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  • provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act (Act 12 of 1966).
  • provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 (Central Act 63 of 1948
  • provisions of Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act, 1966,
  • S. 7-A of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act, 1966,
  • provisions of the Urban Land Tax Act, 1966.7.
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • S. 2(10) of the Urban Land Tax Act, 1966,
  • Industrial Development Regulation Act
  • provisions of the Urban Land Tax Act.
  • S. 2 (1) of the Urban Land Tax Act, 1966.
  • S. 50 of the Urban Land Tax Act, 1976
  • Nadu Urban Land Tax Act, 1976
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894
  • Act, 1962 (C. 39. J.S 13 (2),
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Acts
  • provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act (Act 12 of 1966).
  • provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 (Central Act 63 of 1948
  • provisions of Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act, 1966,
  • S. 7-A of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act, 1966,
  • provisions of the Urban Land Tax Act, 1966.7.
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • S. 2(10) of the Urban Land Tax Act, 1966,
  • Industrial Development Regulation Act
  • provisions of the Urban Land Tax Act.
  • S. 2 (1) of the Urban Land Tax Act, 1966.
  • S. 50 of the Urban Land Tax Act, 1976
  • Nadu Urban Land Tax Act, 1976
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894
  • Act, 1962 (C. 39. J.S 13 (2),
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitions (W.P. Nos. 4172–4175 of 1982) were filed by companies belonging to a group (including Sundaram Fasteners Ltd. and Sundaram Abex Ltd.) challenging the levy of urban land tax on certain lands assigned to them by the Government. The petitioners had been granted licences under the Industrial Development Regulation Act and, following applications by their promoter (T.V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Ltd.), the Government acquired lands under the Land Acquisition Act and assigned those lands to the promoter and related companies by agreements and government orders (dated among others 25-3-1960, 16-11-1961 and G.O.Ms. No. 4823 dated 8-11-1961).

The assignments included conditions (in Articles of Agreement dated 14-2-1961 and related deeds) that the lands be used for specified industrial purposes, that ground rent/assessments be paid, and that the Government had the power to resume the lands in certain events (including non-use, failure to establish factories or voluntary relinquishment in certain circumstances), with compensation limited to the original acquisition value (less 15% solatium) or market value at resumption, whichever was less.

The Urban Land Tax Authority assessed market value and levied urban land tax; the petitioners appealed to the Urban Land Tax Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal by an order dated 12-3-1982, holding the petitioners liable to pay urban land tax on the assessed market value. The petitioners sought writs of certiorari to quash the Tribunal's confirmation of the Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax's order (the petition in W.P. No. 4172 of 1982 specifically sought quashing of the order in C.M.A. No. 133 of 1978 on the Tribunal file and the Assistant Commissioner's order dated 23-6-1978).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether lands assigned to the petitioners by the Government — under agreements containing a clause of resumption and restrictions on alienation — have become the petitioners' absolute property so as to render the petitioners liable to pay urban land tax under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act, 1966 (as amended).
  2. Whether the presence of contractual restrictions (including a power of resumption and limits on alienation and transfer price) precludes characterization of the assignees as "owners" for the purpose of assessment under the Urban Land Tax statute.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The lands were not absolutely owned by the petitioners because the Government retained the power of resumption; consequently the petitioners could not be treated as full owners liable to pay urban land tax.
  • The Tribunal and the Authority erred in treating the mere use and occupation (building factories) as converting the assignees into absolute owners with unrestricted power to alienate the lands at market price.
  • The agreements and assignments restricted sale at a different price (Government had fixed a transfer price of Rs. 5,060 per acre for internal transfers) and contained conditions limiting alienation; therefore the lands were held only as assignees on behalf of the Government.
  • Counsel for the petitioners relied on prior case law, including Kemcos Chemical Industries v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others, Lakshmana v. R. Ramier (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 304), R.C. Society v. Authorised Officer (A.I.R. 1971 Mad. 458) and Victoria P.H.T. Board v. Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax (1977 I M.L.J. 294), to support the contention that tax can be levied only on the owner and not on an assignee who does not have full ownership rights.

Respondents' (Authority's) Position

  • In the counter-affidavits the Assistant Commissioner admitted that the deeds of assignment contained restrictions intended to ensure the lands were used for the purpose assigned, including prohibitions on sale to third parties and restrictions on use for other purposes.
  • The respondents also stated that the petitioners had constructed factories and there was no breach of the conditions of assignment.
  • Implicit in the Authority's position (as reflected in the Tribunal's reasoning) was the view that because the petitioners were in possession and had used the lands for the assigned purpose, they had become owners for the purposes of the Urban Land Tax Act and thus liable to tax; the petitioners disputed this legal conclusion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kemcos Chemical Industries, Madras-6 v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others (W.P. No. 5389 of 1981) The opinion expressly cites this decision for the principle that tax can be collected only from the owner of the land and that a clause of resumption indicates that ownership remains with the Government; the Government, being owner, is exempt from urban land tax under the Act. The court relied on and followed the reasoning in this decision to conclude that the petitioners were not owners and therefore could not be assessed to urban land tax.
Victoria Public Hall Trust Board v. Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion states that the Kemcos decision is supported by the decision in Victoria Public Hall Trust Board v. AC of Urban Land Tax; the court relied on these authorities to support the conclusion that only full-fledged owners can be assessed under the Urban Land Tax Act.
Lakshmana v. R. Ramier (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 304)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion records that the petitioners relied on this decision; the text does not describe a specific application of this case by the court in its reasoning.
R.C. Society v. Authorised Officer, Land Reforms (A.I.R. 1971 Mad. 458)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion indicates the petitioners relied on this decision; the court's written analysis does not specify detailed application of this precedent beyond listing it as relied upon by the petitioners.
Raja Rajendra Malojirao Shitobe v. State of M.P. (cited within quotation concerning "resumption") The cited extract indicates the principle that "resumption" connotes taking back what was given and that land resumed is not the property of the person from whom it is taken back; the case is cited in support of that principle in the opinion. The court used the concept of "resumption" (as explained in authorities and lexicons) to conclude that the Government remained the owner for purposes of taxation, and that the presence of resumption clauses weighed against treating the assignees as owners.
Kingdom v. Minister of Housing and Local Government (cited under Stroud's Judicial Dictionary)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion quotes Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (which itself cites this case) in explaining the meaning of "resumption"; the court relied on the general dictionary/case authority to elucidate the legal concept of resumption in its analysis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded along the following lines, based only on the material presented in the opinion:

  1. The court examined the factual matrix and the documentary terms of the assignments/Articles of Agreement (notably the agreement dated 14-2-1961) and identified clauses which restricted use of the land to specified industrial purposes, required payment of assessments or ground rent, and expressly provided for resumption by the Government upon certain contingencies (failure to carry out terms, winding up, non-use, voluntary relinquishment where Government requires resumption, etc.). The agreements also limited compensation on resumption to acquisition value less 15% solatium or market value at resumption, whichever is less.
  2. The court noted that for certain internal transfers the Government had fixed a transfer value (Rs. 5,060 per acre) and that there had been no outright sale by the Government to the petitioners at open-market prices — a factor relevant to determining market value for Urban Land Tax assessment.
  3. The Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal had treated the petitioners as owners because they were in possession and had constructed factories. The court concluded that possession and use, even compliance with conditions, did not confer on the petitioners the full bundle of rights that constitute "ownership" under the Urban Land Tax Act.
  4. The court relied on the legal principle (as articulated in Kemcos and supported by other authorities) that tax can be levied only on the owner of the land; where the Government retains a right of resumption and other restrictions on alienation exist, the assignee does not acquire ownership in the sense contemplated by the Urban Land Tax statute.
  5. The court examined definitions and statutory concepts (references in the judgment to S.2(10) of the Urban Land Tax Act and S.7-A of the Act are invoked in the reasoning) and used lexicons/dictionaries and cited authorities to explain the meaning of "resumption" and the legal import of a clause allowing the Government to take back the land.
  6. Applying these legal principles to the facts — the restrictions on sale/alienation, the limited compensation on resumption, the Government's fixation of internal transfer value, and the express power to resume — the court concluded that the petitioners were assignees and not full-fledged owners within the meaning of the Urban Land Tax Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions were allowed. The court held that the petitioners are not the owners of the lands assigned to them by the Government (because of the restrictions and the power of resumption contained in the agreements) and therefore the petitioners are not liable to pay urban land tax under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act, 1966.

Implications:

  • The direct legal consequence is that the petitioners cannot be assessed to urban land tax on the lands assigned under the agreements containing resumption and restriction clauses; the Tribunal's order confirming the Assistant Commissioner's assessment was quashed as to these petitioners.
  • The judgment expressly records that there will be no order as to costs in the petitions.
  • The opinion does not elaborate broader, novel legal rules beyond applying established principles (the court grounded its decision on existing authorities and statutory definitions). The decision's immediate effect is confined to the parties: the petitioners are not liable to pay urban land tax on these assigned lands under the facts and agreements before the court.

Prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added that is not present in the text provided.

    Sundaram Fasteners Limited v. Assistant Commissioner Of Urban Land Tax

    1. In all these writ petitions, the main point raised on behalf of the petitioners is that when once the power of resumption of the lands assigned to the petitioners is vested with the respondent Governnient, jt cannot be held that the lands in question are: owned by the petitioners absolutely, in other words as full owners, so as to hold that the petitioners in these writ petitions are liable to pay nrban land tax. The petitioners in these four petitions belong to one group of companies, known as Sundaram Fasteners Ltd., Sundaram 4\bex Ltd, Padi, Madras-50, The prayer of the petitioners in W.P No. 4172 of 1982 reads as follows:—

    “To issue a writ of certiorari calling for the records in C.M.A No 133 of 1978 on the file of the Urban Land Tax Tribunal, Chengal put, and quash the order therein confirming the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Madras-7, in U.L.T Case No. 4 of 1385 Korattur, dated 23-6-1978”.

    Similar prayers have been made in W.P Nos. 4173, 4174 aad 4175 of 1982 on behalf of the respective petitioners therein.

    2. The contents of the affidavit accompanying the writ petition in’ W.P No. 4172 of I982, disclose the following facts, which may be noted as representing similar facts in all the writ petitions as well. The petitioner (in W.P No. 4172 of 1982) is a Company licensed under the Industrial Development Regulation Act and is engaged in the manufacture of automobile components for the manufacture of ancillary items. In pursuance of the grant of licence to manufacture by the Government, the promotor of the petitioner company, Messrs. T.V Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Ltd., applied to the Government of Tamil Nadu for acquisition and assignment of lands for the establishment of factories. In view of the importance of the items to automobile manufactures, the Government agreed to acquire and assign certain lands in Padi, Kalpakkam and Villivakkam villages. The Government took out proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and acquired and assigned lands in favour of Messrs. T.V.S & Sons Limited, after entering into various agreements with the Company and assigning properties in their favour. By Government Orders dated 25-3-1960 and 1611-1961 the Government directed acquisition of lands for the purpose of assignment to the Company for establishment of factories. By G.O.Ms No. 4823 dated 8-11-1961 the Government laid down certain conditions to be followed by the Company regarding maintenance of tank, channels etc. By Articles of Agreement entered into between the Company and the Government, it was agreed that the Governor shall execute certain documents vesting the lands in the Company upon payment of all the moneys mentioned in the agreement and Upon certain conditions.

    3. The Company was required to establish the new undertakings, pay appropriate assessments annually or ground-rent and in the event of failure on the part of the company to establish factories, it was stipulated that the lands were liable to be resumed by the Government, in which event, the compensation payable to the Company in respect of the resumed lands shall be the value of the lands at the time of the acquisition and assignment excluding 15 percent solatium or the market value prevailing at the time of resumption whichever is less.. It is this particular aspect that is very much stressed on behalf of the petitioners herein while putting forth their respective cases for exempting the lands in question from the levy of urban land tax on the ground that the lands are not absolutely owned by the petitioners but only enjoyed as assignee-holders on behalf of the Government in that the Government can resume the lands assigned at any moment. The Government had also option to resume the lands if they remained unused. In pursuance of the agreements, the Government had also fixed the value of the lands at Rs. 5,060 per acre. Even at the time of the transfer of the lands to the new undertakings of the promoter, Company, the Government had permitted the transfer of the lands only at the same cost at which the lands were assigned to the Company. Even in 1972, in its letter dated 20-7-1972 when 11 acres were transferred to M/s. Wheels India Ltd., the Government had approved the sale only at a cost of Rs. 5,060 per acre. Even the sale of lands to M/s. Sundaram Clayton Ltd., on 20-7-1972 was at the same cost of Rs. 5,060 per acre. The sale of 25.81 acres to M/s. Sundaram Fasteners Ltd., in 1971 and the sale of lands of 13.70 acres to M/s. Sundaram Abex Ltd., in 1975 were all at the same cost of Rs. 5,060 per acre.

    4. The Urban Land Tax Authority asses sed the Market value of the lands at Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 4,000 per ground on an erroneous inter pretation of the various deeds of agreements and assignments. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Tribunal which however dismis sed the same by its order dated 12-3-1982, holding, without going into the real question in issue, that the petitioner is liable to pay urban land tax, calculated at the market value fixed, since, according to the Tribunal also, the lands had been utilised by the Company and there is no chance of the Government resuming the land. The Tribunal, according to the petitioner, erred in not considering the fact that the petitioner cannot sell the pro perty out of their volition to any third-party at any time.

    5. It is contended by Mr. A.R Raroanathan, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the Tribunal and the Authority below have erred in law in thinking that merely be cause the petitioner has put up the factory on the lands in question, they have become absolute owners of the properties with free right to sell the properties to any third-party. They also erred in thinking that the Govern ment cannot resume the lands so long as the petitioner utilised the lands and as such, the lands will have a free market value and are capable of being freely alienated by the peti tioner to any one at a negotiated price. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the decision of this Court in Kemcos Chemical Industries, Madras-6 v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others W.P No. 5389 of 1981 of this Court Order dated February 29, 1988.. He also relied on the decisions in Lakshmana v. R. Ramier A.I.R 1953 S.C 304.. RC. Society v. Authorised Officer. Land Reforms A.I.R 1971 Mad. 458. and Victoria P.H.T Board v. Assistant Commis sioner of Urban Land Tax 89 L W. 41 S.N=1977 I M.L.J 294.

    6. The point for consideration in all these writ petitions is, whether the lands, having been assigned to the petitioners, have become the absolute property of the petitioners as to attract the assessing provisions of the Urban Land Tax Act, 1966.

    7. In the counter-affidavits filed in the respective petitions on behalf of the respondents, the Asst. Commissioner, Urban Land Tax has admitted in paragraph 3, the following facts:

    “The restrictions referred to by the petitioner are embodied in the deed of assignment of land in the usual manner with a view to see that the lands are put to use for the purpose for which they were acquired and handed over. The government had imposed some conditions to see that the lands assigned to the petitioner for the purpose of establishing a factory, should not be sold to third-parties and should not be used for any other purpose excepting the purpose for which they had been assigned. The petitioner has already constructed factories and there is no breach of condition”.

    Thus, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners as well as the facts disclosed in paragraphs 3 of the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents show that the assignments of lands made in favour of the respective petitioners are not absolute transfers in character so as to clothe the assignees with full power of disposition. In the deed of assignment there are certain restrictions embodied. These restrictions, according to the respon-| cents, are introduced therein with a view to seeing that the lands are put to use for the purpose for which they were acquired and assigned to the petitioners. The Government had imposed some conditions to see that the lands assigned to the petitioners for establishing factories, should not be sold to third-parties and should not be used for any purpose other than the one for which they were acquired and assigned to them. In this regard, it is also relevant to note that in the Articles of Agreement made on 14-2-1961 between Messrs. T.V Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Pvt. Ltd., and the Governor of Madras, shows, in Cl.(3), the following conditions:—

    “(a.) that the land shall be used for the establishment of new industrial undertakings, one for the manufacture of wheels and rims for automobiles and others for manufacturing projects of an allied nature, with scope for future expansion and also for amenities to be provided for under the provisions of the Factories Act”.

    “(b) that the Company shall pay to the Government annually the appropriate assessment or ground rent as the case may be, on the lands which shall be liable to revision at any general revision of the land revenue settlement:

    (c) that in the event of the Company being wound up or in the event of failure on the part of the Company to carry out the terms of the agreement, that is to say, conditions (a) and (b) above, the lands shall be liable to be resumed and taken back by the Government on repayment to the Company of the amount of the award as finally settled less the 15% awarded for compulsory acquisition or the estimated market value of the land at the time of resumption, whichever shall be less, and if there are any buildings on the land the Government may at their option either purchase the buildings on payment of their estimated value at the time or direct the Company to remove the buildings at its own cost within such time as may de allowed by Government;”

    “(d) that, in the event of the voluntary relinquishment of the land by the Company as not required, the Government may resume the land, if it is required for a Public purpose or if they consider that it should be returned to the original owner. If the Government decide not to exercise this power and inform the Company accordingly, the latter may dispose of the land in any manner it likes. In the event of the resumption of the land under this condition, the compensation payable to the Company shall be the value of the land at the time of acquisition (less 15 per cent awarded for compulsory acquisition) or its estimated market value at the time of resumption, whichever may be less, together with the value of the buildings and other improvements at the time of resumption.”

    “If there are buildings on the land which the Government do not require, the Company shall remove them at its cost”.

    Thus we find that the lands assigned in favour of the petitioners herein are liable to be resumed by the Government, and in the event of resumption of the lands under this condition, incorporated under Cl. (3) in the agreement, the compensation payable to the petitioners shall be the value of the lands at the time of acquisition less 15 per cent solatium awarded, or their estimated market value at the time of resumption, whichever is less. The above clause is pointed out by Mr. Ramanathan, learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his contention that in the case of an absolute sale by a full-fledged owner of a land he is at liberty to sell it at a cost which he feels reasonable and is not bound by any restrictions, and that when once there is a restriction with respect to alienation of lands, then it cannot be considered the absolute property of the person who holds it. ‘Holding’ is different from ‘owning’. They are absolutely two divergent and different concepts in law. In his order in U.L.T Case No. 5/1385/75-76.Korattur dated 20-6-1978, the Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax has observed as follows:—

    “The lands of the company from part of the lands acquired and assigned by the Government in favour of T.V Sundaram Iyengar & Sons (P) Ltd., Mathurai, for the construction of a factory for the manufacture of wheels and rims for automobiles and products of allied nature, in No. 61 Korattur. 72 Kalpakkam, 73 Villivakkam, and 80 Padi Villages. The lands were acquired in 1960 and 1961 under Part II of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on behalf of T.V Sundaram Iyengar and Sons (P) Ltd. The Government have subsequently conveyed the lands to the Company in accordance with an agreement entered into by it with the Government, the Company was to meet all the costs of acquisition of lands and amounts incidental to acquisition such as the cost of Revenue and Survey Department Staff, the expenses in connection with the suits, etc. Cl. 2 of the agreement contemplates the vesting of the lands in the company and giving the company an absolute title tnereto subject to payment of an assessment or ground rent and certain other condition for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the Company; i.e, for establishing four new industrial undertakings namely (i) Wheels India Ltd., for manufacture of wheels and rims for automobiles, (ii) Lucas-T.V.S Pvt. Ltd., for the manufacture of vehicle lighting equipment (iii) Sundaram Clayton Pvt. Ltd., for the manufacture of compressors and exhausters and (iv) Brakes India Ltd., for the manufacture of brakes system for automotive and non-automotive vehicles, with scope for future expansion and also for amenities to be provided for under the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 (Central Act 63 of 1948 All these companies are having their factories in Padi-Korattur area, i.e, in the lands acquired and assigned to T.V Sundaram Iyengar and Sons Pvt. Ltd. The T.V Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Pvt. Ltd., have transferred most of the lands to the six companies mentioned above and retained with it some lands… The transfers have taken place with the approval of the Government. For the purpose of this internal transfer of the lands, the Government have fixed certain value for the lands which is based mainly on the cost of acquisition incurred by the parent company and the Government in I960 and subsequently. This cannot be the market value of the lands as on 1-7-1971 as contemplated in S. 50 of the Urban Land Tax Act, 1976 as amended. There had been no case of outright sale of land by Government to T.V Sundaram Iyengar and Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. S. 6 of the Act refers to fixation of market value for the purpose of Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act, 1976 as amended. According to this Section, the market value of any urban land shall be estimated to be the price in the opinion of the Assistant Commissioner or the Tribunal, as the case may be, such urban land would have fetched or fetch if sold in the open market. So, the market value of the land has to be estimated by reference-to the price which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser. This value could be measured by a consideration of the prices that have obtained in the past for similar lands and with reference to location of the land, nearness to a main road, accessibility to road, frontage etc., and depending upon the size and shape of the lands and other special consideration. The lands under reference have been acquired for a specific public purpose, i.e, for establishing certain industries on behalf of M/s. T.V Sundaram Iyengar and Sons (P) Ltd., on the application to Government and on agreeing to certain conditions prior to acquisition. These conditions are embodied in the deed of assignment of lands with a view to see that the lands are put to use for the purpose for which they were acquired and banded over. So, those usual conditions do not stand in the way of fixing the market value for the purpose of levy of urban land tax as per the provisions of Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act, 1966, as amended”.

    A careful reading of the above passage in the order of the Assistant Commissioner shows that for the purpose of internal transfer of the lands the Government have fixed certain value for the lands which is based mainly on the cost of acquisition incurred by the parent company and the Government. This rate cannot therefore be the market value of the lands as on 1-7-1971 as contemplated under S. 5-C of the Act. There had been no case of outright sale of lands by the Government to the company. S. 6 of the Act refers to the fixation of market value of lands for purposes of the Act. As already seen, there cannot oe a determination of market value as per the provision of S. 6. since the value of the lands has to be fixed at the instance of the Government which has been responsible for the assignment of the lands in question in favour of the petitioners. Various other factors also come to play a part in the case of transfers. Thus, we find that there are restrictions relating to the transfer of the lands in question.

    8. The Tribunal in its appellate judgment dated 12-3-1982, while discussing Point No. 1, has held that the Government have assigned the lands to the petitioners with a view to encourage the industrialists for starting various factories and that the petitioners are in possession and management of the case lands in their own right and therefore, they have become the owners of the case lands. This decision arrived at is certainly not in consonance with law. By no stretch of imagination can any one of the petitioners claim to be the owner of the case lands in view of the specific condition in the agreement, extracted supra, covenanted at the time of the assignment of lands to the petitioners. As already seen, it is the case of the Government that it had imposed certain conditions to see that the lands assigned for the specific purpose of constructing and ‘running factories should not be used for any purpose other than that for which they were assigned. Merely on the ground that the petitioners have constructed factories and that they have complied with the conditions, that does not clothe them with the rights which an absolute owner would possess with respect of a land. Assignees of lands from Government, by acquisition or otherwise, stand on a different footing altogether. The assignees cannot claim themselves to be absolute owners of those lands which were assigned to them for specific purposes. We have already seen that those lands can be resumed at any time by the Government for the reasons which it considers as apart and justified. In other words, the petitioners can, at any moment, be stripped off their right of even possession apart from the rights which they are enjoying as assignees, inasmuch as they may even be asked to demolish the buildings erected by them and no compensation can be claimed by the petitioners therefor.

    9. In Kemcos Chemical Industries, Mad-ras-6 v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others this Court had occasion to consider the question whether urban land Tax is to be paid by the person in whose favour a land had been assigned. In this respect, this Court had observed in paragraph 6 of the judgment in that case as follows:—

    “Tn Venkataramaiya's law Lexicon and Legal Maxims the word ‘resumption’ is described as follows:

    “The word ‘resumption’ connotes taking back what was given. For ‘resumption’ connotes the idea that the land resumed is not the property of the persons from whom it is taken back by the rightful owner. Raja Rajendra Malojirao Shitobe v. State of M.P

    “It is an established principle of law that tax can be collected only from the owner of the land. In the instant case, the owner of the land is only the Government and that is clear from the fact that there is a clause relating to resumption of the land from the occupation of the petitioner. The Government is exempted from payment of urban land tax by virtue of the provisions of the Urban Land Tax Act. Therefore, on no ground can the” petitioner be made liable to pay urban land tax Moreover, the petitioner is only an assignee as per the agreement between the petitioner and the respondents. Looked at from any angle, the contentions of the respondents cannot be upheld. So viewed from the legal point of view as well as from the approach of the layman,’ resumption' means, taking back what has been given in respect of the right of enjoyment of the land in question”.

    “It is not denied by the respondents that it is only for a limited period. It may be for 99 years or 990 years, but yet, possession has been definitely given in favour of the petitioner herein only for enjoyment, That does not mean the entire elements that are available to recognise ownership have been Kgjisferred in favour of the petitioner. Under these circumstances, this Court is definitely of opinion that no person, other than the owner of the land, ean be assessed under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act (Act 12 of 1966). In this view, when the entire facts of the instant case before us are looked into, we are unable to See any iota of ownership of land transferred or given in favour of the petitioner herein. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner are all legal and valid and are supported bv the decision of this Court, in Victoria Public Hall Trust Board v. AC. of Urban Land Tax In view of the definition of ‘Ownership’ under S. 2(10) and also in view of the provision under S. 7-A of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act, 1966, this Court holds that, unless a person is a full-fledged owner of a piece of land, and so long as it does not exceed the minimum contemplated under the Act, it cannot be assessed to tax. It is not liahle to pay tax even though it had entered into a contract”.

    It is an established principle of law that tax can be collected only from the owner of the land. Tn this case, it has not been proved that the assignees, viz., the petitioners herein, are owners of the lands in question. The ownership still vests with the Government in that there is a clause relating to resumption of the lands, incorporated in the agreement entered into between the petitioners and the Government at the time of the assignment. Government is exempted from payment of urban land tax by virtue of the provisions of the Act. The concept of ‘transfer’ as recognised by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act as well as the concept of ‘ownership’ as defined in S. 2(10) of the Urban Land Tax Act, 1966, do not bring within their fold the relationship or the right which the petitioners enjoy due to the assignment of the lands in their occupation by Government by virtue of the conditions of assignment which contain the clause relating to resumption. ‘Resumption’ has been defined in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, at page 2381 as follows:—

    “(1) ‘Resumption’ is a word used in the statute of 3 Hen. 6, C 7. and is there taken for the taking again into the King's hands such lands or tenements as upon false suggestion or other error he had made livery of to an heire, or granted by patent into any mand. (Termes de la Ley).

    “(2) ‘Resumption Of normal use’ (Town and Country Planning Act, 1962 (C. 39. J.S 13 (2), Where land was used as a golf course for 13 years, by the War Department for 3 years and for agricultural purpose for 20 years, re-use as a golf course was held not to be ‘resumption of normal use’ under this section Kingdom v. Minister of Housing and Local Government”

    In Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon and Legal Maxims, the word ‘resumption’ is described, which has been extracted in this para (page 14) supra.

    10. Thus, viewing from any angle, the relationship between the petitioners and the Government on the basis of the agreement of assignment entered into between them, does not bring the petitioners within the definition of owners' as per S. 2 (1) of the Urban Land Tax Act, 1966. Under these circumstances, necessarily the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners in all these writ petitions has: to be upheld holding that the petitioners are not owners of the lands assigned to them by the Government and as such, they are not liable to pay urban land tax. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs in any one of the petitions.

    VCS/RR.

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    Sundaram Fasteners Limited v. Assistant Commissioner Of Urban Land Tax
    (Aug 1, 1988)