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Summary of Legal Opinion — Second Appeal No. 201 of 1990

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal was filed by the original plaintiff Nemichand (appellant) after adverse decisions in Regular Civil Suit No. 97 of 1983 and Regular Civil Appeal No. 180 of 1986. The litigation concerns succession rights and the entitlement to compensation payable in respect of agricultural land (Survey No. 15 / Gat No. 34) at village Naigaon, Taluka Gangapur, acquired by the Government.

Relevant facts as set out in the opinion: - Shantilal Patni (father of defendant Basantabai and husband of Kundanbai) died on 29-4-1969 leaving no male issue. Compensation for his acquired land was held by the Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad. - On 11-5-1969 (13 days after Shantilal's death), Kundanbai purportedly adopted Nemichand. The adoption ceremony was said to have been performed according to community customs; an adoption deed (Exh. 116) was executed later on 21-11-1970. - Kundanbai died on 8-1-1973. She had executed a will on 6-12-1972 bequeathing her interest in the property to her daughter (the present respondent-defendant). - The plaintiff sought a declaration that he was the adopted son of Kundanbai and a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from receiving the compensation amount. The trial Court rejected the adoption claim and upheld the defendant's entitlement under the will; the plaintiff was non-suited by order dated 15-4-1986. The Regular Civil Appeal was dismissed on 14-3-1990. The present matter is an appeal against those decrees.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the purported adoption of the plaintiff Nemichand by Kundanbai is valid under Section 10 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 given that the plaintiff was married and over 15 years of age at the time of adoption (i.e., whether a community custom or usage exempted conditions (iii) and (iv) of Section 10).
  2. Whether the adoption complies with the further requirements of Section 11 of the Act, specifically conditions (iv) and (vi) (minimum age difference between adoptive mother and adoptee, and the requirement of actual giving and taking of the child).
  3. Consequent to the validity or invalidity of the adoption, whether the plaintiff is entitled to succeed to the property of Kundanbai and to an injunction restraining the defendant from receiving the compensation amount.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as summarized in the opinion)

  • The appellant (through Shri P.R. Deshmukh) argued that the parties are Jains and in their community the object of adoption is to secure an heir and perpetuate the adopter's name; adoption has no religious significance and there is no restriction of age or marriage for adoption.
  • Reliance was placed on precedent(s) said to recognize community customs permitting adoption of a married person or a person above 15 years (cited cases: Suraj Mal v. Babu Lal, Anirudh Jagdeorao v. Babarao, and Kondiba R. Papal v. Narayan K. Papal) to support the proposition that the custom permitting such adoptions is not immoral or against public policy and should make the adoption valid.
  • The appellant asserted that the adoption in his community was customary and that the adoption ceremonies performed were sufficient to effect a valid adoption.

Respondent's Arguments (as summarized in the opinion)

  • The respondent (through Shri Nawander) denied the adoption and argued the defendant, as the biological daughter of Shantilal, succeeded to the property; Kundanbai had executed a will in favour of the defendant.
  • It was submitted that the plaintiff failed to plead or prove any community custom exempting the age and marriage requirements of Section 10; there was no independent evidence or independent witness proving such a custom in the Digambar Jain Khandelwal community.
  • The respondent further argued that even if a custom were assumed, the adoption was invalid for non-compliance with Section 11 conditions (iv) and (vi): the adoptive mother was not at least 21 years older than the adoptee, and there was no evidence of the essential ceremony of "giving and taking" required by section 11(vi).
  • Reliance was placed on authority (Laksman Singh v. Kanwar) holding that some form of giving and taking is essential to a valid adoption; and on T. Saraswathi Ammal v. Jagadambal for the proposition that a custom must be pleaded and proved and cannot be established by analogy or a priori reasoning.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Suraj Mal v. Babu Lal, AIR 1985 Delhi 95 Recognition that in that case Jain Oswal parties in Delhi had a custom permitting adoption without restriction as to age or marriage. The Court distinguished Suraj Mal on facts: the cited case concerned Jains of the Oswal sect in Delhi where the custom was proved; here the parties are Digambar Jain Khandelwal and no custom was pleaded or proved.
Anirudh Jagdeorao v. Babarao, 1983 Mh.L.J 379 Authority for the proposition that in the Marathwada/Vyavahara Mayukha context a custom was recognised permitting adoption of a person over 15 years of age and even a married person when that custom was pleaded and proved. The Court treated this as distinguishable: Anirudh Jagdeorao involved Hindus of the Maratha community where the custom was pleaded and proven; in the present case no comparable proof of custom was produced.
Kondiba R. Papal v. Narayan K. Papal, (1991) 2 SCC 218 Affirmation/approval of the 1983 Mh.L.J 379 approach where evidence supported the existence of a custom allowing adoption at any age, including of married persons. The Court noted Kondiba Rama approved the earlier ruling where evidence of custom existed; applied by analogy to explain that proof of custom is essential, which was lacking in this matter.
T. Saraswathi Ammal v. Jagadambal, AIR 1933 SC 201 Principle that custom must be applicable to the parties and cannot be extended by analogy or established a priori; custom must be pleaded and proved. The Court relied on this authority to emphasise that the plaintiff failed to plead or adduce independent evidence to establish any community custom exempting Sections 10(iii) and (iv).
Laksman Singh v. Kanwar, AIR 1961 SC 1378 Holding that the ceremony of giving and taking (transfer of the adoptive child) is an essential condition for a valid adoption, though the form may vary. The Court applied this principle to conclude that there was no evidence of actual giving and taking as required by Section 11(vi), and therefore the adoption could not be held valid on this ground.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in clear steps addressing statutory requirements and evidentiary proof:

  1. Statutory framework: - Section 10 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act prescribes conditions for a valid adoption; conditions (iii) and (iv) restrict adoption of a married person and persons over 15 years of age, but allow exceptions by reason of a custom or usage applicable to the parties. - Section 3 defines when a custom or usage acquires the force of law (open, continuous, uniform, not unreasonable or against public policy). - Section 11 imposes further conditions (including (iv) and (vi)) which the Court observed do not admit exceptions by community custom (except a specific proviso about datta homam).
  2. Absence of pleaded or proved custom: - The Court noted the plaintiff did not plead any community custom in the plaint that would exempt the age and marriage bars in Section 10. - Even if inferentially read, the plaint merely averred that customary ceremonies were performed, not that there was a community custom permitting adoption of married persons or persons above 15. - On evidence, no independent witness or community office-bearer was produced to prove such a custom in the Digambar Jain Khandelwal community. The plaintiff's three witnesses attested generally that a married boy could be adopted but did not mention age limits or show the custom met the Section 3 criteria (open, continuous, uniform). - Citing T. Saraswathi Ammal, the Court emphasized custom cannot be established by analogy or a priori reasoning; it must be specifically pleaded and proved as applicable to the parties.
  3. Non-compliance with Section 11 conditions: - The Court considered conditions (iv) and (vi) of Section 11 which require, respectively, that the adoptive parent be at least 21 years older than the person to be adopted, and that there be actual giving and taking of the child by the parents or guardian. - Facts established in evidence: the plaintiff was 30 years old at the time of the adoption ceremony (11-5-1969); Kundanbai was 48½ years at that time (the deed dated 21-11-1970 records her as 50 years old at the date of the deed). Thus the adoptive mother was older by 19 years — short of the 21-year minimum required by Section 11(iv). This breach was held fatal. - There was no evidence of the required "giving and taking" during the lifetime of the child's parents or guardian. The plaintiff's own evidence described him sitting on Kundanbai's lap; there was no evidence that his parents or guardians actually gave him in adoption. The Court relied on Laksman Singh for the principle that some form of giving and taking is essential even if the ceremony varies in form. - The Court observed that section 11(vi) admits no community-custom exception (except the limited proviso about Datta Homa), so the absence of giving and taking could not be cured by alleging a custom.
  4. Conduct after adoption and evidentiary weight: - The Court observed that the plaintiff's subsequent conduct was inconsistent with being an adopted son: he continued to act and deal with properties in his former name as if there had been no adoption. - Both Courts below had found that the plaintiff failed to prove adoption and therefore rightly denied succession rights; the present Court found no reason to disturb those findings.
  5. Distinction from cited authorities: - The Court considered appellant's authorities (Suraj Mal, Anirudh Jagdeorao, Kondiba Rama) but distinguished them on their proven facts — in each cited case, the relevant custom was pleaded and proved in evidence. By contrast, no such proof existed here.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: - Given the absence of pleaded/proved custom to relieve the plaintiff from Sections 10(iii) and (iv), and given the statutory non-compliance with Section 11(iv) (age difference) and Section 11(vi) (giving and taking), the adoption could not be held valid. The trial Court and first appellate Court were justified in dismissing the plaintiff's claim.

Holding and Implications

Holding: - The Court's final decision was to dismiss the second appeal. The opinion concludes: DISMISSED.

Direct implications and consequences: - The plaintiff's claim to be the adopted son of Kundanbai was rejected for failure to plead and prove any community custom exempting statutory bars and for non-compliance with mandatory requirements of Section 11 (insufficient age difference and absence of giving and taking). - The plaintiff was non-suited in respect of the consequential relief (perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from receiving the compensation amount). - The defendant, being the biological daughter and the beneficiary under Kundanbai's will, was properly held entitled to the property/compensation. - There was no order as to costs of the second appeal.

Broader precedential effect: The opinion does not announce any new legal principle beyond application of existing statutory provisions and precedents; it affirms that pleading and proving a community custom is essential where relied upon to overcome statutory requirements, and that certain conditions in section 11 admit no community-custom exception.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed. No order as to costs.

    Nemichand Shantilal Patni v. Basantabai

    1. This is a second appeal by the original plaintiff who has lost Regular Civil Suit No. 97 of 1983 as well as Regular Civil Appeal No. 180 of 1986 against the present respondent-defendant.

    2. One Shantilal Patni was the husband of Kundanbai and the father of defendant Basantabai. Shantilal expired on 29-4-1969 leaving behind him wife and daughter but no male issue. Deceased Shantilal was having agriculture land bearing survey No. 15 (Gat No. 34) at village Naigaon, Taluka Gangapur which came to be acquired by the Government and the compensation amount was lying in the office of the Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad at that time. As Shantilal had not left any male issue behind him, his wife Kundanbai adopted the plaintiff Nemichand as her son on 11-5-1969, that is, on the 13th day of the death of Shantilal.

    3. It is the case of the plaintiff Nemichand that he was adopted as per the desire of Shantilal and all the necessary ceremonies according to the custom prevailing in their community were duly performed. The plaintiff Nemichand claims, therefore, a succession to the property of Shantilal as adopted son. Kundanbai, the adoptive mother, then expired on 8-1-1973. But, prior to that had executed an adoption deed on 21-11-1970. The plaintiff therefore claims to be an adoptive son of deceased Kundanbai and as such challenges her last will executed in favour of defendant. To get a declaration as adopted son and for the relief of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from receiving the compensation amount of the property, the plaintiff Nemichand filed Regular Civil Suit No. 97 of 1983.

    4. The suit was resisted by the defendant by a written statement (Exh. 13) and the adoption as well as the deed came to be denied. As per the defendant, she, being the daughter of Shantilal, claimed ownership by succession. It is further case that after the death of Shantilal, she and her mother Kundanbai succeeded to the property and deceased Kundanbai herself in her lifetime executed her last will on 6-12-1972 bequeathing her interest in the property in favour of her daughter defendant.

    5. On framing necessary issues and on consideration of evidence on record the trial Court refused to accept the plaintiff as adopted son of the deceased Kundanbai and further held defendant as entitled to the property on the basis of the will deed. By an order dated 15-4-1986 the plaintiff was non-suited and his Regular Civil Appeal No. 180 of 1986 also came to be dismissed by an order dated 14-3-1990. It is against these two decrees that the plaintiff has approached this Court in this second appeal.

    6. Before considering the crucial points in respect of the custom prevalent in the community and its proof certain admitted facts are required to be noted. It is not disputed that the plaintiff Nemichand was 30 years' old in age and was also married and was having the issues at the time of his adoption. It is further the case of the plaintiff that in his community a married boy of above 15 years' old in age can go in adoption and a custom or usage to that effect was often in use.

    7. Section 10 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act prescribes four conditions for a valid adoption. There is no dispute in respect of the first two conditions in the present case. The conditions (iii) and (iv) prescribe that person to be adopted should not be a married one and must not have completed the age of 15 years unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties permitting such adoptions. It is, therefore, clear that the first two conditions except no exceptions while the subsequent conditions are subject to a contrary rule prevalent in the community by reason of a custom or usage. It is on the basis of this exception to conditions (iii) and (iv) that the plaintiff claims a valid and legal adoption inasmuch as, he had crossed the maximum age of 15 years and was also married at the time of this adoption. Section 3 of the said Act prescribes as to what is required to make an act or conduct amounting to custom or usage. According to it, it must be a rule which has obtained the force of law because of its open, continuous and uniform observation for a long time and such a rule should not be uncertain, unreasonable or opposed to any public policy. It is to be considered in the case at hand as to whether the plaintiff proves by sufficient evidence on record that there was a custom or usage in his community permitting the adoption of a married boy of more than 15 years in age and whether such a custom or usage was observed openly; continuously and uniformly thereby gaining the force of law. It is pertinent to note that “such a case of custom or usage in the community and the adoption in pursuance of such a custom is conspicuously absent. It is not pleaded in the suit that there was nay such custom or usage in his community providing exceptions to conditions (iii) and (iv) of section 10 of the Act nor there is any whisper that the adoption of the plaintiff was made in conformity and in pursuance of such a custom or usage. It is material to note that what is averred in the plaint by the plaintiff is not that there was any such custom or usage but the adoption of the plaintiff by Kundanbai was performed as per customary ceremonies. Even if a maximum latitude is to be given to the averments in the plaint so as to take a generous view, the plaintiff has even failed to prove such a custom in his community. Admittedly, the plaintiff adduced no evidence of any independent witness to prove a custom that in the community of Digamber Jain Khandelwal to which the parties belong, a married person above 15 years of age can be validly adopted. Further, it is material to note that even though it was the case of the plaintiff himself that several persons of his community were present at the time of this adoption, not a single independent witness has been examined. The plaintiff adduced the evidence of three witnesses, namely, PWs 2, 3 and 5 and even though all of them are unanimous that a married boy can go in adoption in their community, none of them even whispered about the age of the boy to be adopted. It is not even indicated in the evidence of any of these three witnesses that there was any such custom in the community to adopt a boy who had crossed 15 years in age. These three witnesses were admittedly not the Panchas or office bearers of the community and, as stated above, no independent person came forward to prove a custom in the community of Digamber Jain Khandelwal for a valid adoption of a married person even if he is above the age of 15 years. The exceptions provided to conditions (iii) and (iv) of section 10 of the Act are not, therefore, sufficiently carved out in the case at hand and as such, the bars prescribed by these two conditions in respect of the marriage and age of the adopted boy come in the way of the present plaintiff. Both the Courts below were, therefore, justified and right in holding that the plaintiff failed to prove any custom as alleged and as such, the necessary requirements of section 10 for a valid adoption were not complied with.

    8. Shri P.R Deshmukh, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the parties to this litigation are Jains and the object of adoption in this community is to secure an heir and perpetuate the adopter's name. According to Shri Deshmukh, the learned counsel for the appellant, the adoption in this community has no religious significance and there is no restriction of age or marriage nor any special ceremony is necessary to give legal effect to adoption. Shri Deshmukh for this proposition relied on a ruling in Suraj Mal v. Babu Lal, AIR 1985 Delhi 95 and submitted that such a custom to adopt a married boy without any restriction of age was neither immoral nor against the public policy. Reliance is also placed by Shri Deshmukh, the learned counsel for the appellant, on a ruling in Anirudh Jagdeorao v. Babarao, 1983 Mh.L.J 379 for the proposition that, the Hindus in Marathwada area were governed by Vyavahara Mayukha School of Hindu Law which permitted a widow to adopt a boy over 15 years of age in adoption and also a married person. Shri Deshmukh further relied on a ruling in Kondiba R. Papal v. Narayan K. Papal, (1991) 2 SCC 218 approving the ruling in 1983 Mh.L.J 379. It is, therefore, submitted that as the parties to the present proceedings are also Jains and from Marathwada area, the custom having been recognised by law, makes the adoption of the present plaintiff as legal.

    9. It is, however, to be noted that in the case of Suraj Mal v. Babu Lal referred to above, the parties were Jains of Oswal sect and were residents of Delhi and on evidence it was found that the boy was adopted according to the custom prevailing in Delhi in Jain community permitting the adoption without any restriction to the marriage or age. In the case of Anirudh Jagdeorao the parties were Hindu belonging to Maratha community and a custom was pleaded and proved in that community to take in adoption any person even above the age of 15 years and even though such adopted person was a married one. So also in the case of Kondiba Rama it was found on evidence that the custom prevailed amongst them that the person may adopt at any age though he may be older than the adopter and was married and have children. It was also found that the evidence was led of 2 instances of such adoptions of persons belonging to the same caste and as such when the factum of adoption was established by sufficient evidence, its validity was upheld on the ground of custom as judicially recognised. It is to be noted further that the parties to the present proceedings are Digambar Jain Khandelwal, and, as observed above, not a single person was examined to prove the alleged custom in this community permitting the adoption of a married person and also above the age of 15 years. It need not be stated that the parties setting up a particular custom is required not only to allege but to prove it so as to make such a custom to be a rule of law as applicable to the concerned parties. Shri Nawander, the learned counsel for the respondent, in this connection relied on a ruling in T. Saraswathi Ammal v. Jagadambal, AIR 1933 SC 201, wherein it is ruled that custom cannot be extended by analogy and it cannot be established by a “priori” method. In the same ruling it is further laid down that it is not that any theory of custom or deductions from other customs which can be made a rule of decision but only any custom applicable to the parties concerned that can be the rule of decision in a particular case. If the facts, as brought on record in the case at hand, are re-averted, it is clear that neither the plaintiff sets such a custom in his plaint nor proves it on which he relies so as to succeed to the properties of his mother Kundanbai.

    10. Shri Nawander, the learned counsel for the respondent, further submitted that there are additional hurdles in the way of the plaintiff and the adoption has to be held invalid because of non-compliance of conditions (iv) and (vi) of section 11 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. According to Shri Nawander, the learned counsel for the respondent, these two conditions do not accept any exception and there can be no question of any custom or usage in the community providing otherwise than required by these two conditions. It is, therefore, submitted that for a valid adoption the adoptive mother must be at least 21 years' older than the person to be adopted and further the child must be shown to have been actually given and taken in adoption. There is sufficient and substantive force in the above submissions. Section 11 of the Act lays down further a proviso for a valid adoption and as per the proviso, it is only the performance of datta homam which has been dispensed with for a valid adoption. Conditions (iv) and (vi) raise a bar and prescribe the minimum difference of age between the adoptive mother and the adopted person. So also it is prescribed that there must be actual giving and taking of the child by the parents or guardian concerned. It is therefore to be ascertained as to whether the case of the valid adoption of the plaintiff is also affected by these two conditions.

    11. As stated above, the plaintiff was admittedly 30 years' old at the time of the adoption. It is further admitted by the plaintiff in para 16 of his evidence so also the adoption deed (Exh. 116) that Kundanbai, the adoptive mother, was 50 years' old at the time of the deed (Exh. 116). Admittedly, the adoption ceremony was performed on 11-5-1969 and the deed (Exh. 116) is dated 21-11-1970. It is, therefore, clear that at the time of the adoption, the plaintiff was 30 years' old while the adoptive mother was 48 years and 6 months in age. As such, the adoptive mother Kundanbai was older by 19 years than the plaintiff. There is, therefore, the breach of condition (iv) as the adoptive mother was not at least 21 years' older than the person adopted. There is also a legal bar against the valid adoption of the plaintiff raised by condition (vi) of section 11 of the Act. There is absolutely no evidence in the case at hand that the plaintiff Nemichand was actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned as required by that condition. It is in the evidence of the plaintiff himself as well as his three witnesses that the plaintiff Nemichand himself sat on the lap of Kundanbai and the adoption was effected. There is no whisper in the evidence that either the parents or the guardian of Nemichand actually gave him in adoption during their life-time. Shri Nawander, the learned counsel for the respondent, then relied on a ruling in Laksman Singh v. Kanwar, AIR 1961 SC 1378, wherein it is held that, the transfer of adoptive boy by ceremony of giving and taking is essential condition for a valid adoption even though there is no particular form of giving and taking prescribed. It is laid down in the said case that, nature of the ceremony may vary depending upon the circumstances of each case but there must be a ceremony of giving and taking. As stated above, this condition No. (vi) of section 11 of the Act does not accept any exception or explanation in the form of a contrary usage or custom prevalent in the community. The only proviso is in respect of performance of Datta Homa and it is, therefore, clear that there may not be the performance of Datta Homa but there must be actual giving and taking in adoption of the child that is essential to the validity of an adoption. As stated above, the evidence in the case at hand not only falls too short but is totally absent on this count. Therefore, the conditions (iv) and (vi) of section 11 of the Act are not at all complied with and as such, the adoption of the plaintiff cannot be upheld as valid. It may also lastly be mentioned that the conduct on the part of the plaintiff subsequent to the alleged adoption is also eloquent and both the Courts have found that in respect of this alleged adoption, the plaintiff Nemichand continued his actions and dealt with the properties not as a son of Kundanbai but in his prior name as if there was no adoption at all. Both the Courts below, therefore, rightly held that the plaintiff cannot be held to be an adopted son of Kundanbai and he has been rightly denied his succession to the properties of Kundanbai. The suit of the plaintiff for declaration as an adopted son of Kundanbai has therefore been rightly dismissed. Admittedly, the defendant-respondent is the daughter of Kundanbai and Kundanbai has also executed her last will in her favour bequeathing her own share in the suit-properties in favour of her daughter after the death of her husband Shantilal. The plaintiff was, therefore, rightly non-suited in respect of the consequential relief of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from receiving the compensation amount which was due and payable to her. The second appeal is therefore devoid of any substance and as such, is liable to be dismissed.

    12. In the result, Second Appeal No. 201 of 1990 is hereby dismissed. There shall however be no order as to costs of this second appeal.

    Appeal dismissed.
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    Comments

    Nemichand Shantilal Patni v. Basantabai
    (Jan 21, 1994)