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citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • provisions of Sub-S. (1) of S. 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
  • Land Acquisition Act, the appropriate provision
  • S. 19(1)(b) of the Defence of India Act. C.M.A
  • S. 19(1)(e)(i) of the Defence of India Act,
  • (i) of S. 23 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • S. 34 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Sub-S. (1) of S. 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
  • Land Acquisition Act, the appropriate provision
  • S. 19(1)(b) of the Defence of India Act. C.M.A
  • S. 19(1)(e)(i) of the Defence of India Act,
  • (i) of S. 23 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • S. 34 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion, delivered by Govindarajachari, J., concerns two appeals (C.M.A. No. 667 of 1945 by the Associated Oil Mills Ltd., the claimant, and C.M.A. No. 732 of 1945 by the Government of the Province of Madras) from the judgment and decree of the District Judge of North Arcot, Vellore, sitting as an arbitrator under S. 19(1)(b) of the Defence of India Act.

The dispute arises from the Government's requisition (order dated 20 May 1942; possession taken three days later) of about four acres and 15 cents of land in Ammanur village, Arkonam taluk, which included superstructures and a groundnut-crushing mill belonging to the claimant. The claimant alleged it would have commenced and carried on manufacture but for the requisition; it removed the mill and re-erected it at Katpadi. The claimant's loss-of-income claim was initially for the period 23 May 1942 to 1 November 1942, but at trial was narrowed to 1 June 1942 to 24 October 1942.

The District Judge awarded Rs. 63,259-12-0 for loss of income, calculated for the period 1 June 1942 to 15 October 1942. Two appeals followed: (1) the Government challenged the award for the period 11 September to 15 October 1942, contending no loss-of-income should be allowed after 11 September; and (2) the claimant appealed arguing (a) interest should have been awarded on the decretal amount, and (b) the claimant should have been allowed greater costs than Rs. 100.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the award for loss of income should be confined to the period 1 June 1942 to 11 September 1942 (i.e., whether the claimant was entitled to compensation for loss of income between 11 September 1942 and 15 October 1942).
  2. Whether interest should be awarded on the amount decreed to the claimant.
  3. Whether the District Judge erred in awarding only Rs. 100 as costs to the claimant (and similarly to the Government) given the claimant's substantial success.

Arguments of the Parties

Government's Arguments

  • The award for loss of income should be confined to 1 June 1942 to 11 September 1942; no compensation should be given for the period between 11 September 1942 and 15 October 1942.
  • It was for the claimant to show that it could not have begun working the mill at Katpadi earlier than the date asserted; the Government suggested claimant could have constructed the mill and obtained requisite permit earlier.
  • On costs, if costs are to be awarded ad valorem, the Government would be entitled to costs on amounts in respect of which the claimant's demand was refused by the District Judge.

Claimant's Arguments

  • The claimant contended it was entitled to compensation for loss of income including the period up to the date it actually began crushing at Katpadi (initially claimed until 1 November 1942, later narrowed).
  • The claimant sought interest on the awarded amount; it was suggested there had been an agreement or at least a basis under S.19(1)(e)(i) of the Defence of India Act (by reference to provisions of the Land Acquisition Act) to award interest.
  • The claimant argued that the costs allowance of Rs. 100 was insufficient given its substantial success before the arbitrator.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Inglewood Pulp & Co. v. Newbrunswick Electric Ltd. (Privy Council) Recognised practice/principle that purchaser pays interest on purchase money from date of possession; extension of such principle to statutory compulsory purchase contexts (Lands Clauses Consolidation Act referenced in Privy Council observations). Cited by the claimant to support an argument for interest; the court considered the authority but found it inapposite to the statutory scheme under the Defence of India Act and the Land Acquisition Act as applied by statute in India, because the specific Land Acquisition Act provision for interest (S.34) was not made applicable by the Defence of India Act.
Swift v. The Board of Trade (per Lord Cave L.C.) Practice that a purchaser is required to pay interest on purchase money from the date of possession. Quoted in the Privy Council material relied upon by the claimant; the court treated the principle as part of the comparative authority but again determined it could not override the specific statutory applicability (or lack thereof) in the Indian statutory framework under consideration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the two appeals sequentially and applied evidence assessment, statutory interpretation, and appellate review of discretionary orders:

Government's Appeal (period of loss-of-income)

  • Fact assessment: The claimant's mill and land were requisitioned; claimant removed and re-erected the mill at Katpadi and applied for a permit to work on 6 October 1942; a permit was issued on 11 October 1942. The District Judge allowed four days for delivery of the permit and fixed 15 October 1942 as the date up to which compensation should run.
  • Evidence: The claimant's director — the only witness — testified that the claimant purchased a site at Katpadi on 2 June 1942 and, with the greatest expedition, constructed buildings and installed machinery and actually started pressing oil by the last week of October (after receiving the permit). He admitted small purchases on 11 and 14 September but explained these were small; the Government produced no contrary evidence.
  • Legal burden and inference: While the Government argued that the claimant should show inability to start earlier, the court found that the claimant's evidence was sufficient to establish inability to start before the date fixed by the District Judge. The court emphasized that the mill could not be worked without the permit (issued 11 October) and that the Government failed to make out that the claimant could have obtained the permit and begun operations earlier.
  • Conclusion: The District Judge's factual finding that the claimant could not have commenced earlier than the date he fixed (15 October) was upheld; the Government's appeal failed on this point.

Claimant's Appeal (interest and costs)

  • Interest:
    • The court first rejected the proposition that interest could be awarded as a matter of agreement: the correspondence and the Collector's award showed that, unlike for another corporation (Associated Trading Corporation) where interest was expressly sanctioned, there was no agreement by the Government to pay interest to the Associated Oil Mills Ltd.; the Collector expressly stated there was no agreement and referred the matter to the arbitrator.
    • Statutory interpretation: The claimant relied on S.19(1)(e)(i) of the Defence of India Act, which directs the arbitrator to have regard to Sub-s. (1) of S.23 of the Land Acquisition Act "so far as the same can be made applicable." The court examined Sub-s. (1) of S.23 and noted that the Land Acquisition Act's specific provision for interest is in S.34, which was not made applicable by the Defence of India Act. Because the Defence of India Act made only Sub-s. (1) of S.23 applicable, and did not make S.34 applicable, the court found no statutory basis under the Defence of India Act to award interest.
    • Comparative authority: The court considered the Privy Council decision in Inglewood Pulp & Co. and the underlying principle (cited practice of charging interest from possession) but concluded that the Indian statutory framework governed compulsory acquisition here and did not authorize an interest award in the circumstances, given the express limited incorporation of Land Acquisition Act provisions by the Defence of India Act.
    • Procedural point: Even assuming an arbitrator has jurisdiction to award interest pendente lite in appropriate cases, the court observed no claim for interest was made before the arbitrator; the District Judge's award did not address any claim for interest, and therefore the claimant cannot now obtain interest on appeal.
  • Costs:
    • Context: When the matter was referred to the arbitrator the claimant's total demand was Rs. 165,275-5-6; before the arbitrator the loss-of-income claim was reduced to Rs. 72,957-4-2; the District Judge awarded Rs. 63,259-12-0.
    • Ad valorem argument: The claimant argued for ad valorem costs; the court observed that if costs were awarded ad valorem on both sides (as the Government might claim on amounts refused), the net difference would be small.
    • Discretion and appellate restraint: The court was unwilling to interfere with the District Judge's discretion in awarding costs and upheld the award of Rs. 100 each to counsel for the Government and claimant.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The appeal filed on behalf of the Government is dismissed with costs. The District Judge's award of compensation for loss of income up to 15 October 1942 (Rs. 63,259-12-0) is upheld because the claimant's evidence satisfactorily established that it could not have commenced operations earlier and because the permit necessary to operate was not issued until 11 October 1942.
  • The appeal filed on behalf of the claimant is dismissed with costs. The claimant is not entitled to interest on the amount decreed (no agreement to pay interest was shown; the Defence of India Act did not make the Land Acquisition Act provision authorizing interest—S.34—applicable; and no claim for interest was made before the arbitrator). The District Judge's discretion in awarding nominal costs (Rs. 100 each to counsel for both sides) is upheld.

Implications: The direct effects of the decision are that the District Judge's award and decree stand unchanged: the claimant receives Rs. 63,259-12-0 for loss of income for the period determined by the arbitrator, no interest is payable on that amount, and costs of Rs. 100 are confirmed for each side. The court did not expand or create a new rule extending the Land Acquisition Act's interest provision to requisition claims under the Defence of India Act; rather, it applied the Defence of India Act's selective incorporation of the Land Acquisition Act and refrained from awarding interest in the absence of statutory or contractual basis. The opinion does not announce any broader precedent beyond its statutory interpretation and application to these facts.

    Associated Oil Mills Ltd. v. Provincial Government Of Madras

    (Delivered by Govindarajachari, J.)

    These two appeals are directed against the judgment and decree of the District Judge of North Arcot, Vellore, acting as an arbitrator under S. 19(1)(b) of the Defence of India Act. C.M.A No. 667 of 1945 is by the Associated Oil Mills Ltd., Katpadi hereinafter referred to as the claimant and C.M.A No. 732 of 1945 is by the Government of the Province of Madras. It is convenient to deal with the latter appeal first.

    The only point taken in this appeal on behalf of the Government is that in his award concerning the loss of income to the claimant the District Judge should have confined it to the period from 1st June 1942 to 11th September 1942 and should not have given any amount for loss of income for the period between 11th September 1942 and 15th October 1942. About four acres and 15 cents of land belonging to the claimant in the village of Ammanur in Arkonam taluk was requisitioned by the Government for military purposes with some superstructures standing thereon. The order requisitioning those properties was passed on the 20th May 1942; but possession was actually taken three days later. The superstructures included a mill which the claimant had erected for crushing groundnuts and other oil seeds. It is common ground that the claimant would have commenced the working of the mill and would have gone on with the manufacture of oils had it not been for the requisitioning of the properties by the Government. After it received the order of requisition the claimant had to remove the mill from there and erect it at Katpadi. On behalf of the claimant it was at first claimed that it should be awarded compensation by way of loss of income from the 23rd May 1942 to the 1st November 1942. At the time however, when evidence was adduced before the arbitrator the claim was restricted to the period between the 1st June 1942 and 24th October 1942. There is no objection on the part of the Government to the 1st June 1942 being regarded as the commencement of the period; but it is contended by the Government that the claimant should not be awarded any compensation for loss of income after the 11th September 1942. The District Judge awarded Rs. 63,259-12-0 under this head calculating as already stated for the period between 1st June 1942 and 15th October 1942. It would appear that the claimant applied to the proper authorities for permission to work the factory on the 6th October 1942 and that permission was given on the 11th October 1942. The District Judge allowed four days for the permit to reach the claimant and that is how he fixed the 15th October 1942 as the date up to which compensation should be awarded. On behalf of the Government the learned Government Pleader argued that it is for the claimant to show that it could not have started the working of the factory at Katpadi at an earlier date. The evidence on this matter is meagre; but from the evidence of the claimant's director who was the only witness examined in the case it appears that soon after the requisition was received the claimant purchased another site at Katpadi on the 2nd June 1942 and that with the greatest expedition the witness constructed the buildings there and planted the machinery which he had removed from Arkonam, by the last week of October when, according to him, he actually started pressing oil after getting a permit. There was no serious challenge of this statement which was made by the witness in his examination-in-chief. He was asked in cross-examination about the purchases made by his company on the 11th September, 1942 and again on the 14th September. He admitted the purchases, but stated that they were for small amounts. He added that the company carries an advance stock of 15000 bags valued at Rs. 3,75,000. The Government called no evidence contra. The mere fact that some quantity of groundnut was purchased on the 11th September and 14th September does not indicate that the crushing of the groundnut was started on either of these dates. Assuming that it is for the claimant to establish that it could not have started the working of the mill at Katpadi earlier, the evidence given by the witness examined on behalf of the claimant, in our opinion, satisfactorily establishes that the company could not have started the working of the mill at Katpadi earlier than the date fixed by the learned District Judge. It is not denied that the mill could not be worked without a permit which was only issued on the 11th October 1942. All that is suggested on behalf of the Government is that the claimant could have constructed the mill at Katpadi and obtained the permit earlier than that date but for reasons already stated not only has the Government not made this out, but the claimant has definitely established that it could not have started the working of the mill at Katpadi earlier than 15th October. That is the only point argued in the appeal filed by the Government. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

    In the appeal filed by the claimant two points were taken on its behalf. One is that interest should have been awarded by the learned District Judge on the amount which he has decreed. The second is that the learned District Judge is wrong in allowing only Rs. 100 by way of costs to the claimant, while allowing a like amount of costs to the Government though the claimant has very substantially succeeded before him.

    As to the first point we do not see how interest can be awarded on an amount which is in the nature of damages. It was suggested that the Government had agreed to pay interest. The appellants' Counsel took us through some of the letters which passed between the claimant's solicitor and the Government in an endeavour to establish that there was an agreement between the claimant and the Government as to the amount payable to the former by way of compensation for loss of income. We are satisfied that at no stage during the correspondence was there any such agreement. In his award dated 31st January 1945 the Collector of North Arcot refers to the claims made before him on behalf of the Associated Trading Corporation Limited and the Associated Oil Mills Ltd., the latter being the claimant in this proceeding. Dealing with the claim made by the Associated Trading Corporation, he stated that it was agreed between the Government and the Corporation that Rs. 3394 should be paid by the Government by way of compensation for requisitioning certain properties of the Corporation and in referring to this amount the Collector says that the Government was pleased to sanction payment of interest at 6 per cant per annum on the amount of compensation as finally agreed upon. In a separate paragraph he refers to the claim made by the Associated Oil Mills Ltd. There he simply sets out the particulars of the amounts which the Government was prepared to pay to the claimant and expressly states that there being no agreement between the Associated Mills and the Government, there would be a reference to the arbitrator, viz., the District Judge of North Arcot. Moreover, we are not concerned with the question whether there was any agreement between the Government and the claimant as to the period for which compensation should be awarded for loss of income, the point which we have to decide being whether the Government consented to pay interest. We have not been shown any document from which it can be said that the Government agreed to pay interest on such compensation as may be awarded to the claimant.

    It was then argued on behalf of the the appellant that under S. 19(1)(e)(i) of the Defence of India Act, it would be entitled to the award of interest. S. 19(1)(e)(i) runs as follows:

    “The arbitrator in making his award shall have regard to—

    (i) The provisions of Sub-S. (1) of S. 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, so far as the same can be made applicable.”

    Turning to Sub-S. (i) of S. 23 of the Land Acquisition Act it will be noticed that there is no provision therein for the award of interest in cases arising under the Land Acquisition Act, the appropriate provision being contained in S. 34 which, it will be observed, is not one of the provisions made applicable to by the Defence of India Act to claims made in regard to properties which are requisitioned. Reference was made on behalf of the appellant to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Inglewood Pulp & Co. v. Newbrunswick Electric Ltd., (1). At page 290 of the report occur the following observations of the Privy Council:

    “It is now well established that on a contract for sale and purchase of land it is the practice to require the purchaser to pay interest on his purchase money from the date when be took possession [per Lord Cave L.C in Swift v. The Board of Trade (2)]. The law on the point has also been extended to cases under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845.”

    So far as the compulsory purchase of properties in this country is concerned, the law is statutorily laid down in the Land Acquisition Act. In the absence of any provision in the Defence of India Act or the rules framed there under making S. 34 of the Land Acquisition Act applicable and in view of the provision expressly making Sub-S. (1) of S. 23 of that Act alone applicable, we are unable to see on what general principle we can award interest to the claimant because he was kept out of the use of money which ultimately is found payable to him by way of compensation.

    It is unnecessary for us to go into the question whether any interest is awardable from and after the date of the reference to the arbitrator. Assuming that there is power and jurisdiction in the arbitrator to award interest during the pendency of the arbitration in appropriate cases, it must be noticed that no claim for interest from the commencement of the arbitration proceedings was made before the arbitrator. In a careful judgment the learned District Judge deals with every one of the claims made before him and there is no reference anywhere to any claim for interest. In these circumstances we must hold that the claimant is not entitled to the award of any interest on the amount which has been decreed to him.

    As regards costs it must be mentioned that by the time the reference was made to the arbitrator the claimant's total demand stood so high as Rs. 1,65,275-5-6. It is only in the statement that he subsequently filed before the arbitrator that the claim in respect of loss of income was reduced to the figure of Rs. 72,957-4-2. It is true that the District Judge has awarded Rs. 63,259-12-0 which represents a substantial portion of the amount claimed in the respondent's statement but if costs are to be awarded ad valorem as the appellant's Advocate claims, the Government would be entitled to costs on the amount in respect of which the claimant's demand was refused by the learned District Judge. If there are to be costs ad valorem on both sides there would be very little difference indeed in the matter of the resultant costs payable by one side to the other. We are unwilling to interfere with the discretion of the learned District Judge in his award as to costs. He fixed the sum at Rs. 100 each to the Counsel appearing for the Government and the claimant. In our opinion the award must stand. The appeal filed on behalf of the claimant also fails and is dismissed with costs.

    N.R.R

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    Comments

    Associated Oil Mills Ltd. v. Provincial Government Of Madras
    (Aug 25, 1947)