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  • SECTION 3 LIMITATION ACT
  • provisions of Order VI. Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure.3.
  • section 86 of the Representation of the Peoples Act
  • section 123 of the Representation of Peoples Act
  • sections 117 and 118 respectively. Sub-section 2
  • section 97 of the Representation of Peoples Act.
  • Order VI, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Election Petition. Sub-section 4 of section 86
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act
  • section 100 as well as section 101
  • provisions of section 81, 82
  • section 101(a). Section 97(1)
  • section 100(1)(d)(iii)
  • Order VI, Rule 16,
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 3 LIMITATION ACT
  • provisions of Order VI. Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure.3.
  • section 86 of the Representation of the Peoples Act
  • section 123 of the Representation of Peoples Act
  • sections 117 and 118 respectively. Sub-section 2
  • section 97 of the Representation of Peoples Act.
  • Order VI, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Election Petition. Sub-section 4 of section 86
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act
  • section 100 as well as section 101
  • provisions of section 81, 82
  • section 101(a). Section 97(1)
  • section 100(1)(d)(iii)
  • Order VI, Rule 16,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed an election petition on 16 April 1990 seeking a declaration that the election of the first respondent to the Vidhan Sabha from the 41 Andheri Assembly Constituency (held on 27 February 1990) was null, void and/or illegal on the ground that the first respondent and his agents, with his consent, committed corrupt practices as defined under section 123 of the Representation of the Peoples Act. The petitioner also sought a declaration that he (the petitioner) had been duly elected.

Procedural history (as stated in the opinion): the petition was accepted by order dated 7 July 1990 and made returnable on 23 July 1990. The first respondent was served on 31 July 1990, applied for and was granted four weeks' time to file a written statement on 28 August 1990, and filed a written statement dated 28 September 1990 (filed on record 1 October 1990). Issues were settled by the court on 10 October 1990, and the court posted arguments on Issues Nos. 1 and 2 to be heard and decided on the day of the opinion. The petition was placed for hearing on 8 October 1990 and the matter proceeded as described in the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner proves that the pleadings in the written statement of the first respondent at paragraphs 3(i) to 3(viii) are abusive, scandalous, vexatious and irrelevant and have been made with the sole intention of delaying the trial and/or embarrassing the petitioner and hence are liable to be struck out under Order VI, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  2. Whether the petitioner proves that the pleadings at paragraph 3(xix) as well as paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the written statement of the first respondent are liable to be rejected and/or that the first respondent is not entitled to take up those pleas on the ground that he has not filed a recrimination petition as provided under section 97 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Shri Bhandari)

  • The averments in paragraphs 3(i) to 3(viii) of the first respondent's written statement are irrelevant to the issues in the election petition, are unnecessary, frivolous and embarrassing, and were made to protract or delay the hearing. These paragraphs should be struck out under Order VI, Rule 16 CPC.
  • The averments in paragraphs 3(xix), 4, 5 and 6 are liable to be struck out because the first respondent failed to file recrimination under section 97 of the Representation of Peoples Act. Since the petition seeks, if successful, a declaration that the petitioner has been duly elected, the returned candidate (first respondent) must file recrimination to be permitted to lead evidence to show that the petitioner's election would have been void if he (petitioner) had been the returned candidate. By not filing recrimination, the first respondent is debarred from leading such evidence and those averments should be struck off.

First Respondent's Arguments (Shri Vashi)

  • It was premature at this stage to decide whether the challenged paragraphs should be struck out; these issues are better decided during the course of evidence and at the final hearing.
  • The facts pleaded in the contested paragraphs would be relevant at the stage of appreciation of evidence and should be permitted to stand until trial is conducted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P. Malai Chami v. Andi Ambalam, (1973) 2 SCC 170 : AIR 1973 SC 2077 Establishes that an election petition is a purely statutory proceeding and the High Court, as a tribunal for election disputes, has powers conferred by statute and not common law powers. Used to support the court's view that election petitions must be dealt with as statutory proceedings and that the tribunal must control procedure to avoid protraction and irrelevant matters; justified deciding the preliminary issues at this stage rather than deferring to final hearing.
Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal, 1964 Mah LJ 617 : AIR 1964 SC 1200 Explains the operation of section 97 in composite election petitions: where petitioner seeks a declaration that some other candidate has been duly elected, the returned candidate may recriminate under section 97; failure to recriminate precludes the returned candidate from leading evidence attacking the alternative claimant's election. Applied to hold that because the first respondent did not file recrimination within the time and manner required by section 97, he was precluded from leading evidence in respect of averments that imputed corrupt practices to the petitioner; therefore those averments had to be struck off.
Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 133 : AIR 1974 SC 480 Discusses whether Limitation Act provisions (sections 4 to 24 or section 5) apply where a special statute contains its own limitation or procedural scheme; indicates that election law may be a complete code excluding the Limitation Act's extension provisions. Relied upon to hold that the 14-day period for filing recrimination under section 97 is a statutory period of limitation which cannot be extended by invoking the Limitation Act; therefore the first respondent's failure to give notice within 14 days could not be cured by extension principles.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two analytical strands corresponding to the two settled issues.

1. Relevance and strike-out under Order VI, Rule 16 CPC (paragraphs 3(i)–3(viii))

  1. The court examined paragraphs 3(i) to 3(viii) of the first respondent's written statement and noted these paragraphs narrate the first respondent's past career, achievements and positions held from 1968 onwards.
  2. The central question was whether those facts were germane to deciding whether the first respondent was guilty of corrupt practices (one of the grounds on which the petitioner challenged the election).
  3. The court emphasized that an election petition is a statutory proceeding and that the tribunal's powers and procedure are governed by the statute (citing P. Malai Chami v. Andi Ambalam). Election petitions must be decided expeditiously and the court must prevent undue protraction.
  4. Applying Order VI, Rule 16 CPC (which permits striking out pleadings that are unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or that tend to delay or embarrass a fair trial), the court held the averments in paragraphs 3(i)–3(viii) do not offer any defence to the election petition and are irrelevant to whether corrupt practices were committed.
  5. The court found that permitting those paragraphs to remain would encourage the introduction of voluminous irrelevant evidence and thereby protract the trial; accordingly, the court decided it was appropriate to decide this at the preliminary stage rather than reserving to final hearing.

2. Recrimination and section 97 (paragraphs 3(xix) and 4, 5, 6)

  1. The court reproduced section 97 and explained its operation: where an election petition includes a claim that another candidate is duly elected, a returned candidate may lead evidence to show that the alternative candidate's election would have been void had that candidate been the returned candidate — but only if the returned candidate, within 14 days from the commencement of trial, gives notice of intention to recriminate and furnishes specified securities and particulars.
  2. The court relied on the definition of "commencement of trial" in section 86 (explanation) — the date fixed for the respondents to appear and answer the petition — to compute the 14-day statutory period for giving notice of recrimination. The court identified the returnable/commencement date(s) in the record and concluded that the first respondent did not give notice within the prescribed 14 days in any scenario considered.
  3. Citing Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal, the court observed the returned candidate who does not recriminate as required by section 97 cannot attack the validity of the alternative claimant's election; the tribunal may proceed to deal with the alternative claim but the returned candidate will be precluded from leading evidence on that counter-claim.
  4. Relying on Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, the court held the 14-day period under section 97 is a statutory limitation that cannot be enlarged by the Limitation Act or by other extension principles; election law constitutes a complete code for these purposes.
  5. Because the first respondent did not give notice of recrimination within the 14-day statutory period, the court concluded he is barred from leading any evidence in support of averments in paragraphs 3(xix), 4, 5 and 6 which impute corrupt practices to the petitioner and would operate as attacks on the petitioner's possible claim to be declared duly elected.

Consequently, for both lines of analysis the court determined the contested averments were not permissible: paras 3(i)–3(viii) were irrelevant and liable to be struck out under Order VI, Rule 16 CPC; paras 3(xix) and 4–6 were barred by the failure to comply with section 97 and therefore also liable to be struck off.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court answered Issues Nos. 1 and 2 in the affirmative and ordered that the challenged averments be struck out. In the court's own words, it directed that the averments contained in paragraphs 3(i) to 3(viii) and paragraphs 3(xix) and paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the written statement "be struck off."

DIRECTIVE: The first respondent was ordered to amend the written statement by deleting the specified paragraphs within two weeks and to serve a copy of the amended written statement upon the petitioner within one week thereafter. On application of the first respondent's counsel the order was stayed for two weeks from the date of the judgment. The petition was directed to appear on the court's board on 5 November 1990 for the recording of evidence.

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is to remove from the record the specified paragraphs of the first respondent's written statement and to bar the first respondent from leading evidence based on those averments. The opinion applies existing Supreme Court authority on the limited procedural regime for election petitions; it does not state that it establishes any new precedent beyond applying the cited authorities to the facts before the court.

Order accordingly.

    Ramesh Shankar More v. Ramesh Mataprasad Dube And Others

    1. By the present election petition the petitioner has prayed for a declaration that the election of the first respondent to the Vidhan Sabha Elections from the 41 Andheri Assembly Constituency held on 27th February 1990 is null and void and or illegal on the ground that the first respondent and his agents and other persons with his consent have committed corrupt practice as defined under section 123 of the Representation of Peoples Act as well as for violation of the other provisions of the said Act. The Petitioner has further prayed for a declaration that he has been duly elected in the said election. The said petition was filed on 16th April 1990. By my order passed on 7th July 1990 the petition was accepted and was made returnable on 23rd July 1990. The first respondent who is the returned candidate was served on 31st July 1990. On 28th August 1990 the first respondent appeared and applied for four weeks time to file the written statement and the same was granted. The first respondent filed his written statement dated 28th September 1990 on 1st October 1990. After all the respondents were duly served, the petition was placed on board for Hearing on 8th October 1990. After the pleadings in the case were perused with the assistance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and the first respondent, by my order dated 10th October 1990 the issues in the case were settled. I further posted the petition for arguments on issues Nos. 1 and 2 for being heard and decided today. The said issues are as under:—

    1. Whether the petitioner proves that the pleadings in the written statement of the first respondent at para No. 3(i) to 3(viii) are abusive, scandalous, vexatious and irrelevant and have been made with the sole intention of delaying the trial of the petition and/or embarrasses the petitioner and hence is liable to be struck out under the provisions of Order VI. Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure?

    2. Whether the petitioner proves that the pleadings at Para 3(xix) as well as Paras 4, 5 and 6 of the Written Statement of the First Respondent are liable to be rejected and/or the First Respondent is not entitled to take up the said pleas on the ground that he has not filed a Recrimination Petition as provided under section 97 of the R.P Act, 1951?

    2. Shri Bhandari the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner has contended that the averments contained in paras Nos. 3(i) to 3(viii) are irrelevant for the decision of the issues arising in the present petition. According to him the same have been made in order to protract and/or delay the hearing of the petition. The same are unnecessary, irrelevant, frivolous and embarrassing and are put forth for the purpose of confusing or protracting the trial. According to Shri Bhandari the averments contained in the aforesaid paragraphs are liable to be struck off under the provisions of Order VI. Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    3. Shri Bhandari further submitted that the averments contained in paragraphs 3(xix), 4, 5 and 6 are also liable to be struck off on the ground that the first respondent has not filed recrimination as provided under section 97 of the Representation of Peoples Act. The present petition contains a prayer not only for a declaration that the election of the first respondent be declared as null and void but a further declaration that the petitioner has been duly elected. Since the first respondent has failed to file recrimination he is debarred from claiming or leading evidence to prove that the elections of the petitioner would have been void if he had been the returned candidate. The first respondent in paragraphs 3(xix), 4, 5 and 6 of the written statement has pleaded facts which seek to challenge the validity of the petitioner's election on the ground inter alia that he is guilty of corrupt practices. Since section 97 of the Representation of Peoples Act bars the first respondent from leading evidence in this behalf the averments contained in the aforesaid paragraphs are liable to be struck off.

    4. Shri Vashi, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent on the other hand submitted that this is not the stage where the Court should be called upon to decide upon the aforesaid issues. According to him these issues would be relevant during the course of leading of evidence. He further submitted that the facts pleaded in the aforesaid paragraphs in the written statement would be relevant in the matter of appreciation of evidence. According to him, these issues could well be settled at the final hearing of the petition.

    5. It would be convenient at this stage to reproduce the relevant paragraphs contained in the written statement which are the subject matter of the present controversy. They are as follows:—

    “3(i) This Respondent started his career as a social worker at a young age of 25 years. In the year 1968 he contested as a Congress Part candidate for the Municipal Election from Ward No. covered the area of Mogra, Gundivli, Andheri (East), and he got himself elected. In the said election, he was elected with a higher margin because of his interest in the educational activities of the Corporation.

    (ii) This Respondent says that in the year 1973 he again got elected to the Municipal Corporation.

    (iii) In the year 1978 this Respondent again was elected as a Municipal Councillor to the Municipal Corporation.

    (iv) In the year 1973-75 this Respondent was elected as the Chairman of the Education Committee unopposed. Thereafter he was also elected as a leader of the Congress part in the Municipal Corporation as also the leader of the opposition in the Congress party. Apart from the above positions, this Respondent was elected on the statutory committees, namely, the BEST Committee. Improvements Committee, Standing Committee. Special Committee and Works Committee and Medical Health Committee etc.

    (v) This Respondent was also appointed as Chairman of the Minimum Wages Committee for Milk Producers' Labour which was appointed by the Government of Maharashtra.

    (vi) This Respondent says that during his tenure as a Municipal Corporator, he proposed and carried out the works of civic amenities in the slum areas namely. Mogra, Gondivli, Ambadevi and other slums. This Respondent says that at his initiative the Municipal Corporation carried out the work of repairing the roads, drainage. Nallahs, widening of the roads, providing more water for the slum dwellers. Municipal Schools. Best Bus Services and the electricity supply for the slum dwellers and public conveniences.

    (vii) This Respondent says that in the year 1985, he contested the election for the Vidhan Sabha from 41 Andheri East Constituency as a Congress (1) candidate and he got elected by a thumping majority and by a margin of 30000 votes.

    (viii) During his tenure as MLA from, 1985 he discharged his duties and functions to the best of his ability and to the satisfaction of the people. In his constituency there are 70 p.c slum dwellers. In order to improve the living of lot of the slum dwellers, this Respondent utilised the MLA funds from time to time as mentioned below. These funds are meant to be spent on small civic amenities in the areas which are declared as slums by the Government.

    (xix) This Respondent says that the Petitioner himself in his election speech in the meeting held within the MIDC Police Station on 17-2-1990 said to the effect that “for the other communities and religions there are separate laws and for the Hindus there are separate laws. The votes of non-Hindus always go to the Congress Party. The Petitioner further made allegations in the same meeting that similarly the Prime Minister V.P Singh has kept an eye on the elections and adopted Green Colour for the Janta Dal to appease the Muslims. This Respondent says that on the other hand, the Petitioner was so communal that his agents Khatu, Dandekar, Khadekar and others gave the slogans at Shamnagar, Jogeshwari factory for Hindutva. This Respondent craves leave to refer to and rely on the Police Election Diaries, newspaper reports and other materials when produced. This Respondent submits that in fact the Petitioner himself has not come to the Court with clean hands.

    4. This Respondent says that the Petitioner was a candidate of BJP Shiv Sena alliance. During the election campaign the Petitioner resorted to corrupt practices by appealing by himself, his agents and supporters with his consent and knowledge that the alliance claims to protect Hindu Religion and Hindu Culture. A prominent strategy adopted by the Petitioner was that as majority of voters from the Andheri Constituency belong to Hindu religion, the Petitioner projected himself as the sole champion of Hindus and projected that Hindus should cast their votes to him alone. The inaugural campaign meeting for the said assembly election, was held at Girgaum Chowpatty on 29th January 1990. The said meeting was addressed amongst others by headers like Shri Balasaheb Thackrey and Shri Pramod Mahajan. General Secretar of BJP. Various other leaders of the said alliance and 34 candidates, alliance of the said for the said assembly election from Bombay City were present on the dias. In the said meeting. Shri Thackrey said that the alliance will the election on the plank of Hinduism and the Bombay citizens will have no other alternative but to elect the candidates of the said alliance. This Respondent relies upon the newspaper reports, other materials, brochures, leaflets etc. and the police diaries when produced.

    5. This respondent says that during the Assembly election campaign the said Alliance had taken video cassettes for the purpose of campaigning for their candidates. This Respondent submits that the Petitioner had used the said Video Cassettes and had shown them in the various parts of Andheri Constituency. This Respondent relics upon the same when produced. The said Video cassettes were objectionable inasmuch as it offended the various provisions of the representation of peoples act in the sense that it sought to make an appeal in the name of Religion.

    6. This Respondent submits that the Petitioner is one of the prominent union leaders of Bhartiya Kamgar Sena. The Petitioner has got his units working in the prominent hotels like Centaur. Leela Kempinski and Hotel Imperial Palace. The Petitioner, therefore, took extensive advantage from the management of these hotels by getting thousand of food packets on the day of the election.”

    6. A perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs 3(1) to 3(viii) would show that the first respondent in the said paras has dwelt upon his past career as a social worker and a politician. He has dwelt upon the achievements which he has acquired during the period 1968 upto date. The question that falls for consideration is whether the facts pleaded in the said paragraphs are relevant or germ me for the decision of the present election petition.

    7. While deciding the above question, it has to be borne in mind that this Court is merely a tribunal deciding an election dispute. Its powers are wholly the creature of the statute under which it is conferred the power to hear the election petition. An election petition as has been pointed out again and again is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely statutory procedure unknown to the common law and the Court possesses no common law power. (See P. Malai Chami v. Andi Ambalam, (1973) 2 SCC 170 : AIR 1973 SC 2077, Para 9.)

    8. In the present election petition, the petitioner has challenged the election of the first respondent on grounds inter alia that he has indulged in corrupt practices. The issue which arises for determination is whether the petitioner proves that the first respondent is guilty of corrupt practices. In my judgment, the facts which the first defendant has pleaded in paragraphs 3(i) to 3(viii) are not germane for deciding the issues which arise in the petition. The achievements and/or distinctions which the first respondent may have acquired in the past are in my view wholly irrelevant for deciding whether the first respondent has or has not been guilty of corrupt practices.

    9. Under Order VI, Rule 16, the Court is empowered at any stage in the proceedings to order striking out of any pleadings which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit or which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. Election petitions are required to be decided expeditiously and there is no obligation cast upon the Court to dispose of the same, within the period of six months. It is, therefore, desirable or rather it would be necessary to ensure that the parties and especially the returned candidate is not permitted to unduly protract the hearing of the petition. It is, therefore, necessary to ensure that unnecessary or irrelevant pleadings and evidence are not permitted to be resorted to which may tend to unnecessarily protract the trial. I am, therefore, inclined to reject the contention of Shri Vashi that it is not necessary at this preliminary stage to decide the aforesaid two issues but to leave it at the final disposal of the petition. If the said issues are kept open during the recording of the evidence that would open the floodgates for introducing voluminous evidence which would otherwise be irrelevant. I have, therefore, decided to answer the said issues at this stage itself.

    10. In my view, the averments contained in paragraphs 3(i) to 3(viii) of the written statement, to which the plaintiff has taken exception, do not make out any defence to the election petition. In my view, the petitioner is justified in contending that the pleadings contained in the aforesaid paragraphs are unnecessary, irrelevant, frivolous and embarrassing. The obvious purpose is to confuse and protract the trial. Order VI, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables a party to apply to strike out any part of the opponent's pleadings which may be unnecessary or scandalous or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the petition. If it is found that a party by reason of its stating immaterial facts, which could not be material, the said pleadings would be liable to be struck out. Where a pleading cannot offer a defence to an action and which if not struck out would unnecessarily delay the petition, it should be struck out.

    11. In view of the aforesaid observations, I am clearly of the view that the averments contained in paragraphs 3(1) to 3(viii) of the written statement are liable to be struck off.

    12. In paragraphs 3(xix) and paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the written statement, the first respondent has sought to allege facts which impute corrupt practices on the part of the petitioner. By the said facts, the first respondent has sought to contend that the election of the petitioner would be void even if he were to have been the returned candidate. As pointed out earlier, the present petition contains twofold prayers: (1) that the election of the first respondent be declared to be null and void and (2) that the petitioner be declared to be duly elected. It is common ground that the first respondent has not till today filed a recrimination as contemplated under section 97 of the Representation of Peoples Act. It may be convenient to reproduce section 97 which reads as follows:—

    “When in an election petition a declaration that any candidate other than the returned candidate has been duly elected is claimed, the returned candidate or any other party may give evidence to prove that the election of such candidate would have been void if he had been the returned candidate and a petition had been presented calling in question his election.”

    13. The above provision permits a returned candidate, in a case where the petitioner claims a declaration that he is duly elected candidate, to lead evidence to prove that the election of the petitioner is void and hence he is not entitled to the declaration that he be declared as having been duly elected. The said right is subject to the proviso contained in the said section which provides that the said right is subject to his having within 14 days from the date of commencement of the trial given notice of his intention to do so and has also given security and the further security covered under sections 117 and 118 respectively. Sub-section 2 provides for the form and the particulars which are required to be accompanied by the said notice. It is common ground that no such notice has been given. Section 86 which appears in Chapter III, deals with the trial of the Election Petition. Sub-section 4 of section 86 provides as under:—

    “Any candidate not already a respondent shall, upon application made by him to the High Court within fourteen days from the date of commencement of the trial and subject to any order as to security for costs which may be made by the High Court, be entitled to be joined as a respondent.

    Explanation — For the purpose of this sub-section and of section 97, the trial of a petition shall be deemed to commence on the date fixed for the respondents to appear before the High Court and answer the claim or claims made in the petition.”

    14. The above explanation makes it clear that for the purpose of section 97, with which we are presently concerned, the trial of a petition shall be deemed to commence on the date fixed for the respondent to appear before the Court and answer the claim or claims made in the petition. In the present case the returnable date of the petition was first entered to 27th August 1990 and that would be under the aforesaid explanation be the date of the commencement of the trial. The period within which the first respondent could have given notice of recrimination was 14 days from 27th August 1990. The first respondent was served on 31st July 1990. The first respondent on 28th August 1990 applied for four weeks time to file the written statement. He however did not give notice of recrimination within the stipulated period as required under section 97. Even if the commencement of the trial were to be held as on 25th September 1990, which was the further adjourned returnable date, the first respondent did not give the aforesaid notice within a period of 14 days thereafter. In view of the provisions contained in section 97 the first respondent is debarred from giving evidence in respect of the averments contained in paragraphs 3(xix). 4, 5 and 6 of the written statement.

    15. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal reported in 1964 Mah LJ 617 : AIR 1964 SC 1200, as under:—

    “There are, however, cases in which the election petition makes a double claim; it claims that the election of the returned candidate is void, and also asks for a declaration that the petitioner himself or some other person has been duly elected. It is in regard to such a composite case that section 100 as well as section 101 would apply, and it is in respect of the additional claim for a declaration that some other candidate has been duly elected that section 97 comes into play. Section 97(1) thus allows the returned candidate to recriminate and raise pleas in support of his case that the other person in whose favour a declaration is claimed by the petition cannot be said to be validly elected and these would be pleas of attack and it would be open to the returned candidate to take these pleas, because when he recriminates, he really becomes a counter petitioner challenging the validity of the election of the alternative candidate. The result of section 97(1) therefore is that in dealing with a composite election petition, the Tribunal enquires into not only the case made out by the petitioner, but also the counter-claim made by the returned candidate. That being the nature of the proceedings contemplated by section 97(1), it is not surprising that the returned candidate is required to make his recrimination and serve notice in that behalf in the manner and within the time specified by section 97(1) proviso and section 97(2). If the returned candidate does not recriminate as required by section 97, then he cannot make any attack against the alternative claim made by the petition. In such a case an enquiry would be held under section 100 so far as the validity of the returned candidate's election is concerned, and if as a result of the said enquiry declaration is made that the election of the returned candidate is void, then the Tribunal will proceed to deal with the alternative claim, but in doing so, the returned candidate will proceed to deal with the alternative claim, but in doing so, the returned candidate will not be allowed to lead any evidence because he is precluded from raising any pleas against the validity of the claim of the alternative candidate.

    It is true that section 101(a) requires the Tribunal to find that the petitioner or such other candidate for the declaration of whose election a prayer is made in the election has in fact received a majority of the valid votes. It cannot be said that the Tribunal cannot make a finding that the alternative candidate has in fact received a majority of the valid votes unless all the votes cast at the election are scrutinised and counted. As result of Rule 57, the Election Tribunal will have to assume that every ballot paper which had not been rejected under Rule 56 constituted one valid vote and it is on that basis that the finding will have to be made under section 101(a). Section 97(1) undoubtedly gives an opportunity to the returned candidate to dispute the validity of any of the votes cast in favour of the alternative candidate or to plead for the validity of any vote cast in his favour which has been rejected; but if by his failure to make recrimination within time as required by section 97, the returned candidate is precluded from raising any such plea at the hearing of the election petition, there would be nothing wrong if the Tribunal proceeds to deal with the dispute under section 101(1) on the basis that the other votes-counted by the returning officer were valid votes and that votes in favour of the returned candidate if any, which were rejected, were invalid.

    If the returned candidate has recriminated and has raised pleas in regard to the votes cast in favour of the alternative candidate or his votes wrongly rejected, then those pleas may have to be tried after a declaration has been made under section 100 and the matter proceeds to be tried under section 101(a). In other words, the first part of the enquiry in regard to the validity of the election of the returned candidate must be tried within the narrow limits prescribed by section 100(1)(d)(iii) and the latter part of the enquiry which is governed by section 101(a) will have to be tried on a broader basis permitting the returned candidate to lead evidence in support of the pleas which he may have taken by way of recrimination under section 97(1).”

    16. The above case was approved and followed by the Supreme Court in the case of P. Malai Chami v. M. Andi Ambalam reported in (1973) 2 SCC 170 : AIR 1973 SC 2077 (supra) as already noted above wherein it was observed as follows:—

    “Courts in general are averse to allow justice to be defeated on a mere technicality. But in deciding an election petition the High Court is merely a tribunal deciding an election dispute. Its powers are wholly the creature of the statute under which it is conferred the power to hear election petitions. An election petition, as has been pointed out again and again, is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and the Court possesses no common law power.”

    17. Since the first respondent has not filed a recrimination within the stipulated period of 14 days from the commencement of the trial, he is now debarred from leading evidence in support of his plea that the petitioner is guilty of corrupt practices. The period of 14 days provided under section 97 is a statutory period of limitation and the same cannot be extended by the application of the Limitation Act. It has been held in the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 133 : AIR 1974 SC 480, as under:—

    “Even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisionis of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of the provisions of the special law or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. What the Court has to see is whether the scheme of the special law and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the limitation act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Special Act. The provisions of section 3 of the Limitation Act that a suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed are provided for in section 86 of the Representation of the Peoples Act which gives a peremptory command that the High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of section 81, 82 or 117. If for non-compliance with the provisions of sections 82 and 117 which are mandatory, the election petition has to be dismissed under section 86(1) the presentation of election petition within the period prescribed in section 81 would be equally mandatory, the non-compliance with which visits the penalty of the petition being dismissed. Though Parliament has made certain amendments in section 8 of the Act in 1989, it has not considered it necessary till now to amend the Act to confer, on persons challenging an election, benefits similar to those available to them under the proviso to the repealed section 85 of the Act, for it did not want delays to occur in the disposal of election petitions as in the past. Hence the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act do not govern the filing of election petitions or their trial.”

    18. In my judgment, the aforesaid ratio will apply on all fours to the filing of recrimination under section 97. Since the first respondent has failed to give notice of recrimination within the prescribed period of 14 days as provided in the proviso to section 97, the first respondent is barred from giving evidence in respect of the averments contained in paragraph 3(xix) and paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the written statement for contending that the petitioner is not entitled to a declaration that he is duly returned candidate on the ground that he himself has indulged in corrupt practices. In view of the above, the averments contained in paragraphs 3(xix), 4, 5 and 6 of the written statement are liable to be struck off.

    19. In view of the above discussion, I answer the above issues Nos. 1 and 2 in the affirmative and direct that the averments contained in paragraphs 3(1) to 3(viii) and paragraphs 3(xix) and paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the written statement be struck off. The first respondent is directed to carry out the necessary amendments to the written statement by deleting the aforesaid paragraphs in the written statement within a period of two weeks and serve a copy thereto upon the petitioner within a period of one week thereafter. On the application of Shri Mulani the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the first respondent, my order is stayed for a period of two weeks from today. The petition will appear on my board on 5th November 1990 for recording of evidence.

    Order accordingly.
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    Ramesh Shankar More v. Ramesh Mataprasad Dube And Others
    (Oct 11, 1990)