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citation codes
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  • Ss. 179 and 189 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act.
  • S. 179 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Ss. 179 and 189 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act.
  • S. 179 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two applicants (accused Nos. 1 and 2) in Criminal Case No. 12275/1976 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Second Court, Amravati, applied under ss. 397 read with 401 and s. 482 Cr. P.C. to quash the proceedings in that criminal case.

The non-applicant (the complainant) filed the underlying criminal complaint alleging offences under sections 380, 425 and 441 and section 109 IPC. The factual allegations in the complaint were:

  • The complainant ran a hotel in a tinshed at Municipal House No. 231/8, Amravati.
  • Accused No. 1 was the Chief Officer of the Amravati Municipal Council and accused No. 2 was a sub-overseer.
  • Accused No. 1 had earlier prosecuted the complainant in Criminal Case No. 519/1972 for constructing the hotel without municipal permission; the complainant was fined in that case.
  • Accused No. 1 issued notices dated Feb. 3, 1976 and March 17, 1976 requiring demolition: the first notice cited lack of municipal permission, the second called the construction an encroachment; the notice was not complied with.
  • Accused No. 1 ordered demolition on April 30, 1976; accused No. 2 carried out demolition on May 10, 1976 with labourers and removed the demolished material to municipal premises. The complainant alleged loss of Rs. 8,000/-. The complaint alleged these acts constituted theft, mischief and criminal misappropriation.

The Magistrate on Nov. 30, 1976 registered the case under ss. 109, 425 and 380 IPC and issued summons to the accused — an order taking cognizance which is challenged in the present application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under section 482 Cr. P.C. can be invoked to quash summons/order of the Magistrate when revision is not available under section 397(2) Cr. P.C. (i.e., whether s. 397/399 can preclude invocation of s. 482).
  2. Whether, on the facts alleged in the complaint (taken at their highest), the acts of accused Nos. 1 and 2 constitute offences under sections 380 (theft) and 425 (mischief) IPC or otherwise disclose a prima facie offence such that criminal proceedings should be allowed to continue.
  3. Whether the complaint discloses an abuse of the process of court warranting exercise of inherent jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Accused (Applicants) — Mr. Deshpande

  • Asserted entitlement to invoke section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash the proceedings to prevent abuse of process and secure ends of justice.
  • Initially contended accused No. 1 was a State Government servant and thus prosecution required compliance with section 197 Cr. P.C., but conceded that absorption into that cadre occurred after the incident and did not press that point further.
  • Main contention: the case falls under category (ii) in R.P. Kapur (AIR 1960 SC 866) — i.e., even if allegations in the complaint are taken at their highest, they do not constitute any offence; therefore inherent jurisdiction should be exercised to quash.

Complainant — Mr. Ghare

  • Contended the impugned order of the Magistrate was interlocutory as contemplated by section 397(2) Cr. P.C., and therefore a revision is not tenable; argued the accused could not seek revision against that order.
  • Argued that questions of whether offences were committed required evidence and should be decided by the Magistrate after trial rather than at the interlocutory stage.
  • Asserted that powers under section 482 could not be invoked to circumvent statutory bars on revision (relying on Delhi and Andhra Pradesh High Court decisions).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sant Lal v. Krishan Lal, 1976 Cri LJ 215 (Delhi) Held that where no revision is maintainable against an order (e.g., under s. 204 Cr. P.C.), an aggrieved party cannot circumvent that bar by invoking s. 482 Cr. P.C. The court noted this view but did not adopt it; it contrasted this decision with other authorities and ultimately preferred a different approach.
Budaraju Seshagiri Rao v. T.V. Sarma, 1976 Cri LJ 902 (Andhra Pradesh) Similar view as Sant Lal: s. 482 cannot be used to bypass statutory bars on revision. The court referred to this decision but did not follow it, opting instead for the reasoning in the Allahabad decision discussed below.
Sarjoo v. Babadin, 1975 Cri LJ 1562 (All.) Held that ss. 397 and 399 only bar revisional jurisdiction in certain circumstances but do not oust the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under s. 482; the inherent jurisdiction is distinct from revisional jurisdiction. The court found this view "more acceptable" and held that s. 482 Cr. P.C. is not controlled by s. 397; consequently, complainant could not successfully argue that accused had no right to invoke inherent jurisdiction.
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 (1960 Cri LJ 1239) Sets out the circumstances in which the High Court's inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings may be exercised (e.g., to prevent abuse of process or secure ends of justice); provides illustrative categories including where the allegations, even if true, do not constitute an offence. The court relied on this Supreme Court authority as the guiding test and used its categories (particularly category (ii) — allegations do not disclose an offence even if accepted) to assess whether the complaint should be quashed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two linked strands of analysis: first, jurisdictional — whether section 482 Cr. P.C. could be invoked in the face of statutory provisions limiting revision — and second, the substantive question whether the complaint, on its face, disclosed offences.

Jurisdictional analysis:

  • The court acknowledged the complainant's submission that the Magistrate's order was interlocutory under s. 397(2) Cr. P.C. and that revision might not be maintainable. It accepted that revision is not available against that order but considered whether s. 482 could still be invoked.
  • The bench reviewed conflicting authorities. It noted decisions from the Delhi and Andhra Pradesh High Courts which held that s. 482 cannot be used to circumvent statutory bars on revision. It then considered the Allahabad High Court decision in Sarjoo v. Babadin which held that ss. 397 and 399 restrict revisional jurisdiction but do not oust the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under s. 482.
  • The court found the reasoning in Sarjoo more acceptable and concluded that the inherent powers under s. 482 Cr. P.C. are not controlled by the provisions of s. 397; consequently, the accused were entitled to invoke s. 482 and it was not open to the complainant to assert that the accused had no right to seek relief under s. 482.
  • The court then turned to the guidance in R.P. Kapur (Supreme Court) on the circumstances in which inherent jurisdiction should be exercised, noting the Court's reluctance to quash criminal proceedings at interlocutory stages except in proper cases and listing illustrative categories (including the category where allegations, if accepted, still do not constitute an offence).

Substantive analysis of the complaint:

  • The court examined the factual allegations in the complaint and material admissions by the complainant: prior prosecution and fine in Criminal Case No. 519/1972 for constructing without municipal permission; issuance of demolition notices under municipal law; demolition carried out by the sub-overseer and removal of material to municipal premises.
  • The court applied relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act disclosed in the complaint (ss. 179 and 189): s. 179 penalizes encroachment/obstruction and empowers the Chief Officer to remove an obstruction or encroachment without notice; s. 189 requires permission for construction and empowers the Chief Officer to require demolition and to cause demolition if notice is not complied with.
  • On the ingredients of theft (s. 380 IPC) the court noted that theft requires dishonest intention to take moveable property causing wrongful gain or wrongful loss per s. 24 IPC. The complaint did not allege that the material was removed with any dishonest intent; counsel for accused stated materials were shifted to municipal premises for safe custody to enable the complainant to get them. Thus, a vital ingredient of theft (dishonesty leading to wrongful gain/loss) was absent from the complaint.
  • On mischief (s. 425 IPC), the court observed mischief requires intention or knowledge likely to cause wrongful loss or damage (with “wrongful” defined by s. 23 IPC). The complaint failed to allege that the accused had requisite intention or knowledge of causing wrongful loss or damage. Rather, factual allegations indicated lawful action under ss. 179 and 189.
  • Regarding accused No. 2 (the subordinate who executed the demolition), the complaint itself suggested he acted pursuant to orders of the Chief Officer. The court explained that the Chief Officer is empowered to effect removal and that he must direct subordinate staff to carry out lawful acts; accused No. 2's actions, therefore, did not disclose criminality. The court also cited s. 76 IPC (acts done in good faith by one who believes himself bound by law to do it) to emphasize that accused No. 2's conduct fell within lawful execution of orders rather than a culpable offence.
  • On balance, the court concluded that the complaint did not disclose a prima facie case of offences under ss. 380 or 425 IPC against either accused even if all allegations were assumed to be true.

Having reached the view that the complaint failed to disclose essential ingredients of the alleged offences and that continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of process, the court concluded it was appropriate to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed the application and exercised its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash and terminate the criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No. 12275 of 1976.

Final Disposition: Application allowed; the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 12275 of 1976 are quashed and terminated.

Implications

  • Direct effect: The criminal proceedings against accused Nos. 1 and 2 in Criminal Case No. 12275/1976 were quashed and stand terminated by this order.
  • On jurisdictional principle: The court accepted the view (as reflected in the Allahabad decision it cited) that the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under s. 482 Cr. P.C. is not displaced by the procedural bars in ss. 397 and 399 Cr. P.C., and it applied the Supreme Court's guidance in R.P. Kapur to determine whether to exercise that jurisdiction.
  • No new legal doctrine was invented in the opinion; the court applied existing authorities (notably R.P. Kapur and Sarjoo v. Babadin) to the facts and concluded that the complaint, even if taken at face value, did not disclose offences and that continuation would be an abuse of process.

This summary is confined strictly to the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not introduce information beyond that text.

    Shriram v. Thakurdas

    1. The applicants in this Criminal Application, (hereinafter referred to as accused Nos. 1 and 2) in Criminal Case No. 12275/1976.V.O. on the file of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Second Court, Amravati, have filed this application under S. 397 read with S. 401 as also under S. 482 of the Cr. P.C praying that the proceedings in the above-mentioned criminal case be quashed.

    2. Non-applicant No. 1 in this application (hereinafter referred to as the ‘complainant’), has filed the criminal case in question against the two accused alleging that offences under Ss. 380, 425 and 441 as also under S. 109 of the I.P.C have been committed. The allegations in the complaint are that the complainant was running a hotel in a tinshed in Municipal House No. 231/8 at Amravati Accused No. 1 is the Chief Officer of the Amravati Municipal Council, while accused No. 2 is the sub-overseer working in the Municipal Council the complainant further alleges that accused No. 1 prosecuted the complainant in Criminal Case No. 519/1972 for constructing the said hotel without municipal permission. The complainant admitted that he was fined in that case. Thereafter accused No. 1 issued two notices on Feb. 3, 1976 and March 17, 1976, asking the complainant to demolish the building. In the first notice it was stated that the demolition was necessary as the construction was without municipal permission, while in the latter notice it is stated that the construction was an encroachment. The notice was not complied with Accused No. 1, therefore, ordered the demolition of the structure on April 30, 1976. This order was carried out by the accused No. 2 on May 10, 1976 with the help of labourers. The material of the demolished structure had been removed to the Municipal Council premises. The complainant alleges that he has suffered a loss to the extent of Rs. 8,000/-. After making these averments, he has alleged in para 2 of the complaint as follows:

    “Thus, accused No. 1 illegally ordered on 30-4-76 the accused No. 2 contravention of the provisions of Municipal Act, to commit theft, mischief and criminal misappropriation and accused No. 2 accordingly committed these offences.”

    3. This complaint was placed before the Magistrate, who passed an order on Nov. 30, 1976, that the case be registered under Ss. 109, 425 and 380 of the I.P.C end that the summons be issued to the accused. Thus, the Magistrate took cognizance on the basis of this complaint and it is this order that is being challenged in the present application. Mr. Ghare for the complainant contended that the impugned order is only an interlocutory order as contemplated by S. 397(2) of the Cr. P.C and, as such, a revision is not tenable. There seems to be much substance in this contention and I do not think that the accused can come in revision against that order.

    4. Mr. Deshpande, however, urged that the accused have filed the present application also under S. 482 Cr. P.C praying that the inherent powers of this Court should be exercised for preventing the abuse of the process and also for securing the ends of justice. Mr. Ghare replied that the powers under S. 482 Cr. P.C cannot be invoked when there Is a specific provision which prevents a party from filing a revision application against the impugned order. He relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in Sant Lal v. Krishan Lal, (1976 Cri LJ 215 (Delhi)), wherein it is laid down that as no revision is maintainable against the order under S. 204, Cr. P.C, an aggrieved party cannot try to circumvent the procedure by applying to the Court under S. 482, Cr. P.C Similar view has been taken by the Andhra Pradesh in Budaraju Seshagiri Rao v. T.V Sarma (1976 Cri LJ 902 (Andh Pra)). There is, however, the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sarjoo v. Babadin (1975 Cri LJ 1562 (All)). The relevant Head note is as follows) (at p. 1565):

    “Sections 397 and 399 only bar the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, if that jurisdiction has already been invoked by a party before a Sessions Judge but it does not and cannot bar any other jurisdiction of the High Court which is inherent and not revisional. These are two different jurisdictions and it cannot be said that the inherent jurisdiction is the same as the appellate or the revisional. The use of the words “no further application” occurring in S. 397(3) has the effect of restricting the revisional power because the words “no further application” can have reference only to an application in revision. Similarly, what is barred by S. 399(3) “further proceeding by way of revision” and not an independent proceeding under S. 482. In short, the power under S. 482 stands intact and unaffected by sub-sec. (3) of Ss. 397 and 399.”

    5. I think that the inherent powers as mentioned in S. 482 of the Cr. P.C cannot be controlled by the provisions of S. 397 and thus the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in 1975 Cri LJ 1562 appears to be more acceptable than the views of the Delhi and Andhra Pradesh High Courts. It will not, therefore, be open for the complainant to urge that the accused have no right to invoke the exercise of the powers under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.

    6. Of course, the accused will have to make out a case that the inherent powers ci this Court should be exercised in their favour. The question as to the circumstances in which such powers are usually exercised is considered by the Supreme Court in R.P Kapur v. State Of Punjab. (AIR 1960 SC 866) : (1960 Cri LJ 1239). The relevant head note is in following words (at p. 1241 of Cri LJ):

    “……The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction.”

    7. Some of the categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings can and should be exercised are:

    (i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the offence alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category.

    (ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in the entirety, do mot constitute the offence allege; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not.

    (iii) …… …… …… ……

    8. Mr. Deshpande for the accused initially wanted to submit that accused No. 1 being a Chief Officer under the new Maharashtra Municipalities Act, is a State Government servant and as such no prosecution against Mm can be lodged without following the procedure laid down in S. 197 of the Cr. P.C it is time that to-day accused No. 1 is a State Government servant hut his absorption in that cadre has taken place after the date of the incident in question. In view of this position, Mr. Deshpande did not pursue this submission based on the provisions of S. 197, Cr. P.C

    9. The main contention of Mr. Deshpande, however, is that the present case would fall under category No. 2 as mentioned in AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1960 Cri LJ 1239). According to him, the allegations in the complaint filed by the complainant even if accepted to be true, would not constitute any offence. Shri Ghare for the complainant urged that the question as to whether the accused have committed offences or not will have to be gone into by the Magistrate after recording the evidence and that it would be premature to decide upon that aspect without there being any evidence on record. I do not think that the procedure suggested by Mr. Ghare requires to be adopted particularly when the contention is that the allegations in the complaint even if assumed to be true, do not constitute any offence.

    10. I have already given the gist of the allegations made in the complaint. The complainant admits that in Criminal Case No. 519 of 1972 he was prosecuted for constructing hotel shed without the municipal permission and was also fined. Thus, here is a case of the construction either on municipal property or on one's own property but without securing municipal permission in that respect. S. 179 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, lays down that no person shall make any encroachment or obstruction as contemplated by that section and that such action is made penal under sub-sec. (2). Sub-sec. (3) provides that the Chief Officer shall have power to remove, without notice, an obstruction or encroachment. S. 189 has made a provision that nobody is entitled to make any construction without securing permission from the Chief Officer. For that purpose he has to make an application in writing giving all the necessary details of the intended construction. Sub-sec. (8) says that if any person makes a construction without such permission, the Chief Officer can ask that person to demolish the construction by giving a notice. The Chief Officer is also empowered to cause such construction to be demolished if the concerned person does not comply with the notice. It is needless to say that a non-compliance of the municipal notice is made punishable under sub-sec. (9), These provisions have to be borne in mind while appreciating the allegations made in the complaint. The complainant has admitted his conviction and sentence, He has also admitted that the Chief Officer has issued notices to him for demolition of the construction and that thereafter the Chief Officer through his subordinate, viz., the sub-overseer (accused No. 2) demolished the construction and has removed the construction material to the municipal premises.

    11. The contention of the complainant is that both the accused have committed offences under Ss. 380 and 425 of the I.P.C For constituting an offence of theft, there must be an intention to take dishonestly some moveable property from the possession of another. S. 24 of the I.P.C defines the term ‘dishonestly’ to mean that there must be a wrongful gain to one person or a wrongful loss to another. The complaint has nowhere alleged that the removal of the building material (after demolition work was over) has been done by accused Nos. 1 and 2 with a view to cause any wrongful gain or wrongful loss to the complainant, In fact Mr. Deshpande for the accused frankly stated during the course of arguments that these materials have been shifted to the municipal premises for safe custody so as to enable the complainant to get them. It is thus clear that the complainant has not alleged facts which constitute an important ingredient of dishonest removal. The same is the position if the ingredients of the offence of ‘mischief are taken into account. The gravamen of that offence is that there must be an intention to cause or there must be a knowledge that the accused person is likely to cause a wrongful loss or damage to another, on account of any destruction. The word ‘wrongful’ loss’ is defined under S. 23 of the I.P.C and according to that definition, loss would be wrongful if it is done by wrongful means. In the present case, the complainant has not even alleged that the accused had the requisite intention or knowledge or causing wrongful loss or damages. On the contrary, the allegations in the complaint themselves show that the accused No. 1 has acted not wrongfully but legally and in accordance with the powers vested in him under Ss. 179 and 189 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act. There is thus no scope for the complainant to urge that the demolition of the building in pursuance of these powers would be a mischief.

    12. As far as accused No. 2 is concerned, the complainant has alleged that he has acted as per the orders of the Chief Officer. Ss. 179 and 189 empower the Chief Officer to get the encroachment or the construction (without permission) removed. For obvious reasons the Chief Officer is not expected to do all these things personally but he has to direct his subordinate staff members to get the lawful things done. As a matter of fact, the complaint does give an indication that accused No. 2 acted in pursuance of the orders issued by the Chief Officer, accused No. 1. Thus, there is no allegation to suggest that the action of accused No. 2 would constitute any offence under Ss. 380 or 425 of the I.P.C Shri Deshpande drew my attention to the provisions of S. 76 of the I.P.C That section lays down that nothing is an offence which is done by a person, in good faith believes himself to be bound by law to do it. In the present case the matter is not within the limited scope of belief and good faith inasmuch as accused No. 2 is bound by the lawful orders of accused No. 1.

    13. In view of the above discussion, It Is clear that the complaint has not made out any prima facie case of any offence at the hands of accused Nos. 1 and 2. All the allegations, even if accepted to be true, would not make the action of accused Nos. 1 and 2 as penal or as an offence. There is much substance in the contention of Mr. Deshpande that the present proceeding is not bona fide and it appears to be mischievous and frivolous particularly when both the accused have acted lawfully in exercise of their powers and duties. The necessary result is that the continuation of such a complaint would tantamount to abuse of process of law and it would be in the fitness of things to put am end to that abuse. The result is that the application is allowed. The proceedings in Criminal Case No. 12275 of 1976 are gnashed and the said criminal case shall standi terminated on account of this quashing.

    14. Application allowed.

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    Shriram v. Thakurdas
    (Apr 21, 1977)