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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Mr. S. Balathandapani for Applt.
  • K.S Desikan, K. Raman, T. Chengalvarayan and P.S Somasundaram for Respts.
Judges
  • Kailasam
  • N.S Ramaswami, JJ.
Acts
  • Section 51 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act. (Act XXVI of 1948).
  • provisions of the Civil Procedure Tribunal. Section 51 of the Abolition Act
  • Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • Section 95(2)(b) of the Motor Vehicle Act,
  • Section 10(2) of the Madras Forest Act.
  • Sec-110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • rules of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Section 51 of the Abolition Act,
  • Order 41, Rule 22, C. P. Code
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • Section 95 (2)(b)
  • Section 110-D
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Mr. S. Balathandapani for Applt.
  • K.S Desikan, K. Raman, T. Chengalvarayan and P.S Somasundaram for Respts.
Judges
  • Kailasam
  • N.S Ramaswami, JJ.
Acts
  • Section 51 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act. (Act XXVI of 1948).
  • provisions of the Civil Procedure Tribunal. Section 51 of the Abolition Act
  • Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • Section 95(2)(b) of the Motor Vehicle Act,
  • Section 10(2) of the Madras Forest Act.
  • Sec-110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • rules of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Section 51 of the Abolition Act,
  • Order 41, Rule 22, C. P. Code
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • Section 95 (2)(b)
  • Section 110-D
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from claim petition No. 37 of 1966 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Tirunelveli. The claimants are the widow and children of Lucas Hass Morais, who died in a motor accident on 1-2-1966 at about 2 p.m. The motor vehicle involved was a taxi (registration No. MDU 8441) owned by the first respondent to the claim petition. The second respondent in the claim petition (the insurer of the taxi) is the appellant in this appeal.

The claimants sought Rs. 25,000 as compensation for loss of benefit. The Tribunal found that the accident resulted from rash and negligent driving and awarded a total compensation of Rs. 9,600 against both the owner and the insurer. The Insurance Company appealed, contending that under Section 95(2)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act as it stood prior to the 1969 amendment, its maximum liability for the death of a single passenger in a taxi carrying six or fewer passengers was Rs. 4,000 and therefore it could not be made to pay the full Rs. 9,600.

The claimants did not file an independent appeal but filed a cross-objection to seek enhancement of compensation against both the insurer (appellant) and the vehicle owner (a respondent in the appeal). The vehicle owner had been impleaded as a pro forma respondent in the insurer’s appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under Section 95(2)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act as it stood prior to the 1969 amendment, the insurer's maximum liability for the death of a single passenger in a taxi carrying six or fewer passengers is limited to Rs. 4,000.
  2. Whether a respondent to an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act may file a memorandum of cross-objections (i.e., whether the Civil Procedure Code rules governing appeals, including Order 41 Rule 22, apply to appeals to the High Court under Section 110-D).
  3. Whether a cross-objection can be validly filed against a co-respondent (specifically, whether the claimants' cross-objection could be prosecuted against the vehicle owner who was also a respondent in the appeal).

Arguments of the Parties

Insurance Company (Appellant)

  • The insurer's sole contention before the court was that Section 95(2)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, as it stood prior to the 1969 amendment, limited the insurer's liability in respect of the death of an individual passenger in a vehicle carrying six or fewer passengers to Rs. 4,000. Therefore the insurer could not be required to pay the full Rs. 9,600 awarded by the Tribunal.

Claimants (Cross-Objectors)

  • The claimants filed a cross-objection seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal against both the insurer and the owner. (The opinion does not set out detailed legal arguments advanced by the claimants in support of enhancement in the text provided.)

Preliminary Objections Raised (as stated in the opinion)

  • First preliminary objection: Because the appeal arises under a special statute (the Motor Vehicles Act) and the Tribunal is a creature of statute to which the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) is not fully applicable, no respondent can file a cross-objection; Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for appeals but does not expressly permit a respondent to file cross-objections.
  • Second preliminary objection: Even if a cross-objection lies against the insurer, a cross-objection could not validly be maintained against the owner of the vehicle who is also a respondent in the appeal. (The opinion notes this objection but on the facts finds it unnecessary to decide it.)

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vedantacharsami v. Sri Muthiah Chetti, (1955) 68 Mad LW 66 Held that a cross-objection could not be entertained in an appeal under Section 51 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act because that appeal was to a special tribunal and the Act did not incorporate CPC procedures like cross-objections. The court distinguished this decision as inapplicable: the appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act lies to the High Court (not to a special statutory tribunal) and therefore the reasoning in Vedantacharsami does not prevent cross-objections in the present context.
A.A.O. No. 317 of 1967 (Mad.) (Srinivasan v. Subbiah Chettiar) — unreported Followed the Vedantacharsami approach to hold that no memorandum of cross-objections is entertainable in an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. The court rejected this decision's approach as incorrect, stating the learned Judge overlooked that appeals under Section 110-D are to the High Court and thus CPC appellate rules apply.
A.A.O. No. 222 of 1970 (Mad.) (Govindaraj v. Venugopal) — unreported Also followed the view that cross-objections are not entertainable in appeals under Section 110-D (following Vedantacharsami/A.A.O. No. 317). The court held this decision was not correctly decided for the same reasons as in respect of A.A.O. No. 317: appeals to the High Court attract ordinary appellate procedures where the statute is silent.
Secretary of State v. Rama Rao, AIR 1916 PC 21 Principle that where an appeal lies to an ordinary court (here the District Court), the ordinary rules of procedure (e.g., Civil Procedure Code rules) apply unless the statute prescribes otherwise. The Privy Council's statement was relied upon to support the proposition that an appeal to the High Court under Section 110-D attracts the ordinary appellate procedures (i.e., CPC rules) in the absence of a special procedure prescribed by the Motor Vehicles Act.
National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwich & Bros. Ltd. (Trade Marks Act case) Where a statute provides for an appeal to the High Court but does not prescribe appellate procedure, the High Court exercises appellate jurisdiction in the same way as it does in other appellate matters (i.e., relevant procedural rules apply). The court used this to reinforce that appeals to the High Court under special statutes attract the High Court's ordinary appellate procedures, supporting the applicability of CPC rules (including Order 41, Rule 22) to appeals under Section 110-D.
Venkatesan v. Ranganayaki, A.A.O. No.162 of 1972 (Mad.) Decision adopting the view that a respondent may present a memorandum of cross-objections in an appeal under Section 110-D. The court indicated agreement with this decision and cited it as supporting the maintainability of cross-objections in appeals to the High Court under Section 110-D.
Manjula Devi Butta v. Manjusri Raha, 1968 ACJ 1 (Madh. Pra.) Authority for the proposition that cross-objections or CPC appellate rules apply in appeals to ordinary courts under special statutes (as cited in the opinion). Cited as one of the High Court decisions supporting the court's view that cross-objections are maintainable when appeals lie to the High Court and no special procedure is prescribed.
W. S. Bhagsingh and Sons v. Omprakash Kaith, 1971 ACJ 324 (Delhi) Another High Court decision consistent with the view that appellate procedural rules (including rights to file cross-objections) apply where appeals lie to the High Court under special statutes and no alternative procedure is stated. Cited to show other judicial support for the court's conclusion that CPC appellate rules apply to appeals under Section 110-D and that cross-objections may be filed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two principal strands: (A) the substantive contention about the insurer's monetary liability under Section 95(2)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act (as it stood before the 1969 amendment); and (B) the procedural question whether cross-objections are maintainable in an appeal under Section 110-D.

(A) Insurer's substantive liability under Section 95(2)(b)

  • The court read Section 95(2)(b) as it stood prior to the 1969 amendment to mean that an insurance company’s maximum liability in respect of all passengers carried in a vehicle is subject to a cap (stated in the opinion as Rs. 20,000 in respect of all passengers), and more specifically that the insurer's liability in respect of any individual passenger is limited to Rs. 4,000 where the vehicle carries six or fewer passengers (and Rs. 2,000 for vehicles carrying more than six passengers).
  • Because the vehicle involved was a taxi (to carry fewer than six passengers), the court concluded that the insurer's maximum liability for the death of the passenger (Lucas Hass Morais) was only Rs. 4,000 under the statute as then in force.
  • On that statutory construction, the court held the insurer's appeal must be allowed to the extent of restricting the insurer's liability to Rs. 4,000 despite the Tribunal's award of Rs. 9,600 against both owner and insurer.

(B) Maintainability of the cross-objection under Section 110-D

  • The court addressed the first preliminary objection — that the Motor Vehicles Act's Tribunal being a creature of statute prevents the application of CPC appellate procedures (including cross-objections) — by distinguishing appeals to special tribunals from appeals directly to the High Court. It emphasized that Section 110-D contemplates an appeal to the High Court itself, not to a special tribunal constituted by statute.
  • The court relied on precedents (notably Secretary of State v. Rama Rao and National Sewing Thread) to state the general proposition that where appeals lie to an ordinary court (here the High Court) and the special statute does not prescribe alternative appellate procedure, the ordinary rules of appellate procedure (i.e., the CPC rules) apply. Consequently, Order 41, Rule 22 CPC — which permits a respondent to present a memorandum of cross-objections — is applicable to appeals under Section 110-D.
  • The court considered earlier decisions (including Vedantacharsami and two unreported A.A.O. decisions) that had held cross-objections not entertainable but distinguished or rejected them on the basis that those cases involved appeals to special statutory tribunals (or otherwise misapplied the reasoning) and thus did not govern appeals to the High Court under Section 110-D.
  • Accordingly, the court held that a cross-objection would lie in an appeal under Section 110-D and that the first preliminary objection was not tenable.
  • As to the second preliminary objection (that a cross-objection could not be maintained against the owner who was a respondent in the appeal), the court stated it was unnecessary to decide that point because the cross-objection failed on merits.

(C) Merits of the cross-objection

  • The Tribunal had found that the deceased earned Rs. 150 per month and was 39 years old at death. Although the court described the Tribunal's reasoning as not "quite sound," it concluded that the quantum of Rs. 9,600 fixed by the Tribunal did not warrant interference on appeal.
  • Despite upholding the Tribunal's compensation quantum as not requiring interference, the court nevertheless restricted the insurer's liability to Rs. 4,000 under Section 95(2)(b) (pre-1969 position). The cross-objection seeking enhancement was dismissed on the merits.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • APPEAL ALLOWED. The insurer's appeal was allowed to the extent that the insurer's liability was restricted to Rs. 4,000, being the maximum statutory liability under Section 95(2)(b) as it stood prior to the 1969 amendment for a taxi carrying fewer than six passengers.
  • CROSS-OBJECTION DISMISSED. The claimants' cross-objection for enhancement was dismissed on the merits.
  • The court held that a respondent may present a memorandum of cross-objections in an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act because appeals to the High Court attract the ordinary rules of appellate procedure (Order 41, Rule 22 CPC) where the statute is silent on procedure; accordingly, the first preliminary objection to the cross-objection was not tenable.
  • No order as to costs was made in either the appeal or the cross-objection.

Implications (direct effects stated in the opinion):

  • The direct effect on the parties as recorded in the opinion is that the insurer's financial liability under the award is limited to Rs. 4,000. The cross-objection by the claimants for enhancement was dismissed. The Tribunal's assessment of Rs. 9,600 as the appropriate total compensation was not interfered with in substance by the court, but the insurer's statutory cap reduced the insurer's share of that award.
  • The court also articulated a procedural holding that appeals to the High Court under Section 110-D are governed by ordinary appellate procedural rules (including the right to file cross-objections) where the special statute does not provide otherwise. (The opinion treats this as a binding procedural conclusion in the context of the appeal.)

Final disposition recorded in the opinion: "Appeal allowed."

Show full summary ...

    The Union Co-Operative Insurance Society Ltd. Madras v. Lazarammal Ravel And Others

    1. This appeal is filed by the second respondent in claim petition No. 37 of 1966 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Tirunelveli. The appellant is the insurer of the vehicle which was involved in the motor vehicle. The claimants are the widow and children of the Lucas Hass morais who died in the motor accident that occurred at about 2 p.m. on 1-2-1966. The motor vehicle involved in the accident is a taxi bearing registration No. MDU 8441, and owned by the first respondent to the claim, petition. The claimants prayed for a total compensation of Rs.25,000 towards loss of benefit as a result of the death of Lucas Hass Morais. The two respondents to the claim petition resisted the claim. But, ultimately the Tribunal held that the accident was as a result of rash and negligent driving of the motor vehicle, that the claimants are entitled to compensation and fixed the quantum of compensation at Rs. 9,600. It has passed an award for such sum against the owner of the vehicle as well as the insurer. The Insurance Company has preferred this appeal and the only contention raised before us is that as per Section 95(2)(b) of the Motor Vehicle Act, as it stood prior to 1969 amendment, the maximum amount to which the insurer can be made liable, in this case, is only Rs. 4,000. The contention is that the Insurance Company cannot be asked to pay the entire sum of Rs. 9,600 awarded as the compensation.

    2. The claimants had not preferred any independent appeal claiming enhancement of compensation fixed by the Tribunal. But, they have filed a cross objection to the appeal filed by the Insurance Company in which they have claimed enhancement of compensation against the insurance company as well as the owner of the vehicle. It may be noted that the owner of the vehicle who was the first respondent in the claim petition has been impleaded as pro forma respondent in the appeal preferred by the Insurance Company. Now, in the cross-objection the prayer is for enhancement of compensation not, only against the insurance company, who is the appellant, but also against the owner of the vehicle, who is one of the respondents to the appeal.

    3. There can be no doubt that the appeal of the Insurance Company has to be allowed. Section 95 (2)(b) as it stood prior to 1969 amendment provided that the maximum liability of an insurance company in respect of a vehicle which carries passengers is limited to Rs. 20,000 in respect of all passengers who travelled in the vehicle and there is the further restriction that in respect of all in respect as of an individual passenger, the maximum liability of the insurance company is Rs. 4,000 in the case of vehicle carrying six or less passengers and Rs. 2,000 in the case of a vehicle carrying more than six passengers. The vehicle which is a taxi was to carry less than six passengers and as per the said provision, the maximum liability, regarding the death of one of the passengers on the Insurance Company is only Rs. 4,000 as the law stood then. Therefore, the appeal of the Insurance Company has to be allowed.

    4. Regarding the cross-objection two preliminary objections were raised. The first is that the appeal being one arising under a special statute and the Civil Procedure Code not being applicable to the Tribunal constituted under the said statute, viz., the Motor Vehicles Act, no cross-objection can be filled. It is pointed out that under Section 110-D though there is provision for any of the aggrieved parties to file an appeal, there is nothing in the section permitting a respondent to an appeal to file cross-objection.

    5. In support of this contention, three decisions were relied on. The first is Vedantacharsami v. Sri Muthiah Chetti, (1955) 68 Mad LLW 66. The other two decisions are not reported and they are in A.A.O. No. 317 of 1967 (Mad.) (Srinivasan v. Subbiah Chettiar) and A.A.O. No.222 of 1970(Mad.)(Govindaraj v. Venugopal). One of these two decisions (A.A.O. No. 317 of 1967) is rendered by Somasundaram J., and the other is rendered by Maharajan J. We are of the view that the above contention raised against the maintainability of the cross-objection is untenable. Under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, an appeal lies to this court. It must be remembered that when once an appeal is entertained by this court, all the provisions relating to the appellate jurisdiction to this court are attracted. it is true that all the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to the Tribunal, because it is a creature of the statute, but the appeal against the order of the Tribunal is to the High Court and not to any other Tribunal constituted under the statute. In Secretary of State v. Rama Rao, AIR 1916 PC 21, the question was whether the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code would apply to appeal to the District Court against the decision of the Forest Settlement Officer under Section 10(2) of the Madras Forest Act. The Privy Council pointed out that the appeal being to the District Court which is one of the ordinary courts of the country, the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply. National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd., v. James Chadwich and Bros. Ltd. is a case under the Trade Marks Act, 1940. Under Section 76(1) of the said Act, an appeal shall lie from any decision of the Registrar under that Act to the High Court having jurisdiction. The question arose whether an appeal under Clause 15. Letters Patent is maintainable against the decision of a single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 76(1) of the said Act. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court that as the said Act had not made any provision with regard to the procedure to be followed by the High Court in hearing the appeal under the said Act, the High Court has to exercise its appellate jurisdiction in the same manner as it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction and therefore when such jurisdiction was exercised by a single Judge, his judgment was appealable under C1. 15 Letters Patent. As we pointed out earlier, Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act contemplates an appeal to the High Court. Once an appeal is entertained by this court, all the rules in the Civil Procedure Code would be applicable, to such an appeal in as much as no other procedure is prescribed under the said Act. That means. Order 41, Rule 22, C. P. Code would be applicable and the respondent in an appeal would be entitled to present a memorandum of cross-objections are provided under the said rules, Venkataraman J., in disposing of A.A.O. No. 162 of 1972 (Mad.) (Venkatesan v. Ranganayaki) has taken a similar view and we agree with the same. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Manjula Devi Butta v. Manjusri Raha, 1968 ACJ 1 (Madh. Pra) and the Delhi High Court in W. S. Bhagsingh and Sons v. Omprakash Kaith, 1971 ACJ 324 (Delhi), have taken the same view.

    6. (1955) 68 Mad LW 66 arises under Section 51 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act. (Act XXVI of 1948). Under that section, any person aggrieved by any decision of the Abolition Tribunal may appeal to a Special Tribunal consisting of two Judges of the High Court nominated from time to time by the Chief Justice in that behalf. The question arose whether the respondent in an appeal filed under section 51 of that act can file a cross-objection. A Division Bench of this court held that such a cross-objection cannot be entertained. but this decision has no application to the facts of the present case. As already seen, under Section 51 of the Abolition Act, the appeal contemplated is not to the High Court as such but only to a Special Tribunal consisting of two Judges of the High Court, Such a Special Tribunal, even though consisting of two Judges of the High Court, is a creature of the statute and the provisions of the Civil Procedure Tribunal. Section 51 of the Abolition Act itself did not contemplate the filing of cross-objections by a respondent in an appeal under that section. It was under those circumstances, a Division Bench of this court held that the cross-objection cannot be maintained. It is pointed out there that Section 51 confers a special rights on the aggrieved person in certain cases to appeal to a special Tribunal, constituted by the Chief Justice and that there is no provision in the Act attracting the entire procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code including the right to file cross-objections. The very reasoning contained in that decision would go to show that in the present case, a cross-objection is maintainable because the appeal contemplated under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act is not to a special Tribunal but to the High Court. Undoubtedly all the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code would be applicable to any proceeding before this court even if it is an appeal under any special stature.

    7. Somasundaram J. in disposing of A.A.O. NO. 317 of 1967 (Mad.) has purported to follow the above Bench decision (1955) 68 Mad LW 66 in holding that no memorandum of cross-objections is entertainable in an appeal under Sec-110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. There is no further discussion by the learned Judge in coming to that conclusion. All that the learned Judge says is that there is no provision in the special Act attracting the entire procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code, including the right to file the cross-objections and therefore the memo of cross-objections does not lie. The learned Judge has overlooked the fact that the appeal is to the High Court to which the Civil procedure Code applies. For the reasons stated supra, we are of the view that this decision of the learned Judge, (Somasundaram J.) and that in A.A.O. No. 222 of 1970 (Mad.) by Maharajan J. following the above decision are not correctly decided. We hold that a cross-objection would lie and the first preliminary objection is not tenable.

    8. The second preliminary objection is that whatever be the right of the cross-objector against the appellant, namely, the Insurance co., there cannot be a valid cross-objection against the owner of the vehicle who is also a respondent in the appeal. However, we think it is unnecessary to consider whether this objection is tenable or not, for on merits, the cross-objection has to fail.

    9. The finding of the Tribunal below is that the deceased was earning a sum of Rs. 150 per month. He was aged 39 years at the time of his death. Considering his age and the income, we do not think that the sum of Rs. 9,600 fixed as the total compensation payable to the claimants towards loss of benefit calls for any interference, even though the reasoning of the Tribunal below does not appear to be quite sound. The result is the appeal is allowed and the liability of the appellant (Insurance Company) is restricted to a sum of Rs. 4,000. The cross-objection is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs either in the appeal or in the cross-objection.

    10. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    The Union Co-Operative Insurance Society Ltd. Madras v. Lazarammal Ravel And Others
    (Jul 30, 1973)