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citation codes
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Acts
  • Section 96 read with Order 23, Rule 3 and Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (m), Civil P. C.,
  • Section 50 (1), Malabar Tenancy Act expressly made Order 40, Civil P. C.,
  • Order 40, Rule 1 by virtue of Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (s), Civil P. C.
  • Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (u) read with Order 41, Rule 23, Civil P. C.
  • Order 40, Rule 1. When Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P. C.,
  • SECTION 50 MALABAR TENANCY ACT
  • provisions of Sections 96 and 100, Civil P. C.
  • provisions of Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P. C.,
  • Act. Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (s), Civil P. C.,
  • Section 13(2) and (3), Malabar Tenancy Act,
  • O. 43, Rule 1, Sub-clause (s), Civil P. C.
  • Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (s), Civil P. C.
  • Section 50 (2), Malabar Tenancy Act,
  • Section 50 (1), Malabar Tenancy Act
  • SECTION 13 MALABAR TENANCY ACT
  • SECTION 9 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • Sections 12, 23, 25, 30, 31, 34, 35
  • Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code,
  • Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P. C.,
  • Section 102, Civil P. C.,
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 96 read with Order 23, Rule 3 and Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (m), Civil P. C.,
  • Section 50 (1), Malabar Tenancy Act expressly made Order 40, Civil P. C.,
  • Order 40, Rule 1 by virtue of Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (s), Civil P. C.
  • Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (u) read with Order 41, Rule 23, Civil P. C.
  • Order 40, Rule 1. When Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P. C.,
  • SECTION 50 MALABAR TENANCY ACT
  • provisions of Sections 96 and 100, Civil P. C.
  • provisions of Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P. C.,
  • Act. Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (s), Civil P. C.,
  • Section 13(2) and (3), Malabar Tenancy Act,
  • O. 43, Rule 1, Sub-clause (s), Civil P. C.
  • Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (s), Civil P. C.
  • Section 50 (2), Malabar Tenancy Act,
  • Section 50 (1), Malabar Tenancy Act
  • SECTION 13 MALABAR TENANCY ACT
  • SECTION 9 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • Sections 12, 23, 25, 30, 31, 34, 35
  • Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code,
  • Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P. C.,
  • Section 102, Civil P. C.,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Civil Revision Petitions on the Question of Appealability of an Interlocutory Order Appointing a Receiver

Factual and Procedural Background

The landlord (petitioner) filed Original Petitions Nos. 139 to 141 of 1948 in the Court of the District Munsif of Palghat under Section 13, Malabar Tenancy Act, seeking fixation of the tenant's fair rent and an order directing payment of one year's fair rent in advance or the furnishing of security. Interlocutory applications were made by the landlord for the appointment of a receiver if the tenant defaulted in payment or in furnishing security.

The District Munsif, by an order dated 9-4-1949, directed the tenant to furnish security by 20-4-1949. The tenant failed to comply. On the landlord's interlocutory applications (I.A. Nos. 2618–2620 of 1948) the District Munsif appointed a receiver. The tenant appealed (C.M.A. Nos. 11–13 of 1949) to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of South Malabar at Palghat, which reversed the District Munsif’s orders on the ground that there were insufficient grounds to dispossess the tenant by appointing a receiver.

The landlord then filed these civil revision petitions challenging the appellate Court's reversal of the trial Court's appointment of a receiver.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal is maintainable against an interlocutory order appointing a receiver in an original proceeding (other than a suit) when the final order in the original proceeding is itself not open to appeal.
  2. Whether the incorporation of provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (specifically Order 40, Rule 1) into the Malabar Tenancy Act by Section 50(1) brings with it the right of appeal under Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (s) of the Code (i.e., whether an appointment of a receiver under the Act is appealable because the CPC provisions were made applicable).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Landlord) — Principal Contentions

  • The appeals brought by the tenant to the Subordinate Judge were incompetent and the appellate orders were without jurisdiction.
  • Section 50(2) of the Malabar Tenancy Act does not include orders under Section 13 among those made appealable; consequently, where the final order under the main proceeding (Section 13) is not open to appeal, an interlocutory order appointing a receiver during that proceeding is not appealable.
  • Relied on case-law (e.g., Ramanayya v. Kotayya; In re Veerasami Padayachi) to suggest that orders closely integrated with an unappealable final decision cannot be treated as independently appealable.
  • Also cited decisions (Thomas Souza v. Gulam Moideen Beevi; Kanai Lal v. Jatindra Nath) that support the non-appealability of certain execution or execution-related orders, though those conclusions were said to rest on express statutory language.

Respondent (Tenant) — Principal Contentions

  • Section 50(1) of the Malabar Tenancy Act makes the procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings under the Act, and Order 40, Rule 1 of the CPC (which governs appointment of receivers) is expressly made applicable to proceedings under Section 13.
  • The landlord invoked the provisions of Order 40, Rule 1 of the CPC; therefore the order appointing a receiver was one made under that rule and is appealable under Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (s) of the CPC.
  • No directly on-point authority was cited by the respondent; some decisions were relied upon by way of analogy.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramanayya v. Kotayya, 57 M.L.J. 398; A.I.R. (17) 1930 Mad. 75 Held that no appeal lay under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against an order of a single Judge refusing leave to appeal in a second appeal; an order granting/refusing leave was treated as part of the decision on the merits, not an independent order. The Court distinguished this authority, stating it was inapplicable because the order appointing a receiver had an independent existence apart from any final order under Section 13 and could be canvassed independently on appeal.
In re Veerasami Padayachi, I.L.R. (1938) Mad. 633; A.I.R. (25) 1938 Mad. 399 Similar principle that an order of a single Judge refusing to review his judgment in a second appeal was not appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Distinguished on the ground that the interlocutory order appointing a receiver is a distinct judicial determination separable from the final order under Section 13.
Kumarappa Chettiar v. The Official Receiver, West Tanjore (reported) Followed Ramanayya and In re Govinda Row in holding that an order refusing leave in a second appeal was not appealable under Clause 15. Cited as supporting the principle in Ramanayya; the Court treated it as not applicable to the present facts for reasons of independence of the receiver order.
Thomas Souza v. Gulam Moideen Beevi, 26 Mad. 438 Authority cited for the proposition that an order in execution of a decree under Section 9, Specific Relief Act, was not appealable (based on the express language of Section 9). The Court noted the decision but observed that the non-appealability there rested on explicit statutory wording and therefore did not control the present case.
Kanai Lal v. Jatindra Nath, 45 Cal. 519; A.I.R. (5) 1918 Cal. 925 Also cited for the view that certain execution orders were not appealable under the Specific Relief Act. Noted by the Court but regarded as inapposite because its reasoning relied on express statutory prohibition of appeal.
Govindaswami v. Kaliaperumal, A.I.R. (8) 1921 Mad. 696; 66 I.C. 837 Example where an order recording a compromise is appealable although a decree on the compromise is not — illustrating that interlocutory or intermediate orders can be made appealable even if the final order is not. Used by the Court as an illustrative example to show the Legislature can make certain interlocutory orders appealable even when final orders are not.
National Telephone Co. v. Post Master General (No. 2), (1913) A.C. 546; 82 L.J. K.B. 1197 Principle: when a question is referred to an established Court without more, ordinary incidents of that Court's procedure, including the general right of appeal, attach. Quoted and relied upon by the Court to support the view that incorporation of ordinary civil procedure into the Act carries with it the ordinary right of appeal unless the special statute excludes it.
Adikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar, I.L.R. (1948) Mad. 505; A.I.R. (35) 1948 P.C. 12 Held by the Judicial Committee that where ordinary Courts are seized of disputes involving legal rights even under a special statute, the ordinary procedural rules (including rights of appeal authorised by such rules) govern unless the special statute expressly removes them. The Court treated this as a clear and controlling pronouncement supporting the proposition that incorporation of CPC procedure permits appeals unless the special Act otherwise provides.
Secretary of State v. Chelikani Rama Row, 39 Mad. 617; A.I.R. (3) 1916 P.C. 21 Authority cited as being in the same vein as Adikappa Chettiar — i.e., ordinary procedural rights apply when ordinary Courts handle disputes arising under special statutes. Cited by the Court as supporting authority for the application of ordinary procedural rules and appeals in proceedings under a special statute.
Hem Singh v. Basant Das, I.L.R. 17 Lah. 146; A.I.R. (23) 1936 P.C. 93 Cited as another decision reinforcing the same general principle as the Judicial Committee's pronouncements. Summarily relied upon by the Court to bolster the point that ordinary rules of procedure (including appeals) apply unless displaced.
Chandrawati v. Jagannatha Singh, A.I.R. (12) 1925 Lah. 489; 90 I.C. 611 Decision relied on by the respondent (details not expanded in the opinion). The Court stated it would not discuss this case in view of the clear pronouncement of the Judicial Committee (Adikappa Chettiar).
Shri Devi Amma v. Valia Narayan, A.I.R. (16) 1929 Mad. 20; 114 I.C. 839 Decision relied on by the respondent (details not expanded in the opinion). The Court declined to discuss it in detail for reasons stated in the opinion (preference to the Judicial Committee's clearer authority).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court’s analysis proceeded in the following logical steps, grounded in statutory construction and precedents cited in the opinion:

  1. Statutory starting point: The Court reiterated the fundamental principle that an appeal lies only if granted by statute. Whether an interlocutory order made during a proceeding is appealable depends upon specific legislative provision for that proceeding.
  2. Legislative possibilities: The Court identified three legislative approaches: (a) the Legislature may make interlocutory orders appealable even though the final order is not (example: Section 96 read with Order 23, Rule 3 and Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (m), CPC, as illustrated by Govindaswami v. Kaliaperumal); (b) the Legislature may make interlocutory orders appealable only if the final order would have been appealable; and (c) intermediate approaches (example: Section 102 CPC regarding execution of Small Cause decrees).
  3. Application to the Malabar Tenancy Act: Section 50(2) of the Malabar Tenancy Act enumerates specific sections whose orders are to be treated as if they were decrees (i.e., made appealable as decrees). Section 13 orders are not listed in Section 50(2).
  4. Incorporation of CPC procedure: Section 50(1) of the Malabar Tenancy Act expressly made the procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings under the Act, "as far as it can be made applicable." Order 40 CPC (dealing with appointment of receivers) was thereby made applicable to proceedings under the Act.
  5. Consequence of incorporation: Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (s) of the CPC grants a right of appeal against an order appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver under Order 40, Rule 1. The Court reasoned that when Order 40, Rule 1 was incorporated into the Malabar Tenancy Act, it carried with it the right of appeal given by Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (s), unless displaced by the special Act.
  6. No displacement by the Malabar Tenancy Act: The Court found nothing in the Malabar Tenancy Act that restricted or displaced the right of appeal that would be attracted by incorporation of Order 40, Rule 1. The proceedings were before ordinary civil Courts (subject to normal appellate jurisdictions); therefore the ordinary incident of appealability attached in the absence of an express exclusion.
  7. Reliance on higher authority: The Court relied on the Judicial Committee’s statement in Adikappa Chettiar (and other like decisions) and quoted National Telephone Co. v. Post Master General to support the principle that ordinary procedural incidents, including appeals, attach when matters are before ordinary courts unless the statute expressly excludes them.
  8. Distinguishing contrary authorities: Cases that treat orders closely integrated with a non-appealable final decision as not independently appealable (e.g., Ramanayya, In re Veerasami Padayachi) were considered but distinguished on the basis that an order appointing a receiver is a judicial order with an independent existence separable from any eventual final order under Section 13.
  9. Discretion on merits: On the merits of the revision petitions, the Court declined to interfere with the appellate Court’s order reversing the trial Court’s appointment of a receiver. Practical occurrences (such as receipt/deposit of rents and payment of arrears) and subsequent events made interference unnecessary. The Court indicated the landlord would remain free to reapply if the tenant defaulted in future.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision petitions are DISMISSED.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The appellate Court's reversal of the District Munsif's appointment of a receiver stands: the appellate process that was invoked was not incompetent and the appellate Court had jurisdiction to entertain appeals against orders appointing a receiver made under Order 40, Rule 1 by virtue of the Malabar Tenancy Act's incorporation of CPC procedure.
  • The Court did not disturb the appellate Court's order on the merits, noting factual developments (that the receiver had presumably deposited rents in Court and the landlord had been paid the arrears or the bulk of them) and expressing disagreement with some of the lower appellate Court's reasons but finding it unnecessary to intervene.
  • The petitioner remains at liberty to apply afresh for appointment of a receiver if, after being put in possession by the receiver continued by an interim order of the High Court, the respondent defaults in payment of rent or in furnishing security; such an application must be considered by the trial Court on its own merits.
  • The civil revision petitions are dismissed without costs.

Note: This summary is constrained to the information expressly contained in the provided opinion. No additional facts, authorities or inferences not present in the opinion have been added.

    P.V Eswara Iyer v. Sankunni Nair.

    1. These civil revision petitions raise a question of law of some importance and that is whether an appeal is maintainable against an interlocutory order appointing a receiver in an original proceeding other than a suit, when the final order in the original proceeding is itself not open to appeal. The landlord, here petitioner, applied in O. p. Nos. 139 to 141 of 1948 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif of Palghat under Section 13(2) and (3), Malabar Tenancy Act, for fixing the fair rent in respect of the holding of the tenant, here respondent, and for a direction that he should pay one year's fair rent in advance or furnish security for the rent. There were interlocutory applications filed for the appointment of a receiver in case the tenant defaulted to pay the rent or furnish security. By his order dated 9-4-1949, the District Munsif directed the tenant to furnish security for Kanni rent on or before 20-4-1949, but the tenant failed to comply with this order. On the landlord's applications I. A. Nos. 2618 to 2620 of 1948 in O. P. Nos. 139 to 141 of 1948 praying for the appointment of a receiver for the holdings of the tenant the District Munsif appointed a receiver. The tenant filed C. M. A. nOS. 11 to 13 of 1949 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of South Malabar at Palghat, against the orders of the District Munsif appointing a receiver. The appellate Court reversed the orders of the Munsif on the ground that there were no sufficient grounds for dispossessing the tenant by the appointment of a receiver. The landlord has preferred these civil revision petitions against the orders of the appellate Court.

    2. Mr. C. S. Swaminathan, the learned advocate for the petitioner, contends that the appeals referred by the tenant to the Court of the Subordinate Judge were incompetent and that the orders passed by the appellate Court were without jurisdiction. Both sides relied on Section 50, Malabar Tenancy Act (XIV [14] of 1930) which runs as follows :

    "5O. (1) The procedure provided as regards suits in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, including Orders XXXVIII, XXXIX and XL of the first schedule, shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings relating to applications under this Act.

    (2) Appeals shall lie from orders made under Sections 12, 23, 25, 30, 31, 34, 35 and 36 as if they were decrees in suits."

    The argument of the petitioner is that an order under Section 13 is not made appealable by Section 60 (2) and where the final order on the main proceeding itself is not open to appeal, an inter-locutory order by way of appointment of a receiver, made during the pendency of that proceeding, is not appealable. For the respondent it is contended that under Section 60 (1) of the Act provisions of Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P. O. are expressly made applicable to proceedings under Section 13 of the Act, and the landlord have invoked the provisions of Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P. C., by applying for the appointment of a receiver. The order made on his application was one made under Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P. C., and was, therefore, open to appeal under O. 43, Rule 1, Sub-clause (s), Civil P. C. No decision exactly in point was cited by the learned counsel, but some decisions were relied upon by way of analogy.

    3. The petitioner relied upon Ramanayya v. Kotayya, 57 M. L. J. 398 : (A. I. R. (17) 1930 Mad. 75) where this Court held that no appeal lay under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against an order of a single Judge refusing to grant leave to appeal from his judgment in a second appeal. He also referred to In re Veerasami Padayachi, I. L. R. (1938) Mad. 633 : (A. I. R. (25) 1938 Mad. 399) where it was held that an order of a single Judge refusing to review his judgment in a second appeal was not appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. I might also refer to the recent decision in Kumarappa Chettiar v. The Official Receiver, West Tanjore, where the decisions in Ramanayya v. Kotayya, 57 M. L. J. 398 : (A.I.R. (17) 1930 Mad. 75) and in In re Govinda Row, 59 Mad. 293 : (A. I. R. (23) 1936 Mad. 134) were followed and an order refusing leave to appeal in a second appeal was held not to be appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The ratio decidendi of these cases was that an order granting or refusing leave was part of the decision on the merits of the second appeal itself and not an independent order apart from the decision. Since the decision on the second appeal was open to a farther appeal only with leave, an order refusing leave which was part of the decision itself could not be treated as an independent order appealable without leave. I consider that these decisions have no application because the order appointing a receiver was a judicial order having a separate and independent existence of its own, apart from the order of the original petitions filed under Section 13, Malabar Tenancy Act. In my opinion, the merits of the order appointing a receiver could be canvassed on appeal independently of the merits of any final decision or order that might be rendered on the main petition. The petitioner also relied on the decision in Thomas Souza v. Gulam Moideen Beevi, 26 Mad. 438 and Kanai Lal v. Jatindra Nath, 45 Cal. 519: (A. I. r. (5) 1918 Cal. 925) to the effect that an order in execution of a decree passed under Section 9, Specific Relief Act, was not appealable. But this conclusion was based on the express language of Section 9 that "no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit." The word "suit" was construed as being wide enough to include execution proceedings also.

    4. These decisions do not lead to the conclusion that merely because a final order in an original proceeding is not open to appeal interlocutory orders made during the pendency of the proceeding become unappealable. It is, of course, a trite proposition that an appeal lies only if it is granted by statute. The Legislature can provide for a right of appeal against an interlocutory order in a proceeding even though the final order on that proceeding is not made appealable, or it might provide that an interlocutory order shall be open to appeal only in cases where an appeal would have lain from the final order in the main proceeding. An example of the former class of cases would be found in Section 96 read with Order 23, Rule 3 and Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (m), Civil P. C., under which an order recording a compromise is appealable, but not a decree passed on the compromise. See Govindaswami v. Kaliaperumal, A.I.R. (8) 1921 Mad. 696: (66 I. C. 837). An example of the latter class of cases is found in Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (u) read with Order 41, Rule 23, Civil P. C. An intermediate position is envisaged in Section 102, Civil P. C., which allows one appeal but not a second appeal from an order in execution of a Small Cause decree when the decree is under execution on the original side of the Court, if the value of the subject-matter of the suit does not exceed Rs. 500. The Small Cause decree itself is not open to appeal, but an order in execution of the decree made on the original side is open to appeal. I am, therefore, unable to accept the broad proposition for which the petitioner contends. In my opinion, it all depends on what provision has been made by the Legislature by way of a grant of a right of appeal in each particular case.

    5. In the present case, Section 50 (2), Malabar Tenancy Act, does not include an order under Section 13 in the category of appealable orders. The orders specified in Section 50 (2) are made appealable as if they were decrees, that is to say, they would be open to an appeal and a second appeal conformably to the provisions of Sections 96 and 100, Civil P. C. The Legislature has in Section 50 (1), Malabar Tenancy Act expressly made Order 40, Civil P. C., applicable to proceedings under the Act. Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (s), Civil P. C., grants a right of appeal against an order appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver under Order 40, Rule 1. When Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P. C., was incorporated in the Malabar Tenancy Act as part of the procedure applicable to proceedings under the Act, it carried with it the right of appeal given by Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (s), Civil P. C. There is nothing in the Malabar Tenancy Act restricting or displacing the right of appeal which is attracted by the incorporation of Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P. C., in Section 60, Clause (1) of the Act. It must be remembered that the application for the appointment of a receiver was made to an ordinary civil Court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court and the High Court and not to a special tribunal or judicial officer functioning as persona designata. The Court was here appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country. The effect of Section 13, Malabar Tenancy Act was merely to invest the Court with jurisdiction over the new subject-matter dealt with by that section. The proceeding was a judicial proceeding and the order appointing a receiver was a judicial determination under Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P. C. If the Court of the District Munsif had all the powers and jurisdiction conferred by Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code, in the matter of appointing a receiver and dispossessing the respondent--and this is the true position according to both sides --it is not possible to hold that the decision of the District Munsif was not open to appeal, which was attracted to every order made under Order 40, Rule 1 by virtue of Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (s), Civil P. C. The general principle applicable to cases of this kind was thus stated by Viscount Haldane, Lord Chancellor in National Telephone Co. v. Post Master General (No. 2), (1913) A. C. 546 : (82 L. J. K. B. 1197):

    "When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decisions likewise attaches."

    It may be that a particular case is taken out of this general principle by special enactment. There is none such in the present case. On the other hand, the procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code is expressly made applicable by Section 50 (1), Malabar Tenancy Act to proceedings under the Act, and there is no prohibition of an appeal. In Adikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar, I. L. R. (1948) Mad. 505 : (A. I. R. (35) 1948 P. C. 12), Lord Simonds delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee held that :

    "Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such disputes, the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal."

    To the same effect were the decisions of the Board in Secretary of State v. Chelikani Rama Row, 39 Mad. 617 : (A. I. R. (3) 1916 P. C. 21) and Hem Singh v. Basant Das, I. L. R. 17 Lah. 146 : (A. I. R. (23) 1936 P. C. 93). In view of what I consider to be the clear pronouncement of the Judicial Committee, I do not propose to discuss the decisions in Chandrawati v. Jagannatha Singh, A. I. R. (12) 1925 Lah. 489 : (90 I. C. 611) and Shri Devi Amma v. Valia Narayan, A. I. R. (16) 1929 Mad. 20 : (114 I. C. 839) relied upon by the respondent.

    6. On the merits it is unnecessary to interfere with the Order of the lower appellate Court. The receiver who has been in possession has presumably deposited the rents in Court and the petitioner has been paid the rents in arrear or at any rate the bulk of such arrears. I do not agree with all the reasons given by the lower appellate Court for reversing the order of the trial Court. Having regard to the subsequent course of events it is unnecessary to disturb the orders of lower appellate Court. If the respondent after he is put in possession of the property by the receiver who has been continued by an interim order of this Court commits default in payment of the rent or in furnishing security therefor within such time as the Court thinks fit to allow, it will be open to the petitioner to apply for the appointment of a receiver and such an application should be dealt with on its own merits by the trial Court. The civil revision petitions are dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs.

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    P.V Eswara Iyer v. Sankunni Nair.
    (Sep 22, 1950)