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  • S. 33-C of the Industrial Diputes Act, 1947.
  • S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act
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citation codes
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  • S. 33-C of the Industrial Diputes Act, 1947.
  • S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the Secretary of the Palani Co-operative Sales Society. The second respondent was appointed as one of the society's salesmen and was placed under suspension on charges of misconduct (making false entries in the society's books of account and distributing rations in excess of permitted amounts). The order of suspension was dated 5 December 1967 and effective from 6 December 1967. An enquiry was held and the second respondent was ultimately dismissed, but the present dispute concerns the period of suspension and related pay claims rather than the dismissal itself.

During the pendency of the enquiry the second respondent filed a claim petition under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act claiming Rs. 700: Rs. 640 for salary from 6 December 1967 to 26 October 1968 and Rs. 60 as leave wages. The Labour Court, Madurai, directed payment of the salary in full as claimed. The petitioner (management) challenged that part of the Labour Court's award, contending that bye-law 13(h) of the society's bye-laws limited subsistence allowance during suspension and that the Labour Court's award was vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record.

The narrow procedural posture: conflicting judicial authorities on the proper interpretation of bye-law 13(h) led Ramaprasada Rao, J. to refer the question to a Division (Full) Bench for authoritative determination. The Full Bench hearing then delivered the judgment summarized here, quashing the Labour Court's award insofar as it granted full salary for the suspension period and remitting the matters for fresh consideration in light of the Full Bench's interpretation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether bye-law 13(h) applies to suspension pending an enquiry (i.e., suspension as an interim measure during investigation) or is confined to suspension awarded as a substantive punishment following enquiry.
  2. Whether the management, when suspending an employee pending enquiry, may exercise a discretion under bye-law 13(h) to grant subsistence allowance at a rate not exceeding one-fourth of substantive pay, rather than being obliged to pay full salary.
  3. Whether bye-law 13(h) should be read in conjunction with bye-law 13(b) (or whether the two clauses operate independently), and the effect of the three-month limit in 13(h) on suspensions and the employer's discretion.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Management's) Arguments

  • The management contended that bye-law 13(h) applies to the facts and limits payment during suspension; specifically, the management relied on bye-law 13(h) as permitting suspension with subsistence allowance up to one-fourth of substantive pay.
  • The management argued that the Labour Court's direction to pay full salary during suspension was erroneous because bye-law 13(h) allowed a lower subsistence allowance and was applicable to the suspension in question.
  • The petitioner's counsel (Mr. Chidambaram) relied upon a decision by Alagiriswami, J. (Madurai Mills Workers Cooperative Stores Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai and others) to support the proposition that bye-law 13(h) governs suspension pending enquiry and the employer's entitlement to suspend pending enquiry (and the related consequences on subsistence allowance).

Second Respondent's (Employee's) Arguments

  • The second respondent argued that bye-law 13(h) cannot be applied to suspension pending enquiry; instead, it applies only to suspension imposed as a substantive punishment following enquiry.
  • From that premise the second respondent contended that when suspension is ordered during the pendency of a regular enquiry, the employer cannot avail itself of bye-law 13(h) to deny full pay, and therefore the Labour Court correctly awarded full salary for the suspension period.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Madurai Mills Workers Cooperative Stores, Ltd. by its Secretary v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai and others (decision of Alagiriswami, J.) The court held that bye-law 13(h) deals with suspension pending enquiry as well as suspension as punishment; it supported the proposition that the employer has the right to suspend an employee pending enquiry and that the three-month limitation in 13(h) governs such suspension (including possible renewals). Ramaprasada Rao, J. expressed agreement with this view and the Full Bench recognized this authority when framing the interpretative issues; the Full Bench accepted that bye-law 13(h) can govern suspension pending enquiry and discussed its implications for subsistence allowance and the three-month limitation.
R.P. Kapur v. Union of India (Supreme Court decision, quoted in the text) Quoted to support the proposition that the employer has the right to suspend an employee pending enquiry. The decision was relied upon by the earlier judge (Alagiriswami, J.) in support of the proposition that an employer can suspend pending enquiry; the Full Bench noted this reliance when analyzing prior authorities.
Madras Dt. Co-operative Supply and Marketing Society, Ltd., Madurai, represented by Special Officer v. Veerappan (Palaniswami, J.) Held that clause (h) of bye-law 13 does not include suspension pending enquiry and is applicable only to suspension as substantive punishment (i.e., a conflicting view with Alagiriswami, J.). The Full Bench recorded this decision as representing a conflicting view on the interpretation of bye-law 13(h) and considered it in deciding to refer and then resolve the conflict.
Kanyakumari Dt. Cooperative Supply and Marketing Society, Ltd. v. Sankaranarayana and another (Palaniswami, J.) In this later decision (after receiving Alagiriswami's view), the learned judge found that the employer was entitled to suspend employees pending enquiry and, in that view, held that employees were not entitled to subsistence allowance during the suspension period (as reported in the opinion). The Full Bench described this case as showing the evolution/conflict of views in the lower courts; the Full Bench treated it as part of the body of conflicting authority that needed resolution.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains two levels of reasoning: (1) the initial analysis by Ramaprasada Rao, J., which found conflicting decisions and referred the question to a Division Bench; and (2) the Full Bench (led by the Chief Justice) analysis and ultimate application.

Ramaprasada Rao, J.'s analysis (pre-reference):

  • He examined the text of bye-law 13(h) and observed that it expressly limits suspension to a period not exceeding three months "at a time", which suggests the provision contemplates suspensions imposed during the pendency of enquiries (where the three-month limit operates to expedite the enquiry and to protect the charged employee from prolonged suspension).
  • He concluded that bye-law 13(h) should not be read as merely ancillary to bye-law 13(b). If 13(h) were read into 13(b), the unconstrained disciplinary power in 13(b) would be unintentionally curtailed; instead, the two clauses should be treated as independent, each operating in its respective sphere.
  • Because conflicting High Court decisions existed on whether 13(h) applies to suspensions pending enquiry or only to suspensions as substantive punishment, he referred the matter to a Division Bench to avoid practical difficulties and to secure definitive guidance for tribunals.

Full Bench's (Chief Justice-led) reasoning and disposition:

  • The Full Bench analyzed the language of bye-law 13(h) and the broader context of disciplinary powers. It noted that where appointment power is vested in an authority, disciplinary power (including the power to suspend pending enquiries) is generally implied; no separate grant is necessary.
  • The bench construed sub-clause (h) as not confined to suspension by way of punishment; it is also applicable to suspension pending enquiry. The clause gives the competent authority discretion to sanction subsistence allowance at a rate not exceeding one-fourth of substantive pay during suspension.
  • The discretion to grant subsistence allowance must be exercised reasonably, according to law and justice, and not whimsically or arbitrarily. If the authority chooses to deny subsistence allowance it must do so for stated reasons.
  • The Full Bench interpreted the three-month limit and the phrase "at a time" to mean that suspension should be kept to three months in each instance, thereby encouraging expedient conduct of enquiry; extensions beyond three months are possible by successive orders but each order should be limited to three months "at a time."
  • Because the Labour Court had proceeded on the basis that bye-law 13(h) applied only to substantive punishment (and therefore awarded full salary during suspension), the Full Bench found that part of the award to be unsound and quashed it.
  • The Full Bench remitted the matters to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai, to give the management an opportunity to show whether it had exercised the discretion under bye-law 13(h), whether suspension orders were limited to successive three-month periods, and to consider the subsequent dismissal of the employee when determining the respondent's entitlement (if any) to salary for the suspension period.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling):

THE COURT QUASHED the part of the Labour Court's award that granted full salary for the period of suspension and remitted the matter to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai, for fresh disposal in the light of its interpretation of bye-law 13(h).

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Labour Court's award of full salary for the suspension period is set aside; the Labour Court must re-examine the claim after giving the management an opportunity to show that it exercised the discretion under bye-law 13(h) and that suspension orders were made in successive periods not exceeding three months. The Labour Court must also take the subsequent dismissal into account in assessing the claim.
  • Interpretive guidance: The Full Bench interpreted bye-law 13(h) as applicable to suspension pending enquiry and recognized the management's discretion to grant subsistence allowance up to one-fourth of substantive pay, subject to reasonable exercise and articulation of reasons. The three-month limitation is to be construed as a procedural safeguard requiring expedition of enquiries and permitting successive three-month suspensions if necessary.
  • No-order on costs: The court explicitly stated "No costs."

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not introduce or infer facts beyond that text.

    The Secretary, Palani Co-Operative Sales Society (D.D 218), Palani And Another v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai And Another.

    Ramaprasada Rao, J.

    The petitioner is the Secretary of the Palani Co-operative Sales Society, Dindigul Road, Palani. The Second respondent was appointed as one of its salesmen. On charges of misconduct, to wit, making false entries in the books of account of the Society and distributing to card holders rations far in excess of those permitted to them, the second respondent was placed under suspension pending disciplinary action. The order of suspension was dated 5th December, 1967 and it was to take effect from 6th December, 1967. The petitioner's case is that such suspension is possible under its be-laws. It transpires that later on the enquiry was completed and ultimately, the second respondent was dismissed from service. We are not, however, concerned with the order of dismissal. The second respondent during the pendency of the enquiry filed a claim petition on the file of the first respondent under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act claiming a sum of Rs. 700 made up of a sum of Rs. 640 towards salary for the period commencing from 6th December, 1967 to 26th October, 1968, and a sum of Rs. 60 as and towards leave wages. The petitioners's contention was that the second respondent was not entitled to the full pay under bye-law 13(h) which according to the petitioner would apply to the facts of the case, and therefore, the order of the Labour Court, Madurai, which directed the payment of the salary in full as claimed was vitiated by an error apparent. The contention of the second respondent, however, is that by-law 13(h) will not cover a situation like the one which has arisen in this case as that bye-law can only apply to a case where suspension is imposed as a matter of substantive punishment against a delinquent employee and would not relae to a case where the order of suspension is made during the pendency of a regular enquiry into the misconduct of an employee.

    2. The bye-law which is relied upon by both the petitioner as well as the second respondent appears to be one which is generally incorporated in the by-laws of co-operative societies. By-law 13(h) of the bye-laws of-the petitioner-society deal with the punishments which an appropriate authority can inflict on any of its employees. The punishments include censure, withholding of increments, suspension or reduction in rank or dismissal. Bye-law 13(h) which is reproduced here for ready reference deals with a case of suspension of an employee. It reads as follows:

    “The authority competent to suspend as employee may, in its discretion, sanction him subsistence allowance at a rate not exceeding one fourth of his substantive pay during the period of his suspension. No employee shall in any case be kept under suspension for a period exceeding three months at a times.”

    The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that bye-laws 13(b) and 13(h) are mutually exclusive and that bye-law 13(h) by itself covers all situations, including a case where suspension is awarded during the pendency of an enquiry, and where such suspension is awarded as substantive punishment on a delinquent employee. Per contra, it is argued that bye-law 13(h) is ancillary to bye-law 13(b), and bye-law 13(h) has to be understood in the context of bye-law 13(b), and, therefore, the said bye-law will not enable an employer to suspend an employee without concurrently making himself responsible for paying his full salary and emoluments during the period of such suspension, if such suspension is occasioned during the pendency of an enquiry.

    3. The language of bye-law 13(h) is peculiar and, in my view, it is not necessary to interpret this bye-law in the context of bye-law 13(b). The text of bye-law 13(h) contemplates that no employee, shall, in any case, be kept under suspension for a period exceeding three months at a time. This limitation in the exercise of power, and more so, in the infliction of the punishment cannot be squarely read into bye-law 13(b) which gives an unlimited discretion to the competent authority to award such punishment as it deems fit, and particularly, to suspend an employee for any period as decided by it. If, therefore, bye law 13(h) and bye-law 13(b) are to be understood as complementary to each other, then the power of the competent authority under bye-law 13(b) is conditioned by the prescription under bye-law 13(h), which I am of the view is not the intention of either of these bye-laws. Bye-law 13(h) speaks of the power of the competent authority to award punishments, and the various heads of punishments are detailed therein. In juxta-position to this, bye-law 13(h) deals with a situation where an employee is kept under suspension for a period beyond three months. The latter part of bye-law 13 (h) can, in the normal circumstances, refer only to the factum of suspension during the pendency of an enquiry, but not to the order of suspension made by a competent authority against his employee as a substantive punishment awarded after full enquiry.

    4. The above position appears to be rather clear. But, two confliciting views of our court have been placed before me in the course of the arguments by the learned counsel. Mr. Chidambaram, learned counsel for the petitioner, referred to the decision of Alagiriswami, J. in The Madurai Mills Workers Cooperative Stores, Ltd. by its Secretary v. Presiding officer, Labour Court, Madurai and others(1). In this case, the question directly arose as to whether bye-law 13(h), which is being considered by me, would apply to a case where the authority was Imposing a substantive punishment, or to a case where an order of suspension was made pending an enquiry into the delinquency of a servant of a cooperative society. The learned Judge expressed the view:

    “There was no need to specify any period of suspension as a punishment. The bye-laws do not lay down any maximum period for suspension as punishment. It is true that the bye-law contemplates suspension both as punishment and suspension pending enquiry………I do not think there is any difficulty at all in holding that by bye-law (h) deals with suspension pending enquiry also.”

    After quoting the decision of the Supreme Court in R.P Kapur v. Union of India(2), the learned Judge said:

    “………there is no difficulty in holding that the employer has the right to suspend the employee pending enquiry. That power is only subject to the limitation laid down in by-law 13th), that is, the period of suspension should not exceed three months at a time………But it may not be possible to complete the enquiry within 3 months and it will be very very difficult to hold that the employer has no right to renew the period of suspension for 3 months at a time. That is the meaning which has got to be given to by-law 13(h).

    Palaniswami, J. in the Madras Dt. Co-operative Supply and Marketing Society, Ltd., Madurai, represented by Special Officer v. Veerappan, a judgment rendered by him on 24th March, 1971, had no occasion to refer to the decision of Alagiriswami, J., as obviously it was not placed before him. In those circumstances, interpreting by-law 13 (h) the learned Judge said—

    “………there is no reference to suspension pending enquiry. Secondly, the period of suspension is limited to three months. Obviously such a restriction cannot be applied in the case of suspension pending enquiry. For reasons beyond the control of the employer and the employee the enquiry may go on for more than 3 months. If the provision was intended to apply to a case of suspension pending enquiry, the said limit of 3 months time would be out of place. Therefore, I am of the view that clause (h) of by-law 13, dealing with suspension does not include (sic?) power to suspending pending enquiry, and that clause is applicable only to suspension as substantive punishment.”

    In a later case decided by the learned Judge on 28th April 1971, the decision of Alagiriswami, J., was placed before him. In the Kanyakumari Dt. Cooperative Supply and Marketing Society, Ltd. v. Sankaranara-yana and another, Palaniswami, J. dealing with the situation and referring to the judgment of Alagiriswami, J. said-

    “On behalf of the petitioner reliance was next placed upon the decision of Alagiriswami, J. in W.P 2718, 2719 and 2120 of 1969…That case related to the claim for computation of subsistence allowance for the period during which certain employees were kept under suspension. The learned Judge on a construction of the bye-laws, held that the employer was entitled to suspend the employees pending enquiry. In that view, the learned Judge held that the employees were not entitled to subsistence allowance during the period of suspension”.

    With great respect, this was not the ratio of the decision in Madurai Mills Workers Cooperative Stores, Ltd., by Secretary v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai and others(3) rendered by Alagiriswami, J. As a matter of fact, bye-law 13(h) was expressly considered by the learned Judge, and he came to the conclusion that it was applicable to a case where suspension was awarded during the pendency of an enquiry. Even in the later case, following his earlier view, Palaniswami, J., held bye-law 13(h) can only apply to a case where suspension was awarded as a substantive punishment.

    5. I have already expressed my view in brief. I am in entire agreement with Alagiriswami, J. Bye-laws 13(b) and 13(h) are independent and can exist and be active in their respective spheres. In any event, bye-law 13(h) which mentions a period during which an employee could be suspended cannot be consistently held to be a situation which is contemplated under by-law 13(h) which does not prescribe any such maximum period which can be awarded by way of substantive punishment by the competent authority. As a matter of fact, by law 13(h) appears to be a deterrent against prolonged enquiries and to avoid as much agony as possible to a charged employee from suffering such charges for a period which is not absolutely necessary.

    6. But, as the views are conflicting as on date, and as I am of the view that the decision in W.P 2718 and 2719 of 1968 and 2120 of 1969 correctly projects the position, I am asked to refer the matter to a Division Bench so that practical difficulties could be avoided, and the Labour Courts be given a correct guidance in the matter of the interpretation of by-law 13(h). As such matters are likely to arise very frequently, and as the by-laws in many of the societies reflect the same situation and text, I am of the view that instead of adding to the practical difficulties which the tribunals may face with, if I were to dispose it of myself, agreeing with one view or the other, the subject has to be set at rest by a fuller Bench.

    7. The matter therefore may be placed before my Lord, the Chief Justice for necessary orders.

    (Pursuant to the above Order of Reference these petitions coming on for hearing before the Full Bench, the court delivered the following Judgment:

    ORDER: The Chief Justice.

    8. These petitions by the management arise out of an order made by the Labour Court, Madurai, under S. 33-C of the Industrial Diputes Act, 1947. The respondent asked his salary to be computed at Rs. 60 per month. He claimed the salary at that rate for the period of suspension commencing from 6th December 1967 to 26th October 1968 and also leave wages for the period from 22nd October 1965 to 26th October 1968. We are not concerned with the second part of the claim. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, took the view that under bye-law 13(h) the management had no power to suspend a worker pending an enquiry. On that view, he allowed the respondent's claim so far as the salary for the period of suspension was concerned. Ramaprasada Rao, J., found that there was conflict of views on the scope and interpretation of bye-law 13(h), and made a reference of the, question to a Division Bench.

    9. Bye-law 13 deals with disciplinary action against a member of the establishment. It is contemplated by the bye-law that a sub-committee shall be elected by the Board of Directors, and such sub commitee shall exercise the powers specified against it in the succeeding sub-clause of the bye-law. We are concerned with clause (9), which is.-

    “The authority competent to suspend an employee may, in its discretion, sanction his subsistence allowance at a rate not exceeding one-fourth of his substantive pay during the period of his suspension. No employee shall in any case be kept under suspension for a period exceeding three months at a time”.

    Generally speaking, where the power of appointment is vested in an authority, it has the power of disciplinary action as well which again necessarily involves the power to keep a particular member of the establishment under suspension in a suitable case pending on enquiry. No conferment of a separate power to that effect is necessary. Apart from the power of appointment, the power can be implied In the disciplinary power to inflict punishment by way of removal or dismissal of any other punishment. In the instant case, sub-clause (a) extracted above visualises the powir of suspension. In our opinion, it is not confined to suspension by way of punishment. It is also applicable to a case of suspension pending an enquiry. Discretion is given in the case of such suspension to allow subsistence allowance at a rate of one-fourth of substantive pay during the period of suspension. If no order of sanction has been made, it may appear that during the period of suspension no remuneration will be permissible. But, this discretion, coupled as it is, with a benefit, has to be exercised in every case reasonably and according to law and justice and not whimsically or arbitrarily. It is only for stated reasons that the authority suspending a member pending an enquiry can deny subsistence allowance to him. We construe the provision in that way, more especially because of the last sentence in the sub-clause which has restricted the power of suspension to a period not exceeding three months at a time. This means that the enquiry has to be expedited and the suspension cannot be for more than three months at a time. The last words “at a time” signify or indicate that the power can be exercised in suitable cases for extending the period of suspension beyond three months, every time restricting it only to three months.

    10. Since the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, has taken the view that the power of suspension is available only by way of punishment and on that basis he awarded full salary for the period of suspension, we quash that part of the award. The matters involved in the three writ petitions will stand remitted to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai, for fresh disposal in the light of the observations made above and in accordance with law. The Presiding Officer will give the management a fresh opportunity to show whether it has exereised its discretion contemplated by bye-law 13(h) and further whether it passed orders of suspension each time for a period not exceeding three months, in the light of which the Presiding Officer will decide. The Presiding Officer will also take into account the subsequent dismissal of the employee concerned on the question whether in view of it his claim would be tenable and if so, what extent.

    No costs.

    V.C.S

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