Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal is brought by the plaintiff (appellant) against a judgment of the District Judge, Ramanathapuram, which was reversed by the lower appellate Court. The underlying facts are:

  • Defendants 2 and 3 obtained a decree dated 16-7-1956 against the appellant.
  • In execution of that decree, the suit property was put up for sale; a stranger (the first defendant/purchaser) bought the property at a sale held on 25-3-1957, confirmed on 4-6-1957.
  • The appellant instituted the suit in October 1957 seeking a declaration that the sale was fraudulent and void, and for a preventive injunction or alternatively for recovery of possession.
  • The appellant's case was that, although the execution petition was filed within two years of the decree (so no notice under Order XXI Rule 22 was required), the proceedings to settle the proclamation were conducted without giving him the notice required by Order XXI Rule 66; the process-server allegedly did not properly serve notice but only affixed it to the outer door of the appellant's house.
  • The trial Court found that there had been no effective service for settlement of proclamation, held the sale to be fraudulent and void, and granted possession to the appellant.
  • On appeal the lower appellate Court concluded that affixture (even if the server had gone to the house) was an improper service amounting to a material irregularity — a matter for Order XXI Rule 90 — and that the appellant's remedy was under Rule 90; since he had not pursued that remedy, the suit was dismissed. The appellant has challenged that decision in this second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a failure to give the judgment-debtor the notice required by Order XXI Rule 66 (in proceedings for settlement of proclamation) renders an execution sale a nullity (i.e., void for want of jurisdiction) or is merely a material irregularity remediable only under Order XXI Rule 90.
  2. If Rule 90 does not apply, what is the proper procedural remedy — a suit for declaration of voidness or an application under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code — and which Article of the Limitation Act governs such remedy?
  3. Whether a failure to give notice under Rule 66 (when it is the first notice to the judgment-debtor) is equivalent to a failure to give notice under Order XXI Rule 22 (which has been held elsewhere to be jurisdictional), and therefore whether such failure defeats the Court's jurisdiction to sell.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Order XXI Rule 90 does not apply to breaches of Rule 66 (settlement of proclamation); Rule 90 is confined to material irregularity or fraud in "publishing or conducting" the sale, and the proceedings to settle the proclamation fall outside that scope.
  • Where the execution petition is filed within two years (so Rule 22 notice is not required), the first notice that a judgment-debtor receives is Rule 66. If that first notice is not given, the judgment-debtor may remain wholly unaware of execution proceedings and this failure should be treated as jurisdictional (akin to failure under Rule 22), rendering the sale a nullity rather than a mere irregularity.
  • Cited authorities and obiter (including Karunakarun Nair v. Chathu) support the view that when Rule 66 is the first notice and it is not given, the sale may be a nullity.
  • Since the sale is void, the remedy is not to set it aside under Rule 90 but to seek a declaration of voidness and recovery of possession; limitation in that situation is governed by Article 181 (not Article 166), and precedent supports this position.

First Defendant — Purchaser's Arguments

  • The lower appellate Court's view was that service by affixture was a material irregularity (not an illegality) and therefore Rule 90 was the appropriate remedy; the suit was not maintainable because the appellant did not pursue Rule 90 relief.
  • Alternatively, counsel for the purchaser submitted that the appellant's remedy, even if not Rule 90, was by application under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and not by suit; and that, if treated as an application, limitation under Article 166 (or timing under the Limitation Act) might bar the relief on the facts of this case.
  • The purchaser's counsel also argued that the stranger-purchaser may be regarded as representative of the judgment-debtor and so Section 47 might govern the proceedings impugning the sale.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Neelu Nethiar v. Subramania Moothan, 11 Mad LW 59 (AIR 1920 Mad 481) Held that objection that notice under Order XXI Rule 66(2) was not given to some judgment-debtors before drawing proclamation is not a matter relating to publication or conduct of sale within the meaning of Order XXI Rule 90. The Court followed this view and used it to hold that Rule 90 does not provide the appellant's remedy for a breach of Rule 66 in the settlement of proclamation.
Jagannatha v. Perumal (and others) — reference to judgment by Govinda Menon and Ramaswami, JJ. On facts where execution petition was filed within two years but no notice of execution petition was actually given, the Court held service under Order XXI Rule 22 was a condition precedent to jurisdiction to sell; failure rendered sale invalid for want of jurisdiction. The Court relied on the principle that absence of required notice can be jurisdictional and cited this case in discussing whether a failure to give Rule 66 notice (when it is the first notice) should be treated similarly.
Karunakarun Nair v. Chathu, 1956-1 Mad LJ 47 (AIR 1956 Mad 231) Panchapakesa Aiyar, J. (obiter) suggested that rare cases may arise where failure to issue notice under Order XXI Rule 68 (or Rule 66 contextually) might make a sale, held without the judgment-debtor knowing of proclamation, a nullity; though many such sales could be set aside under Rule 90 for irregularity if prejudice not established. The Court expressed concurrence, with respect, with the obiter dictum that where Rule 66 notice is the first notice and none is given so the debtor never knows, the sale may be a nullity; it relied on this to support the conclusion that the present sale was void.
Vasudeva Kavu Patteri v. Marti Naicka (citation referenced) Observed that Rules 54, 66, 67, 68 and 72 are enacted to fetch the best price; failure to observe them could render subsequent sale illegal and Rule 90 provides remedy; Rule 92 bars collateral attack. The Court cited this to note that Rule 90 is intended to cover many breaches related to publication/conduct of sale, but nevertheless held that Rule 90 did not extend to irregularities in settlement of proclamation under Rule 66 as in the present case.
Rajagopala Iyer v. Ramanujachariar, ILR 47 Mad 288 (AIR 1924 Mad 431) (Full Bench) When a sale in execution was inoperative and void, an application by a judgment-debtor to have it declared void and for reliefs is governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act, not Article 166. The Court relied on this precedent to determine the applicable limitation article (Article 181) where a sale is void and not merely voidable.
Veeraraghavayya v. Venkataraghavareddi, 1917-2 Mad LJ 468 (AIR 1948 Mad 226) (Full Bench) Affirmed the principle that when a sale in execution is inoperative and void, relevant limitation is Article 181 (not Article 166) for reliefs seeking declaration of voidness and consequential reliefs. Used to support the Court's conclusion on limitation applicable to a suit seeking declaration and possession where the sale is held void.
Ramanna v. Nallaparaju (Supreme Court) — referenced Held that when a sale in execution was inoperative and void an application by a judgment-debtor to have it declared void and for reliefs was governed by Article 181. The Court cited this Supreme Court ruling to reinforce that Article 181 governs actions where execution sales are inoperative and void.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the findings of the trial Court and the lower appellate Court and by interpreting the scope of Order XXI Rule 90 in relation to Rule 66:

  1. Findings on service:
    • The trial Court had disbelieved the process-server and found there was effectively no service of the notice in the proceedings for settlement of the proclamation; it regarded the sale as fraudulent and void.
    • The lower appellate Court accepted that affixture was not proper service and treated the defect as a material irregularity remediable under Rule 90; it therefore held the suit inappropriate.
    • This Court preferred the trial Court's appreciation of the process-server's evidence and agreed there was no service of the Rule 66 notice.
  2. Scope of Rule 90 versus Rule 66:
    • The Court analysed the language of Rule 90 ("material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting [a sale]") and the structure of Order XXI (separate rules for settlement of proclamation and for publication of sale).
    • While acknowledging that an argument could be made that "publishing" might include settlement of proclamation, the Court concluded that Rule 90 cannot be extended to cover irregularities in settlement of proclamation under Rule 66.
    • The Court relied on the Division Bench decision in Neelu Nethiar v. Subramania Moothan to support the conclusion that objections to absence of Rule 66 notice are not matters within Rule 90's ambit.
  3. Whether absence of Rule 66 notice can be jurisdictional:
    • The Court considered whether absence of Rule 66 notice (when it is the first notice to the judgment-debtor because Rule 22 notice is not required) should be treated as a condition precedent to jurisdiction, analogous to failures under Rule 22 as indicated in Jagannatha.
    • The Court expressed agreement with the obiter in Karunakarun Nair that in "rare cases" where Rule 66 is the first notice and the judgment-debtor never becomes aware of the proclamation or sale, the sale may be a nullity and not a mere irregularity.
    • On that understanding, and given the finding of no service, the Court held that the present sale was void for want of the requisite notice under Rule 66.
  4. Remedial and limitation consequences:
    • Because the Court concluded the sale was void (not merely voidable), it did not require setting aside under Rule 90 nor an application to set aside; the suit seeking a declaration that the sale was fraudulent and void and for possession was appropriate.
    • The Court addressed the purchaser's contention that the remedy should be under Section 47 CPC and that limitation under the Limitation Act would bar relief. The Court held that where the sale is void, Article 181 (not Article 166) applies — a position supported by Rajagopala Iyer and other authorities — and therefore limitation did not bar the appellant on the facts here.
    • The Court further noted that even if Section 47 were the proper procedural vehicle, the suit could be regarded as such an application and would be within time on the facts presented.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial Court are restored.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The execution sale is treated as void for want of service of the notice required by Order XXI Rule 66 (on the facts found), and the trial Court's decree in favour of the appellant for possession is restored. There will be no costs and no leave (as ordered by the Court).
  • Legal principle articulated by this opinion: Order XXI Rule 90 (remedy for material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting a sale) does not extend to cover material irregularities arising out of a breach of Rule 66 (proceedings for settlement of proclamation). In circumstances where Rule 66 notice is the first notice to the judgment-debtor and no notice is given so that the debtor never knows of the proclamation or sale, the sale may be a nullity rather than a mere irregularity.
  • Procedural consequence for remedies and limitation: Where an execution sale is held to be void (inoperative), relief may properly be sought by suit or appropriate application, and limitation for such a claim is governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act rather than Article 166 (as supported by cited precedents).

No information beyond the provided opinion has been added. All statements above reflect only the content and reasoning contained in the supplied judgment text.

    Ramalingam Pillai v. Sankara Iyer (Died) And Others.

    1. This second appeal by the plaintiff is against a reversing judgment of the District Judge, Ramanathapuram, and raises an interesting point of law. In execution of a decree obtained by defendants 2 and 3 against the appellant, the suit property was brought to sale and the first defendant, who was a stranger, was the purchaser The sale was on 25-3-1957, and was confirmed on 4-6-1957. The suit was instituted in October 1957, by the appellant for a declaration that the sale was fraudulent and void, and for a preventive injunction or in the alternative for recovery of possession. The appellant sought this relief on the ground that though the decree was passed on 16-7-1956, and no notice of the execution petition under Order XXI Rule 22 was required to be given to him, still, inasmuch as the settlement of the proclamation was without notice to him, contrary to the provisions of Order XXI Rule 66 C. P. C. the eventual sale in execution was a nullity, and that the failure to comply with the requirements of the said Rule 66 was not merely an irregularity. What appeared to have happened was that the decree-holders paid batta on 3-1-1957, and the process-server did not actually serve the notice in the proceedings settling the proclamation, but on 4-1-1957, he merely affixed the notice on the outer door of the appellant's house.

    The trial Court was not prepared to accept that the process server went to serve the appellant at all, and it found that the sale was fraudulent and the alleged service of notice was as good as no notice at all. On that view, the trial Court held the execution sale to be void and granted a decree to the appellant for possession. On appeal by the first defendant-purchaser, the lower appellate Court considered that the service of notice by affixture, even assuming that the process server went to the plaintiff's house, was not a proper service, and that this was a material irregularity and not an illegality which would render the sale null and void, and that, in such circumstances, the proper remedy of the appellant was to have filed a petition under Order XXI Rule 90 Civil Procedure Code and that, he having not done so, the suit did not lie. The lower appellate Court, therefore, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. That is how the plaintiff has come to this Court in second appeal.

    2. It is argued for the appellant that this is a case to which Order XXI Rule 90 will have no application, and that, therefore, the proper remedy is a suit. It is common ground that the execution petition which resulted in the sale was filed within 2 years of the date of the decree and that, therefore, no notice was required to be given to the judgment-debtor in the execution petition. It is also common ground that in the proceedings to settle the proclamation, notice is bound to be given to the judgment-debtor as required by Order XXI Rule 66. The finding of the lower appellate Court, as I mentioned, is that there was no proper service of notice on the appellant in those proceedings. Though the learned counsel for the purchaser wanted to attack this finding, in my view, the lower Appellate Court should have even gone further and agreed with the trial Court that there was no service at all of the notice in the proceedings for settlement of the proclamation. The lower appellate Court, without weighing the process-server's evidence, proceeded on the assumption that what he deposed was true. The trial Court appreciated his evidence and was not prepared to accept it. I think, in taking that view, the trial Court was right. If then there was no notice served upon the appellant under Order XXI Rule 66, the question directly arises as to whether the present suit is barred and that the appellant's only remedy was under Order XXI Rule 90. The argument for the appellant is that in terms that rule does not cover a breach of Rule 66, as Rule 90 is confined to setting aside sale on the ground of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it.

    It is said that the words "'publishing or conducting it" will not cover the proceedings for settlement of the proclamation. In one sense, it may appear that material irregularity in publishing a sale may take in the first step of settlement of a proclamation. This view may also appear to be supported by the fact that the whole set of rules, from Rule 64 to Rule 104, is preceded by the heading "Sale Generally". But, on a closer examination, I am inclined to the view that the words "material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducing it" cannot be extended to the material irregularity arising out of a breach of the requirement of Rule 66. Separate sets of rules arc framed under Order XXI, one set relating to settlement of proclamation and the other to the manner of publication of a proclamation of sale. Nevertheless, Rule 90 speaks of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting a sale. The rule, to my mind, will not, therefore, cover any irregularity in the settlement of proclamation. That 1 find is also the view of a Division Bench of this Court in Neelu Nethiar v. Subramania Moothan, 11 Mad LW 59 : (AIR 1920 Mad 481). The learned Judges there held that an objection to an execution sale on the ground that before the drawing up of the proclamation, the notice required to be given under Order XXI Rule 66 (2) Civil Procedure Code was not given to some of the judgment-debtors was not a matter relating to the publication or conduct of the sale within the meaning of Order XXI Rule 90. Following this view of the scope of Rule 90, I hold, disagreeing with the lower appellate Court, that the remedy of the appellant was not under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Civil Procedure Code.

    3. A second argument for the appellant is that where execution is levied within 2 years of the date of the decree and therefore no notice of the execution petition is required to be given under Order XXI Rule 22, service of notice in the proceedings for settlement of proclamation is a condition for jurisdiction to execute the decree by bringing the judgment-debtor's properties to sale. No direct authority has been brought to my notice on this point. In Jagannatha v. Perumal, Govinda Menon and Ramaswami, JJ., held that the jurisdiction to sell a property could arise in a Court only where the owner was given notice of the attachment and sale. On facts, it was found in that case that though the execution petition was filed within two years of the date of the decree, no notice was actually given of the execution petition to the judgment-debtor. In such circumstances, the learned Judges took the view that service of notice as required by Order XXI Rule 22 was a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with the execution and that failure to observe that rule and serve notice was not merely an irregularity, but would render the sale itself invalid as one without jurisdiction.

    Learned counsel for the appellant contends that where the execution does not fall within the scope of Order XXI Rule 22, the first notice the judgment-debtor could get of an execution petition is under Order XXI Rule 66 and that if this first notice in such an execution is not given to the judgment-debtor, there is no means by which do should know the proceedings and that such a case should be equaled to the case of a failure to give notice under Order XXI Rule 22. In support, relianee is placed upon an obiter dictum in the judgment of Panchapakesa Aiyar, J., in Karunakarun Nair v. Chathu, 1956-1 Mad LJ 47 : (AIR 1956 Mad 231). That was also a case where no notice was given under Order XXI Rule 66. But the learned Judge was inclined to think that nevertheless the judgment-debtor had knowledge of the execution by some other means. On that ground, he held that there was no prejudice by a breach of Order XXI Rule 66. In the course of his judgment, the learned Judge observed:

    "...... there may be some rare eases where failure to issue a notice under Order 21 Rule 68 Civil Procedure Code to the judgment-debtor may make a sale held, without his knowing at all about any such proclamation of the sale, a nullity, though, in almost all these cases, the sales can also be set aside under Order 21 Rule 90 Civil Procedure Code for irregularity and consequent injury."

    The learned Judge went on:-

    "Thus, where a notice under Order 21 Rule 22 Civil Procedure Code is not required, as the execution petition is filed within two years of the decree and where the notice under Order 21 Rule 66 is the very first notice which will go to the judgment-debtor, and such notice is not issued and the proclamation is drawn up and the sale held without the judgment-debtor being ever aware of the proclamation or the sale, then the sale for held will be a nullity and it will not be a case of mere irregularity and any knowledge about the sale or sale proclamation after the sale is over will not alter the matter."

    With this view of the learned Judge, I am inclined, with due respect, to concur, though the point did not arise in that ease for decision on the facts found in it. It is generally true that Rule 90 is intended to cover practically all cases of breach of the rules relating to the conduct and publishing of execution sales. As was pointed out in Vasudeva Kavu Patteri v. Marti Naicka, . Rules 54, 66, 67, 68 and 72 are pro visions which have been enacted for the purpose of fetching the best price possible and if there was a failure to observe any one of them the safe following thereon could in one sense be said to be illegal because illegality consists in, the violation of an express provision of law and that for such illegalities Rule 90 provided for a remedy and Rule; 92 prohibits such matters from being made a ground of attack in collateral proceedings by way of a suit. That was, however, not a case where the sale was treated as a nullity. The learned Judges in that case did not hold that rule 90 would also cover cases of the kind here in question.

    4. Both on the ground that Rule 90 does not cover this case and on the ground that the sale for want of notice under Order XXI Rule 66 was a nullity, I am inclined to the view that the proper remedy of the appellant was not under the former rule.

    5. Sri K. S. Desikan for the purchaser has strongly pressed upon me that even on the assumption that Rule 90 did not cover a failure to give notice under Rule 66 in such circumstances, the appellant's remedy was in any case an application Under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and not a suit. His further argument is that, though a suit could, Under Section 47(2), be permitted to be converted into an application under that Section, it would, on the facts of this case, be out of time under Article 166 of the Limitation Act. This contention is urged on the supposition that the sale was not a nullity, but was effected by a mere irregularity and was therefore only voidable and such a sale was required to be set aside. It is also stated that any such question will be matter relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree I have already held that the sale in this case was void. That being the case, it did not require to be set aside. As a matter of fact. the suit itself was not for setting aside the sale, but for a declaration that the sale was fraudulent and void.

    In fact, the appellant need not have asked for such a declaration but straightaway sought to re cover possession on an application that the sale was void in the particular circumstances In such circumstances, even granting that the proper remedy of the appellant was Under Section 47, the article that would be applicable is 181 and not Article 100. So much appears to be well settled so far as this Court is concerned. See Rajagopala Iyer v. Ramanujachariar, ILR 47 Mad 288 (AIR 1924 Mad 431) (FB) and Veeraraghavayya v. Venkataraghavareddi, 1917-2 Mad LJ 468 : (AIR 1948 Mad 226 (FB)) In Ramanna v. Nallaparaju, (S) the Supreme Court also ruled that when a sale in execution was inoperative and void an application by a judgment-debtor to have it declared void and for appropriate reliefs was governed by Article 181 and not Article 166

    6. Mr K. S. Desikan argued the point that limitation on the basis that the appellant could have resorted to Section 17 Learned counsel con tended that the stranger-purchaser was but a re presentative of the judgment-debtor and the question as to the validity of the execution sale was one, therefore, falling within the scope of Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. On the view I have expressed on limitation, this question does not require to be decided for purposes of this appeal. Even if the remedy of the appellant is only Under Section 47, the suit, regarded as one such application, was well within time.

    7. The second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court arc set aside and those of the trial Court are restored In the circumstances, there will be no costs. No leave.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ramalingam Pillai v. Sankara Iyer (Died) And Others.
    (Nov 18, 1963)