Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Hindu Marriage Act, the Parsi Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Indeed, the Special Marriage Act
  • English Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857.
  • provisions of the Indian Divorce Act,
  • Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act
  • Section 488, Criminal Procedure Code,
  • Matrimonb.1 Causes Act, 1923,
  • DIVORCE ACT 1869
  • HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Hindu Marriage Act, the Parsi Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Indeed, the Special Marriage Act
  • English Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857.
  • provisions of the Indian Divorce Act,
  • Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act
  • Section 488, Criminal Procedure Code,
  • Matrimonb.1 Causes Act, 1923,
  • DIVORCE ACT 1869
  • HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a petition under Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act brought by the husband for restitution of conjugal rights against his wife. The parties are Indian Christians married on 26 May 1955. Shortly after the marriage the wife went to her parents' house for the customary month of "Adi" and thereafter returned only after a considerable delay; thereafter she visited her parents intermittently. In 1959 the wife filed a petition before the Chief Presidency Magistrate under Section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code for maintenance. Following court proceedings, the husband set up a separate home and the parties moved into it on 19 November 1959. After about three weeks the wife was taken away by her father and cohabitation ceased.

The wife applied for maintenance and was awarded Rs. 25 per mensem on 18 January 1960; in 1965 she filed for enhancement and the maintenance was raised to Rs. 35 per month with the consent of both parties. The husband later served notice demanding that the wife return to live with him and instituted the present petition for restitution of conjugal rights.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a decree for restitution of conjugal rights should be granted to the husband under Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act in the factual circumstances of this case.
  2. Whether the wife's absence from the matrimonial home constitutes desertion or whether she was compelled to leave by the husband's conduct (i.e., whether constructive desertion occurred).
  3. Whether the husband's conduct (including alleged failure to provide a matrimonial home and alleged mistreatment) and the motives behind bringing the petition affect the grant of restitution of conjugal rights.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Husband's) Arguments

  • The wife was unwilling to have normal sexual relations with the petitioner, allegedly because she had given her heart to another young man before marriage.
  • The wife's father was purportedly trying to obtain a divorce and a lump sum from the petitioner to enable the wife to marry another man.
  • Implicitly, the husband sought the decree for restitution of conjugal rights so that the wife would return to cohabit with him.

Respondent's (Wife's) Arguments

  • The wife alleged cruelty by the husband and his sister-in-law and said she was forced to leave the matrimonial home.
  • She alleged illicit intimacy between the husband and his sister-in-law and claimed that when she discovered it she was ill-treated.
  • She alleged that after the separate establishment was set up the husband did not stay in that house, taunted her and refused to behave as a husband, and that she therefore left on 14 December 1959.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rayden on Divorce (Ninth Edition) — passages at pages 175, 179, 195, 200 and 266 (as cited in the opinion) - Page 175: Desertion is not to be tested merely by which party left first; one may be guilty of desertion if conduct of one spouse forces the other to leave.
- Page 179: Where conduct of the required nature is established, intention to drive the other away can be readily inferred (constructive desertion).
- Page 195: Court has power to refuse restitution where a decree would compel treating one spouse as deserting the other contrary to truth.
- Page 200: Husband's duty to provide a home according to his circumstances; matrimonial home should be settled by reasonable accommodation.
- Page 266: Motives for seeking relief must be bona fide; long delay or collateral motives may warrant refusal.
The Court relied on these principles to conclude that the respondent had been compelled to leave by the husband's conduct (constructive desertion), that the husband had a duty to provide a matrimonial home (which he had failed to discharge properly), and that the husband's motives in bringing the present petition were suspect (possibly to avoid maintenance). These principles supported the refusal of the decree for restitution.
Decision in "Bipinohmdra Juisingbai Skahv. Probhavati" (as cited) This information was not described in the opinion beyond the citation; the precise rule or principle from the decision is not stated in the text provided. The Court referred to the decision as an additional authority supporting its reasoning. The opinion does not elaborate further on how the decision was applied.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a credibility assessment of competing factual assertions and applied the legal principles quoted from Rayden on Divorce. The Court's step-by-step reasoning as set out in the opinion is as follows:

  1. Evaluation of the wife's allegations of illicit intimacy and physical ill-treatment: the Court found these allegations unlikely and "thoroughly artificial" based on timing (very soon after marriage), implausible particulars about the alleged incident, and inconsistencies in the wife's account (e.g., changing her version about the necklace). The Court rejected the wife's account of discovering the husband and sister-in-law in bed and of being beaten thereafter.
  2. Treatment of the necklace evidence: the Court accepted the petitioner's account and letters (Exhibit P-6) showing the wife's father had pledged the necklace because of financial needs connected with the marriage; the Court rejected the wife's assertion that she did not write the letter or could not read well.
  3. Evaluation of the petitioner's claim that the wife was always unwilling to have sexual relations: the Court did not accept this claim, noting evidence that sexual relations had occurred "quite frequently" and that the husband's account that intercourse occurred only when the wife was sleeping or by force was not believable. The Court observed that if the wife truly had an existing betrothal three months before marriage she could have refused the marriage, but she did not.
  4. Synthesis of witness evidence (including the petitioner's sister-in-law and Srinivasa Mudaliar): the Court accepted the sister-in-law's evidence that a separate establishment was advisable and that the respondent visited her parents for justifiable reasons (health and mother's illness). The Court found Srinivasa Mudaliar to be strongly sympathetic to the petitioner and discounted portions of his testimony.
  5. Factual conclusion on underlying cause of estrangement: the Court inferred that the respondent wanted a separate establishment, and the petitioner was strongly attached to his brother and sister-in-law and unwilling to promptly establish a separate home. The petitioner’s failure or delay in providing a suitable matrimonial home and his apparent preference for living with his brother and sister-in-law caused embitterment and ultimately led to the wife's leaving.
  6. Application of legal principles on desertion and restitution: relying on Rayden, the Court held that if a spouse is compelled by the conduct of the other to leave, the leaving spouse is not guilty of desertion; constructive desertion can be inferred without explicit proof of intention to drive the other away. The Court also invoked the principle that a husband must provide a home and that restitution should not be ordered in circumstances that would unfairly treat the leaving spouse as a deserter.
  7. Assessment of petitioner's motive and delay: the Court noted the husband's long delay in seeking restitution (he waited from 1960 to 1965 and had earlier consented to maintenance orders) and inferred that the petition's primary object was to escape the increased maintenance order rather than bona fide efforts to restore conjugal relations. The Court cited authority that motives for relief must be bona fide and that collateral motives may justify refusal.
  8. Conclusion from the combined factual findings and legal tests: because the wife had been compelled to leave by the petitioner's conduct and because the petitioner's motive was suspect, the Court concluded that a decree for restitution should be refused.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition for restitution of conjugal rights is DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and immediate implications:

  • The respondent (wife) continues to receive the maintenance previously ordered (as increased in 1965).
  • Both parties are ordered to bear their own costs.
  • The Court refused to grant restitution because it found the wife left for sufficient reason (constructive desertion due to the husband's conduct) and because the husband's motives in bringing the petition were not bona fide.

Broader observations recorded by the Court (policy/legislative implications noted in the opinion):

  • The Court criticized the Indian Divorce Act (1869) as outdated compared with later reforms in English law and other Indian matrimonial statutes (references made to English Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, Matrimonial Causes Acts of 1923 and 1937, the Hindu Marriage Act, the Parsi Marriage Act amendments, and the Special Marriage Act, 1954). The Court stated it is "high time" the Indian Divorce Act be revised and aligned with other modern statutes.
  • The Court observed procedural anomalies specific to Christian matrimonial causes in Madras (e.g., forum allocation to the High Court for city cases and special confirmation requirements) and recommended that forum and appeal provisions under the Indian Divorce Act be reconsidered by the Legislature to avoid wasting High Court judicial time on matters comparable to those handled by subordinate courts for other communities.

The opinion records these legislative and procedural criticisms as part of the judgment, but the Court's operative order in this case is limited to dismissing the petition for restitution and directing each party to bear their own costs.

    Solomon Devasahayam Selvaraj v. Chandriah Mary

    1. This is a petition under Section 32 of the Indian Divorce Act by a husband for restitution of conjugal rights against his wife. The parties are Indian Christians. They were married on 26th May, 1955. The husband was then living with his brother and his family and the wife was taken to that house. Soon after about the middle of July, 1355, the wife was taken to her parents' house for the month of 'Adi' as is usual in the south in the case of newly married brides. She came back to the husband's house not at the end of Adi but much later. It appears that the wife used to go to her parents' house off and on and once the husband's brother's father-in-law had to go and persuade the wife's parents to send her to her husband's house and another time one Rev. Chinniah had to be approached. Ultimately in 1959, the wife filed a petition before the Chief Presidency Magistrate under Section 488, Criminal Procedure Code, for maintenance. As a result of what happened in the Court, the husband set up a separate home to which both the parties moved on 19th November, 1959. After about three weeks, the wife was taken away by her father to his house and thereafter, the parties had not been cohabiting together. Immediately after the wife went to her parents' house, she filed another petition for maintenance and without much contest, she was awarded a sum of Rs. 25 per mensem as maintenance on 18th January, i960. In 1965, she filed another petition for enhancement of maintenance and it was enhanced to Rs. 35, per month with the consent of both the parties. Thereafter, the husband sert a notice demanding that his wife come and live with him and followed it up with the present petition.

    2. The wife's contention is that she was treated with cruelty by her husband and his sister-in-law and that therefore, she was forced to leave. She also alleged that her husband had illicit intimacy with his sister-in-law and that because she found it out her husband and his sister-in-law began to ill-treat her. She further alleged that after they set up a separate establishment soon after the first petition for maintenance, the husband never lived in the house and was always taunting her saying that as she wanted a separate house and he had provided it, she should be satisfied with it and that she could not expect any other husbandly actions or attitudes from him, and that was why, she had to leave on the 14th December, 1959. On the other hand, the petitioner's case was that the respondent had already, even before her marriage, given her heart to another young man and that she was, therefore, unwilling to have normal sexual relations with the petitioner, and that the respondent's father was trying to get a divorce for her and also a lump sum from the petitioner so as to enable the respondent to be married to another young man.

    3. I am satisfied that the allegation of the respondent that she found her husband and his sister-in-law in compromising circumstances is wholly untrue. This could, not have happened in the case of a newly married husband within 10 days of the marriage, nor is it likely that the husband was sleeping separately and that this enabled him to have illicit intimacy with his sister-in-law. The particulars, as to the happenings on the night on which the respondent says she Found her husband and his sister in-law in bed together, are too artificial to be believed. The husband could not have come into the 100m in which the respondent was lying down and immediately gone out to lie with his sister-in-law. He should certainly have expected that his wife would be awakened and might even notice what he was doing. Nor am I able to accept the respondent's evidence that she and her husband had sexual relations only on the first two days and not thereafter. The story of the respondent about her husband having taken away her chain, necklace, earrings and ring also sounds too artificial. They could not have needed repairs so soon after the marriage, having only recently been made; nor can I accept her evidence that her husband gave the necklace, which was presented to her by her father to her husband's sister-in-law and that she was wearing it. Indeed, the respondent had to change her Version and say that it was converted into a chain and given to his sister-in-law. The petitioner and his sister-in-law could certainly not have shown their relationship so openly; nor can I believe the respondent when she says that when she found fault with her husband the next morning, he and sister-in-law beat her and fisted her and her husband's brother kept quiet even though he came to learn of his wife's illicit relationship with his brother. The whole story is thoroughly artificial and the incident is unlikely.

    4. What has happened about the necklace given to the respondent by her father is that because of his needs and because he had to incur some debts in connection with the respondent's marriage, her father seems to have pledged it. This is clear from the letter Exhibit P-6 written by the respondent herself to her father. I cannot accept her evidence that that letter was not written by her and that she cannot read well. This is only a pretence; nor can I accept her father's evidence that he is not able to say whether it is a letter written by his daughter. I accept the petitioner's evidence with reference to this letter. Respondent's, father also accepts that he pledged it. In fact, it is this fact of having pledged the necklace and also probably respondent's father's inability to provide the things necessary to set up-a household, that seems to have been responsible for the delay in the respondent being sent back to her husband's house.

    5. Equally, I must say, I am not convinced of the petitioner's case that from the beginning the respondent was showing an unwillingness and disinclination to have sexual relations with him and that she said that she had already given her heart to another young man and that she had been forced to marry him and that, therefore she was not willing to have sexual intercourse and that she was giving various excused like pain in the chest etc. Indeed, it is obvious from the evidence of petitioner that he had sexual relations quite frequently with the respondent. I am not able to accept his evidence that he had sexual relations with respondent either while she was sleeping or by forcing her. His story about the respondent having told him about her having given her heart to another young man, cannot be true. The betrothal took place three months before the marriage and if the respondent was unwilling to marry the petitioner and had already given her heart to another young man. she could have refused to marry him. I accept the evidence of the respondent and her father on this point that the respondent never expressed her unwillingness to marry the petitioner. This is only an excuse thought of by the petitioner to buttress his case. It is unfortunate that both sides have freely lied about the facts of this case, and it is therefore rather difficult to arrive at the truth. Even the respondent had said that she had sexual relations with the petitioner only for two days and that thereafter, the petitioner refused to have sexual relations with her

    6. We probably get a picture fairly near the truth from the evidence of the petitioner's sister-in-law. She said that the petitioner and the respondent had to go to the open terrace in order to speak to one another and that she thought a separate establishment should be set up for them. I cannot accept the evidence of Srinivasa Mudaliar in regard to what the petitioner is said to have told him about the sexual relations between the husband and the wife. He and the petitioner's brother are very old friend, having started their life together in school and later as labourers in the Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, though he is now in prosperous circumstances. It is obvious that all his sympathies are with the petitioner and his brother. The truth seems to be that the petitioner having been brought up by his brother and sister-in-law from his childhood and got married by them, was very much attached to them and did not.want to leave, them, and set up a separate establishment. That he should have been very much attached to his brother and his sister-in-law is obvious, and that he should have shown respect to his sister-in-law is also obvious. This would also, prove that the story of the respondent about the illicit intimacy between her husband and his sister-in-law cannot be true. What seems to have really happened is that the respondent wanted a separate establishment to be set up. In addition, she also does not seem to have been of very robust health and on that account and on account of her mother's illness, she used to go to her parents' house now and then This is clear from the evidence of the petitioner's sister-in-law herseif She only says that whenever the respondent went to her parents' house that was for a justifiable reason and they only found that the respondent found it difficult to come back She also says that both the husband and wife were happy, and even the petitioner had to admit that except in the matter of sexual relationship' to all outward appearances during day time, the respondent was behaving normally. So, the inference, which we can draw, from the circumstances, is that the respondent was insisting upon a separate establishment being set up, that the petitioner was not willing to leave his brother and sister-in-law and that the petitioner also apparently had his grievance about the respondent going away to her parents' house off and on and taking her own time for coming back. These things naturally led to the feelings the coming embittered, which ultimately resulted in the wife filing a petition for maintenance.

    7. As happens in most cases, when the wife files a petition for maintenance, the Tiusband comes forward with an offer to set up a separate establishment. It was also aided in this case by the advice of the Magistrate that young people should live together and a separate establishment should be set up. In fact much of the trouble in this case could have been avoided, if only the husband had set up a separate establishment soon after the marriage, especially when the respondent was wanting a separate establishment and even the sister-in-law says that she thought that is was better to have a separate establishment. After all, when a man marries, he is bound to provide a matrimonial home for the wife and he cannot go on living with his brother and his sister-in-law. The very suggestion put to the respondent on behalf of the petitioner that his brother had put up a big house seems to imply that the respondent and the petitioner should live with the petitioner's brother and that the respondent was being unreasonable in insisting upon a separate establishment.

    8. According to the respondent after a separate establishment was set up, the petitioner did not stay in that house at all. He did not even provide her with the things necessary for cooking. He used to go in the evenings, stay in the verandah and go away and when asked, he said that the respondent had insisted upon having a separate establishment, that he had given it to her and that she should be satisfied with it. He also said that because the Court asked her to go and live with him she should not have agreed and she should suffer for that and he would not be a husband to her. I cannot accept the evidence of the petitioner that he was a dutiful husband during this period, that he had provided all the necessities for the living, that he used to sleep there and that he does not know why his wife went away. I accept the evidence of the respondent's father on this point as also that of the respondent. A woman, who has been insisting upon a separate establishment and has got one, would not leave it without sufficient reason. In fact we get an indication of the truth of this from the evidence of Srinivasa Mudaliar himself though Srinivasa Mudaliar wanted to make it appear that the respondent's father merely anxious to get a lump sum from the petitioner, so as to enable him to get his daughter married again. He had to say that the respondent's father came and told him that his daughter was not properly treated, but like a dog, and that he should arrange for payment of a lump sum. He also had to admit that the respondent's father had told him that he was not anxious in getting maintenance because his daughter would always be weeping and therefore, he should arrange as he had asked for. Thus, even from the mouth of a witness favourable to the petitioner, it is established that it was not the respondent that was anxious to live separately from the husband, that it was not she who wanted maintenance and that she was feeling unhappy over having to live away from her husband. It Was because the respondent and her father realised that the petitioner did not want her and that he was more particular about living with his brother and sister-in-law rather than living in a separate house with his wife, they thought that it would be better to put an end to the misery of both parties; by getting a divorce and getting the respondent married off to another person. There is nothing unreasonable about this.

    9. It is unfortunate that the law being what it is, nothing could be done about such a situation. The facts of this case clearly show that the respondent had to leave the matrimonial home not because she did not want to live with the petitioner, but she realised that it was not possible to live with the petitioner and because the petitioner had compelled her to do so. In law that is sufficient reason to resist the petition for restitution of conjugal rights.

    10. In Rayden on Divorce, Ninth Edition, at page 175, the following passage occurs:

    Desertion is not to be tested by merely ascertaining which party left the matrimonial home first. If one spouse is forced by the conduct of the other to leave home it may be that spouse responsible for the driving out is guilty of desertion. There is no substantial difference between the case of a man who intends to cease cohabitation and leaves his wife; and the case of a man who compels his wife by his conduct, with the same intention to leave him; and the case of one who persists in treating his wife in a way which he knows she will probably not tolerate and which no ordinary woman would tolerate and she leaves him.

    11. See also the, decision in Bipinohmdra Juisingbai Skahv. Probhavati.

    12. At page 179 of the same work it is mentioned as follows:

    Where conduct of the required nature is established, the necessary intention is readily inferred for prima facie a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts and it is not necessary to show in a case of constructive desertion some definite evidence of a clear intention on the part of one spouse to drive the other away.

    13. At page 195 it is mentioned as follows:

    The Court has power to refuse a decree for restitution of conjugal right wherever the result of such decree would be to compel the Court to treat one of the spouses as deserting the other without reasonable cause contrary to the real truth of the case.

    14. At page 200 it is mentioned as follows:

    It is a husband's duty to provide his wife with a home according to his circumstances. There is no absolute rule whereby either party is entitled to dictate to the other where the matrimonial home shall be; the matter is to be settled by agreement between the parties, by a process of 'give and take' and by reasonable accommodation.

    15. That, the husband has not done in this case.

    16. I must make it clear that the sole object of the petitioner in instituting these proceedings is to get rid of the maintenance order against him. Otherwise, he need not have waited from i960 to 1965 having practically consented to an order for maintenance both in i960 as well as in 1965. It is obvious that his action is instituting these proceedings is because the maintenance rate had been increased by the 1965 order and he wants to get rid of it. In view of the fact that his case is that the respondent was unwilling to offer him sexual satisfaction, one cannot believe that he is still hoping that when she comes back, she would do so. The wife's attitude in refusing to go back to her husband is clear when she says that if the offer had come much earlier she would have accepted and that it is now too late. He had never made an offer after 1959 to get back his wife. The wife's evidence on this point has a ring of truth about it. At page 266 of Rayden's the following passage occurs:

    The motives for seeking relief must be bona fide and direct; the sense of injury must not be wanting and a decree may be refused, after a long delay during which the remedy was known, when the true motive of the petitioner (this particularly applies to a wife) appears to be a collateral nature.

    Though at page 269 it is mentioned that the delay occasioned, for instance, by poverty, does not affect a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, it is also mentioned that unexplained delay in bringing the suit might influence the mind of the Court in a subsequent suit for dissolution and that the Court must be satisfied of the petitioner's sincerity. I am satisfied that in this case, the sincerity is lacking in the petitioner's action and his sole object is to get rid of the maintenance order against him. To make an order in his favour would be contrary to the facts of this case and the petitioner being allowed to take advantage of his own wrong:

    17. The petition must therefore stand dismissed. The result is unfortunate. The respondent continues to get maintenance, which is Very poor satisfaction for a young woman in her thirties. The husband has no wife and that again is unfortunate for a young man in his thirties. But the law being what it is, there is nothing which this Court can do to help the parties.

    18. The petition is dismissed, but in the circumstances both parties will bear their own costs.

    19. Before parting with this case, I want to make a few general observations. The Indian Divorce Act, 1869 is wholly out of date. Its provisions were exact copies of the English Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857. Under that Act, it was enough if the husband proved adultery in order to enable him to get a divorce from his wife. On the other hand that was not enough for a wife to get a divorce against her husband. Something more must be proved. The law had been amended in England as early as 1923 by the Matrimonb.1 Causes Act, 1923, putting the husband and the wife on equal footing. The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1937 added some more grounds for divorce. The law in India under the Hindu Marriage Act is practically the same as in England at present. The Parsi Marriage Act was amended in 1936 to put it more or less on the same basis as the English law of 1937. Only the Divorce Act which applies to Christians is at least 50 years behind the times. No one will consider that the Christians are a backward community compared to the other communities in the country. It is high time that the indian divorce act is brought into line with the Hindu Marriage Act, the Parsi Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Indeed, the Special Marriage Act even provides for divorce by consent of parties.

    20. Another important matter is that under the indian divorce act for cases arising inside the city of Madras, the High Court is the Court competent to try such cases whereas in the case of other communities, the City Civil Court, Madtas, can deal with the cases. What is more a decree for dissolution of marriage of nullity of marriage passed by a District Judge has to be confirmed by a Bench of three Judges of the High Court. In the case of the other communities the Subordinate Courts are competent to deal with these matters and the ordinary provisions of appeal in civil cases apply. It is unnecessary and wholly incongruous that the causes under the indian divorce act, should be heard by a High Court Judge, in the city and decrees passed by District Judges should be confirmed by a Bench of three Judges of the High Court. It is necessary and it would be advisable, to bring the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act, in regard to divorce and judicial separation, in line with the provisions of the other three Acts already mentioned. While that is a matter for the Legislature to consider in its own good time the question relating to the forum of trial as well as of appeal under the indian divorce act is an urgent matter. There is no need to waste the time of the Judges of the High Court over matters which relate to the Christian community which are no more important than similar matters relating to the other communities.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Solomon Devasahayam Selvaraj v. Chandriah Mary
    (Sep 21, 1967)