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  • Item 1(a) of Schedule II and Items 2, 6, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act (in short MRTU and PULP Act).(b) Direction
  • section 2(s) of The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act) and section 3(5) of the MRTU and PULP Act.
  • section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Recruitment
  • section 26 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971.14.
  • section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • ARTICLE 12 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • Item 1(a) of Schedule II and Items 2, 6, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act (in short MRTU and PULP Act).(b) Direction
  • section 2(s) of The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act) and section 3(5) of the MRTU and PULP Act.
  • section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Recruitment
  • section 26 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971.14.
  • section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • ARTICLE 12 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (A.H. Joshi, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two respondents (workmen) filed separate complaints in the Industrial Court of Maharashtra at Aurangabad alleging unfair labour practices by their employer (originally the Maharashtra State Electricity Board, now a company fully owned and controlled by the Board). The complaints sought (a) declarations that the employer engaged in various unfair labour practices under specified items of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act (MRTU & PULP Act), (b) directions to desist from such practices, and (c) directions to pay wages and extend permanency benefits.

The employer filed written statements denying employer-employee relationship and raising maintainability objections. The Industrial Court dismissed the complaints on the ground that the complainants failed to prove an undisputed employer-employee relationship, applying the ratio in State of Maharashtra v. Pandurang Sitaram Jadhav. The respondents challenged that dismissal by filing writ petitions in this Court (Nos. 2551/2011 and 2548/2011). A learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions, relied chiefly on Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Caste Tribe Rajya P. Karmchari Sanghatana, and remanded the complaints to the Industrial Court for rehearing and trial. The employer appealed by Letters Patent Appeals; the appeals were admitted for final hearing and ultimately disposed of in this judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Industrial Court was correct in dismissing the complaints at the threshold for want of an "undisputed or indisputable" employer-employee relationship (i.e., whether the maintainability objection was rightly upheld).
  2. Whether the learned Single Judge correctly set aside the Industrial Court's dismissal and remanded the complaints for trial (i.e., whether the complaints deserved to be tried on merits notwithstanding the employer's denial of regular appointment and recruitment procedure).
  3. Whether the fact that the employer is a State-owned/statutory body (falling within Article 12) and subject to statutory recruitment obligations precludes relief for workmen who performed work but were not appointed through the prescribed recruitment channels.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Employer's) Arguments

  • The employer (originally Maharashtra State Electricity Board) is effectively a State organization falling within Article 12 of the Constitution; therefore constitutional obligations and statutory recruitment rules govern recruitment and have overriding effect.
  • The appellant is bound to follow statutory rules and procedures for recruitment (M.S.E.B. Service Regulations, Recruitment Regulations, etc.), and failure to follow such procedures cannot be remedied by declaring unfair labour practice or granting permanency.
  • The Division Bench decision in State of Maharashtra v. Pandurang Sitaram Jadhav (cited) governs this case and supports refusing to entertain the complaints where recruitment procedure was not followed.
  • Model Standing Orders cannot override the constitutional and statutory recruitment scheme applicable to a State employer.
  • Although respondents did the work and their nature of work falls within "workman," they were not regularly appointed employees and hence not entitled to declarations of unfair labour practice and permanency benefits.
  • Also relied upon: Hindustan Coca Cola Bottling SAY Pvt. Ltd. v. Bhartiya Kamgar Sena (citation given) as supportive authority.
  • Primary ground of appeal: the learned Single Judge exceeded jurisdiction and disregarded settled law in allowing the writ petitions and remanding complaints for trial.

Respondents' (Complainants') Arguments

  • The question whether the workmen are entitled to permanency and whether unfair labour practices occurred are matters of fact to be decided on merits by the Industrial Court; maintainability should not depend on a preliminary or summary rejection of the complaint.
  • The learned Single Judge rightly held that the complaints deserved hearing on merits and remanded them for trial in accordance with law.
  • If the Standing Orders or statutory provisions are shown to be violated, a declaration regarding failure to implement award/contract etc., could validly be made (drawing upon the dictum in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Caste Tribe Rajya P. Karmchari Sanghatana).
  • The employer created a factual situation: equipment purchased and work existed; complainants were engaged to operate PBX/telephone exchange; employer sought four posts though only two were sanctioned; no efforts were made to fill vacancies by proper recruitment; complainants worked for years on a status less than temporary or casual with pay below minimum wages.
  • Such conduct by the employer, including exploitation and failure to regularize employment, constitutes unfair labour practice which should not be summary-determined at the maintainability stage.
  • Relied upon Fulchand Baburao Gedam v. Lokmat (Lokmat case) which, per the Division Bench, held that a bare denial of employer-employee relationship without demonstration of intervening contractor/contract-labour does not oust the jurisdiction of the Labour/Industrial Court; such a bare denial cannot be treated as creating an undisputable status defeating maintainability.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Maharashtra v. Pandurang Sitaram Jadhav (2008 (111) CLR 151) Ratio relied upon by the Industrial Court to refuse to entertain complaints where the employer-employee relationship was said not to be undisputed. The Industrial Court followed this ratio and dismissed the complaints. This Court observed that the Industrial Court became "prey" to the plea based on the phrase "undisputed or indisputable relationship" and held that dismissal on that basis was incorrect in the present facts.
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Caste Tribe Rajya P. Karmchari Sanghatana (2009 (111) CLR 262) The judgment contains dictum (noted in paragraphs 33 and 34 of that judgment) that if it is shown that provisions contained in the Standing Orders are violated, a declaration in relation to failure to implement award/contract etc. could be validly made. The learned Single Judge relied upon this Supreme Court judgment in allowing the writ petitions and remanding the complaints for trial. This Court noted the Single Judge's reliance and ultimately held that the Single Judge's order should not be interfered with.
Fulchand Baburao Gedam v. Lokmat (2007 (6) Bom. C.R. 28) Held by the Division Bench that a bare denial by an employer of an employer-employee relationship, without demonstration of an intervening contractor or contract labour, would not oust the jurisdiction of the Labour/Industrial Court; such a plea is insufficient to treat the relationship as "undisputed or indisputable" for purposes of maintainability. The respondents relied on this Division Bench precedent; the Court discussed the Lokmat facts and concluded that the present complainants stood in a stronger position than in Lokmat, and that Lokmat lends support to remitting the complaints for trial.
Hindustan Coca Cola Bottling SAY Pvt. Ltd. v. Bhartiya Kamgar Sena (2002 (1) Mh. L.J. 559 : 2001 (111) CLR 1025) The opinion records that reliance was placed on this authority by the appellant; the specific rule or principle drawn from it is not detailed in the text of this opinion. The Court records that the appellant placed reliance on this authority; the judgment does not elaborate further on its application in the reasoning portion beyond noting reliance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of factual and legal observations leading to its decision:

  1. Admissibility and procedure: The appeals were admitted, service waived for respondent, and the appeals were heard finally at the motion hearing.
  2. Factual findings of the lower forums: It was undisputed that the complainants actually performed the work of Telephone Operator; work existed even though sanctioned posts were created much later and recruitment through regular channels was not used for the complainants' induction. The Industrial Court dismissed the complaints relying on the ratio in Pandurang Jadhav that emphasized an "undisputed or indisputable" employer-employee relationship.
  3. Assessment of the "undisputed or indisputable relationship" concept: The Court critically examined the use of the phrase "undisputed or indisputable status or relationship." It held that the phrase should not shelter facile, contentious or evasive pleas by employers. A bare or contentious denial of employer-employee relationship cannot be equated with a true factual dispute that justifies summary dismissal for want of maintainability.
  4. Question of fact vs. maintainability: The Court emphasized that whether an employer-employee relationship exists is fundamentally a question of fact. Pleadings (admissions and denials) form the foundation for that inquiry, and fact-finding is ordinarily conducted at trial. Therefore, where the material facts show the complainants actually worked and no convincing demonstration of an intervening employer/contractor exists, the issue should not be decided by a preliminary dismissal but left for trial.
  5. Effect of State-employer argument: The appellant's contention that, being a State or State-controlled organization (Article 12), it must follow statutory recruitment procedures and thereby avoid declarations of unfair labour practice was considered. The Court declined to adjudicate fully on that constitutional submission at the appellate stage, observing that the submission appeared to be advanced to fit the case within prior Division Bench authority rather than on the merits. The Court left that aspect to be considered at trial so as not to prejudice the merits.
  6. On application of precedents: The Court noted the Industrial Court's reliance on Pandurang Jadhav, but concluded that, on the present facts, the Industrial Court erred in dismissing the complaints on that ground. The Single Judge's reliance on the MSRTC decision was noted and accepted as justifying remand for trial. The Division Bench Lokmat decision was discussed as a precedent that a bare denial of employment does not oust jurisdiction; the Court considered Lokmat supportive of remand in the present factual matrix.
  7. Substantive conclusion on maintainability: Given the undisputed fact that complainants actually performed the work and the lack of any assertion that they were fraudulent back-door entrants, the Court held that maintainability could not be defeated on the employer's contention alone. The appropriate course is to allow the Industrial Court to determine on evidence whether unfair labour practices occurred and whether permanency or other relief should be granted.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Letters Patent Appeals are DISMISSED. The Court held that the judgment and order dated 28-9-2012 passed by the learned Single Judge (allowing the writ petitions and remanding the complaints for rehearing and trial) meets the ends of justice and does not call for interference. The appeals were dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Single Judge's order stands; the Industrial Court must rehear and try the complaints on merits in accordance with law (i.e., to determine whether unfair labour practices were committed and whether the complainants are entitled to permanency or other relief), rather than having the complaints dismissed at the maintainability stage.
  • The opinion does not announce that it is laying down any new broad legal precedent; it resolves the appeals by applying existing precedents to the facts and upholds the remand for trial. (The Court declined to make a final adjudication on the State-employer constitutional recruitment submission so as not to affect the merits on rehearing.)
Appeals dismissed.

    Maharashtra State Power Generation Company Ltd. v. Anant

    A.H Joshi, J.:— These Letters Patent Appeals have come up for admission hearing. The learned Advocates for the parties have agreed for having the final hearing in the motion hearing itself.

    Admit.

    Advocate Shri G.K Thigale waives service for the respondent in both the appeals.

    Therefore, the appeals are taken up for final disposal.

    2. The respondents filed two separate cases. Those were complaints of unfair labour practice, in the Industrial Court of Maharashtra at Aurangabad.

    3. The relief by way of declaration prayed for in the complaints is summarized as follows:—

    (a) Declaration that the respondent (present appellant's predecessor) had engaged in various unfair labour practices under Item 1(a) of Schedule II and Items 2, 6, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act (in short MRTU and PULP Act).

    (b) Direction to the employer to desist from engaging in those unfair labour practices; and

    (c) Direction that the workman be paid regular payment of wages etc. and all benefits of permanency in accordance with law.

    4. The complaints were opposed by the employer by filing written statement. The objection to the maintainability of the complaint was raised.

    5. The complaints were heard. The learned Judge, Industrial Court, has delivered a common judgment and dismissed the complaints. The finding, which is the basis of dismissal is seen in paragraph No. 25 of the complaint to following effect:—

    “25. In the light of above discussed facts and circumstances and the ratio laid down in the various cases, it is clear that basically the complainant has failed to prove that there exists undisputed relationship between himself and the respondent of employee and employer. The complainant has failed to prove that he was appointed by following prescribed rules as telephone operator and as such, he is entitled to permanency benefits.”

    6. It is seen that the Industrial Court was persuaded with the ratio as laid down in the State of Maharashtra v. Pandurang Sitaram Jadhav, reported in 2008 (111) CLR 151.

    7. The respondents preferred Writ Petition Nos. 2551/2011 and 2548/2011 in this Court. Those were heard and have been decided on 28-9-2012 by common judgment of learned Single Judge, which judgment is impugned in these appeals.

    8. The respondents writ petitioners had reiterated their stand as averred in the complaint.

    9. The learned Single Judge accepted the plea of the complainants and declined to accept the employer's plea that the complaint was not maintainable. Learned Single Judge relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court and mainly Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Caste Tribe Rajya P. Karmchari Sanghatana, reported in 2009 (111) CLR 262.

    In the result, the learned Single Judge has held that the complaints deserve hearing on merits and remanded the complaints for rehearing and trial in accordance with law.

    10. In the process of hearing of the Letters Patent Appeals, the learned Advocate Shri R.P Powar appearing for the appellant has emphasized on following points:—

    (a) That the original employer Maharashtra State Electricity Board is a statutory Board, of which present appellant is a company fully owned and controlled by the Board, and hence is as much a State organization and falls within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

    (b) Appellant is bound by the law, rules, etc. which are statutory in the matters of recruitment.

    (c) Appellant's plea is governed and supported by the Division Bench of this Court in the State of Maharashtra v. Pandurang Sitaram Jadhav (cited supra).

    (d) The Constitutional obligation fastened to the State and statutory corporations that its recruitment is for public employment and hence it has to be done in accordance with the rules and regulations relating to selection and appointment.

    (e) The Model Standing Orders would never have overriding effect over the scheme of the Constitution of India.

    (f) Though it cannot be disputed that the respondents have worked and the nature of work done by them falls in the work done by others who fall in the category of “workman”, however, since they are not “regularly appointed employees” of the Board, they are not entitled to have the declaration as regards the unfair labour practice, as sought for by the complainants. The Constitutional obligation on the appellant shall have overriding effect over Labour Laws.

    (g) Therefore, the judgment of Industrial Court was perfectly within the four comers of law and it is wrongly set aside by the learned Single Judge.

    (h) The judgment in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Caste Tribe Rajya P. Karmchari Sanghatana is not a judgment which would govern the case as a precedent since the aspect of public employment, as is ruled by the Division Bench of this Court, in case of State of Maharashtra v. Pandurang Sitaram Jadhav is not overruled, and even today it holds the field as a good law, and it has to be followed.

    (i) Reliance is also placed on Hindustan Coca Cola Bottling SAY Pvt. Ltd. v. Bhartiya Kamgar Sena, reported in 2002 (1) Mh. L.J 559 : 2001 (111) CLR 1025.

    (j) In substance, the ground of appeal is that the learned Single Judge has exceeded the jurisdiction in allowing the writ petitions by disregarding the settled law.

    11. The appeals have been opposed. The learned Advocate Shri T.K Prabhakaran instructed by Advocate Shri G.K Thigale for the respondents, has relied upon following judgments:—

    (1) Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Castribe Rajya P. Karmchari Sanghatana, reported in 2009 (111) CLR 262, (2) Fulchand Baburao Gedam v. Lokmat, reported in 2007 (6) Bom. C.R 28.

    12. The judgment in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Caste Tribe Rajya P. Karmchari Sanghatana is cited by the appellant as well as the respondents.

    13. Other points urged by learned Advocate Shri T.K Prabhakaran are:—

    (a) The question as to whether the workman would be entitled to get permanency would be a subject-matter of a decision on merits in the main complaint and could not be a matter to be prejudged or preempted at the time of decision on the point as to whether the complaint is maintainable or not.

    (b) The relief for which the complaints would be entitled to would be a matter liable to be decided by the Industrial Court after hearing the complaints on merits and ought not be dilated at the stage of consideration as to whether it is maintainable.

    (c) The authority, the power and extent of jurisdiction of an authority under the MRTU and PULP Act would be under section 30 of the mrtu and pulp act to granting the declaration as to whether unfair labour practice is engaged in and to issue an order of restraint for that matter.

    (d) The dictum contained in paragraph Nos. 33 and 34 of the judgment in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Caste Tribe Rajya P. Karmchari Sanghatana, is that if it is shown that the provisions contained in the Standing Orders are violated, the declaration in relation to failure to implement award/contract etc. could be validly made.

    (e) Existence of posts and observance of recruitment procedure are wholly within the own province of the act of the employer (the department of the Government).

    (f) The employer Board ought not be allowed to act in violation of law for its own pecuniary advantage or convenience, exploit the workmen, yet take shelter to protect itself from liability arising out of violation of Labour Laws particularly when it is not the employer's plea that the employees-workmen had fraudulently secured the employment.

    (g) The employer had purchased a manually operated telephone exchange system. It was to be operative during day and night hours. The employer engaged the complainant and Mr. Ayachit for working for each shift of 12 hours and another complainant called to work by Mr. Ayachit had to work for remaining shift of 12 hours.

    (h) The employer sought creation of four posts while only two were sanctioned by the competent authority.

    (i) No efforts were taken to fill in these vacancies and complainants were continued with some status which was on even lesser pedestal than temporary or casual and this position of employment was continued for years together.

    (j) These acts of employer, seen from any angle constitute commission of unfair labour practice. These acts of unfair labour practice cannot be left unenquired by giving a summary dismissal of complaint as done by the Industrial Court.

    (k) This results in compounding an act which is prohibited by law by section 26 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971.

    14. Reliance is also placed by Advocate Shri T.K Prabhakaran for the respondents on the judgment in Fulchand Baburao Gedam v. Lokmat (cited supra).

    15. The case of Lokmat (supra) was decided by the Division Bench to which one of us (A.H Joshi, J.) was a Member.

    16. Case of Lokmat was a case where:—

    The employer (Lokmat Newspapers) had taken up a plea that the complainant before the Labour Court was not employee of the employer (Lokmat Newspapers). It was then pleaded that the officer who could have at disposal an employee may have employed him and hence there was no employer employee relationship between the complainant and the respondent. The complaint was dismissed at the threshold on the ground that the employer employee relationship was in dispute due to the plea of lack of existence of employer employee relationship. The dismissal of complaint was maintained by the learned Single Judge.

    The question which had arisen was as to whether the bare denial by an employer that there is no employer employee relationship could fall within the ambit of “undisputed or indisputable relationship”. The Division Bench took a view that bare plea that someone is not employed in absence of demonstration of a fact that there exists intervening contractor or contract labour would not oust the jurisdiction of Labour Court or Industrial Court, and such plea would not bring the case within the ambit of objection to jurisdiction as to the maintainability of the complaint.

    17. The judgment in case of Lokmat (supra) is relied and/or countered by both sides.

    18. Reliance was placed by the complainants/respondents in following premise:—

    The complainants in present cases stand on a far better footing. There is no other intervening employer either as a contractor or as an officer as was a fact in case of Lokmat (supra). Rather complainant Mr. Sudhir Kamlakar Ayachit who himself is a workman is also shown as a contractor which is an act of camouflage while other complainant was shown working under alleged contractor worker Mr. Sudhir Kamlakar Ayachit i.e the complainant, who did same work in one shift of 12 hours. Therefore, in these circumstances, the case of Lokmat (supra) would lend support to the employees/complainants to urge that the complaint is maintainable and deserves to be tried and decided in accordance with law.

    19. Reliance by employer appellant:—

    The case of Lokmat (supra) does not lend any support to the respondents' submission in the background that it is a case arising in the background of the peculiar facts of the said case. In the case at hand, the employer is a State within the compass of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, entire spectrum would change. Therefore, the case of Lokmat (supra) would not in any manner guide or govern the situation at hand and hence cannot be relied upon.

    20. In the background of rival submissions, it is necessary to have a quick look at the rival pleadings without which the decision in these appeals would not be convenient.

    21. Considering that the pleadings are voluminous, it would be beneficial to draw the summary of pleadings as is effectively done by the learned Judge, Industrial Court in the body of judgment. It is extracted below by supplying the headings thereto.

    22. Summary of Complaint:—

    “4. According to the complainant, he is neither a registered contractor, nor a contract labour. He is a workman covered within section 2(s) of The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act) and section 3(5) of the MRTU and PULP Act. He is working in a clear vacant permanent post. The respondent board has made regular appointment of Telephone Operators at various other places except the place where the complainant is working. It is contended that in the MSEB Employees Service Regulations, contractor or contract labour is nowhere defined. There is no genuine contract system prevailing in the board. As more than 100 employees are employed by the respondent, the provisions of Chapter VB of the ID Act and Model Standing Orders are applicable. According to the complainant, though he is shown to have engaged on individual contract basis, he is working continuously without any break since the date of his appointment. The working hours are fixed and regulated by the respondents. The complainant is required to report for duties as regular employee and to follow the instructions of his superiors while discharging the duties. It is contended that the respondents by treating the complainant as contract labour is exploiting the complainant in order to compel him to discharge duties with his assistant another employee Mr. Anant Sonar who has filed similar complaint. The complainant and Mr. Sonar are working individually and independently with the respondent, but they are made victims of a camouflage contract. During last about 21 years, no other contractor has submitted tenders. The amount paid to the complainant and his assistant Mr. Sonar is quite below the minimum wages. Other service benefits are not extended to the complainant and his assistant.

    5. Senior Officers of the respondent had requested for creation of posts to their Head Office. However, as yet, such permanent posts of Telephone Operator are not created and the complainant is not given regular appointment. It is contended that the officers of the respondent have engaged in unfair labour practices in continuing the services of the complainants on contract basis without issuing regular orders and without extending permanency benefits. On such grounds, it is contended that it be declared that the respondent has engaged in unfair labour practice covered under various items referred above and request is made to direct the respondents to issue regular appointment orders to the complainant along with arrears of pay, if any.”

    (Extract is drawn from the judgment and order dated 27-8-2010 of the Industrial Court, Aurangabad, at page Nos. 296, 297 and 298 of the paper book of LPA 224/12)

    23. Summary of Written Statement:—

    “6. The respondent resisted the claim by filing written statement at Exhibit C-3. It is contended that the services of the employees of the respondent are regulated and governed by M.S E.B Employees Service Regulations framed under section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Recruitment to various posts is controlled and governed by M.S E.B Classification and Recruitment Regulations, 1961. It is admitted that Thermal Power Station of the respondent at Parli Vaijnath is equipped with PBX Exchange. Initially from 9-11-1982, independent contractor Mr. Bhosale was entrusted with the work of operating PBX Exchange purely on contract basis. Complainant was engaged by contractor Shri Bhosale at the relevant time. Contract with Shri Bhosale came to an end on 30-5-1984. Thereafter from time to time contract is entered into with the complainant to operate PBX Exchange w.e.f 1-6-1984. Temporary or permanent post on regular establishment can be filled in only in accordance with Service Regulations and Recruitment Regulations. Complainant was never employed as an employee of respondent.

    7. Respondent has denied existence of any vacant permanent post. It is denied that, the respondent deprived the complainant of any legitimate claim of being employed as a permanent employee. On or about in the year 1982, there was no sanctioned post of Telephone Operator at Thermal Power Station. Two posts of Telephone Operators were sanctioned for the first time in June, 1996. But the same could not be filled on account of ban on fresh recruitment. In short denying the allegations in the complaint, it is contended that the respondent has not engaged in any unfair labour practice, as alleged. The complainant is not entitled for a declaration or a direction as claimed. On such grounds request is made for dismissal of the complaint.”

    (Extract is drawn from the judgment and order dated 27-8-2010 of the Industrial Court, Aurangabad, at page Nos. 298 and 299 of the paper book of LPA 224/12)

    24. Facts which are not in dispute at this stage are narrated in following paragraphs.

    25. As has been noted, it is not in dispute that the job undertaken by both the complainants was that of a Telephone Operator and that there existed work. The Superintending Engineer has sought for sanction of posts of Telephone Operators. In due course, though much later, two posts were sanctioned.

    26. It is not in dispute that the entry of the respondents for work on that post was not through the regular recruitment channel. This has happened because the recruitment procedure could not be resorted to for want of posts and could not have been resorted to for want of sanctioned post though work for four Telephone Operators existed.

    27. Prima facie, the complainants had an entry to the work and had done actual work on the basis of a contract of service for operating PBX machine which was duly entered. The signing/ordering contract was done by an officer who was the highest in rank at the station and authority to induct them on the job. The induction of complainants cannot be denoted as an act of fraud by employees workmen.

    28. The question in issue before the Industrial Court was in fact whether the case would fall in the bracket of any of the unfair labour practices for which the complaints were filed.

    29. The question as to whether the employer had engaged in an unfair labour practice is a question of fact to be proved by the employee and disproved by the employer. The process of proof or disproof would begin only after the Industrial Court takes cognizance of the complaints holding that it has jurisdiction.

    Learned Judge of the Industrial Court has followed the ratio as laid down in case of State of Maharashtra v. Pandurang Sitaram Jadhav (cited supra), and refused to entertain the complaints.

    30. As it is seen, the learned Single Judge has scrutinized the fact and found the fact that the respondents were actually undertaking the job is not in dispute. Therefore, on this simple and plain proposition, it is prima facie made out that the status of complainants on facts is that of workmen under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This fact was rather an indisputable or undisputed fact.

    31. From the language employed in the rival pleadings before the Industrial Court, it is evident and can be noted is that the complainants' status as a person doing work as workmen with the employer was neither “disputed or disputable”. The fact that the complainants have worked as if a workman but for nomenclature is not disputed. Work existed but posts were not created is a fact on record. It is not the employer's case that the complainants are fraudulent back door entrants.

    32. The phrase or group of words “undisputed or indisputable status or relationship” would exclude from its arena facile or sheerly contentious and evasive pleas. It appears to us and we accordingly hold that the plea to which Industrial Court became prey is the ground based on the term “undisputed or indisputable status or relationship”.

    33. In the light of submissions now advanced before us, discussion is revolving around the phrase “undisputed or indisputable relationship” between the employer and employee. In the present case, the relationship is disputed by doing gimmick of words. It appears to us that the arena of undisputed or undisputable relationship does not bring within its compass a sheerly contentious, facile or evasive plea of undisputed or indisputable relationship.

    34. A question as to whether there exists employer employee relationship is a question of fact. The pleadings of admission or denial would constitute a foundation. Fact finding is always required to be done upon the trial of the contentious issue. Any conclusion in relation to this question, which is always a matter of fact cannot be adjudicated in absence of trial.

    35. Therefore, the question liable to be considered by the Industrial Court as to whether the complaints were maintainable did not arise. Even if every word and contention of the employer is taken to be worthy of consideration that since the mandatory recruitment procedure was not followed while availing the services of the complainants, even then the employer cannot escape the responsibility of suffering the unfair labour practice was engaged and the workmen would still be entitled for benefit of permanency. At the most, a hanging sword may still remain on their head of the fear that eventuality may arise where they may have lateron to suffer the termination by following procedure laid down by law as and when employment in accordance with law takes place.

    36. We do not propose to deal with the submission of learned Advocate Shri R.P Powar, which on merits, we record as follows:—

    That the employer being a State, it would be imperative for such employer to follow the recruitment procedure to answer the Constitutional duty of giving wider access to all aspirants to have the recruitment done in accordance with law.

    It is not shown that any such attempt was not possible. Therefore, it is not the employer's plea that the workmen have come in the way. Therefore, it will look allegoric, but we wish to employ the word that, these submissions are like giving sermons by a person, who himself does not believe in those words.

    37. We leave these submissions unadjudicated and do not comment any further so that this aspect in any manner may not affect the merits of the case when the matter will be heard in future.

    38. In the background discussed in earlier paragraphs, the submissions advanced before us, what emerges is that like an obedient State owned Corporation, the appellant herein did not want to give permanency to the workmen because it would thereby violate the opportunity of employment to members of public at large as is found by the Division Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Pandurang Sitaram Jadhav (cited supra). This submission, however, seems to be a chance submission advanced sheerly to let its behaviour like a lawabiding Corporation and win the sympathy of the Court and fit the case within the compass of the reported judgment. The pleading in the written statement, which is reproduced in foregoing paragraph No. 23 and relevant part we reproduce below hereinafter will reveal that the plea raised before this Court is apparently lacking sincerity as well as honesty. Relevant averment reads as follows:

    “But the same could not be filled on account of ban on fresh recruitment. In short denying the allegations in the complaint, it is contended that the respondent has not engaged in any unfair labour practice, as alleged.” [Reproduced from paragraph (xii) appearing at page No. 291 of the Letters Patent Appeal No. 224/2012 paper book.]

    39. The appellant, who is a fully owned Government Corporation being an organ of the Government ought to prove itself to be an ideal employer. The Telephone Exchange equipments were purchased, posts were not created, services were availed as a contractor from individuals. Their status was that of a workman for all purposes, but for the camouflage of the nomenclature. The appellant has, thus, utterly failed in discharging the obligation as a Government organization, as an ideal employer.

    40. In the result, we hold that the judgment and order dated 28-9-2012 passed by the learned Single Judge meets the ends of justice. It does not call for any interference.

    41. The Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed with costs.

    Appeals dismissed.
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