1. This Petition is directed against the order dated 18th July 1986 passed by Shri M.R Bhope, Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Bombay (Respondent No. 2 herein), in Reference (IDA) No. 175 of 1982 made by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour under sections 10(1) and 12(5) of the Industrial, Disputes Act, 1947.
2. The material facts and circumstances leading to the filling of this Petition are as Under:
3. By an order dated 10th March 1979, the Bombay Iron and Steel Labour Board (Respondent No. 1 herein), a statutory board constituted under sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 (Maharashtra Act No. XXX of 1969) (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as “the Act”), appointed the Petitioner as an Inspector of the Respondent No. 1-Board on probation for a period of three months from the date of his reporting for duty. The Petitioner was required to perform functions of Inspector as specified under section 15 of the Act. By its order dated 17th December 1980, the Respondent No. 1-Board informed the Petitioner that the question of Petitioner's confirmation as an Inspector in the services of the Board was considered by the Board in its meeting held on 5th December 1980 and the Board was not in favour of confirmation of the Petitioner. The Petitioner was informed that his services were terminated with effect from 18th December 1980.
4. Being aggrieved by the said termination order, the Petitioner made a demand for his reinstatement in the service. Conciliation proceedings were held. On failure of the conciliation proceedings, the dispute was referred to the Labour Court at Bombay by an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour. The said dispute was in respect of the claim of the Petitioner for reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service with effect from 18th December 1980.
5. During the course of the said reference proceedings, the Petitioner filed his statement of claim contending that the said termination order was mala fide and unjust. The Petitioner also proceeded on the footing in the said statement of claim that the Petitioner was deemed to have been confirmed in the service of the Respondent No. 1-Board as an Inspector in the absence of any communication from the Board on expiry of the said period of three months. In the written statement filed in the said proceedings, two preliminary contentions were urged on behalf of the Board. The Board contended that having regard to the nature of its functions under Maharashtra Act No. XXX of 1969, the Board was not an ‘industry’ as defined under section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Board also contended in its written statement that the Petitioner was not a ‘workman’ as defined under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. On merits also, the Board disputed the claim of the Petitioner. It appears to be the contention of the Board on merits that the Petitioner was on probation and in the absence of any express order of confirmation, the petitioner could not be deemed to have been confirmed. It was also the case of the Board in paragraph 15 of the written statement that the Petitioner was not confirmed because there were several complaints against the Petitioner by the employers and it was not possible for the Board to repose the requisite confidence in the Petitioner.
6. The First Labour Court framed five issues for its consideration. Evidence was led by the parties. Two of the said issues were jurisdictional issues. The said two issues read as under:—
(1) “Does the opponent (i.e the Respondent No. 1 before me) prove that Shri Mhasvadkar (i.e the Petitioner before me) is not a workman as defined under section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act?
(2) Whether the opponent is an industry?”
7. The First Labour Court came to the conclusion that the Respondent No. 1-Board was not an ‘industry’ within the meaning of the said expression used under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In view thereof, the First Labour Court also came to the conclusion that the Petitioner was not a workman. The First Labour Court rejected the reference as not maintainable for lack of jurisdiction. The First Labour Court made certain observations on the merits of the case but did not record any positive findings on issues. Nos. 3 to 5 concerning the merits of the matter, in view of its finding that it had no jurisdiction to try the reference and the reference itself was without jurisdiction.
8. The first and foremost question which is required to be considered in this Writ Petition is as to whether the Respondent No. 1 Board is an ‘industry’ under section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act defines the expression ‘industry’ as under:—
“‘industry’ means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture of calling of employers and includes any calling, service employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workman”
9. The definition of the expression ‘industry’ was amended by section 2(c) of the Amending Act (46 of 1982) in view of the observations made in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa reported in (1978) 2 SCC 213 : AIR 1978 SC at page 548. The said amended definition has not yet been brought into force.
10. Before I refer to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the Petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1-Board, I think it necessary to refer to the provisions of the Act, viz. Maharashtra Act No. XXX of 1969. It may also be mentioned at this stage that Entries 23 and 24 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India read as under—
“23. Social security and social insurance; employment and unemployment.
24. Welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, employers' liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits.”
“Administration of laws” passed by the Legislature is part of regal functions of the State, whether the function of “administration of law” is performed by the State or by the Board specially constituted for this purpose.
11. The Act was passed by the Maharashtra Legislature to regulate the employment of unprotected manual workers employed in certain employments in the State of Maharashtra, to make provision for their adequate supply and proper and full utilization in such employments and for matters connected therewith. Section 3 of the Act provided for framing of a statutory scheme for the registration of employers and unprotected workers in any scheduled employment or employments, and provided for the terms and conditions of work of registered unprotected workers, and made provision for the general welfare in such employments. Section 3(2) of the Act provides that such statutory scheme may provide for various matters concerning regulating of the employment of workers and also in respect of their welfare, including for constitution of fund or funds. Such Scheme to be framed by the State Government under section 3 of the Act is required to be placed before the House of the State Legislature under section 28(2) of the Act. By section 6 of the Act, it was provided that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, establish a statutory Board to be known by such name as may be specified in the notification for any scheduled employment in any area. By section 6(3) of the Act, it was provided that the Board shall consist of members nominated from time to time by the State Government representing the employers, the unprotected workers and the State Government. It was provided by section 6(5) of the Act that the Chairman of the Board shall be one of the members appointed to represent the State Government, nominated in this behalf by the State Government. Section 6A of the Act made provision for appointment of the Board consisting of one person in case the State Government was unable to constitute the Board for the scheduled employment in accordance with the provisions of section 6. It is of considerable relevance to refer to the provisions of section 7 of the Act, as section 7 of the Act prescribes powers and duties of the Board. Section 7(1) of the Act provided that the Board shall be responsible for administering a scheme, and shall exercise such powers and perform such functions as may be conferred on it by the scheme. Section 7(2) of the Act provided that the Board may take such measures as it may deem fit for administering the scheme. Section 7(3) of the Act imposes an obligation on the Board to submit periodical statements to the State Government in respect of administration of the scheme by the Board. It was also prescribed by the Act that every such report received by the State Government shall be placed before each House of the State Legislature. Section 7(4) of the Act is also of considerable significance. The said section reads as under:—
“7. (4) In exercise of the powers and discharge of its functions, the Board shall be bound by such directions as the State Government may, for reasons to be stated in writing, give to it from time to time.”
12. It is not necessary to refer to all the provisions of the Act. Reference may, however, be made to section 13 of the Act by which the Board was empowered to adjudicate and determine the question of moneys due from the employers or the workers under the Act or the scheme framed thereunder. The Board was empowered to hold statutory inquiry under sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act. For this purpose, the Board was authorised to exercise the same powers as are vested in Civil Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for trying a suit to the extent specified therein. Section 14 of the Act provides for constitution of an Advisory Committee to advise the State Government upon various matters concerning administration of the Act or the scheme framed under the Act. Section 15 of the Act is also of considerable significance. Section 15 of the Act reads as under:—
“15. (1) The Board may appoint such persons as it thinks fit to be Inspectors possessing the prescribed qualifications for the purposes of this Act or of any scheme and may define the limits of their jurisdiction.
(2) Subject to any rules made by the State Government in this behalf, an Inspector may
(a) enter and search at all reasonable hours, with such assistants as he thinks fit, any premises or place, where unprotected workers are employed, or work is given out to unprotected workers in any scheduled employment, for the purpose of examining any register, record of wages or notices required to be kept or exhibited under any scheme, and require the production thereof, for inspection;
(b) examine any person whom he finds in any such premises or place and who, he has reasonable cause to believe, is an unprotected worker employed therein or an unprotected worker to whom work is given out therein;
(c) require any person giving any work to an unprotected worker or to a group of unprotected workers to give any information, which is in his power to give, in respect of the names and addresses of the persons to whom the work is given, and in respect of payments made, or to be made, for the said work;
(d) seize or take copies of such registers, records of wages or notices or portions thereof, as he may consider relevant, in respect of an offence under this Act or scheme, which he has reason to believe has been committed by an employer; and
(e) exercise such other powers as may be prescribed:
Provided that, no one shall be required under the provisions of this section to answer any question or make any statement tending to incriminate himself.
(3) Every Inspector appointed under this section shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code.”
13. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Act, the State Government framed a scheme known as the Bombay Iron and Steel Unprotected Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Scheme, 1970. The said scheme confers various powers on the Chairman of the Board and also prescribes for classification of workers, registration of employers, promotion and transfer of workers, surrender of cards, etc. The above-referred Act and the scheme framed thereunder are liable to be read together to ascertain the functions of the Board.
14. Right at the outset, I must mention that the Respondent No. 1-Board is a “statutory authority” in charge of administering the Act and the scheme as provided in the Act subject to statutory control of the State Government. The Board is entitled to exercise powers of administration under the Act and its Inspectors also can enter and search, at all reasonable hours, the premises or places mentioned in section 15 of the Act, examine the persons found in such premises or places, and seize the books and records for the purpose of carrying out investigation under the Act. The Board is enjoined by law to administer the Act and the scheme. Its functions include regulating the employment of unprotected workmen and registers the employers and the workers and enforce discipline in terms of the relevant provision.
15. Mrs. Desai, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1-Board, relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vizagapatnam Dock Labour Board v. Stevedores Association, Vishakhapatnam reported in (1969) 2 SCC 801 : AIR 1970 SC 1626. In this matter, a reference was made by the Central Government to the Industrial Tribunal in respect of the demand of the workmen for payment of bonus and the question before the Court was as to whether the appellant-Board was liable to pay bonus or not. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the Dock Labour Board constituted as a statutory Board under the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948, could not be considered to be the employer of the Dock workmen. It was observed by the Apex Court that the appellant-Board was not the ‘employer’ of the Dock workers. In paragraph 29 of the said judgment, it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the matter could be examined from an another angle also, i.e whether the Board was carrying on an industry so as to attract the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? After referring to the earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gymkhana Club Union v. Management reported in AIR 1968 SC 354 at page 361, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the appellant-Board could not be considered as an ‘industry’ under the provisions of section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In paragraph 30 of its judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:—
“Applying the above principles to the case on hand, in our opinion, it is clear that it cannot be stated that the Board functioning under the Act and the Scheme carries on any industry so as to attract the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.”
16. This judgment was followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a later judgment concerning Calcutta Dock Labour Board reported in (1974) 3 SCC 216 : AIR 1973 SC 2231. It cannot be disputed that the functions of the Dock Labour Board constituted under the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948, are similar to the functions of the respondent No. 1-Board under Maharashtra Act No. XXX of 1969. The First Labour Court has also relied upon the above-referred judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vizagapatnam Dock Labour Board for its conclusion that the Respondent No. 1-Board was not an ‘industry’. Mr. Grover, learned counsel for the Petitioner, has submitted that in the matter pertaining to Vizagapatnam Dock Labour Board, there was no occasion for the court to consider as to whether the Board was an ‘industry’ or not and once it was held that the Board was not the employer of the Dock workers, it was not necessary to consider as to whether the Dock Labour Board was an ‘industry’. Mr. Grover has further submitted that this decision is per incuriam, as it does not take notice of the various facets having bearing on the question arising for consideration as to whether the Board is an ‘industry’ or not. Mr. Grover has further submitted that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vizagapatnam Dock Labour Board (supra) is based more or less on the ratio of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the earlier case known as “Madras Gymkhana Case”. Mr. Grover has submitted that since the judgment in the case of Gymkhana Club Union (supra) is in terms overruled in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra), the above-referred judgments in the matters pertaining to Dock Labour Board cases have lost their legal efficacy and no longer represent correct law. As against that, Mrs. Desai, learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1-Board, has submitted that these judgments pertaining to Vizagapatnam Dock Labour Board and Calcutta Dock Labour Board continue to lay down correct law and are binding on this Court. It is not possible for me to accept the submission of Mr. Grover that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vizagapatnam Dock Labour Board (supra) is per incuriam. If an issue arising before the Court is examined from two different angles and the law is declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on several aspects of the matter argued before it and considered by it, declaration of law by the highest court on all the aspects will be binding on this Court. However, in view of overruling of the “Madras Gymkhana Case” by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra), I will examine this case on its own merits in the light of the ratio of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra). I have already analysed the provisions of the Act and the scheme framed thereunder. I shall now proceed to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Its Employees reported in (1960) 2 S.C.R at page 943 : AIR 1960 SC 675, which was in terms approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra). In this case, the question before the Court was whether the activity of the Municipal Corporation was an ‘industry’ or not. A reference was also made in this case to the earlier Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment in the case of D.N Banerji v. P.R Mukherjee reported in 1953 S.C.R at page 302 : AIR 1953 SC 58. It is by this time well-settled that regal functions of the State, performed by the State or by the statutory corporation to which such functions are delegated, are outside the purview of the definition of the expression ‘industry’ as defined under section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is useful to refer to the observations of Isaacs, J., in his dissenting judgment in the Australian case of Federated State School Teachers' Association of Australia v. State of Victoria reported in (1929) 41 CLR 569 at page 585, expressly approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The relevant passage reads as under:—
“Regal functions are inescapable and inalienable. Such are the legislative powers, the administration of laws, the exercise of the judicial power……..”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. The above test was approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Thus it was held in this case that regal functions of the State, i.e function of “the administration of the law” in addition to other regal or sovereign functions of the state, are liable to be excluded from the definition of the expression ‘industry’. It is of no relevance for our purpose as to whether the administration of the law is done by the State Government itself or by a statutory corporation constituted by the State for the purpose of the administration of a particular law. On this aspect, it shall be of some relevance to refer to the judgment of the Supreme court of the United States in the case of Vilas v. Monila reported in (1910) 220 U.S 345 at page 356 - 35 Law Ld. 491 at page 493, specifically approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Corporation of City of Nagpur (supra). In this case, it was observed, while expounding the dual character of a Municipal Corporation, as under:—
“They (i.e municipal corporations) exercise powers which are governmental and powers which are of a private or business character. In the one character a municipal corporation is a governmental sub-division, and for that purpose exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the State. In the other character it is a mere legal entity or juristic person. In the latter character it stands for the community in the administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred.”
18. The question which I ask myself is as to whether the Respondent No. 1-Board is entrusted with administration of law”, i.e Maharashtra Act No. XXX of 1969 and the statutory scheme framed thereunder, and whether the activity of the Board by applying the dominant nature test, can be classified as an activity pertaining to regal functions of the State discharged by a statutory corporation. The Constitution contemplates making of Labour Legislations by the State and Central Legislatures and administration of such Labour Legislations by the State or the statutory corporations or Board established for this purpose. If a Legislation contemplates registration of an employer or an employee, administration of a scheme confers powers of seizure and inspection on the Board or its inspection empowers it to adjudicate claims, etc., can it be said that the Board is not in charge of the “administration of law” framed by the State? Whether the activity of the Board is anything more or anything less than administering the Act or administering the scheme framed thereunder subject to statutory control of the State. The statutory scheme is more or less a part of the Act. The Respondent No. 1-Board is to be nominated by the State Government. The Board is to be guided by the directions of the State Government. The Board, even if constituted by various representatives, can consist of even one person nominated by the State Government. If the Board was not constituted, all this work would have been required to be done by the State Government through its own department. Merely because the State Government has constituted a statutory corporation with the delegated powers, can it be said that the Board is not discharging the regal functions of the State? I am conscious of the fact that in a welfare State, statutory corporations can be constituted to implement directive principles of the Constitution. I am conscious of the fact that if the Board is discharging such functions which could be discharged by a private party, the Board cannot be considered as an authority discharging regal functions of the State. In my judgment, the Respondent No. 1-Board is entrusted with such functions which could not be delegated to a private party at all. These functions are “functions of administration” in a country where the Government is enjoined to regulate employer-employee relationship. The Board is set up as an independent statutory authority to administer the law and to take steps to enforce the same. Applying the dominant nature test laid down by Krishna Iyer, J., in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (Supra) in his leading judgment on behalf of the Apex Court, I hold that the functions of the Respondent No. 1-Board are primarily or substantially to administer the law.
19. Now I shall refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra). It was held in this case by a seven-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that subject to certain exceptions and exclusions legally carved out, an activity could be considered as an ‘industry’, if the triple test laid down by the Court was satisfied. It was held that when there was a systematic activity organised as a result of co-operation between employer and employee for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants, prima facie the enterprise would constitute an ‘industry’. It was held that absence of profit motive was irrelevant. It was held that the real test was functional and the Court had to consider the nature of the activity of the concern, with special reference to employer-employee relationship. Applying this test, it was held that professions, clubs, educational institutions, research institutions, charitable projects, hospitals, etc. could amount to an ‘industry’, if the triple test laid down in the judgment was satisfied. As far as sovereign functions of the State or the statutory corporations are concerned, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer in his leading judgment in the above-referred case approved the view taken by Mr. Justice Subba Rao in the case of The Corporation of the City of Nagpur (supra). It was observed as under:—
“Sri Justice Subba Rao, with uninhibited logic, chases this thought and reaches certain tests in Nagpur Municipality, AIR 1960 SC 675, speaking for an unanimous bench. We respectfully agree with much of his reasoning and proceed to deal with the decision. If the ruling were right, as we think it is, the riddle of ‘industry’ is resolved in some measure.”
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Reference was made to the Australian case reported in (1929) 41 CLR 569 and other cases in paragraph 73 of the judgment. In other paragraphs of this judgment, the observations by Isaac, J., from his dissenting judgment in the above-referred Australian case already extracted hereinabove were approved. Whether the function of administering the Act or Rules, registering the employers or the workmen, taking action against the defaulting employers, collecting amount of levy, could have been performed by a private individual. The answer is obviously in the negative. The Respondent No. 1-Board discharges the regal functions of the State. Accordingly, the test laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra) is satisfied in this behalf. I have no hesitation to hold that the Respondent No. 1-Board is not an ‘industry’. In view of my finding that the Board is not an ‘industry’, it is not necessary to pursue the discussion on the question as to whether the Petitioner would have been treated as a ‘workman’ or not, if the Board was held to be an ‘industry’. I need not discuss the Madras Gymkhana Case in detail. In that case, it was observed by Chief Justice Hidayatullah that the Gymkhana, could not be considered as an ‘industry’, as it was a self-serving institute. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra) came to the conclusion that the gymkhana clubs were not self-serving institutes. I have examined the issue in the light of the provisions of the Act, i.e Maharashtra Act No. XXX of 1969, and the ratio of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra). I am also fortified in the view which I am taking by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vizagapatnam Dock Labour Board (supra). In my view, the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dock Labour Board cases still operate in the field. Even independently of the above-referred judgment in the case of Vizagapatnam Dock Labour Board (supra), I am of the opinion that the Respondent No. 1-Board is not an ‘industry’. It is contended by Mr. Grover, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, that the functions discharged by the Board are such that the same could be performed by any private party. It has been argued by Mr. Grover that the Board supplies labour and there is nothing sovereign about the functions of the Board. This argument, with respect, suffers from over simplification and cannot be accepted.
21. Assuming that I am wrong in the view which I have taken about the functions of the Respondent No. 1-Board being regal functions or part of the sovereign functions of the State, I am nevertheless of the view that in any event the functions of the Board are governmental functions and not functions analogous to trade or industry. Merely because the Board is statutory, it does not ipso facto follow that it is exempted from the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. No one says so. There are several departments of the Government which are held to be an ‘industry’ under section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In its recent judgment in the case of Des Raj v. State of Punjab reported in (1988) 2 SCC 537 : AIR 1988 SC at page 1182, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Irrigation Department of the Government was also liable to be treated as an ‘industry’ when subjected to dominant nature tests. By this judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court overruled the Full Bench judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of Om Prakash v. The Management of Executive Engineer reported in 1984 Lab. I.C at page 1165. It is not necessary to pursue this line of a discussion any further, as the Board is not an ‘industry’ in the extended sense of the said word as defined under section 2(j) of the Act in the light of its judicial interpretation.
22. Keeping all this in mind, it is still required to be examined as to whether a department of the Government, or a statutory corporation entrusted solely with the administration of law or the administration of a scheme, can be treated as an ‘industry’. If the function discharged by the Respondent No. 1-Board is a sovereign function or part of regal functions, the Board cannot be held to be an ‘industry’. Even if the function of the Board is a mere “governmental function”, it cannot be classified as an ‘industry’. On both the counts, I hold that the Board is not an ‘industry’. In this view of the matter, prima facie the Petitioner cannot claim to be a workman employed by an industry. In this view of the matter, I uphold the finding of the First Labour Court that the Board is not an ‘industry’. I also uphold the finding of the First Labour Court that the Petitioner is a ‘workman’. If there would have been an occasion to consider the merits of the case, it would have been necessary to examine as to whether the Petitioner was automatically confirmed on the probation period of three months having come to an end or not. Perhaps no probationist can claim automatic confirmation on expiry of the initial probation period. However, it is not necessary to examine any of these questions on merits.
23. In view of the above discussion, the Petition is dismissed and the Rule is discharged. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Petition dismissed.