1. This petition has been filed by the tenants against an order of the District Judge Madurai, passed in C.R.P 23 of 1970. The contention that is raised in this court is that the orders passed by the courts below were based on a compromise and not on a finding that the tenants have committed a breach as required under Section 10(2) clauses (i) to (vii) and therefore the order of eviction is not executable. I find on facts that this submission is not borne out. Before the Rent Controller, the landlady contended that the tenants were guilty of wilful default in payment of rent, that the tenants have subleased the premises, that the tenants had denied the title of the landlady and that the landlady required the building bona fide for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction. It is unnecessary to consider the other grounds except the requirement by the landlady of the building bona fide for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction. The trial court in paragraph 8 of its order found that the requirement by the landlady is bona fide and allowed the petition, granting the tenant three months' time for vacating the premises. The appeal was preferred on the ground that the Rent Controller was in error in holding that the landlady required the premises bona fide for immediate demolition and reconstruction. During the hearing of the appeal the tenants submitted to an order of eviction and requested that the Court may grant 3½ years time to vacate the premises. The landlady agreed to grant nine months time to the tenants to vacate. The appellate court after hearing both the parties granted 1½ years time to the tenants for vacating the premises. In the result the appellate court confirmed the order of the Rent Controller except for the modification that the tenants were granted years time from the date of the order for vacating the premises. The tenants took up the matter up on revision to the District Judge, Madurai. The learned District Judge found that the parties had agreed that the order of eviction may be confirmed but the tenants wanted 3½ years time to vacate the premises While the landlady agreed to grant only nine months time. As the parties could not agree regarding the time for eviction, the matter was left to the discretion of the court. In the revision preferred by the tenants, it was contended that the order of the Appellate authority granting li years time was erroneous and that it should have granted 3½ years time to vacate the premises. Regarding the contention that the order of eviction based on the joint endorsement of the parties was a nullity, the learned District Judge held that both the parties made a written statement that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller may be confirmed and hence the order of eviction, was confirmed on merits and the only question that was in dispute was about the time that has to be granted to the tenants for vacating.
2. On the facts stated above it is clear that the Rent Controller found that the requirement by the landlady for demolition and reconstruction was accepted by the tenants in the lower appellate Court. The revisional Court also found that the tenants did consent to an order of eviction on the basis that the landlady wanted the building bona fide for demolition and reconstruction and prayed for time. The only question therefore that was before the appellate court and the revisional Court was about the time that was to be granted to the tenants.
3. The tenants having explicitly agreed to the order of eviction on the ground that the landlady required the building bona fide for demolition and reconstruction and the court having accepted the plea of the landlady that the premises were required bona fide for demolition and reconstruction it is not open to the petitioner to contend that the order for eviction passed by the courts below merely on the compromise memo without considering the question whether the landlady has made out any of the grounds that are required under Section 10 of the Act to enable her to get an order of eviction, is inexecutable. On the facts therefore there can be no doubt that the courts below were satisfied that the landlady bona fide required the premises for demolition and reconstruction and the order was passed on such a finding and not on a compromise. The learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Srimathi Kaushalya Devi & Others v. Shri K.L Bansal , (1969) 1 SCC 59 : AIR 1970 SC 838 and in Ferozilal v. Manmal, (1970) 3 SCC 181 : AIR 1970 SC 794. The facts are different and the finding of the Supreme Court is that the decree was passed by the court on the basis of the award without satisfying itself that the ground of eviction existed. The Supreme Court on a reading of Section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 laid down that the court was forbidden to pass a decree without satisfying itself that the landlord had succeeded in establishing that he is entitled to eviction on one of the grounds permissible in the Act. The decisions were followed by this Court in Seshadri v. Chari, (1971) 84 Mad LW 9. The decision cited had no application to the facts of this case where the courts below were satisfied that the landlady required the premises bona fide for demolition and reconstruction and passed the order for eviction on that ground. The courts below did apply their mind and came to the conclusion that the landlady was entitled to an order of eviction and did not pass an order merely on the memo of compromise filed by the parties. On these facts, the decisions cited by the learned counsel are inapplicable. The orders of the courts below are therefore on merits and are executable and the plea raised by the petitioners has to the rejected. The petition is dismissed with costs. The petitioners had already She indulgence of the appellate court's order of 1½ years time. I will not be justified in granting any further time.
4. Petition dismissed.