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  • Sections 324, 325, 404 and 384 I.P.C.
  • SECTION 23 CONTRACT ACT
  • Sections 404 and 384 I.P.C.
  • Section 253(1), Crl.P.C.
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  • Sections 324, 325, 404 and 384 I.P.C.
  • SECTION 23 CONTRACT ACT
  • Sections 404 and 384 I.P.C.
  • Section 253(1), Crl.P.C.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal under the Letters Patent challenges the decision of Venkatadri, J., which affirmed the judgment of the court of first instance. The underlying suit, described as one for partition, in substance sought to prevent a Hindu son (first plaintiff) from being bound by a debt incurred by his father (the second defendant). Defendants 1 and 2 were brothers and members of a joint Hindu family; plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the son and daughter of defendant 2. Defendants 3 to 5 were creditors who obtained a decree (O.S. 392 of 1955) against defendants 1 and 2 on a promissory note for Rs. 15,000 (the challenged decree debt arose from a promissory note executed for Rs. 20,000 but settled for Rs. 16,000 as a compromise).

Background facts: after the death of Rangaswami Naicker (father of defendants 3–5), defendants 1 and 2 managed the minors' properties for about six years but failed to account properly; at a panchayat it was agreed defendants 1 and 2 would pay Rs. 20,000 to defendants 3–5. A promissory note dated 9-7-1952 (after a mediation on 1-6-1952) led to suit O.S. 392 of 1955 and a decree. Shortly after the mediation a criminal complaint was filed by the third defendant against the second defendant under various IPC sections; the criminal complaint was eventually taken on file under Sections 404 and 384 IPC and the accused was discharged by the Sub-Magistrate under Section 253(1), Cr.P.C., on the ground that no case was made out.

The trial court held the promissory note binding and not vitiated; Venkatadri, J. affirmed, finding no evidence connecting the criminal prosecution with execution of the promissory note and rejecting claims of coercion or collusion. The appeal challenges (i) that the promissory note was executed to stifle the criminal prosecution and is therefore void as against public policy, and (ii) that the debt is avyavaharika so the son is not bound.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the promissory note (and the decree founded on it) was vitiated because it was given in consideration of stifling a pending criminal prosecution, rendering it unenforceable under public policy (Section 23, Contract Act).
  2. Whether the liability evidenced by the decree is an "avyavaharika" debt (i.e., repugnant to good morals or tainted by illegality at inception) such that the son is not bound to discharge it from ancestral property.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The promissory note was executed while a criminal prosecution was pending against the second defendant and was intended to stifle that prosecution; therefore the note is vitiated as opposed to public policy and unenforceable.
  • The sequence of events (complaint filed, panchayat on 1-6-1952, promissory note on 9-7-1952, trial/hearing on 11-10-1952) and the complainant's own admission that his witnesses were unwilling to depose justify the inference that the prosecution was dropped as part of the consideration for the promissory note.
  • The debt was avyavaharika (tainted by immorality/illegality) and therefore the son could not be held liable to discharge it from ancestral property.

Respondents' / Trial Court's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The promissory note was a binding instrument executed to settle a civil liability arising from defendants 1 and 2's management of defendants 3–5's properties; the suit on the promissory note was not collusive.
  • There was no evidence that execution of the promissory note was connected with the criminal prosecution: P.W.1 (the plaintiffs' mother) did not allege coercion; the complainant in the criminal case testified but the prosecution failed for lack of witnesses; panchayat and other witnesses described the settlement and accountabilities.
  • The debt arose from a settled civil accountability (quantified at the panchayat) and was not shown to be avyavaharika; thus the son remains bound to discharge it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Veerayya v. Sobanadri, ILR (1937) Mad 471 = AIR 1936 Mad 656 Distinguishes cases where no pre-existing obligation exists (where inference that security was given to drop prosecution may be patent) from cases with pre-existing legal obligations (where such inference must be proved by evidence, often circumstantial). The court relied on this distinction to say that because a pre-existing obligation (liability to account) existed, the appellants needed evidence to show the promissory note was given as consideration to drop prosecution; such evidence was not present.
Jones v. Marionotheshire Permanent Benefit Building Society, (1892) 1 Ch. 173 Explains that reparation for an obligation is independent of prosecution and that abstention from prosecution should not be made a bargain; if reparation becomes a bargain it is unenforceable. Used to support the general principle that agreements to abandon prosecution cannot be enforced if they form the bargain consideration; applied to emphasize the need to show the prosecution's withdrawal was part of the bargain.
Bhowanipur Banking Corporation v. Durgesh Nandini, AIR 1941 PC 95 Stresses mutual understanding that a promise is made in exchange for the other party's promise not to prosecute; warns against giving undue weight to existence of a real obligation when the agreement to abandon prosecution is part of consideration. Cited to underline that even where a pre-existing debt exists, the agreement not to prosecute may vitiate an instrument if it formed part of the consideration; court nonetheless required evidence of such mutual bargain and found none.
Narasimharaju v. Gurumurthi Raju (Supreme Court, cited) States that to impeach an agreement settling criminal proceedings it is enough to produce evidence from which the inference necessarily arises that part of the consideration was withdrawal and non-prosecution of a criminal complaint. The court invoked this principle to frame the evidentiary threshold: although circumstantial evidence may suffice, no such evidence establishing that withdrawal was part of the consideration was produced here.
Hemraj v. Khemchand, AIR 1943 PC 142 Holds that the character of a debt must be examined with reference to the time when the liability first arose; if not tainted at inception, the debt is binding on the son. Cited to support the conclusion that the liability in this case, arising from management/accountability, was not avyavaharika at inception and therefore bound the son.
Natesayyan v. Ponnusami, (1893) ILR 16 Mad 99 Affirms that a father's dishonest retention of money may be morally blameworthy but does not necessarily absolve sons of their pious obligation to discharge the father's debt if the debt was not immoral at inception. Relied on to show that subsequent dishonesty by the father does not convert a lawful liability into an avyavaharika debt excusing the son.
Gurunatham Chetty v. Raghavalu Chetty, (1908) ILR 31 Mad 472 Concludes failure to account as an administrator was not proven to be a criminal offence and affirms sons' liability where the original duty was not criminal in nature. Used to reinforce that mismanagement or failure to account does not necessarily amount to a crime and therefore does not render a debt avyavaharika.
Venkateswara Temple v. Radhakrishna (Full Bench, Andhra Pradesh High Court) Summarises that a son is immune only where the debt's origin was immoral by being obtained by commission of an offence; misappropriation after lawful taking does not make a debt avyavaharika. Applied to conclude that because the original taking/management was not shown to be criminal, the debt could not be characterised as avyavaharika and the son remained bound.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a two-part analysis corresponding to the two main issues raised.

1. Whether the promissory note was given to stifle the criminal prosecution

  • The court first recognised the established principle that agreements to stifle prosecutions are unenforceable under Section 23 of the Contract Act because "no man shall trade on a felony" and because such bargains are against public policy.
  • It then applied authorities (Veerayya, Jones, Bhowanipur, Narasimharaju) to clarify the evidentiary standard: where a pre-existing legal obligation exists, an inference that a security was given to drop prosecution is not automatically obvious and must be proven from the evidence, often circumstantially; by contrast, where no pre-existing obligation exists, the inference may be more apparent.
  • Applying those principles to the facts, the court observed: the promissory note followed a panchayat settlement of a civil obligation to account for estate proceeds; the criminal complaint was filed earlier but the accused may not even have been aware of its pendency at the time the promissory note was executed. Key pieces of evidence were absent: defendants 1 and 2 did not give evidence; P.W.1 (the plaintiffs' mother) did not state any coercion or that the promissory note was linked to dropping prosecution; the complainant had appeared in the criminal trial and the accused was discharged because witnesses were unavailable and "no case was made out".
  • The court emphasised that absence of prosecution after launch does not necessarily prove that the prosecution was withdrawn as part of a bargain; the complainant's later attitude or motive in not proceeding further is insufficient unless it can be shown that discontinuance formed part of the consideration. Given the lack of evidence showing defendants' awareness of the criminal proceedings or any mutual consensus to abandon prosecution as part of the bargain, the court found the necessary inference not established.
  • Conclusion on this issue: the evidence did not establish that the promissory note was executed in consideration of stifling the prosecution; therefore Section 23 did not render the note void on that ground in this case.

2. Whether the debt was avyavaharika

  • The court examined authorities (Hemraj, Natesayyan, Gurunatham Chetty, Venkateswara Temple) on the doctrine of avyavaharika. The governing principle cited is that the character of a debt must be judged at its inception: only debts obtained originally by commission of an offence or otherwise immoral at the origin can be termed avyavaharika.
  • On the facts, defendants 1 and 2 had taken management of the minors' properties ostensibly for their benefit and had managed them for over six years. There was no pleading or evidence that their original entry upon the properties was unlawful or trespassory; the liability to account arose by virtue of their management. The panchayat settled accountability at Rs. 20,000, which formed the basis of the promissory note.
  • Because the origin of the liability was civil (a duty to account) and not shown to be criminal or immoral at inception, subsequent failure to account (even if dishonest) did not convert the debt into an avyavaharika debt that would absolve the son from his pious obligation.
  • Conclusion on this issue: the decree debt was not avyavaharika; the son remained bound to discharge the debt.

Overall, the court applied established precedent narrowly and factually: it required evidence linking the promissory note to an agreement to stop prosecution before treating the instrument as void for public policy, and it evaluated the origin of the liability to determine whether it was immoral or illegal at inception for the purpose of the avyavaharika doctrine. On both counts the available record did not satisfy the necessary thresholds.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal fails and is DISMISSED with costs. The judgment of the trial court and the decree in O.S. 392 of 1955 (on the promissory note) were affirmed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The promissory note and the decree founded upon it remain enforceable against the plaintiffs (sons/daughters), and the liability to account (quantified by the panchayat and reflected in the promissory note) binds the sons; the appellants take nothing on appeal.
  • On legal doctrine, the court reiterated established principles rather than announcing new law: (a) for an instrument to be vitiated as given to stifle prosecution, there must be evidence (direct or inferential) that discontinuance of prosecution was part of the consideration; (b) for a debt to be avyavaharika, immorality or illegality must have been inherent at the inception of the obligation. The opinion applied prior authorities to the facts at hand but did not purport to create new precedent beyond those restatements.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the facts, arguments, authorities, analysis, and conclusions expressly contained in the provided opinion.

    Loganathan Minor And Others v. Ponnuswami Naicker And Others.

    1. This is an appeal under the Letters Patent from the decision of our learned brother Venkatadri, J., confirming the judgment of the court of first instance, plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the appellants. The facts of the case are within a narrow compass. The suit statedly one for partition is in fact and substance an attempt by a Hindu son to free his share in the family properties from a debt incurred by his father. Defendants 1 and 2 in the suit are brothers and members of a joint Hindu family. The first plaintiff is the son and the second plaintiff, the daughter of the second defendant. The third plaintiff is the wife of the second defendant while the fourth plaintiff is the wife of the first defendant. A daughter of the first plaintiff figures as the fifth plaintiff. The tenth defendant in the suit is the Official Receiver in the Insolvency of defendants 1 and 2 and the remaining defendants are creditors and decree-holders. The only debt that is really under challenge is the decree debt in O.S. 392 of 1955 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Coimbatore for a sum of Rs. 15000 in favour of defendants 3 to 5. These defendants are the sons of one Rangaswami Naicker, brother of the mother of defendants 1 and 2. It emerges from the evidence that on the death of Rangaswami Naicker in or about 1946 leaving defendants 3 to 5 minors defendants 1 and 2, in view of their close relationship, assumed the management of the properties of defendants 3 to 5 but failed duly to account for the income and profits from the properties of defendants 3 to 5. It is common ground that defendants 1 and 2 were in possession of the properties of defendants 3 to 5 for about six years. It is stated for these defendants that by unauthorised application of their funds defendants 1 and 2 added to their own wealth and acquired the suit house and improved their dry lands, sinking a well at a heavy cost. Later on defendants 3 to 5 coming of age and insisting upon an accounting for the assets handled by defendants 1 and 2 at a mediation it was decided that defendants 1 and 2 should take all the then standing crops, retain the cattle and moveables in their possession and pay defendants 3 to 5 a sum of Rs. 20000. It is this liability that formed the consideration of a promissory note which resulted in the decree of court in O.S. 392 of 1955. in the suit on the promissory note defendants 1 and 2 raised various contentions; but eventually settled the claim for a sum of Rs. 16000 taking three months' time to pay. The mediation was on 1-6-1962 and the promissory note for the sum of Rs. 20000 which defendants 1 and 2 had to pay was executed on 9-7-1962. It transpires that shortly after the mediation there was a criminal complaint by the third defendant charging the present second defendant with offences under Sections 324, 325, 404 and 384 I.P.C. Actually the complaint was taken on file only under Sections 404 and 384 I.P.C. in his sworn statement then recorded the third defendant stated that the accused the present second defendant, was managing his affairs and properties after the death of his father, and that he took over the stock of timber the deceased had left and made use of it for construction of his own house. The complaint set out that at a panchayat held on 1-6-1962 the accused had agreed to execute a security bond over his terraced house and dry land in a sum of Rs. 20000 the amount being payable to defendants 3 to 5 within a year. From the calendar and judgment of the criminal case in C. C, No. 837 of 1962, on the file of the Third City Sub-Magistrate, Coimbatore, it is seen that the case was taken up for trial on 11-10-1952 and the accused discharged under Section 253(1), Crl.P.C. finding that no case was made out. The accused is shown to have been apprehended only on that date i.e. on 11-10-1952. The order shows that the complainant examined himself as P.W. 1 and deposed that the accused was his uncle, and that the matter being a family dispute the relatives were unwilling to take part in the case. The complainant deposed also about the panchayat. He stated that the panchayatdars were refusing to depose in the matter, and that he had no other witnesses to examine. It is in this background that the appellants question the validity of the debt under two counts; first it is contended that the promissory note came into existence while a prosecution had been launched against the second defendant, that the promissory note was intended to stifle the pending criminal prosecution, and that so it was vitiated as opposed to public policy. Secondly it is contended that the debt incurred was an Avyavaharika one and that therefore the debt cannot bind the son. The plaint of course, contains the usual reckless and meaningless allegations particularly in the context of the case that defendants 1 and 2 neglected their family, that they colluded with defendants 3 and 4, and that the suit O.S. 392 of 1955 was itself a collusive suit on a promissory note without any consideration. The Subordinate Judge found that the promissory note was binding on the plaintiffs, that the suit was not collusive, and that the decree was not vitiated in any manner. Our learned brother, Venkatadri, J., has on an elaborate consideration of the law applicable in the matter and in the light of the facts that emerged from the record, affirmed the decree of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. It is held that there is absolutely no evidence to connect the criminal prosecution with the execution of the promissory note. The only witness for the plaintiff in the suit, the mother of the plaintiffs as P.W. 1 does not even whisper a word about the circumstances under which the promissory note came into existence. It is pointed out by the learned Judge that she does not depose to any coercion, undue influence or pressure being brought upon the second defendant to Ret him execute the promissory note. The fourth defendant has spoken in detail about the management of the estate by defendants 1 and 2, the circumstances under which the promissory note came to be executed, the suit thereon and the compromise decree. One of the Panchayatdars had been examined as D.W. 4. Defendants 1 and 2 have not gone into the witness box. In these circumstances, our learned brother, remarked that there was no direct evidence to connect the promissory note with the criminal prosecution.

    2. Before us learned counsel for the appellants, the son and daughter of the second defendant, strenuously contended that as it has been made out that a criminal prosecution was pending against the second defendant and the promissory note had been executed pending the criminal prosecution, it was not only a legitimate but a necessary inference that the promissory note was executed in consideration of dropping the criminal prosecution, scuttling it by not prosecuting it. Learned counsel contended that the proper inference in this case should be that the launching of the prosecution and the execution of the promissory note related to each other as cause and effect. According to learned counsel the fact that the complainant had appeared at the trial of the criminal case and examined himself as P.W. 1, was not of much significance; nor the fact that the Sub-Magistrate had discharged the accused holding that no case was made out, as material factor in the examination of the question whether the promissory note was given in consideration of withdrawal of the prosecution. Learned counsel points out that in the very nature of things there will not be direct evidence, and that it is a matter for inference from circumstantial evidence. According to learned counsel the sequence of events and the bland admission of the complainant in the Criminal Court that his witnesses would not help him are tell-tale and indicative that the prosecution was not pressed for the reason that the complainant had consideration for the same.

    3. Agreements for stifling prosecutions, are well known classes of agreements which the court refuses to interfere as falling under Section 23 of the Contract Act. It is based on the principle that no man shall trade on a felony. If the accused person is innocent, the law is abused for, the purpose of extortion, and if he is guilty in fact, the law is eluded by a corrupt compromise screening the criminal for a consideration. The offences for which the complaint was taken on file are under Sections. 384 and 404, I.P.C. which are not compoundable and an agreement made for the purpose of stifling the prosecution in the case, if made out, would certainly invalidate the promissory note. But for Section 23 of the Contract Act to apply the dropping of the criminal prosecution must be at least a part of the consideration for the promissory note. It is pointed out by Venkataramana Rao, J., in Veerayya v. Sobanadri, ILR (1937) Mad 471 at pp. 474, 475=(AIR 1936 Mad 656 at p. 658)-

    When there is no pre-existing obligation, the inference that the security or note was given in consideration of dropping the prosecution may in a given case be patent. But when there is a pre-existing legal obligation and the security or note is given for it, it must be made out from the evidence, true the evidence will normally be circumstantial and it may be by necessary implication that it is a part of the consideration to drop the criminal proceedings. In Jones v. Marionotheshire Permanent Benefit Building Society, (1892) 1 Ch. 173, at pp. 184, 185, Bowen L. J. points out that reparation for an obligation is a duty which the offender owes quite independently of his fear of prosecution or otherwise and that it would be absurd to lay down as an impossible counsel of perfection that the obligee or the relatives of an offender and his friends are not justified in making reparation to the party injured. The learned Lord Justice emphasises that the abstention from or the dropping of the criminal prosecution should not be made a matter of bargain. If reparation takes the form of a bargain the bargain is one which the court will not enforce. Lord Atkin refers again to this principle in Bhowanipur Banking Corporation v. Durgesh Nandini, AIR 1941 PC 95 at Pp. 96 and 98, 99 and points out-

    "But it is also of course necessary that each party should understand that the one is making his promise in exchange or part exchange for the promise of the other not to prosecute or continue prosecuting"
    .

    Lord Atkins also points out that undue weight should not be given to the fact of the existence of a real obligation. It is observed-

    "In this class of cases that fact seems irrelevant if the agreement to abandon a prosecution is part of the consideration for payment of the debt. In most cases of this kind there is a debt or a liability. Indeed if there were not, a demand and receipt of money in consideration of refraining from or withholding a prosecution would apparently in itself be a criminal offence"
    .

    These principles are again the subject of detailed restatement in the Supreme Court by Gajendragadkar, J., (as he then was) in Narasimharaju v. Gurumurthl Raju, , where it has been pointed out that all that is required of the parties to impeach the validity of an agreement to settle the criminal proceedings is to give evidence from which the inference necessarily arises that part of the consideration was unlawful, and that the consideration for the agreement was withdrawal and none prosecution of a criminal complaint.

    4. Learned counsel for the appellants has not made out in this case circumstances so clinching as to necessarily warrant the inference that it is a part of the bargain when the promissory note was executed that the criminal prosecution should not be proceeded with. True the criminal complaint was filed on 10-0-1952, and the promissory note was executed on 9-7-1952. The case was heard only on 11-10-1952. The record shows that the accused was apprehended only on that date. It is not made out in the evidence that the second defendant was even aware of the fact that a criminal complaint had been filed and was pending when he executed the promissory note. To avoid the promissory note, it has to be established that it is a part of consideration that the criminal proceeding should be discontinued. That cannot be made out and there can be no consensus ad idem for a bargain if the second defendant had no knowledge of the pendency of the criminal proceedings. Unless he is aware of the pendency of the criminal proceedings, withdrawal of the same cannot be held to form part of the consideration for the promissory note. In the present case defendants 1 and 2 have remained ex parte and have not been examined. No attempt has been made to show that the second defendant was aware of the pendency of the criminal proceedings when the promissory note Was executed. There is another aspect of the matter and it has a material bear-ins on the question under consideration. The defence that the promissory note was unenforceable as secured in consideration at least partly for stifling a criminal prosecution was as much available to the second defendant as to the plaintiffs. It would have been, if tenable on the merits, a strong and powerful plea in defence to the action on the promissory note in the suit, O.S. 392 of 1955. The plaintiffs have attempted in the plaint to get round the reasonable inference following from the decree on the promissory note by pleading inter alia that defendants 1 and 2 had been prevented by defendants 3 to 5 in substantiating their defence in that suit by using wrongful means and pressure and threatening defendants 1 and 2 to consent to a decree. But these charges have not been made out in the evidence, and even the written statement in that case has not been placed on record now. Learned counsel strongly relied on an observation in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, that it was clear that the complainant did not prosecute the complaint. The learned Subordinate Judge rejected the evidence of the 4th defendant as D.W. 1 that the complaint was dismissed because the complainant was not able to prove the same. For one thing the inference of the learned Subordinate Judge is not a necessary inference on the facts. No doubt the complainant had pleaded his inability to let in further evidence. It does not necessarily follow that the complainant abstained from proceeding further in the matter as a part of the bargain he had with the second defendant. Even assuming that the third defendant was lukewarm in the prosecution after having secured the promissory note, that would not be sufficient to vitiate the promissory note. His subsequent attitude or his motive in not proceeding further with the prosecution after launching it will not render the promissory note unenforceable if withdrawal of the prosecution was not a part of the bargain. In this distinction is noticed. It is observed-

    "This is not a case where It can be reasonably said that the withdrawal of the criminal case may have been a motive and not the consideration by the impugned transaction"
    .

    The sequence of events in the present case is not so clear nor is the withdrawal of the prosecution so interlinked with the execution of the promissory note as to lead to a reasonable inference that one must have been the consideration at least in part of the other. The first point therefore fails.

    5. Coming to the plea that the debt is an avyavaharika debt and therefore not binding on the son, here again we see no reason to differ from the conclusion of our learned brother. When the father of defendants 3 to 5 died leaving them minors, defendants 1 and 2 took possession of the properties for the purposes of management. It has not been made out in the evidence nor is such a case pleaded in the plaint that the original entry on the properties by the defendants was unlawful and in trespass. They entered on the properties to manage the same on behalf of and for the benefit of the minors. Only they have failed to duly account for the proceeds from the properties and it is this liability that was settled at the Panchayat in a sum of Rs. 20,000. The promissory note was for this amount of Rs. 20,000. We can see nothing Avyavaharika in this liability. Colebrooke's translation of the expression "Avyavaharika" as meaning debts for a cause repugnant to good morals has been generally accepted as the nearest approach to the true conception of the term. Under the Hindu Law, a son is under a pious obligation to discharge his father's debts out of his ancestral property even if he had not been benefited by the debts, provided the debts are not avyavaharika. The sons get exonerated from their obligation to discharge the debt of their father from the family assets only if the debt was one tainted with immorality or illegality. The duty that is cast upon the son being religious and moral, the liability of the son for the debt must be examined with reference to its character when the debt was first incurred. If at the origin there was nothing illegal or repugnant to good morals, the subsequent dishonesty of the father is in not discharging his obligation will not absolve the son from Ms liability for the debt. In Hemraj v. Khemchand, AIR 1943 PC 142, at p. 145, the Judicial Committee observes-

    "It also appears to be clear on principle and on authority, that examination of the nature or character of the debt should be made with reference to the time when it originated in other words, when the liability was first incurred by the father. If, on such examination, it is found that at the inception the debt was not tarnished or tainted with immorality or illegality, then it must be held that it would be binding on the son". In Natesayyan v. Ponnusami, (1893) ILR 16 Mad 99 which finds approval in AIR 1943 PC 142, a decree was passed against a Hindu for money dishonestly retained by him from the plaintiff's family to which he was accountable in respect of it. The judgment debtor having died, the decree-holder sought to attach in execution, property of the family which had passed into the hands of his sons by survivorship. The sons objected to the attachment challenging the debt as immoral and illegal in the suit to which the creditor was referred. While terming the action of the father in not accounting for the sums which he had collected as dishonest, it is observed in that case that dishonesty was not of such a nature as to absolve the defendants, that is, the sons, from their pious obligation to discharge their father's debts. The learned Judges observe in (1893) ILR 16 Mad 99, "Upon any intelligible principles of morality a debt due by the father by reason of his having retained for himself money which he was bound to pay to another would be a debt of the most sacred obligation and for the non-disclosure of which punishment in a future state might be expected to be inflicted, if in any. The son is not bound to do anything to relieve his father from the consequences of his own vicious indulgences, but he is surely bound to do that which his father himself would do were it possible, viz., to restore to those lawfully entitled money, he has unlawfully retained". In AIR 1943 PC 142, at p. 146, above cited the Judicial Committee expressed their concurrence with the aforesaid view and with reference to the case before them their Lordships observe--

    "The subsequent dishonest conduct of Danapal, which led to the suit and the decree so much relied upon by the courts in India and made the basis of their decision, cannot in their Lordships' view affect the nature of the father's debt which at its inception was a lust and true debt. As no such immorality or illegality in the nature of the original debt as would absolve them from the obligation to discharge it has been shown by the respondents, the debt, sought to be realised is not an Avyavaharika debt..."
    in Gurunatham Chetty v. Raghavalu Chetty, ( 1908) ILR 31 Mad 472 at p. 474, a Bench consisting of Sir Arnold White, C.J. and Wallis, J.: with reference to a case where an undivided Hindu father acted as the administrator of an estate and was made liable for moneys received by him and not properly accounted for, affirming the liability of the son for the debt, it is observed-

    "The evidence is not in our opinion sufficient to warrant us in holding that the failure by the third defendant to account as an administrator amounted to a criminal offence"
    .

    The question has received a detailed consideration by a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Venkateswara Temple v. Radhakrishna, . Chandra Reddy, C. J., who delivered the judgment of the Bench, summarised the position thus:--

    "What emerges from these rulings is that a son could claim immunity only where the debt in its origin was immoral by reason of the money having been obtained by the commission of an offence; but not where the father came by the money lawfully but subsequently misappropriated it. It is only in the former case that the debt answers the description of an Avyavaharika debt. If originally the taking was not immoral, i.e., if it did not have a corrupt beginning or founded upon fraud, it could not be characterised as an Avyavaharika debt and the son could not be exempted from satisfying that debt. The supervening event, namely, the misappropriation later on would not change the nature of the debt. The vices should be inherent in the debt itself"
    .

    6. When examined in the light of the abovesaid principles, it is impossible to hold that the liability evidenced by the decree debt in O.S. 392 of 1955 is avyavaharika in character. It is not even pleaded in the plaint that the original entry by defendants 1 and 2 on the properties of defendants 3 to 5 was trespass or otherwise unlawful and illegal. They had taken up management of the properties for all appearances and ostensibly bona fide in the interests of the defendants 3 to 5 who were minors, and closely related. They had been in management of the properties for over six years and their accountability for the management was settled at a panchayat. They were found liable to account for a sum of Rs. 20,000. Ex facie it is a civil liability to account, which was quantified and settled by a panchayat. The origin of the liability is not repugnant to good morals. The second defendant appears to have acted as a de facto guardian for the minors. As and when the second defendant assisted by the first defendant realised money from the estate, his obligation to account to the minors arose. His later failure to account may be dishonest, but that cannot alter the original character of the obligation and make it criminal even initially. We agree in the circumstances with the conclusion of our learned brother confirming the judgment of the trial court that the promissory note was executed for amounts lawfully due and payable by defendants 1 and 2 to defendants 3 to 5, that the debt at its inception was lawful and therefore binding on the plaintiffs. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

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    Loganathan Minor And Others v. Ponnuswami Naicker And Others.
    (Jan 23, 1967)