, if any, (iii) the person's representation, if any, and the evidence taken, if any, and (iv) the finding and the grounds thereof, if any. As per Clause (b) of that regulation, apart from the findings and the grounds thereof given by the enquiry officer, the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority should also state the grounds on which they are based, Regulation 14(a)(i) gives an employee against whom the Board has passed an order of punishment a right to seek a review on any of the grounds set out in that regulation. Here the enquiry officer has rendered his findings in his report dated 27th June, 1973, The Board in its show-cause memorandum dated 21st September, 1974, after referring to the charges framed against the petitioner and the findings thereon given by the enquiry officer states as follows:

After careful examination of all the connected records and the written statements of the Assistant Engineer (Electrical), the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board has come to the provisional conclusion that Thiru A. Krishnaswamy Assistant Engineer, (Electrical) is guilty of the charges which have been, held proved beyond doubt and that, therefore, Thiru A. Krishnaswamy. Assistant Engineer (Electrical) should be removed from service.

Later, after the petitioner submitted his objections to the show cause notice proposing punishment of removal from service and after giving a personal hearing to him on 10th August, 1976, the Board passed the impugned order. The said order, after referring to the charges and the findings of the enquiry officer contains the following operative portion:

The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board has carefully considered the explanations of Thiru A. Krishnaswamy, Assistant Engineer (Electrical) and also the written representation given by him during the personal hearing and has decided that the punishment ' removal from service' is warranted. The Board accordingly directs that Thiru A. Krishnaswamy, Assistant Engineer (Electrical) be removed from service of the Board.

The above extracts from the show cause notice and the final order of the Board do not indicate that apart from the findings given by the enquiry officer the Board has itself applied its mind to the materials on record. Regulation 11(b) contemplates the order of punishment containing the grounds on which the punishment is based. In this case the operative portion of the show cause notice merely states that after careful examination of all the connected records the Board had come to the provisional conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the charges which have been held proved and that, therefore, he should be dismissed from service. In the operative portion of the ultimate order the Board merely says that it considered the explanation and also the written representation made by the petitioner during the personal hearing and has decided that the punishment of removal from service is warranted. This order of punishment does not set out the grounds on which the punishment is based as required under Regulation 11(b) which should be independent of the findings rendered by the enquiry officer. Though the enquiry officer has given his finding in relation to each charge the Board does not independently consider the material and say whether it agrees with the findings of the enquiry officer in respect of each charge. So long as regulation 11(b) contemplates separate grounds to be stated in the order of punishment apart from the findings rendered by the enquiry officer, the board is bound to give its reasons at the stage of imposition of the punishment. In this case, the order of the Board merely says that after considering the explanation of the petitioner and the written representation the Board has decided that the punishment of removal from service is warranted. This cannot be said to be the grounds contemplated in Regulation 11(b). We are, therefore of the view that though the conduct of enquiry is valid, the ultimate order of punishment does not satisfy the requirement contemplated by Regulation 11(b).

9. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside and the writ petition is allowed. It is, however, made clear that it is open to the Board to pass a fresh order in accordance with the said regulation. There will, however, be no order as to costs.