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  • S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • S. 18 of the Limitation Act
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  • S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • S. 18 of the Limitation Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These revision petitions arise from orders that set aside a Court auction sale on the ground of fraud and material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale, and from orders excusing the delay in filing the petition to set aside the sale. The auction-purchaser is the petitioner before the Court. The first respondent, who is one of the judgment-debtors, alleged that he was not served with the sale notice because he was absent at Rangoon and that the decree-holder committed fraud by taking the sale notice to his village knowing that he was at Rangoon; further, there was alleged absence of proper proclamation and material irregularities in the sale.

The decree-holder contended that the petition to set aside the sale was barred by limitation because it was filed beyond 30 days of the sale. Two petitions were filed by the first respondent in the District Munsif's Court of Tanuku: E.A. No. 342 of 1941 (under O. 21, R. 90 C.P.C. to set aside the sale) and E.A. No. 947 of 1943 (to excuse the delay under S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act). Both applications were allowed and the sale was set aside; those orders were confirmed on appeal. The auction purchaser (petitioner) now challenges the correctness of the lower courts' orders, confining his arguments before this Court to the question of limitation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purposes of S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act, the fraud that entitles a judgment-debtor to extended time must be the fraud of the auction purchaser alone, or whether fraud by the decree-holder (or by both decree-holder and auction purchaser) suffices.
  2. Whether an application under O. 21, R. 90, C.P.C. to set aside a sale is to be regarded as an application "against" the decree-holder, the auction purchaser, or both, within the meaning of S. 18 of the Limitation Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Auction Purchaser)

  • The petitioner's counsel confined his submissions to the question of limitation.
  • The petitioner argued that to entitle the judgment-debtor to the extended time under S. 18 the fraud by which the judgment-debtor was kept from knowledge of the sale must be the fraud of the auction purchaser and not merely the fraud of the decree-holder.
  • Earlier decisions were relied upon by the petitioner's counsel to support the contention that auction purchaser's fraud is necessary (references to certain cases were made in argument).

Respondent's / Judgment-Debtor's Position

  • The first respondent alleged that he was not served with notice because he was absent at Rangoon and that the decree-holder committed fraud by taking the sale notice to his village despite knowing his absence.
  • The respondent relied on O. 21, R. 90 C.P.C. to set aside the sale and on S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act to excuse the delay in filing his application.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abubaker Saheb v. Mohideen Saheb Referenced in argument; the Court notes that in this decision the question of limitation did not arise. The Court observed that this decision did not decide the limitation point and therefore it was not directly helpful on the S.18 issue.
Payidanna v. Lakskminarasamma In a suit by a minor to set aside sale on ground of fraud, the suit instituted within three years was held not barred by limitation; some observations by Sadasiva Aiyar J. suggested S.18 would not help unless both decree-holder and purchaser kept the person by fraud from knowledge. The Court treated the observations by Sadasiva Aiyar J. as unnecessary to the decision and expressly disagreed with the view that S.18 requires fraud by both decree-holder and auction purchaser; the Court declined to follow those observations.
Pulla Reddi v. Pattabhirami Reddi Held that S.18's language is wide enough to include any person whose fraud kept another from knowledge of the right to institute a suit or make an application; auction purchaser's fraud could be relied on. The Court followed this decision's wider interpretation of S.18 and concluded that fraud by the auction purchaser can enure to the benefit of the judgment-debtor and that, by parity, fraud by the decree-holder would also be covered.
Sheik Muhammad Rowther v. Subba Naicker Applied S.18 where the decree-holder failed to serve the judgment-debtor and then actively concealed knowledge of the right to object; described the fraud as continuing. The Court cited this authority as an instance where fraud by the decree-holder justified application of S.18; it supported the proposition that decree-holder's fraud can ground extension under S.18.
Azozammessa v. Dwarika Prasad Boral; Kedar Hura v. Ashtosh Roy; Mahipathi Saldar v. Atul Krishna (Calcutta decisions) Support the proposition that S.18 can be invoked to extend limitation where fraud is committed by the decree-holder; there is some difference among them as to whether fraud must be only of the decree-holder. The Court relied on these decisions to show that Calcutta High Court authorities contemplate that fraud of the decree-holder can be relied upon under S.18 in relation to applications under O.21, R.90.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by noting that the factual finding — that the sale was vitiated by fraud and material irregularities — was not challenged before it; counsel for the petitioner therefore confined argument to the limitation point under S.18 of the Indian Limitation Act.

The Court analysed S.18, which speaks of a person "having a right to institute a suit or make an application" being kept by fraud from knowledge of that right, and provides that the time for instituting the suit or application runs from when the fraud became known to the injured person. The Court stated that S.18 contemplates fraud "of the person against whom the suit or application is made."

This led to the key conceptual question: is an application under O.21, R.90, C.P.C. an application against the decree-holder, the auction purchaser, or both? The Court examined the procedural scheme:

  • For an application under O.21, R.90 the decree-holder is a necessary party.
  • O.21, R.92, C.P.C. clause 2 provides that no order setting aside a sale shall be made unless notice of the application has been given to all persons affected by it; an auction purchaser is a person affected and must be given notice before such an order is made.
  • Although the Code does not state that the auction purchaser is a necessary party at the outset, once notice is required and the sale is set aside the auction purchaser becomes a necessary party at a later stage.

The Court concluded that an application to set aside a sale is primarily an application against the decree-holder because:

  • The decree-holder initiates and benefits from the sale, is charged with publishing and conducting it, and expects to realize the decree amount as a consequence of the sale.
  • If the sale is set aside, the decree-holder's realization is postponed and he must initiate fresh proceedings.

On the nature of fraud, the Court reasoned that ordinarily the kind of fraud that keeps a judgment-debtor unaware of the sale will be attributable to the decree-holder's conduct (for example, preventing service of notices or failing to publish proclamation correctly). The auction purchaser is ordinarily a stranger to the execution proceedings and has no duty to inform the judgment-debtor about the sale; typically the auction purchaser appears only when seeking possession after the sale. Therefore, in ordinary circumstances, fraud by the auction purchaser alone is unlikely to be the cause of a judgment-debtor's ignorance of the sale. The Court did, however, acknowledge exceptions, for instance when the decree-holder is himself the auction purchaser or when the auction purchaser actively participates in the fraud alongside the decree-holder.

In reconciling earlier authorities, the Court examined multiple decisions. It observed that Pulla Reddi v. Pattabhirami Reddi had interpreted S.18 broadly to include any person whose fraud kept another from knowledge of the right to sue; that decision supported allowing an applicant to rely on auction purchaser's fraud. The Court accepted the wider construction and held that a judgment-debtor may invoke S.18 where fraud is proved to have been committed by the decree-holder, the auction purchaser, or both. The Court also cited authorities (including Sheik Muhammad Rowther and several Calcutta decisions) that support reliance on decree-holder's fraud under S.18.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that a judgment-debtor who was kept out of the knowledge of the sale by fraud can, in an application under O.21, R.90, C.P.C. to set aside the sale, invoke the aid of S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act to extend the period of limitation where fraud is proved to have been committed by the decree-holder or the auction purchaser or both.

The Court disposed of the petitions as follows: DISMISSED — the petitions are dismissed with costs (one Advocate's fee).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petition filed by the auction purchaser seeking to contest the orders setting aside the sale was dismissed; the orders of the lower courts setting aside the sale and excusing delay continue to stand.
  • Legal consequence articulated by the Court: For applications under O.21, R.90 C.P.C., S.18 may be invoked to extend limitation where the fraud keeping the judgment-debtor from knowledge of the sale is that of the decree-holder, the auction purchaser, or both; where the decree-holder is responsible for concealment of the sale, S.18 applies to extend time.

This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond the text.

    Podila Venkanna v. Chinchinada Venkanna And Others.

    These revision petitions arise out of orders setting aside a Court auction sale on the ground of fraud and material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale, and excusing the delay in filing the petition to set aside the sale. The auction-purchaser is the petitioner. The first respondent who is one of the judgment-debtors alleged that he was not served with the sale notice as he was absent at Rangoon and the decree holder committed fraud in taking the sale notice to his village knowing that he was at Rangoon, that there was no proper proclamation and that the sale was vitiated by material irregularities. The decree-holder contended among others that the petition to set aside the sale was barred by limitation as it was filed beyond 30 days of the sale. Two petitions were filed by the first respondent in the District Munsif's Court of Tanuku, E.A No. 342 of 1941 which was a petition under O. 21, R. 90 C.P.C to set aside the sale and E.A No. 947 of 1943 to excuse the delay in filing the petition to set aside the sale under S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act. Both the applications were allowed and the sale was set aside. The said orders were confirmed in appeals preferred by the petitioner. The auction purchaser now seeks to contest the correctness of the orders of the lower Courts.

    The finding that the sale was vitiated by fraud and material irregularities has not been contested before me and the Counsel for the petitioner confined his arguments to the question of limitation, the finding having been that there was fraud played by the decree-holder on the judgment-debtor who was prevented from coming to know of the sale and it was held that S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act applied. The Counsel for the petitioner argues that in order to entitle the judgment-debtor to avail himself of the extended time under S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act the fraud by reason of which the judgment-debtor was kept back from knowledge of the sale must be that of the auction purchaser and not of the decree-holder. S. 18 runs as follows:

    “Where any person having a right to institute a suit or make an application has, by means of fraud been kept from the knowledge of such right or of the title on which it is founded, ……the time limited for instituting a suit or making an application—

    (a) against the person guilty of fraud or accessory thereto,……shall be computed from the time when the fraud first became known to the person injuriously affected thereby. …..”

    The fraud contemplated under S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act must therefore be a fraud of the person against whom the suit or application is made. It is therefore for consideration whether an application under O. 21, R. 90, C.P.C is an application against the decree-holder or the auction purchaser or against both. For such an application the decree-holder is a necessary party. Under O. 21, R. 92, C.P.C clause 2, it is provided that no order setting aside the sale shall be made unless notice of the application has been given to all persons affected thereby and the auction purchaser would necessarily be a person affected by the sale and therefore notice should go to the auction purchaser before an order is made setting aside the sale. Though the Code does not provide that in an application under O. 21, R. 90, C.P.C for setting aside the sale an action purchaser is a necessary party yet notice having been provided for him in case the order is made setting aside the sale it can be stated that he will be a proper party to the application and will be a necessary party at a later stage when the order is made. In this case the fraud alleged and proved is that of the decree-holder alone that he knowing that the first respondent was at Rangoon successfully prevented him from knowing the sale, and the auction purchaser therefore does not come in on the scene at all. It is for consideration, though ordinarily a decree-holder is a necessary party to an application under O. 21, R. 90, C.P.C whether the decree-holder could be said to be the person against whom the application is made, within the meaning of S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act. There can be no doubt that an application to set aside the sale in execution of the decree is primarily an application against the decree-holder since he is the person at whose instance the sale proceedings were initiated and for whose benefit the sale is held since by reason of the sale he would expect to realise the amount of the decree, to which he is entitled and it is he that is in charge of publishing and conducting the sale and it is therefore for him to see that it is done properly and regularly. If the sale is set aside, apart from the auction purchaser, the decree-holder is affected since his realisation of the decree amount is put off and he would be obliged to launch fresh proceedings for conducting the sale. I have therefore no hesitation in holding that an application under O. 21, R. 90 is an application against the decree-holder though those who are affected by the sale would also be necessary parties.

    The nature of fraud that could be practised against the judgment-debtor with a view to deprive him of the knowledge of the sale could, in the ordinary circumstances, be attributed mostly to the decree-holder's conduct. If the decree-holder could successfully see that notice of the execution proceedings, notice effecting the sale proclamation and thereby of the sale itself, are not brought within the knowledge of the judgment-debtor, the judgment-debtor could not be made aware of the sale. It is very seldom that one could come across a case where the knowledge of the sale was kept away from the judgment-debtor when it could be attributed to the auction purchaser. Ordinarily the auction purchaser is a stranger to the proceedings and no duty is cast upon him to take any proceedings whereby the judgment-debtor could be made aware of the sale since the auction purchaser comes in only on the sale being held and it will be at the time of instituting proceedings for possession that he comes in contact with the judgment-debtor. No doubt in cases where the decree-holder himself is the auction purchaser and the fraud is that of the decree-holder it may be said the auction purchaser was a party to the fraud. It is therefore reasonable to hold that in order to entitle a judgment debtor to get the benefit of S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act in an application for setting aside sale it is not the auction purchaser's fraud alone that could be relied upon but the judgment-debtor could also rely upon the fraud practised by the decree-holder in not bringing to his notice the sale. The proper construction of the language of S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act and its application to the provisions of O. 21, R. 90, C.P.C would lead to the same result.

    In support of his contention that it was the auction purchaser's fraud alone that the judgment-debtor could take advantage of, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon two decisions in Abubaker Saheb v. Mohideen Saheb(1) and Payidanna v. Lakskminarasamma(2). In the former the question of limitation did not arise. The latter was in a suit for setting aside the sale by a minor on her attaining majority on the ground of fraud and it was held that the suit having been instituted within three years was not barred by limitation. The learned Counsel however relied on some observations of Sadasiva Aiyar J. in that case. The learned Judge while stating that it would be hard upon a judgment debtor whose properties have been sold for a song by the fraud of the decree-holder that he should be compelled to come in 30 days though he might not have known of the fraud till after the 30 days have expired, stated that S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act would not help him in getting an extension of the 30 days unless after the date of the fraudulent sale the decree-holder and the purchaser kept him by fraud from the knowledge of his right to make the application especially where the Court auction purchaser has joined the decree-holder in bringing about the fraudulent sale. These observations were not necessary for the decision of that case and the learned Judge appears to have taken it for granted that in order to get extension of time under S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act the fraud must be by both the decree-holder and the Court auction purchaser probably because in that case the court auction purchaser joined the decree-holder in bringing about the fraudulent sale, I am however unable to agree with these observations of the learned Judge in view of the language of S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act and the nature of the proceedings to which it has to be applied. In Pulla Reddi v. Pattabhirami Reddi(3) which was a case where the fraud of the auction purchaser was relied upon a Bench of this court held while construing S. 18, that if the words of the section were to be followed, any person whose fraud had kept from another person the knowledge of his right to institute a suit or make an application was included within the provisions of that section and that the auction purchaser, if he could be proved to have committed fraud, then the application for setting aside the sale would not be barred because time would run only from the discovery of such fraud. The learned Judges held that the words of S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act were sufficiently wide to include any person whose fraud had kept from the knowledge of another person his right to institute a suit or make an application and therefore held that the auction purchaser's fraud could also enure to the benefit of the judgment-debtor in getting extension of time. Though this point was not expressly considered in that decision in view of the wider interpretation put upon S. 18 a decree-holder would also come in among the persons whose fraud the judgment-debtor would be entitled to take advantage of. But one cannot subscribe to the view that the fraud of any person who could not be said to be a party against whom the application is made could be availed of by the judgment debtor. Excepting the decision in Pulla Reddi v. Pattabhirami Reddi, where the interpretation of S. 18 was gone into with reference to the limited question raised whether the fraud of the auction purchaser could be taken advantage of by the judgment-debtor, the question as is now raised before me does not appear to have been considered in any of the reported decisions of this High Court. But in Sheik Muhammad Rowther v. Subba Naicker, in a case where the decree-holder failed to serve the judgment-debtor with notice of the intended sale but even after the sale actively concealed from him the knowledge of his right to object to the sale, S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act was applied and the learned Judges observed that there was a continuing fraud which commenced with the decree-holder's failure to serve the judgment-debtor and that justified the application of S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act, Therefore it will be seen that in that decision the fraud practised by the decree-holder was relied upon by the judgment-debtor to get the benefit of S. 18. That S. 18 of the Indian Limitation Act can be invoked to extend the period of limitation where fraud is committed by the decree-holder finds support in the Calcutta decisions in Azozammessa v. Dwarika Prasad Boral, Kedar Hura v. Ashtosh Roy(4) and Mahipathi Saldar v. Atul Krishna(5). Though in the view taken by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in the said decisions there seems to be some difference of opinion as to whether the fraud must be only of the decree-holder and not of the auction purchaser it is clear that what is contemplated, with reference to the plea of fraud under S. 18 in relation to an application under O. 21, R. 90, is the fraud of the decree-holder that could be primarily relied upon by the judgment-debtor for extension of time. In the view which 1 have taken and following the decision of the Bench in Pulla Reddi v. Pattabhirami Reddi, I am of opinion that the judgment-debtor who was kept out of the knowledge of the sale by fraud can, in an application under O. 21, R. 90, C.P.C to set aside the sale, invoke the aid of S. 18 of the Limitation Act to extend the period of limitation where fraud is proved to have been committed by the decree-holder or the auction purchaser or both.

    In the result the petitions are dismissed with costs. One Advocate's fee.

    N.R.R

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    Podila Venkanna v. Chinchinada Venkanna And Others.
    (Jan 6, 1950)