1. One Ramanna is the first respondent before me. He was in possession of certain lands under a lease. He also claimed that he was entitled to occupancy rights over those lands. Alleging that he had been wrongfully and forcibly dispossessed of the lands by defendants 1 to 3 and others, he filed a suit O. S. No. 310 of 1944 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Vizianagaram to recover possession of the lands under S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act. The District Munsif decreed the suit. Thereupon the lessors filed a suit, O. S. No. 24 of 1945 on the file of the Sub Court Visakha-patnam, praying for a declaration that Ramanna had no occupancy rights in the suit lands and for possession.
2. During the pendency of the suit, the original lessors sold the property to Ramabhadra Raju, the appellant before me and he was subsequently added as a plaintiff in the suit. The Sub Court pronounced its judgment on 30th September 1947, holding that Ramanna had no occupancy rights but that he was nevertheless entitled to remain in possession as he was a lessee and there had been no valid notice to quit. From the decision of the Subordinate Judge, there were two appeals, one by Ramanna and the other by the plaintiffs, but both of them failed being dismissed on 14th February 1949. On 29th December 1947, that is to say, while the appeals were still pending the plaintiffs purported to issue a notice to quit to Ramanna. That is said to have been returned as refused to by Ramanna. Ramanna then applied for execution of the decree he had obtained in O. S. No. 310 of 1944. The plaitiffs obstructed the delivery of possession and thereupon Ramanna applied to have obstruction removed. The basis of the objection was that since the Courts had found that Ramanna was entitled to be in possession only as a lessee and since that lease had been terminated by a valid notice to quit his right to recover possession ceased to exist and that, therefore, the decree in O. S. No. 310 of 1944 could not be executed. The learned District Munsif overruled the objection and directed that delivery should be effected. An appeal to the District Judge having filed Ramabhadra Raju the purchaser has come to this Court.
3. Mr. B. V. Subramaniam, the learned advocate for the appellant, argued that the decision of the Courts below was wrong because an executing Court just like a trial Court must take notice of facts that have happened subsequent to the passing of the decree or the institution of the suit as the case may be and that where the jural basis on which the decree was passed has since the date of the decree ceased to exist the executing Court should refuse to execute the decree. In support of this argument he referred me to the decision of Venkataramana Rao J. in 'Annamalai v. Sri-nivasaraghava', AIR (25) 1938 Mad 293. Towards the end of the judgment the learned Judge remarked :
"No doubt ordinarily a Court should deal with the rights of the parties as they stood at the Institution of the suit but where the continued existence of those rights is an essential requisite for according the relief asked for and such rights have been lost before the relief could be granted, the Court cannot but take notice of the altered circumstances and decline to give the petitioners tiiat relief to which they by their own act in bringing the property to sale before filing the petition, they have disentitled themselves."
As a general proposition this is undoubtedly correct enough. But I do not think that the learned Judge Intended to lay down any inflexible rule. An executing Court can certainly take note of the altered circumstances but whether or not in a particular case it should allow execution to proceed and leave the party who considers himself aggrieved to file a separate suit should, it seems to me, depend upon the circumstances of that case. In certain situations for instance the executing Court would stultify itself by trying to execute the decree. Suppose for example, a Court were to grant a decree for restitution of conjugal rights : now, if before the decree in that suit is being executed another competent Court were to grant a divorce to the parties it will be ridiculous to attempt to execute the earlier decree. That would be an obvious case at one end of the series. On the other hand, the events that have transpired might be of such a character that to ascertain the truth of what happened and their true legal import might require a very protracted enquiry. In such a case it may be more appropriate for the executing Court to refer the parties to a separate suit.
4. Mr. Subramaniam read a number of decisions in support of his argument that this decree should not be executed; but I do not think that any of them is in point. Two of them 'Chinna Goundan v. Kalyanasundaram Aiyar', 1940-2 Mad L J 881 and 'Eukkan Singh v. District Board, Ludhi-ana', 14 Lah 230 refer to cases where legislation enacted after the passing of the decree, made the decree abortive; some others refer to cases where there had been an agreement of the parties relating to the manner in which the decree should be executed and some others refer to cases where subsequent decrees had destroyed the right granted under the decree sought to be executed. The present case does not fall within any of these categories. What the appellant says is this : the respondent is holding as the Courts have found under a lease. A lease can be terminated by a valid notice to quit; such a notice has been issued in the present case; the lease has therefore been terminated and the lessee cannot therefore execute the decree that he has obtained for possession on the strength of the lease. It will thus be seen that in the present case what the appellant pleads in bar of execution is an unilateral act of his and no decision has so far held that a party to a litigation can by his own unilateral act avert execution of the decree. No doubt there is force in the argument of Mr. Subramaniam that if the notice to quit is valid it would terminate the lease and thus put an end to the jural basis on which Ramanna obtained his decree. But then it has not been found that the aotice was a valid notice. And we do not know what other answer the lessee may have. These are matters which have still to be investigated. It may be that the investigation would be simple; but that I do not know. It is easy to conceive of cases where examination of questions falling under Section 111 of the T. P. Act might be protracted and complicated; and in those cases it will certainly be competent for an executing Court to refer the parties concerned to a regular suit. In the present case ooth the Courts below have considered that the executing Court was right in directing that exe-cution should proceed. Though this may mean that in the result the petitioner will have to file a separate suit, that does not appear to my mind to be a sufficient justification for interfering with the decision of the Courts below.