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Ayyamperumal Chettiar Died And Ors. v. Palaniandi Chettiar

Madras High Court
Jul 11, 1958
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Second Appeal challenges the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Tiruchirappalli in A.S. No. 31 of 1954, which reversed the decree of the District Munsif of Kulitalai in O.S. No. 499 of 1950.

The factual matrix presented in the opinion is as follows (as stated in the text):

  • The appellant-plaintiff had earlier instituted O.S. No. 494 of 1945 on two promissory notes (Rs.150 and Rs.160) dated 5-9-1938 and 6-3-1939 against Meenakshisundaram Pillai and his undivided sons, obtained a decree and in execution attached the suit properties.
  • The respondent-defendant, claiming to be a mortgagee of the attached properties from Sellathammal (the daughter of Meenakshisundaram Pillai), filed claim proceedings in E.A. No. 441 of 1949. That claim was allowed in the summary claim proceedings.
  • The present suit (the one giving rise to the second appeal) was filed by the plaintiff to set aside the claim order made in E.A. No. 441 of 1949. The core factual dispute concerned whether the partition and subsequent transfers were intended to defeat creditors and whether the respondent's mortgage was bona fide.
  • The District Munsif found the partition unfair, the transfers to the daughter to be a device to screen property from creditors (not a bona fide sale), and the mortgage in favour of the defendant to be a make-believe transaction; accordingly he set aside the claim order and decreed for the plaintiff.
  • The Subordinate Judge agreed with the District Munsif's factual findings but disagreed on a point of law, noting that a Madras decision (Madina Bibi Sahiba v. Ismail Durga Association, A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 789) should have been considered; as a result the Subordinate Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.
  • The plaintiff appealed to the present court (the second appeal), challenging the appellate court's reversal and arguing for restoration of the District Munsif's decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the claim order made in E.A. No. 441 of 1949 (allowing the respondent's claim) was liable to be set aside on the facts alleged (partition and sale being a device to defeat creditors and the mortgage being a make-believe transaction).
  2. Whether a suit brought under Order 21, Rule 63, Civil Procedure Code by an attaching creditor to set aside a transfer must be brought in a representative capacity under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act when the transfer is alleged to have been made with intent to defeat or delay creditors.
  3. Whether, when the suit is in substance an action under Section 53, the trial court should allow amendment to bring the suit into conformity with Section 53 and Order 1, Rule 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  4. Whether equitable reliefs or other equitable considerations should be applied to persons who may lose the benefit of their bargain (for example, a transferee who acquired title) and, if so, in what manner.
  5. Whether the appellate court's dismissal should be sustained given the facts and the legal principles governing representative suits, sham transactions and amendment.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Madina Bibi Sahiba v. Ismail Durga Association, A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 789 Cited as a Madras decision relevant to the point of law on whether a suit under Order 21, Rule 63 must be representative in certain circumstances. Not brought to the notice of the District Munsif; the appellate court noted its relevance when assessing the point of law.
Guljar Khan v. Husen Khan, A.I.R. 1937 Bom. 476 Cited among decisions relevant to whether a decree-holder's suit under Order 21, Rule 63 must be representative. Referenced by the District Munsif and discussed by the appellate court in the context of conflicting authorities.
Jaina Muhammad Sheriff Maraclar v. Official Assignee, Madras (1945) 2 M.L.J. 318; A.I.R. 1945 Mad. 25 Cited as supporting the principle that a suit under Order 21, Rule 63 to avoid a transfer made to defeat creditors is in substance an action under Section 53 and should normally be representative. Used as authority for the proposition that such suits should be brought in representative form and for allowing amendments where necessary.
Seth Nandaramdas Atmaram v. Zulika Bibi (1943) 2 M.L.J. 1; A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 128 Cited as part of the body of decisions about representative suits under Order 21, Rule 63 and Section 53. Included among the decisions the court relied on to state the governing principles.
Pethuraju Kone v. T. Muthuswami Ayyar (1941) 2 M.L.J. 784; A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 128 Cited as an authority relevant to the subject matter of representative suits and avoidance of transfers to defeat creditors. Included among the body of authority from which the court deduced principles.
Faquir Bux v. Thakur Prasad, A.I.R. 1941 Oudh 457 Listed among cases relevant to the principles governing suits to avoid transfers made to defeat creditors. Cited as part of the series of decisions supporting the legal propositions set out in the opinion.
Deokali v. Ramdevi, A.I.R. 1941 Rang. 76 Listed as part of the case law addressing representative suits and avoidance of transfers. Relied on collectively with other decisions to explain the legal position.
Shrimal (Shri Mai) v. Hiralal, A.I.R. 1938 Bom. 289 Cited as an example of authority concerning whether a suit seeking to avoid a transfer as sham must be representative. Referenced in the court's exposition distinguishing cases that require representative suits from those that do not.
Girraj v. Sankatha Prasad, A.I.R. 1938 Oudh 33 Cited among decisions relevant to the principles under Order 21, Rule 63 and Section 53. Included in the list of cases from which the court deduced principles governing representative suits.
Ekkari Ghose v. Sideswar Ghose, A.I.R. 1936 Cal. 783 Listed among authorities on representative suits and avoidance of fraudulent transfers. Used as part of the body of authority supporting the court's legal exposition.
Nagappa v. Arunachalam, A.I.R. 1934 Rang. 250 Cited as part of the jurisprudence dealing with avoidance of transfers and representative actions. Included among precedents informing the court's summary of principles.
Radhika Mohan v. Hari Bashi, A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 812 Noted in the opinion for the principle that a suit not meant to benefit all creditors is not a suit under the section and need not be representative. Cited to support the proposition that some suits under Order 21, Rule 63 need not be representative where they do not aim to avoid a transfer to defeat creditors.
Ranganayakamma v. Jagayya, A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 666 Included among decisions from which principles about representative suits are deduced. Part of the collective authority relied upon in the court's exposition.
Sri Thakurji v. Narsingh Narain Singh, A.I.R. 1921 Pat. 53 Listed as an earlier decision on matters related to representative suits and avoidance of transfers. Included in the court's compilation of relevant authorities.
Puthia Purayil Pokker v. Kunhammad (1919) 36 M.L.J. 231; I.L.R. 42 Mad. 143 Cited among early cases relevant to the treatment of suits seeking avoidance of transfers. Referred to as part of the historical body of precedent informing the court's legal position.
Arumuga (Arumugha) Mudaliar v. Krishnaswami Naicker, (1913) 42 Ind. Cas. 498; A.I.R. 1918 Mad. 697 Cited among divergent authorities on whether a creditor must sue in representative capacity. Included in the opinion's discussion of historical conflict of authority.
Palaniyandi Chetty v. Appavu Chettiar, (1916) 30 M.L.J. 565; A.I.R. 1917/1919 Mad. 519 Cited in the discussion of whether a judgment-creditor must sue in representative form; noted for varying judicial views. Included as part of the cases reflecting differing approaches on the representative requirement.
Waman Ramakrishna v. Ganpat Mahadeo, A.I.R. 1936 Bom. 10 Listed among decisions relevant to the subject matter of representative suits and avoidance of transfers. Part of the body of precedent the court cited in outlining the legal landscape.
Mt. Baskuer v. Gaya Municipality, A.I.R. 1939 Pat. 138 Cited for the proposition that a transferee after the order in claim proceedings is an alienee pendente lite and need not be impleaded separately. Cited in the court's exposition on parties necessary in suits under Order 21, Rule 63.
Md. Asgar Ali v. Md. Ishaq Ali, A.I.R. 1940 All. 72 Included among decisions showing instances where representative character is not required. Part of the collective authorities relied upon by the court.
Prabhu Math Prasad v. Sarju Prasad, A.I.R. 1940 All. 407 Cited as authority for the proposition that when the transfer is sham or fictitious the suit need not be representative. Used in the court's discussion distinguishing sham transfers from those requiring representative relief.
Harchandrai v. Gopaldas, A.I.R. 1939 Sind 177 Cited for the proposition that transferee and judgment-debtor are necessary defendants in a suit under Order 21, Rule 63. Referenced in relation to necessary parties in such suits.
Hrishikesh Sanyal v. A.P. Bagchi, A.I.R. 1940 Lah. 497 Cited as an example concerning alienee pendente lite and party impleading. Included among authorities demonstrating procedural principles.
Lala Hakim Lai v. Mooshahar Sahoo, (1907) I.L.R. 34 Cal. 999 Listed among decisions historically taking the view that a creditor should sue in a representative character. Part of the historical survey of conflicting judicial views used by the court.
Shantilal v. Munshilal, (1932) I.L.R. 56 Bom. 595 Included in the survey of cases on whether representative character is required. Part of the body of precedent informing the court's historical exposition.
Puthiyapurayil Pokker v. Chandrakandi Kunhamad (1918) 36 M.L.J. 231; A.I.R. 1919 Mad. 257 Cited as authority taking the view that a creditor need not sue in representative character in some instances. Cited in the discussion of authorities that permit non-representative suits in specific circumstances.
Dhansukhdas v. Zangoo, A.I.R. 1920 Nag. 80 Included among cases that did not require representative suits in certain contexts. Part of the historical authorities the court summarizes.
Namsimham v. Narayana Rao, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 66 Cited among cases discussing the representative requirement and its exceptions. Referenced in the court's overview of conflicting precedent.
R.R.O.O. Chettiyar Firm v. Ma Seinyin, A.I.R. 1928 Rang. 1 Cited as authority for the view that a judgment-creditor whose attachment has been raised need not sue in representative character. Included to demonstrate judicial variance on the representative question.
Sunder Singh v. Ramnath, A.I.R. 1926 Lah. 167 Cited concerning the requirement in Lahore that a creditor should sue in representative capacity in certain circumstances. Used in the historical comparison of provincial approaches.
Lok Math v. ThakarDas, (1921) 71 Ind. Cas. 20 Cited as a case following the view that a suit under Order 21, Rule 63 need not always be representative. Referenced among authorities showing different approaches.
Budhermal v. Verharam, A.I.R. 1946 Sind 78 Cited for an expressed view that a creditor suing under Order 21, Rule 63 need not sue in representative capacity. Noted by the court as part of the range of judicial opinions on the point.
Suraji Bakhsh Singh v. Thakur Das, A.I.R. 1940 Oudh 200 Cited for the proposition that a creditor who does not know of other creditors need not bring a representative suit; defendant must object if there are other creditors. Used to support the court's statement about when representative form is not mandatory.
Chidambaram Chettiar v. R.M.A.R.S. Firm, A.I.R. 1934 Rang. 302 Cited to show that suits not involving avoidance of any transfer need not be representative. Referenced in the context of distinguishing which suits fall within Section 53/Order 21, Rule 63.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequence of factual recounting and legal analysis, summarized in the opinion and applied to the facts of the case:

  1. Factual findings at trial: The District Munsif concluded that the 1941 partition between Meenakshisundaram Pillai and his sons was unfair and implemented to defeat creditors; transfers to Sellathammal were intended to screen property from creditors and were not bona fide sales; the mortgage in favour of the defendant was a make-believe instrument and did not pass title. On that basis the District Munsif set aside the claim order (E.A. No. 441 of 1949) and decreed for the plaintiff.
  2. First appeal: The Subordinate Judge confirmed the District Munsif's factual findings but reversed on a point of law, observing that a relevant Madras authority (Madina Bibi Sahiba) had not been considered and concluding the defendant was not a bona fide mortgagee; he set aside the District Munsif’s decree and dismissed the suit.
  3. Legal principles considered: The court analyzed the interplay between Order 21, Rule 63 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. The court stated the appropriate test: where a suit brought under Order 21, Rule 63 is in substance an action under Section 53 (i.e., if on success the property would be made available to the general body of creditors), the action must be treated as an action under Section 53 and thereby typically brought in a representative capacity.
  4. The court also explained the policy reasons behind the representative requirement: to prevent multiplicity of suits, collusion between a particular creditor and the judgment-debtor, disorderly distribution of assets, and "each one for himself" outcomes—which Section 53 and corresponding insolvency provisions aim to prevent.
  5. Exceptions and practical considerations: The court noted that where there is only a single creditor who did not know and could not have known of other creditors, or where there is no evidence of other creditors, the suit need not strictly be representative. Further, if the suit is based on an allegation that the transfer is sham or fictitious, the suit need not be representative. The trial court should examine whether the suit ought to proceed in representative form and objections about lack of representative capacity must be raised in trial, not on appeal. Amendment to conform to Section 53 and Order 1, Rule 8 should be freely allowed when the substance of the suit requires it.
  6. Equitable considerations: The court recognized that equities may require relief to persons who lose the benefit of their bargain (donees, alienees, transferees) and that courts may fashion relief according to the nature and circumstances of the case.
  7. Application to the present facts: Applying those principles, the court concluded that the Subordinate Judge's dismissal could not be supported. The court held that the amendment applied for should be allowed and that the District Munsif's decree should be restored, subject to specified modifications to account for the absence of evidence of other creditors and to give due regard to equitable priorities in enforcement.
  8. Remedies and ordering approach: The court explained the priority in which the decree-holder should proceed: first against properties allotted to the father under partition; if unavailable, then against properties allotted to the sons other than the property alienated to the respondent; and only if no other properties are available, then against the property alienated to the respondent. The decree-holder must also proceed against the father and the two sons personally as provided in the decree before proceeding against the alienated property. Costs were apportioned so that each party would bear their own costs throughout the appeal.
  9. Miscellaneous: The court allowed C.M.P. No. 6029 of 1955 and dismissed the memorandum of cross-objections.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF THE LOWER APPELLATE COURT ARE SET ASIDE, AND THE DECREE AND JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT MUNSIF ARE RESTORED, SUBJECT TO THE MODIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE OPINION.

Immediate implications and specific consequences (as stated in the opinion):

  • The claim order in E.A. No. 441 of 1949 (in O.S. No. 494 of 1945) is to be set aside (i.e., the District Munsif's order setting aside that claim is restored).
  • It is declared that the suit property is liable to satisfy not only the decree debt in O.S. No. 494 of 1945 but also the debts, if any, of other creditors of the judgment-debtor — subject to the court's acknowledgment that there is no evidence on record before it of other creditors in this case.
  • The court imposed an enforcement priority: the decree-holder must first proceed (in the first instance) against properties allotted to the father under partition; failing that, against properties allotted to the sons other than the property alienated in favour of the respondent; and only if no such properties are available should the decree-holder proceed against the alienated property last. The decree-holder must also proceed against the father and the two sons personally (as provided for in the decree) before proceeding against the alienated property.
  • As the appeal arose because the appellant did not frame his suit on behalf of the general body of creditors, the court ordered that each party will bear their own costs throughout.
  • C.M.P. No. 6029 of 1955 was allowed and the memorandum of cross-objections was dismissed.

Broader legal implications:

The opinion restates and applies established principles regarding when a suit under Order 21, Rule 63 is in substance a suit under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore should be brought in a representative capacity; it also affirms the courts' power to allow amendment to conform to these requirements and to apply equitable principles to protect or limit the relief available to transferees. The opinion does not assert that it is establishing a novel precedent beyond applying and synthesizing existing authorities; rather, it applies the cited jurisprudence to the facts and restores the trial court decree subject to modification.

If any specific detail requested above is not found in the provided opinion text, it has not been added or inferred beyond what that text expressly contains.

Show all summary ...

1. This Second Appeal is preferred against the decree and judgment of the learned Subrodinate Judge of Tiruchirappalli in A.S. No. 31 of 1954, reversing the decree and judgment of the learned District Munsif of Kulitalai in O.S. No. 499 of 1950.

2. The facts are: The appellant plaintiff instituted O.S. No. 494 of 1945 on the foot of two promissory notes for Rs. 150 and Rs. 160, dated 5th September, 1938 and 6th March, 1939, respectively executed by one Meenakshisundaram Pillai and his undivided sons and obtained a decree against them and in execution thereof attached the suit properties. The respondent defendant claiming to be a mortgagee of the said properties from Sellathammal, the daughter of Meenakshisundaram Pillai, who in her turn claims to be the vendee from her brothers to whom it is alleged that these properties were allotted in the partition between them and their father in 1941, filed E.A. No. 441 of 1949. That claim was allowed. Thereupon the suit out of which this second appeal arises was filed to set aside that claim order and the question that arose for consideration was whether the claim order was liable to be set aside. The learned District Munsif found the partition between Meenkshi-sundaram Pillai and his sons was unfair and that valuable properties were given to the sons with a view to defeat and delay the rights of the creditors. He also found that the sons of Meenakshisundaram Pillai had transferred the properties to their sister with a view to screen the same from the creditors and that it was not a bonafide sale. He further held that the mortgage in favour of the defendant was only a make-believe affair and that no title passed to the defendant thereunder. Therefore, the learned District Munsif set aside the claim order and gave a decree to the plaintiff.

3. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge confirmed the findings of the learned District Munsif on the facts. He writes:

The cumulative effect of the aforesaid transactions is that it was a device adopted by Meenakshi sundaram to get his valuable property out of the reach of the creditors. I am therefore not satisfied that the defendant is bonafide mortgagee of thefsuit properties for valuable consideration. I am also satisfied that he has not been in possession. Therefore the claim order in E.A. No. 441 of 1948 is liable to be set aside.

4. Again, Though I agree with the learned District Munsif on the question of fact that the mortgage in favour of the defendant is a make-believe affair, I have to disagree with him on the point of law. It is unfortunate that the Madras decision Madina Bibi Sahiba v. Ismail Durga Association A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 789 was not brought to the notice of the learned District Munsif and therefore he was obliged to follow the ruling of the Bombay High Court, Guljar Khan v. Husen Khan A.I.R. 1937 Bom. 476.

5. Therefore, he allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. Hence this second appeal by the defeated plaintiff.

6. It is now well settled that where a suit is brought under Order 21, Rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, by an attaching creditor to establish his right to attach and bring to sale certain property by avoiding the transfer of the property on the ground that it had been made with intent to defeat his claim that suit may well in certain circumstances be in essence a suit under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. The test is that if the suit is under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and if the plaintiff succeeds in the action, the property claimed in the action would be available to the general body of creditors. If it would, then the action would in substance be an action under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. The primary object of an action under Section 53 is to make the assets of the transferee available to the general body of creditors. Otherwise there will be multiplication of suits and collusion between the particular creditor and the judgment-debtor and disorderly distribution of the assets of the, debtor and it would become a case of "each one for himself and the devil take the hindmost" and which it is the object of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property'Act and Sections 53 and 54 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, to prevent.

7. Therefore, when in any particular case there is only one creditor and that creditor did not know and could not know the existence of other creditors apd there is also no evidence showing the existence of a number of creditors, the suit filed for a declaration that the property sought to be proceeded against is liable to discharge that particular decree debt, need not strictly be filed in a representative capacity, because one creditor who merely resists the claim by a claimant in summary proceedings cannot be deemed to do it on behalf of other creditors. But even if the plaintiff is the only creditor, he can bring a representative suit for the benefit of or on behalf of all the creditors. Therefore, it is the duty of the trial Court to see whether the suit should be proceeded with in a representative capacity or not, apart from the fact that objection to the maintainability of the suit that it is not a suit in a representative capacity must be raised in the trial Court and not in appeal. That is why it is enjoined that amendment should be freely allowed to bring the suit in conformity with the requirements of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act if the Court considers that it is in substance an action under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is then open to the Court to give a declaration which would make the property available not only for the debt of the particular creditor resisting the claim but also for the general body of creditors of the transferor.

8. These principles are deducible from the following decisions:

Jaina Muhammad Sheriff Maracalr v. Official Assignee, Madras (1945) 2 M.L.J. 318 : A.I.R. 1945 1945 Mad. 25 : 58 Mad. L.W. 462 : (1945) Mad. W.N. 585, Seth Nandaramdas Atmaramv. Zulika Bibi (1943) 2 M.L.J. 1 : 56 Mad. L.W. 583 : (1943) Mad. W.N. 304 : A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 128 : (1941) Mad. W.N. 982,Pethuraju Kone v. T. Muthuswami Ayyar (1941) 2 M.L.J. 784 : A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 128 : (1941) Mad. W.N. 982, Faquir Buxv. Thakur Prasad A.I.R. 1941 Oudh 457 Deokali v. Ramdevi A.I.R. 1941 Rang. 76, Shrimal v. Hiralal A.I.R. 1938 Bom. 289, Girraj v. Sankatha Prasad A.I.R. 1938 Oudh 33, Ekkari Ghose v. Sideswar Ghose A.I.R. 1936 Cal. 783, Nagappa v. Arunachalam A.I.R. 1934 Rang. 250 (F.B.), Radhika Mohan v. Hari Bashi A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 812, Ranganayakamma v. Jagayya A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 666, Sri Thakurji v. Narsingh Narain Singh A.I.R. 1921 Pat. 53, Puthia Purayil Pokker v. Kunhammad (1919) 36 M.L.J. 231 : I.L.R. 42 Mad. 143, Arumuga Mudaliar v. Krishnaswami Naicker (1913) 42 Ind. Cas. 498 , Palaniyandi Chetty v. Appavu Chettiar (1916) 30 M.L.J. 565 and Waman Ramakrishna v. Ganpat Mahadeo A.I.R. (1936) Bom. 10.

9. The following two passages from the A.I.R. Commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure, Fifth Edition, at page 2427, and A.I.R. Commentaries on the Transfer of Property Act, Third Edition, page 705, are apposite:

When a suit is brought under this Rule (Order 21, Rule 63) by an attaching decree-holder to establish his right to attach and bring to sale certain property, and in order to succeed it is necessary to avoid a transfer of the property on the ground that the transfer has been made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of the transferor, the stiit must be brought in the form of a representative suit on behalf of or for the benefit of all the creditors of the transferor as provided in Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act as amended in 1929 and the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8, would be applicable to such a suit....But where the decree-holder's suit under this rule seeking to avoid a transfer in favour of the claimant is not based on such transfer having been made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of the transferor, the suit need not be a representative suit Shri Mai v. Hiralal A.I.R. 1938 Bom. 289, Guljarkhan v. Husenkhan A.I.R. 1937 Bom. 476, Mt. Baskuer v. Gaya Municipality A.I.R. 1939 Pat. 138 and Md. Asgar Ali v. Md. lshaq Ali A.I.R. 1940 All. 72. Thus, where the suit is based on the allegation that the transfer put forward by the other side is a sham, bogus or fictitious transaction, the case docs not come under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and the suit need not be brought in a representative character Prabhu Math Prasad v. Sarju Prasad A.I.R. 1940 All. 407. The transferee and the judgment-debtor, as transferor, will be necessary defendants in a suit under this rule by a decree-holder attacking an alienation of property by the judgment-debtor in favour of the successful claimant: Harchandrai v. Gopaldas A.I.R. 1939 Sind 177. It is not necessary to implead any transferee from the successful claimant after the order in the claim proceedings and before the institution of the suit, as such transferee must be held to be an alienee pendente lite Mt. Baskuer v. Gaya Municipality A.I.R. 1939 Pat. 138 and Hrishikesh Sanyal v. A.P. Bagchi A.I.R. 1940 Lah. 497.

In England a creditor who has not secured a judgment on his debt has to sue on behalf of himself and of all the other creditors of the transferor. But a creditor who has obtained a judgment on his debt may sue on his own behalf and not in a representative character.

In this country there was, in cases arising under the old section, a difference of opinion on the point. In some cases it was held following the English law, tnat a creditor should sue only in a representative character : Arumugha Mudaliar v. Krishnaswami Naicken A.I.R. 1918 Mad. 697; Lala Hakim Lai v. Mooshahar Sahoo (1907) I.L.R. 34 Cal. 999 ; Sri Thakurji v. Narsingh Narain Singh A.I.R. 1921 Pat. 53 ; Shantilal v. Munshilal (1932) I.L.R. 56 Bom. 595. In others, that this was not necessary; Puthiyapurayil Pokker v. Chandrakandi Kunhamad (1918) 36 M.L.J. 231 : A.I.R. 1919 Mad. 257; Palaniyandi Chetti v. Appavu Chettiar (1916) 30 M.L.J. 565 : A.I.R. 1919 Mad. 519; Dhansukhdas v. Zangoo A.I.R. 1920 Nag. 80 I Namsimham v. Narayana Rao A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 66. In a third class of cases, it was held that a judgment-creditor whose attachment has been raised and who is suing under Order 21, Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure could bring his suit otherwise than in a representative character ; R.R.O.O.Chettiyar Firm v. Ma Seinyin A.I.R. 1928 Rang 1. In Palaniyandi Chettiar v. Appavu Chettiar (1916) 30 M.L.J. 565 : A.I.R. 1917 Mad. 519 Coutts-Trotter, J., expressed the opinion that a judgment-Creditor who had not taken out execution could not invoke the provisions of this section at all. In Lahore to which Province this Act does not apply it was held that a suit by creditor should be brought in a representative capacity ; Sunder Singh v. Ramnath A.I.R. 1926 Lah. 167. The view that a suit under Order pi, Rule 63, by a judgment-creditor, whose attachment has been raised need not be in a representative character was followed in Lok Math v. ThakarDas (1921) 71 Ind. Cas. 20.

The last paragraph of Sub-section (1) now makes it quite clear that a suit by a creditor, whether he is a judgment-creditor or not and whether he has or has not applied for execution of decree, to avoid a transfer executed with intent to defeat or delay the creditors shall be brought in a representative capacity, that is to say, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Order 1, Rule 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure: Jaina Muhammad v. Official Assignee, Madras (1945) 2 M.L.J. 318 : I.L.R. (1946) Mad. 486. The reason of the rule is, firstly, that the debtor or the transferee should not be harassed by a multiplicity of suits, and, secondly, that the primary object of an action under this section is to make the assets of the transferor available to the general body of creditors. A view has been expressed in Budhermal v. Verharam A.I.R. 1946 Sind 78 that a creditor suing under Order 21, Rule 63, to establish his rights against the transferee from the judgment-creditor need not sue in a representative capacity.

It has been held by the Chief Court of Oudh that a creditor, who when proceeding under Order 21, Rule 63, does not know the existence of other creditors, is not bound to bring a representative suit and that it is for the defendant to object that there are other creditors and that a representative suit should be filed : Suraji Bakhsh Singh v. Thakur Das A.I.R. 1940 Oudh 200.

A suit which is not meant to be for the benefit of all the creditors is not a suit under this section and need not be brought in a representative capacityj: Radhika Mohan v. Hari Bashi A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 812. So also is a suit which does not involve the avoidance of any transfer : Chidambaram Chettiar v. R.M.A.R.S. Firm A.I.R. 1934 Rang. 302....

10. It is now well-settled that in a suit of this nature where on account of ignorance or misapprehension there is no prayer that the decree that may be passed should be for the benefit of all the creditors, amedment should be freely allowed even at a late stage.

11. The rule is also now well established that the Court may consider whether any relief on the ground of equitable considerations or equities as they are called, should be given to the person losing the benefit of his bargain, that is, a donee, devisee, alienee or any person deriving title or claiming title through him, as the case may be, and grant such relief as the nature and circumstances of the particular case may require.

12. Bearing these principles in mind, if we examine the facts of this case, we find that the dismissal of the suit by the learned Subordinate Judge cannot be supported and that the amendment applied for should be allowed and that the decree and judgment of the learned District Munsif should be restored subject to the modification that the decree setting aside the order in E.A. No. 441 of 1948 in O.S. No. 494 of 1945 be restored and that it shall be declared that the suit property is liable to satisfy not only the decree debt in O.S. No. 494 of 1945 but also the debts, if any, of the other creditors of the judgment-debtor, we have no evidence here regarding the existence of other creditors to defeat whose claims the alienation in question would have been made. In making this modification it must not be understood that I have come to the conclusion that there were other creditors because the evidence as at present on record shows that only the decree-holder in O.S. No. 494 of 1945 was intended to be defrauded. In addition, equities require that this decree-holder should first proceed in the first instance against the properties allotted to the father under partition and if such properties are not available for being proceeded against, then against the properties allotted to the sons in the partition other than the property alienated in favour of the respondent before me. If no such properties are available for being proceeded against, then the property alienated in favour of the respondent should be proceeded against last for the satisfaction of the decree in O.S No. 494 o 1945. The decree-holder in O.S. No. 494 of 1945 should also proceed last against the father and the 2 sons personally as provided for in the decree and then proceed last against the alienated property.

13. In the result, the decree and judgment of the lower appellate Court are set aside and the decree and judgment of the learned District Munsif are restored subject to the two modifications set out above. In as much as this appeal has been necessitated by the appellant not framing his suit, out of abundant caution, on behalf of the" general body of creditors, each party will bear his own costs throughout.

14. C.M.P. No. 6029 of 1955 is allowed and the memorandum of cross-objections dismissed.