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  • provisions of the Madras District Municipalities Act
  • S. 82(2) of the District Municipalities Act.
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citation codes
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  • provisions of the Madras District Municipalities Act
  • S. 82(2) of the District Municipalities Act.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent was the owner of a residential building (No. 57, South Vadambokki Street, Madurai). The Madurai Municipality (the petitioner) had been the tenant of that house until 1942 at a monthly rent of Rs. 60. Thereafter the owner rented the building to another tenant and, at one stage, the fair rent was fixed by the Rent Controller at Rs. 47 per month. In 1949 the plaintiff (respondent in this appeal) obtained possession for his son's occupation. On 16 July 1951 the house was let to Dr. Kaliappan.

The respondent claimed that a registered rent deed fixed the rent payable by Dr. Kaliappan at Rs. 75 per month. Prior municipal assessment for the building was Rs. 53-4-3 per half year (annual rental value taken as Rs. 526). For half-years in 1951–1952, the Commissioner proposed and confirmed a provisional enhancement to Rs. 226-12-6 per half year (annual rental value taken as Rs. 2240). The respondent appealed; the Municipal Council fixed the rental value at Rs. 120 per month and reduced the half-yearly assessment to Rs. 136. The sums were paid by the respondent under protest.

The respondent instituted a suit claiming a refund of Rs. 132-12-0, representing the difference between the assessment finally determined by the Municipal Council and what the plaintiff said should have been fixed on the basis of a Rs. 75 monthly rental. The Municipality pleaded that the suit was barred by S. 354 of the Madras District Municipalities Act.

The learned District Munsif upheld the Municipality's defence and dismissed the suit. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge set aside that decree and decreed the plaintiff's claim. The Municipality (defendant) applied under S. 115 C.P.C. to challenge the appellate court's judgment. The present opinion resolves that application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provisions of the Madras District Municipalities Act (including S. 82(2) and S. 354) had been complied with in substance and effect such that the bar in S. 354(2) operates to prevent the civil suit.
  2. Whether a civil court (on appeal under the ordinary civil procedure) may re-examine and decide the factual question of the actual rent received (and thereby determine the lawful municipal assessment), or whether that factual determination lies within the statutory authorities (Commissioner and Municipal Council).
  3. Whether the Commissioner and the Municipal Council had conducted a proper enquiry (including whether oral reports and investigations by Revenue Officers constituted substantial compliance with the statutory enquiry requirements).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent (Plaintiff) — principal arguments

  • The revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 C.P.C. has been invoked and the key question—whether there has been substantial compliance with the Act—is one of fact that must be determined by reference to the circumstances of the case.
  • Authorities (Municipal Council, Kakinada v. Standard Life Insurance Co. and Municipal Council, Kumbakonam v. Ralli Brothers) support the proposition that the question of substantial compliance is factual, and the appellate court's factual finding should not be disturbed.
  • The Subordinate Judge held that the assessment was made capriciously without considering materials placed by the plaintiff and that S. 82(2) had not been complied with in substance and effect; therefore S. 354(1) could not bar the suit.

Petitioner (Municipality) — principal arguments

  • The Municipality maintained that the suit was barred by S. 354 of the Madras District Municipalities Act.
  • The petitioner challenged the appellate court's finding, arguing that the Subordinate Judge adopted an incorrect approach by substituting the civil court's view of the correct rental value (treating the rent deed showing Rs. 75 as determinative) and thereby vitiating the finding on compliance with the Act.
  • It was urged that the civil court is not an appellate or revisional authority to determine the correct rental value or to reassess the statutory authority's factual conclusion; the appropriate forum for challenging a Commissioner's determination is the Municipal Council (and thereafter the statutory remedies available), not an ordinary civil suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Municipal Council, Kakinada v. Standard Life Insurance Co. Cited for the proposition that whether there has been substantial compliance with the Act is a question of fact to be determined by reference to the circumstances of the case. The precedent was relied upon by the respondent to support the appellate factual finding; the Court acknowledged the authority but held that the Subordinate Judge's approach in evaluating the materials was incorrect and vitiated his conclusion.
Municipal Council, Kumbakonam v. Ralli Brothers Reiterated the position that substantial compliance is a factual question. The precedent was cited by the respondent; the Court noted the point but reached the conclusion that the Subordinate Judge had wrongly treated the factual materials and therefore his finding could not stand.
Lakshmanan Chetti v. Municipal Council of Trichinopoly Contains Reilly J.'s observation that S. 354(2) was intended to provide real protection to the Municipal Council: when the Council has proceeded in accordance with the Act, no suit will lie against them even if their decision is wrong. The Court relied on this authority to emphasise that an incorrect assessment, if made in accordance with statutory procedure, does not permit a civil suit to be maintained merely because the assessor disagrees with the decision; this supported restoring the trial court's finding of compliance.
Narayana Chandra Dutt v. Chairman, Municipal Commissioner, Panipati The opinion mentioned the case but did not expand a general rule from it for present facts. The Court stated that this authority "can have no application to the facts in issue in the present case."
Secretary of State v. Meyyappa (Varadachariar J.) Establishes the principle that a statutory tribunal or authority which must decide as to the existence or non-existence of facts before acting under a statute acts within jurisdiction even though it may be wrong, and is immune from civil proceedings to quash that decision except as prescribed by the statute. The Court invoked this principle to underline that the Commissioner and Municipal Council, as statutory authorities deciding factual questions (such as the actual rent received), are performing functions within their jurisdiction and that their factual decisions are not ordinarily amenable to ordinary civil proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined whether the Subordinate Judge erred in concluding that there had been no substantial compliance with the Madras District Municipalities Act, and that therefore the bar in S. 354 did not apply.

The Court emphasised the proper division of functions between statutory authorities (the Commissioner and the Municipal Council) and civil courts. It held that it was not the province of a civil court to re-evaluate the materials placed before the statutory authorities and to decide, as if sitting in their stead, what the correct rental value was. The crucial factual question before the statutory authorities was the actual rent received by the plaintiff (whether Rs. 75, as the plaintiff claimed, Rs. 200 as the Revenue Officer alleged, or some intermediate figure such as Rs. 120 as fixed by the Municipal Council).

The Court analysed the procedural steps taken by the Commissioner and his officers: the Commissioner issued notice of proposed revision; there was an enquiry conducted in which the plaintiff's representatives participated and produced documents; the Revenue Officer (D.W.1) conducted further enquiries at the Commissioner's direction and reported orally that the rent collected was Rs. 200; the Commissioner discussed the Revenue Officer's findings before accepting them (Ex. B.7). The Court observed that the absence of a written report by the Revenue Officer did not, by itself, negate substantial compliance with the requirement that an enquiry take place.

The Court rejected the Subordinate Judge's conclusion that there had been "no proper enquiry." It held that the statutory authority to conduct the enquiry was the Commissioner, who had the power to depute his subordinate; the plaintiff had been given an opportunity to make representations; the Commissioner had received the Revenue Officer's enquiries and accepted the result after discussion. On those facts, the Court concluded there had been substantial compliance with the statutory enquiry requirement.

The Court further reasoned that even if the Commissioner or the Municipal Council reached an erroneous conclusion on the actual rent, that error, if made in accordance with statutory procedure, did not render the assessment ultra vires or open to collateral attack in a civil suit. The Municipal Council, as the appellate authority, had jurisdiction to determine the quantum of actual rent and did so (fixing Rs. 120). The civil court should not substitute its view for that of the statutory authorities.

The Court relied on established authority to the effect that S. 354(2) protects the Municipal Council when it has proceeded in the matter of assessment in accordance with the Act, and that a disappointed assessee cannot escape the statutory bar merely by describing the Council's action as arbitrary.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court set aside the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge and restored the decree of the learned District Munsif. The Court concluded that there had been real (substantial) compliance with the requirements of the Madras District Municipalities Act and that the statutory bar operated to preclude the civil suit. The petitioner (Municipality) was entitled to costs in this Court and in the lower appellate Court.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the respondent's appellate success was overturned; the trial court's dismissal in favour of the Municipality was restored and the Municipality was awarded costs.
  • The decision reinforces the principle that ordinary civil courts should not re-decide factual findings that fall within the primary domain of statutory authorities (Commissioner and Municipal Council) where those authorities have proceeded in accordance with statutory procedure.
  • The opinion treats errors of judgment by statutory authorities as insufficient, by themselves, to defeat the statutory bar (S. 354) if the statutory machinery and enquiry have been substantially complied with. The Court did not, in this opinion, articulate any new legal doctrine; it applied existing principles to the facts before it.

Judge's endorsement: V.C.S (as signed in the original opinion).

    The Madurai Municipality, Through Its Commissioner, Having His Office At The Municipal Buildings, Madurai Town v. K.N.K Jagannathier.

    The respondent was the owner of the residential building No. 57, South Vadambokki Street, Madurai. The petitioner) the Madurai Municipality, was the tenant of that house till 1942, and the monthly rent was Rs. 60. Thereafter it was rented by the owner to one Krishnier, and the fair rent for that building was fixed at Rs. 47 a month by the Rent Controller. In 1949, the plaintiff himself obtained possession of the house for the occupation of his son. Subsequently, on 16th July, 1951, the house was rented to Dr. Kaliappan. The respondent claimed that under the registered rent deed, the rent payable by the tenant Dr. Kaliappan was Rs. 75 a month. The municipal assessment of this building was Rs. 53-4-3 per half year, the annual rental value being taken as R. 526. For each of the half years in 19511952, the Commissioner of the Municipality proposed to enhance the assessment to Rs. 226-12-6 per half year, the annual rental value of the building being taken as Rs. 2240. That provisional assessment was confirmed by the Commissioner after notice to the respondent. The respondent appealed to the Municipal Council aid reiterated his contention, that the monthly rental value was only Rs. 75 and that the assessment should be on that basis. The Municipal Council fixed a rental value of Rs. 120 per month and reduced the half yearly assessment to Rs. 136. These amounts were apparently paid under protest.

    The respondent instituted the suit, out of which this application arises, claiming a refund of Rs. 132-12-0, which represented the difference between the assessment as finally determined by the Municipal Council and the assessment which, according to the plaintiff, should have been fixed on the footing that the real rental value of the building was Rs. 75 a month. The plea of the defendant Municipality was that the suit was barred under the provisions of S. 354 of the Madras District Municipalities Act.

    The learned District Munsif upheld that defence and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge set aside the decree of the trial Court and decreed the plaintiff's claim. It is the correctness of the appellate judgment that the defendant petitioner challenged by his application under S. 115, C.P.C

    The learned Subordinate Judge correctly posed the question for determination in appeal: “Whether the provisions of the Madras District Municipalities Act have not in substance and effect been complied with.” The finding of the learned District Munsif was the enhancement of the tax on the suit property was not ultra vires and illegal which in effect meant that the provisions of the Act had been complied with, and therefore, the ban imposed by S. 354(2) applied. That finding was not accepted by the learned Subordinate Judge. The learned Subordinate Judge recorded:

    “I have therefore no doubt, as to the assessment having been made capriciously without taking into consideration the materials placed by the plaintiff before the defendant and that therefore it is a case of non-compliance with the provisions of S. 82(2) of the Act in substance and effect and that S. 354(1) cannot therefore operate as a bar to the plaintiff coming forward with the suit.”

    The learned Counsel for the respondent (plaintiff) pointed out that it is the revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 C.P.C that has now been invoked. The learned Counsel urged that the question, whether there has been substantial compliance with the Act, is one of fact, which has to be determined with reference to the particular circumstances of the case. That was what was laid down in Municipal Council, Kakinada v. Standard Life Insurance Co.(1) and reiterated in Municipal Council, Kumbakonam v. Ralli Brothers (2). The learned Counsel therefore urged that even though the appellate Court differed on that question of fact from the trial Court, the finding of the appellate Court should not be disturbed in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

    The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that though the question posed for determination by the learned Subordinate Judge was correct, the approach the learned Judge adopted in aswering that question vitiated the finding, is, in my opinion, well founded. It was certainly not the province of the civil Court to decide on the material placed either before the statutory authorities or before the Court what was the correct rental value on the basis of which the assessment could be determined. The civil Court is neither an appellate nor revisional authority for that purpose. The learned Counsel for, the petitioner would appear to be well founded, when he urged that the learned appellate Judge's view, that the rent deed executed by Dr. Kaliappan, showing that the rent agreed upon was only Rs. 75 a month, should have determined the issue, and that the correct rental value should be taken only as Rs. 75 a month, really furnished the basis for his finding, that the revision of the assessment made by the statutory authorities was capricious “without taking into consideration the materials placed by the plaintiff before the defendant.”

    In Lakshmanan Chetti v. Municipal Council of Trichinopoly,(3) Reilly J. in dealing with the contention that

    “no assessment which is incorrect does in substance and effect comply with the provisions of the Act—that an incorrect assessment has no legal basis”

    observed:

    “If that argument is accepted, then S. 354(2) of the Act is no protection against a suit of any person who is not in complete agreement with the Municipal Council about the justice of his assessment. I have no doubt that the sub section was intended to provide real protection to the chairman and the Council and that its effect is that, when they have proceeded in the matter of assessment in accordance with the Act, no suit will lie against them even if their actual, decision is wrong. A disappointed assesses certainly cannot escape the bar against his suit by describing the action of the Council or the Chairman as arbitrary or by using any other Strong language,”

    The learned Subordinate Judge held in effect that there was no proper enquiry before the assessment was revised, and that vitiated the exercise of the statutory power of the Commissioner to revise the assessment and also the appellate power exercised by the Municipal Council. That there was an enquiry by the Commissioner after the issue of the notice to the plaintiff informing him of the proposal to revise the assessment was common ground. Further, D.W 1, the Revenue Officer deposed:

    “I was present when the Commissioner conducted the revision enquiry. P.W 1's (Plaintiff's) son and his kariasthan were present for that enquiry. They had brought documents and receipts. But they showed only Rs. 75 as rent per mensem.”

    D.W 1 deposed further that the Commissioner directed him as the Revenue Officer to conduct further enquiries, and that on that enquiry he came to know that the monthly rental collected by the plaintiff from Dr. Kaliappan was really Rs. 200. D.W 1 also gave evidence of the scope of his other enquiries with reference to other houses in that locality. It is true that D.W I did not make a Written report to the Commissioner of his enquiry. Ex. B.7 showed that the Commissioner had a discussion with the Revenue Officer before the Commissioner accepted the Revenue Officer's report to him, that the actual rental was Rs. 200. The learned District Munsif commented on the failure of the plaintiff to place on record the evidence of Dr. Kaliappan. The learned Subordinate Judge commented on the failure of the Revenue Officers D.W 1, to examine Dr. Kaliappan during his enquiry. The learned Subordinate Judge apparently overlooked the fact, that the correctness of the decision of the Commissioner was not really the issue for determination before this Court, even assuming that it was open to the learned Subordinate Judge to examine meticulously the scope of the enquiry conducted by the Revenue Officer. It is also a little difficult to accept the final conclusion, that there was no proper enquiry. The statutory authority to conduct the enquiry was the Commissioner. The plaintiff had an opportunity to make his representations to the Commissioner. It was open to the Commissioner to make further enquiries himself or to depute any of his subordinates to conduct the enquiry. The Revenue Officer conducted the enquiry and reported Orally the results of his enquiry to the Commissioner. I am unable to understand how this is not substantial compliance with the requirement, that there must be an enquiry before the quantum of assessment is determined. To determine the quantum of assessment in this case, the quantum of the rent actually received had to be determined. The question at issue was not what was the possible or probable rental value of the building. The question at issue narrowed itself down to this: was it Rs. 75 a month that the plaintiff actually got from his tenant Dr. Kaliappan which was the plaintiff's claim, or was it Rs. 200 a month that the plaintiff was in actual receipt of as rent—which was the case put forward by the Revenue Officer. The quantum of evidence necessary to support the final conclusion, that Rs. 200 was the actual rent that the plaintiff received, was a matter for the statutory authority to decide, As I said, the evidence disclosed that there was an enquiry before the Commissioner discharged his statutory duty to determine the quantum of assessment. That the Revenue Officer did not make a written report in no way affected the teal question, did the Commissioner as the statutory authority substantially comply with the requirements of law?

    The learned Subordinate Judge referred to S. 82(2) of the District Municipalities Act. I fail to see how that really affects the question at issue. As I said, the question even before the Commissioner had narrowed itself to: Was it Rs. 75 or Rs. 200 that the plaintiff, actually received as rent for the building?

    Even if the Commissioner had arrived at an erroneous decision, the proper forum for redress was the Municipal Council to whom an appeal lay. The plaintiff availed himself of that right and appealed to the Municipal Council. The Municipal Council came to the conclusion that Rs. 120 a month was the real rental value of the building. The learned Subordinate Judge observed:

    “It must be either a case of the plaintiff getting a rent of Rs. 75 as contended by him, or a case of Rs. 200 being received by him as rent as contended by the defendant. I do not see how, in between the two, the rental has been fixed at Rs. 1344 under Ex. B-11.”

    It was certainly within the jurisdiction of the statutory authority, the Municipal Council as the appellate authority, to fix on the material placed before it the quantum of the actual rent received. To limit the jurisdiction of the Municipal Council to a choice between Rs. 75 and Rs. 200 is certainly to misconstrue the scope of the jurisdiction vested in the Municipal Council as the appellate authority. Again, even if the conclusion of the Municipal Council that Rs. 120 was the actual rent realised by the plaintiff was erroneous, that was not open to correction by a civil Court. As I said, it was not the duty of the civil Court to determine what was the assessment that could be lawfully levied or to decide as incidental thereto what was the actual rent the plaintiff received.

    There is one other feature I have to notice. Even if the plaintiff's grievance was that there had been no proper enquiry either by the Revenue Officer or by the Commissioner that could have been redressed when he appealed to the Municipal Council. It is a little difficult to say on the material on record that the plaintiff had not a full opportunity of making his representations to the appellate authority, the Municipal Council. Whether in disposing of the appeal the Municipal Council substantially Complied with the requirements of law was the real question, and that question could only be answered in the affirmative. The learned. Counsel for the respondent urged that the erroneous finding of the Commissioner, without a proper enquiry by the Revenue Officer, vitiated the exercise of the appellate power of the Municipal Council. I am unable to accept that conclusion. It is only presenting again the same unacceptable argument, that an erroneous decision by the Municipality would amount to an arbitrary exercise of the power vested in the Municipality.

    The learned Counsel for the respondent referred to Narayana Chandra Dutt v. Chairman, Municipal Commissioner, Panipati . That can have no application to the facts in issue in the present case. As I said, the real question was, what was the rent actually received by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed it was Rs. 75; the Commissioner was of the view it was Rs. 200: the Municipality took the view it was Rs. 120.

    In determining the respective spheres of the civil Court and the statutory authority it is well to bear in mind the principle laid down by Varadachariar J. in Secretary of State v. Meyyappa :

    “A statutory Tribunal or authority which has to arrive at a decision as to the existence or non-existence of certain facts before proceeding to take further action under the statute, is acting within the jurisdiction in making that decision even though wrongly and is immune from civil proceedings to quash that decision except such as are prescribed by the statute.”

    It was the statutory authority that had to decide first what was the actual rental received, and on the basis of that fix the assessment payable by the owner of the house.

    Since the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge, that there had been no substantial compliance with the requirements of the Act, was vitiated by his wrong approach to the problem. I am constrained to differ from him and accept the conclusion of the learned trial Judge, that there had been a real compliance.

    The decree of the learned Subordinate judge is set aside and the decree of the learned District Munsif is restored. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs both in this Court and in the lower appellate Court.

    V.C.S

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    Comments

    The Madurai Municipa... v. K.N.K Jagannathier.
    (Jul 8, 1957)