1. After finding that the delay was not properly explained by the complainant, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate has proceeded to condone the delay by the impugned orders on the basis of the decision of this Court in State Of Maharashtra… v. P.D Pujari…. . 1979 Cri. LJ 1152., after observing that in view of the observations in the judgment of this case, the provisions contained in sections 468 and 469 of the Criminal Procedure Code “will have to be liberally construed”. Relying upon a passage from the judgment in the case of State Of Maharashtra… v. P.D Pujari…., the learned Metropolitan Magistrate further observed that the delay was liable to be condoned in the interest of justice and for the reason that no injustice would be caused to the accused. It appears to me that the liberal construction of provisions does not mean that the right vested in a party can be ignored. P.D Pujari's case (supra) was mainly concerned with the provisions of section 469 of the Criminal Procedure Code providing for commencement of the period of limitation on the date of an offence or on the date of knowledge of commission of an offence when the commission of the offence is not known or on the date of the knowledge of identity of the offender when the identity of the offender is not known earlier. In the present case, the question of applicability of the latter 2 parts of section 469 does not arise and what is material is only the date of offence. It is, therefore, clear that the said decision is in no way applicable to the facts of the present case. I have already observed that even adverting to the general observations made by Pratap J. in para II of the said judgment relating to fair and reasonable construction of the provisions of section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is not possible to construe these provisions in such a way as to deprive an accused person of a right which has accused in his favour under section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code and which can be denied to him only on an order for extension of period of limitation passed by the Court concerned acting judicially under section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code, not when an objection is taken but at the time of the issuance of the process itself. The High Courts of Allahabad, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have taken a similar view see Prakash Chandra v. Kaushal Kishore . 1980 Cri. LJ 578 Allahabad., Krishna v. State of M.P . 1977 Cri. LJ 90. and Madhya Pradesh and Bharat Hybrid Seeds and Agro Enterprises v. State . 1978 Cri. LJ 61 AP.. The consistent view is that the delay could not be condoned under the provisions of section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code as a matter of course and after the cognizance of the offence is taken. The act of taking cognizance of the offence itself becomes an Act without jurisdiction unless the Court concerned examines the question of limitation under section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code either upon a request by the party or on its own accord and, as far as possible, after hearing the opposite party, and decides judicially to grant extension of limitation in that particular case.
2. [Rest of the Judgment not material for the Report.]
Orders quashed and complaints dismissed as barred by limitation.