AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Employees State Insurance Act of 1948 (The Madras Employees Insurance Court Rules 1951)
  • S. 15 (1) of the Limitation Act: would control S. 48 of the Civil Procedure
  • S. 195 and Ch. XXXV of the Civil Procedure Code, 1898 (Act V of 1898).2.
  • provisions of Ss. 5 and 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908
  • Civil Procedure Code and the Limitation Act
  • Madras Employees' Insurance Court Rules, 1951
  • S. 15 (1) of the Indian Limitation Act
  • EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE ACT 1948
  • Art. 120 of the Limitation Act
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935
  • Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
  • State Government.(2) Rules
  • S. 96 (1). Under 96 (1) rules
  • Constitution [Act. 145 (1)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Employees State Insurance Act of 1948 (The Madras Employees Insurance Court Rules 1951)
  • S. 15 (1) of the Limitation Act: would control S. 48 of the Civil Procedure
  • S. 195 and Ch. XXXV of the Civil Procedure Code, 1898 (Act V of 1898).2.
  • provisions of Ss. 5 and 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908
  • Civil Procedure Code and the Limitation Act
  • Madras Employees' Insurance Court Rules, 1951
  • S. 15 (1) of the Indian Limitation Act
  • EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE ACT 1948
  • Art. 120 of the Limitation Act
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935
  • Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
  • State Government.(2) Rules
  • S. 96 (1). Under 96 (1) rules
  • Constitution [Act. 145 (1)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Employees' State Insurance Corporation (the "Corporation") filed an application under section 75(2) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 to recover contributions from the employer, Solar Works. The application related to contributions for the period March 1957 to November 1958 and was filed on 21 June 1959. The Madras State Government Rules (R.17) prescribed a 12-month limitation period from the date the cause of action arose or the claim became due, but contained a proviso allowing the Court to entertain an application after 12 months if satisfied that the applicant had sufficient reason for delay. The Corporation invoked that proviso and stated it became aware of the employer's liability on 16 February 1959 when an Inspector inspected the employer's records.

The employer opposed the claim as barred by limitation and argued that no satisfactory reason for delay had been shown under the proviso to R.17. At the Employees' Insurance Court the employer contended that R.17 was valid but the proviso was not (arguing delay could not be condoned), while the Corporation contended that R.17 itself was ultra vires because the Act did not prescribe any limitation period for such applications.

The Employees' Insurance Court accepted in part the Corporation's contention that the Act did not specifically provide a limitation and that R.17 was ultra vires, but held that the period of limitation would be the same as for an ordinary civil suit (applying Art.120 of the Limitation Act) and thus found the claim within time. The matter produced conflicting views among judges (Kailasam J. held R.17 intra vires in a related application; Venkataraman J. took the opposite view), and the question was referred to a Bench for decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Rule 17 of the Madras Employees' Insurance Court Rules, 1951 (prescribing a 12-month limitation and a proviso for condonation) is intra vires the rule-making power of the State Government under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (in particular S.96 and Ss.77–78).
  2. If the rule-making power is valid, whether the proviso to R.17 (allowing the Court to condone delay upon sufficient reason) is itself valid and should be applied in the present case.
  3. Whether, alternatively, in the absence of a valid R.17, the limitation applicable to the Corporation's application should be governed by the Limitation Act (reference was made to Art.120 of the Limitation Act in the Insurance Court's reasoning).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Employer (Solar Works)

  • The employer opposed the Corporation's claim on the ground of limitation and argued that no satisfactory reason for delay had been shown under the proviso to R.17.
  • At the Employees' Insurance Court the employer contended that R.17 was valid but that the proviso was invalid and that, therefore, delay could not be condoned.
  • Before the appellate court the appellant's counsel (Sri G. Krishnamurthi Aiyar) argued that the Employees' Insurance Court was wrong in holding R.17 ultra vires and that the matter should be remitted for consideration whether reasonable grounds exist to condone the delay under the proviso to R.17. (The appellant did not challenge the validity of the proviso before the appellate court.)

Respondent (Employees' State Insurance Corporation) and State Representatives

  • The Corporation contended that R.17 was ultra vires the State Government because the Act did not provide any limitation period and that a true construction of the Act indicated no limitation should be prescribed at all for such an application.
  • The Government Pleader (Sri Rangarajan) for the Corporation supported the position that R.17 was ultra vires and that no limitation is prescribed by the Act.
  • The learned Advocate General (appearing as amicus) stressed that the rule-making power under S.96(b)/S.78(2) does not, by implication, include the power to prescribe limitation periods where the Act itself does not provide for them, and pointed to legislative patterns where specific reference to power to prescribe time appears when intended.

Views advanced by a Judge whose opinion differed (Kailasam J.)

  • Kailasam J., in a related application (A.A.O. No. 6 of 1960), took the view that R.17 was intra vires. He reasoned that limitation is a matter of procedure and that the power to frame rules regarding procedure (S.78(2) read with S.96) includes prescribing limitation; he relied on the Full Bench decision in Kandaswami v. Kannappa to support the proposition that the Limitation Act and procedural enactments should be read together.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kandaswami v. Kannappa (Full Bench of this Court) Support for the proposition that limitation can be treated as a matter of procedure and that procedural statutes (CPC) and the Limitation Act are co-enactments which may be read together; specifically that S.15(1) of the Limitation Act controlled S.48 of the Civil Procedure Code in that context. The opinion notes that Kailasam J. relied on this authority to treat limitation as procedural and hence within rule-making power, but the Bench (Anantanarayanan J.) records that it did not accept Kailasam J.'s reliance on that decision for validating R.17.
Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidators of Dehra Dun etc. (Privy Council) Quoted for the observation that where an omission (casus omissus) appears in a statute, it may be for others (i.e., the legislature) to remedy the defect rather than the Court to supply the omission. The Court used the Privy Council observation to support the view that a legislative omission (if present) should not be remedied by strained construction; this reinforced the view that the absence of an express power to prescribe limitation should not be read into the Act by the Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Bench's analysis focused on statutory construction of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 and the scope of the State Government's delegated rule-making power (S.96 read with Ss.77–78). The court proceeded in the following logical steps, using only the materials and reasoning given in the opinion:

  1. Identification of the relevant statutory provisions and the content of Rule 17:
    • S.75(2): claims to be decided by Employees' Insurance Court.
    • S.77: commencement of proceedings — applications to be in prescribed form and to contain such particulars and fee "as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Government in consultation with the Corporation."
    • S.78(2): the Employees' Insurance Court "shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Government."
    • S.96(1): enumerates matters on which State Government may make rules (including procedure), and S.96(2): such rules shall have effect as if enacted in the Act.
    • R.17 prescribes a 12-month limitation and a proviso allowing condonation by the Court for sufficient reason.
  2. Consideration of the competing constructions:
    • Kailasam J.'s view: limitation is a rule of procedure, therefore the power to make rules regarding procedure includes power to prescribe limitation; relied on Kandaswami v. Kannappa.
    • Venkataraman J.'s (and ultimately the Bench's) contrary view: if the legislature intended to empower rules to prescribe limitation it would have done so expressly in provisions that deal with commencement (S.77) or elsewhere; S.78(2) is more naturally read as governing the internal procedure of the Court after institution of proceedings rather than the time within which proceedings must be brought.
  3. Textual and contextual arguments supporting the Bench's conclusion:
    • The opinion stresses that S.77 deals expressly with the form, particulars and fee of applications and that it would have been natural to say that applications should be filed within such time as rules may prescribe if that had been intended.
    • The Act elsewhere contains specific time limits where intended (for example S.80 — 12 months for claiming a benefit subject to condonation; S.82(3) — 60 days for appeal under that section). This demonstrates that the legislature knew how to provide for limitation expressly when it wished to do so.
    • S.96(1)(h), while phrased generally, only permits the State Government to make rules in respect of matters required or allowed by the Act; it does not independently create a power to prescribe limitation where the Act does not treat limitation as a subject for rules.
    • The Bench accepted the Advocate General's argument (referred to in the opinion) that in modern legislative practice the power to prescribe limitation is not to be treated as necessarily included within generic rule-making power relating to procedure unless there is specific or at least clear implication to that effect in the enabling section; comparative examples were mentioned to demonstrate that where rule-makers are to be given power to prescribe time, the enabling provision normally contains language to that effect.
  4. Policy and practical considerations noted by the Court:
    • The court observed potential hardship if a strict short limitation (such as 12 months) were imposed upon corporate contribution recovery claims, since defaults by employers may come to light only later and a strict rule might impair employees' benefits. This reinforced the view that rule-making power should not be extended by implication to include prescription of limitation.
    • Where the Act is silent and a casus omissus exists, the court should avoid straining the text to supply the omission and should leave remedial action to the legislature (citing Hansraj Gupta).
  5. Final legal conclusion of the Bench:
    • The Bench agreed with Venkataraman J. that Rule 17, as framed, is ultra vires the rule-making powers conferred on the State Government by the Act. The Bench thus concluded that the Corporation's application in the present case is not time-barred and requires no condonation under R.17.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Rule 17 of the Madras Employees' Insurance Court Rules, 1951 is ultra vires the delegated rule-making powers of the State Government under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, and therefore the Corporation's application is not barred by the limitation prescribed in R.17 and requires no condonation.

Immediate procedural consequence recorded in the opinion: "The C.M.A is dismissed accordingly" and the Court directed that the parties will bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Corporation's recovery application is not time-barred under R.17; no condonation under that rule is necessary in the present case; the appeal referred to in the opinion (the C.M.A.) was dismissed and each party was ordered to bear its own costs.
  • Broader implications: The opinion emphasises a principle of statutory construction — the Court will not read into a general rule-making power an authority to prescribe limitation periods unless the enabling provision expressly or impliedly contemplates such a power; where the legislature intended limitation to be prescribed it normally does so expressly in the Act. The opinion also notes that omissions of this kind (casus omissus) are to be remedied by the legislature rather than by strained judicial construction. The opinion itself does not formulate a detailed rule beyond these legal conclusions.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No information beyond that text has been added.

    Messrs. Solar Works, Madras-1 v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Madras And Another.

    This appeal arises out of an application filed under the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. The application was filed under S. 75 (2) of the Act by the Emplyees' State Insurance Corporation, to recover contribution due from the employer, namely the Solar Works, the appellant in this appeal (respondent in the application before the Employees Insurance Court, the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Madras). The application was filed for the recovery of contribution relating to the period between March, 1957 to November, 1958. It was filed on 21st June, 1959. This Act does not prescribe any period of limitation within which such an application could be filed, but R. 17 of the rules framed by the Madras State Government prescribes a period of 12 months from the date on which the cause of action arose or the claim became due. This is a proviso that the Court may entertain an application after the said period of 12 months, if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient reason for not making the application within the said period. The Corporation invoked the benefit of this proviso in their application. They stated that they became aware of the liability of the employer only on 16th February, 1959, when the Insurance Inpector inspected the records of the employer.

    The employer opposed the claim as barred by limitation and urged that no satisfactory reasons had been adduced under the proviso to R. 17 for excusing the delay.

    At the time of the argument on the application before the Employees' State Insurance Court, it appears to have been contended on behalf of the employer that R. 17 was valid but not the proviso thereto; and that under no circumstances could the delay be condoned. On the other hand, it appears to have been contended on behalf of the Corporation that R 17 itself was ultra vires the State Government, because the Act itself did not provide any period of limitation for such an application for contribution and a true construction of the Act it would follow that the intention of the Legislature was that there could be no period of limitation at all for such an application.

    The Employees' State Insurance Court: accepted the contention of the Corporation to a substantial extent, namely, that the Act did not specifically provide for any limitation and that R. 17 was ultra vires of the Act. At the same time it was not prepared to accept the further contention of the Corporation that there would be no limit of time at all for such an application and it held that the period of limitation, would be the same as if a regular suit had been filed in the ordinary civil Court for recovering the contribution. In that view it held that Art. 120 of the Limitation Act would apply and, if so, the claim would be within time. The Court passed this order in a batch of applications and posted the applications for further consideration, on the other points at issue.

    The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant, Sri G. Krishnamurthi Aiyar, is that the Employees' Insurance Court is wrong in its view that R. 17 is uttra vires the State Government; and he says that the matter must go back in order that the Insurance Court may consider whether there are reasonable grounds for condoning the delay under the proviso to R. 17. The learned Counsel for the appellant does not contend before me that the proviso is invalid as was contended on behalf of the employer before the Insurance Court. As against this, Sri Rangarajan representing the Government Pleader, who appears for the Corporation contends that R. 17 is ultra vires the State Government and that on a true construction of the Act it should be held that no limitation is prescribed at all under the Act. The further question whether Art. 120 of the Limitation Act would apply has not been argued before me because it cannot arise. The question is whether R. 17 is valid; if so the application should go back for consideration whether there are reasonable grounds for condoning the delay or whether R. 17 is ultra vires in which case the application should be held to be within time.

    This question was decided by Kailasam, J. in A. A. O. No. 6 of 1960 arising out of another application dealt with by the Employees' Insurance Court in the same order. Kailasam, J., took the view that R. 17 is intra vires the State Government; and he remanded that particular application for consideration of the question whether there were reasonable grounds for condoning the delay. Prima facie, I am unable to share the view of Kailasam, J., and that is why I feel that it is better that the matter is decided by a Bench and I am making this order of reference to a Bench.

    Section 75 (2) of the Act says that the claims mentioned therein shall be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court. Cl. (a), deals with the claim for recovery of contribution from the principal employer. Sub-S. (3) of S. 75 says—

    “No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question or dispute as aforesaid or to adjudicate on any liability which by or under this Act is to be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court.”

    Section 76 says that the institution of proceedings shall be in the particular Insurance Court appointed for the purpose. S. 77 says;

    “Commencdment of proceedings: 1. The proceedings before an Employees' insurance Court shall be commenced by application.

    2. Every such application shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars and shall be accompanied by such fee, if any, as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Government in consultation with the Corporation.”

    It is also necessary to quote S. 78 in full:

    “Powers of Employees' Insurance Court: (1) The Employees' Insurance Court shall have all the powers of a civil Court for the purpose of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling and the discovery and production of documents and material objects, administering oath and recording evidence and such Court shall be deeded to be a civil Court within the meaning of S. 195 and Ch. XXXV of the Civil Procedure Code, 1898 (Act V of 1898).

    2. The Employees Insurance Court shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Government.

    3. All costs incidental to any proceedings before an Employeess' Insurance Court shall, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf by the State Government, be in the discretion of the Court.

    4. An order of the Employees' Insurance Court shall be enforceable as if it were a decree passed in a suit by a civil Court.”

    S. 96 (1) of the Act in so far as it is material says:

    “Power of State Government to make Rules:

    1. The State Government may, subject to the condition of previous publication, make rules rot inconsistent with this Act in regard to all or any of the following matters—

    (a) the constitution of Employees' Insurance Courts, the qualifications of persons who may be appointed Judges thereof, and the conditions of service of such Judges;

    (b) the procedure to be followed in proceedings before such Courts and the execution of orders made by such Courts;

    (c) the fee payable in respect of application made to the Employees's Insurance Court, the cost incidental to the proceedings in such Court, the form in which applications should be made to it and the particulars to be specified in such applications;

    (h) any other matter which is required or allowed by this Act to be prescribed by the State Government.

    (2) Rules made under this section shall be published in the Official Gazette and thereupon shall have effect as enacted in this Act.”

    R. 17 runs thus:

    “Limitations: 1. Every application to the Court shall be brought within 12 months from the date on which the cause of action arose or, as the case may be, the claim became due;

    Provided that the Court may entertain the application after the said period of 12 months if it is satisfied that the applicant has sufficient reasons for not making the application within the said period;

    2. Subject as aforesaid, the provisions of parts II and III of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall so far as may be, apply to every such application”

    The contention on behalf of the employer which found favour with Kailasam, J., and which is repeated before me is that limitation is a matter of procedure and, therefore, Rule 17 is valid if read long with S. 78 (2) and Ss. 98 (1) (b) and 96 (2). For the proposition that limitation is a rule of procedure, reliance is placed on the observations of the Full Bench of this Court in Kandaswami v. Kannappa(1). The question there was whether the period of 12 years prescribed under S. 48 C. P. Code for the last application for execution of the decree is absolute or is controlled by S. 15 (1) of the Indian Limitation Act which provides for exclusion of the period covered by stay or injunction. In that context the Full Bench held that both the Civil Procedure Code and the Limitation Act are co-enactments relating to procedure which have to be read together and that S. 15 (1) of the Limitation Act: would control S. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code.

    Dealing with this question Kailasam J. observed;—

    “Thus the Act is self-contained regarding the instituting commencement and the procedure to be followed by the Employees' Insurance Court rules of limitation are only rules of procedure and when the statute empowers the Government to frame Rules regarding the procedure to be followed in proceedings before the Employees Insurance Court, that includes the power also to prescribe the period of limitation. A rule of limitation may cease to be a mere procedure when it defeats the vested rights which bad already accrued The Corporation has no vested right to file an application whenever it chaoses. It cannot be said that the present rules in any way affect the vested rights. The statute authorises the State Government no frame rules regarding the procedure which includes the time before the applications should be filed. I hold that R 17 of the Madras Employees' Insurance Court Rules, 1951 is within the rule making power conferred on the Government by S. 96(2) of the Employees State Insurance Act”.

    The reason why I prima facie find myself unable to agree with Kailasam J. is that if it was the intention of the legislature that S. 78 (2) which says that ‘The employees' Insurance Court shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Government should govern also the period of limitation within which the application should be filed, we could reasonably expect it to have been provided for in S. 77, which deals with ‘commencement of proceeding’. S. 77 (2) provides “Every such application shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars and shall be accompanied by such fee, if any, as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Government in consultation with the Corporation.” It would have been the easiest and normal thing to say that it should be filed within such time as may be prescribed either by the Act or by the rules to be framed. S. 78 (2) seems, in my opinion, to have more appropriatness with reference to the procedure to be followed by the Employees' State Insurance Court after the application is filed. It has to be read in conjunction with Sub-S,. (I) to S. 78, which deals with the powers of the Employees” Insurance Court, regulating the procedure for the enquiry of the applications before it after they have been instituted. The question whether an application is filed within time is one anterior to the stage for the provision as made in S. 78, and is one for which we could more legitimately expect a provision to be made in the earlier S. 77. In this connection it is relevant to note that some of the sections in the Act itself have specifically provided periods of limitation. Thus S. 80 of the Act says:—

    ‘Benefit not admissible unless claimed in time:

    An Employees' Insurance Court stall not direct the payment of any benefit to a person unless he has made a claim for such benefit in accordance with the regulations made in that behalf, within twelve months after the claim became due;

    Provided that, if the Court is satisfied that there was reasonable excuse for not making a claim for the benefit within the twelve months after it became due, it may direct the payment of the benefit as if the claim had been made in tome.”

    Similarly, S. 82 of the Act runs:

    “Appeal: (1) Save as expressly provided in this section, no appeal shall lie from an order of an Employees* Insurance Court.

    (2) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court, if it involves a substantial question of law.

    (3) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days.

    (4) The provisions of Ss. 5 and 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (XL of 1908) shall apply to appeals under this section.1’

    This shows that it is not as if the legislature was unaware of the necessity of providing for periods of limitation where it thought fit to do so.

    S. 96 (1) (b) must be interpreted in the same manner as S. 78 (2) just as S. 98 (1) (c) has to be interpreted in the light of S. 77(2). In this view of the matter S. 96 (1) (b) cannot enlarge the scope of S. 78 (2). S. 96 (2) on which reliance has been placed cannot really help the appellant because it only means that the rule made in S. 96 (1) shall have effect as if enacted in the Act and, therefore, he must fall back upon S. 96 (1). S. 96 (1) (h) cannot be of much assistance to the appellant because apart from S. 78 (2), S. 77 itself does not say that the priod of limitation should be prescribed by the State Government. In some enactments we find that without prejudice to the particular matters specified as subjects on which rules could be made by the Government, the Government may make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act and its objects. If such a provision has found place in S. 96, it may be arguable that there is a power for prescribing the period of limitation, but unfortunately such a general power has not been vested in the Government under S. 96 (1). Under 96 (1) rules on particular matters alone can be framed by the State Government and even S. 96 (1) (h) though it is rather general in scope, permits the State Government to make rules only in respect of a matter which is required or allowed by the Act to be prescribed by the State Government. But, if on a true construction of Ss. 77 and 78 of the Act, limitation is not such a matter, R. 96 (1) (h) cannot enable the Government to make a rule about limitation.

    The result of this will no doubt be that there is a lacuna in the Act in respect of this matter—casus omissus as it is called. But with regard to this, a few observations may be made. The first is that while an Act should be so construed as to avoid if possible casus omissus still, we should not strain the language of the Act where the omission clearly appears. As the Privy Council has observed in connection with a different matter, in Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidators of Dehra Dun etc., Co..

    “It is either an application made within toe, or it is an application made for which no period of limitation is prescribed. The case may be a casus omissus. If it is be so, then it is for others than their Lordships to remedy the defect.”

    On behalf of the Corporation it can also be argued that while there may be some justification for imposing a limit of 12 months within which a claim for benefit should be made, it may not be right to impose such a time limit over a claim by the Corporation for contribution by the Employer particularly as the whole scheme depends on contributions by the Employer to a large extent. Anyway, it is a matter for the legislature to rectify by drafting the Act clearly. The business of the Court is to interpret the Act as it stands.

    It seems to me that in view of the considerations which I have outlined above, it is desirable that the matter is decided by a Bench. The matter is accordingly referred to a Bench. The papers will be placed before my Lord, the Chief Justice.

    (In purstance of the aforesaid Order of Reference, this Appeal coming on this day for hearing before this Bench (Anantanarayanan and Venkatadri JJ.) the Court delivered the following);

    JUDGMENT. (Delivered by Anantanarayanan J.)

    The civil miscellaneous appeal really involves brief question whether rule 17 framed by the Government under the Employees State Insurance Act of 1948 (The Madras Employees Insurance Court Rules 1951) is intra vires of the delegated powers of the State, or otherwise. The matter has come up on difference of opinion between two learned Judges of this Court, Kailasam J. and Venkataraman J. Venkataraman J. taking the view that this is a matter of a casus omissus in the Act itself, and hence there is no valid delegation of power to Government with regard of limitation, which would render the rule intra vires of the rulemaking powers of the State.

    We have heard the learned Counsel for the Employees (Messrs. Solar Works) learned Counsel for the Employees State Insurance Corporation, the learned Advocate General as Amicus curiae and learned Government Pleader. We have no doubt whatever that the view expressed by Venkataraman J. is correct, and that the rule, as it stands cannot be supported upon the delegation of powers conferred by the Act in favour of the State, in order to make rules for the purposes of the Act.

    The point is really quite simple, and may be precisely expressed in the following form. Where an Act itself does not provide for limitation with reference to a particular matter and the delegation of power to make rules is conferred by a section of the [Art which does not, expressly or impliedly, relate to the power to prescribe time, the authority to which the power is delegated, namely, the State in this case, cannot make a rule prescribing limitation. This is because, even under the Constitution [Act. 145 (1) (c)] where the Supreme Court is authorised to make rules for the practice and procedure of the Court, there is specific reference to a power to prescribe limitation for applications to Court. As the learned Advocate General rightly stresses, in the Government of India Act, 1935, list 3 entry 4, the power to prescribe limitation was included as part of the Civil Procedure, but a significant departure appears in list (3) entry (13) of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. There the power to prescribe limitation has been segregated. The learned Advocate General has also been at pains to furnish us with a table of Central and State Acts, all the particulars of which need not be reproduced here, which definitely proves that, where the rule-making power is conferred by a section of the Act, and it is contemplated that the rule-making authority might also prescribe limitation, there is a specific reference to the power to prescribe time, in some form or another, in the section concerned. It is sufficient for us to point out that there is an impressive list of the Central Acts exhibiting this uniform feature as well as at least ten or more Madras Acts, also having the same characteristic.

    When we turn to the matter actually in issue before us, we find further difficulties in adopting the view that the rule-making power generally conferred in the present case under S. 96 (b), namely, the power to make rules with regard to “the procedure to be followed in proceedings before such Courts and the execution of orders made by such Court” will, by necessary implication, includes the power to prescribe limitation. First of all, as the learned Advocate General has emphasised the liability under the Act to make the relevant contributions, the failure to make which has led to the application by the employees of the Corporation in this case, is primarily that of the employer. Actually, the default in this respect might be brought to the notice of the Corporation only if an individual case arose, and if there is to be a strict rule of limitation in this behalf, as envisaged by rule 17, the result may constitute very great hardship to the employees and their organisation, and deprivation of the benefits. Again, it is noteworthy that S. 96 (b) which we have just re-produced does not refer, in any sense, to a power to prescribe time, or to lay down any rule of limitation. In the light of the tentency shown in recent times, not to consider the power to prescribe limitation as merely a part of procedural provisions at least so far as legislative competence is concerned, we agree with the argument of the learned Advocate General that S. 96 (b) will not authorise the State Government to make a rule for limitation, as for instance rule 17 which is now in controversy. The learned Government Pleader for the State has offered no arguments to counter this contention. Hence, we agree with Venkataraman J. that rule 17, as it stands, is ultra vires of the rule-making power of the State, and that, in the present case, the application by the employees of the State Insurance Corporation is not time barred in any sense, and needs no condonation. The C.M.A is dismissed accordingly. In the circumstances we direct that the parties will bear their own costs.

    V.C.S

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    Comments

    Messrs. Solar Works, Madras-1 v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Madras And Another.
    (Oct 4, 1963)