Naik, J.:— [His Lordship, after deciding the question whether the suit stall could be held to be premises within the meaning of s. 5(8) of the Act, proceeded.] However, if I have erred in my view that the stall in question is not premises within the meaning of s. 5(8) of the Act, it would be necessary to consider the rival contentions which are made before me. Mr. Abhyankar argues that as this is a suit between a landlord and a tenant ‘relating to the recovery of possession of the suit premises’, as that term is interpreted in the Full Bench decision in Dattatraya Krishna Jangam v. Jairam Ganesh Gore* . 1964 66 Bom. L.R 645, F.B and in the Division Bench decision in Bombay Grain Dealers v. Lakhmichand . 1968 71 Bom. L.R 179., the City Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. As against that, Mr. Lalit, learned advocate for the plaintiffs-respondents, argues, that as this is a suit for an injunction and the plaintiffs have nowhere stated that they have filed the suit in their capacity as tenants nor asked for any protection under the Rent Act, s. 28 of the Act has no application to the facts of the case. He also argues that it is perfectly open to him to file a suit for injunction inasmuch as the observations in the case of The Bombay Grain Dealers Association are obiter. In support of his contention Mr. Lalit has relied upon the decision of Chandrachud, J., as his Lordship then was, in Bishan v. Maharashtra W. & G. Co. . 1966 69 Bom. L.R 229.
2. Now, if we read the plaint it is manifestly clear that the plaintiffs have filed the suit in their capacity as the sub-tenants of the defendants. In terms plaintiffs have stated that they are the sub-tenants of the premises for the last eighteen years by paying Rs. 30 per month as and by way of rent and that they are in exclusive use, possession and enjoyment of the said premises. It is, therefore, clear that the plaintiffs have in fact filed the suit against the defendants in their capacity as a tenant and a landlord. There is no doubt that as the premises are situate in Bombay the provisions of Part II of the Act apply to the same. The only question is as to whether it is a suit or proceeding relating to the recovery of possession of the said premises. No doubt at first blush it would appear that since this is a suit for permanent injunction it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that this is a suit relating to the recovery of possession. But then the question to be considered is as to what is meant by a suit relating to recovery of possession which expression occurs in s. 28 of the Act. If the Legislature intended to cover only a suit for recovery of possession, then, nothing would have prevented the Legislature from stating so in clear terms. Since the Legislature has advisedly used the words ‘suit relating to the recovery of possession’, it would evidently mean something more than the mere expression, ‘suit for recovery of possession’. These words have been interpreted by the Full Bench in Dattatraya's case as under (p. 671):
‘The words used are ‘relating to recovery of rent or possession’ and not ‘for recovery of rent or possession’. The words ‘relating to’ are very wide and would include any suit or proceeding in connection with or having a direct bearing on the question of possession of the premises. Even if, therefore, the suit is not for possession, if the relief claimed in the suit is in regard to or in respect of recovery of possession, it will come within the ambit of this section. Thus a suit, in which the plaintiff seeks to get rid of an order of his eviction by an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession, will also be covered by this section.
Section 28 confers jurisdiction upon the special Court not only to decide questions referred to in the section, but also all matters which are incidental or ancillary to the determination of these questions,…’
3. It was on that reasoning that the Full Bench decision gave negative replies to the following two questions which were formulated for its consideration (p. 668):
“(1) Whether the City Civil Court, Bombay, has jurisdiction to entertain a suit for a declaration that a sub-tenancy was created in favour of the plaintiff by the defendant tenant after the coming into force of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, and for an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession as a sub-tenant; and
(2) Whether the City Civil Court, Bombay, has jurisdiction to entertain a suit for a declaration that the plaintiff is a tenant or sub-tenant of the defendant and for an injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding with or from obtaining an order for eviction of the plaintiff in the application made by the defendant under S. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, or from executing the order for eviction obtained by him in such application?’
4. Again, in the case of Bombay Grain Dealers Association, at p. 195, after posing the question, when it is said that in order that the suit must fall within the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court, it must relate under the first part of the section to recovery of possession, which are those suits? the Division Bench has observed as under:
‘…If a person is seeking to prevent the obtaining of possession by the landlord, it could be said that it relates both to possession of the premises and it also relates to recovery of possession of the same. In each of these cases what the landlord is doing or attempting to do is to recover possession from the tenant. It may be that in one case the landlord may be attempting to recover possession by obtaining an order of a Court which is not final; in another case it may be that he is trying to recover possession in an illegal manner by force. Nonetheless what the landlord is attempting is to recover possession. If the plaintiff comes to Court and says ‘This is what the landlord is doing. You prevent him from doing so’, certainly the suit is one which relates to the recovery of possession’.
5. Again at p. 197, it is observed:
‘…Whether the landlord is trying to recover possession by an order of a Court which is not conclusive or illegally by force cannot affect the question. The suit is one which relates to recovery of possession by the landlord.’
6. Further on referring to the Full Bench ruling in Daitatraya's case, it is observed:
‘…We may again refer to the Full Bench decision which has said that once a suit or a proceeding falls within the jurisdiction of a Court, the Court is entitled to make such consequential orders as are necessary for the effective enforcement of the rights, declared or given by it. It was on this principle that the Full Bench held that even though under the Rent Restriction Act the relief to an injunction is not referred to anywhere, the Court would have jurisdiction to grant injunction in proper cases where the suit fell within its jurisdiction, and at least in the appeals before it injunctions were asked for. Evidently, therefore, the mere fact that the suit is for injunction will not take the case out of the jurisdiction of the special Court if the other conditions of the exercise of jurisdiction are satisfied.’
7. It would, therefore, appear that both according to the Full Bench ruling in Dattatraya's case and according to the Division Bench ruling in the case of Bombay Grain Dealers Association the expression ‘suit relating to recovery of possession’ would include a suit for an injunction, which may be necessitated because of the act of the landlord in trying to recover possession of the premises from the tenant by force. It would, therefore, appear that the City Civil Court in the instant case had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as there are specific allegations in the plaint that the defendants under the guise of renovation of their shop premises have been unlawfully trying to dispossess the plaintiffs and deprive them of their right to use and occupy the premises, as appears from the allegations in paras 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the same. The suit, therefore, is of the type of suits referred to at p. 195 in Bombay Grain Dealers Association's case, and, therefore, the suit shall have to be filed in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay and not in the City Civil Court. It was, however, argued by Mr. Lalit, learned advocate for the plaintiffs-respondents, that the Full Bench decision in Dattatraya's case was concerned only with the two specific points for consideration which involved cases where a declaration of sub-tenancy coupled with the consequential relief of injunction was asked for. He also argues that the observations in the Bombay Grain Dealers Association's case are obiter.
8. With regard to the Full Bench decision I am not impressed with the argument of Mr. Lalit. It is only because the Full Bench took the view that the words ‘relating to recovery of possession’ are very wide and would include any suit or proceeding in connection with or having a direct bearing on the question of possession of the premises, and that even if the suit is not for possession, if the relief claimed in the suit is in regard to or in respect of recovery of possession, that it took the view that such a suit would come within the ambit of s. 28. It is because of that view that the Full Bench held that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit to get a declaration of sub-tenancy and injunction. It is true that in the case of Bombay Grain Dealers Association after a plain reading of the plaint, the Division Bench took the view that although it was couched in the form of a suit for injunction, it was in fact a suit for possession, and, therefore, the case fell within the provisions of s. 28. It is because of that Mr. Lalit argues that the observations in that case at p. 195 of the report, which have been referred to in the earlier paragraphs, are obiter.
9. But then it is important to bear in mind that the matter came before the Division Bench in a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of a learned single Judge. The learned single Judge had taken the view that there is absolutely no provision in the Rent Act so as to enable the special Court to entertain a suit for an injunction. The learned Judge had also tried to distinguish the decision of the Full Bench in Dattatrwya's case. He had also taken the view that the question as to whether the special Court could take cognizance of a suit for injunction had not all arisen in the Full Bench case. He had further observed that a question as to whether a special Court could take cognizance of a suit for an injunction had really arisen in the case reported in Bishan v. Maharashtra W. & G. Co., decided by Chandrachud, J., as his Lordship then was, and that it was held in the said case that a suit for an injunction between the landlord and the tenant in regard to the premises or any part thereof is not a suit for recovery of possession and, therefore, the provisions of s. 28 of the Act are not attracted and the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court cannot be said to have been barred. It is in this view of the matter that the learned single Judge had held that the City Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit in question and set aside the order of the trial Court.
10. It was against that judgment that a Letters Patent Appeal being preferred, the Division Bench considered the question of jurisdiction and about the interpretation of s. 28 of the Act at great length and it also took a review of the decisions in the Full Bench case of Dattatraya v. Jairam Ganesh and the decision of Chandrachud, J., also, in addition to other decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court. It is only after a detailed consideration of these decisions about the interpretation of s. 28 of the Act, that the Division Bench made observations at p. 195 of the report which are referred to earlier. That being the position I feel I am bound by that considered view of the Division Bench, particularly because the allegations in the instant plaint are identical with the hypothetical case of threatened dispossession by the landlord which is considered by the Division Bench for illustrating its point of view.
11. Mr. Lalit drew my attention to the decision in Shiavax Cambata v. Sunderdas Ebji . 1950 52 Bom. L.R 381.. That was a suit by a tenant to recover possession of demised premises from the landlord, brought under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. It was held that such a suit does not fall within the purview of ss. 28 and 50 of the Act. It was observed by Chagla, C.J, at p. 385, as under:
‘…it is clear that the only issue that would arise in this suit and which would have to be determined by the Court would be whether the plaintiff was in possession of the premises in suit within six months from the filing of the suit, and if he was in possession whether he was dispossessed by the defendants. If that issue is answered in favour of the plaintiff, a decree must go in his favour. If the issue is answered against him, the suit must be dismissed.’
12. Further it is observed (p. 385):
‘…Although the plaintiff might have set out his title in the plaint, those averments were entirely unnecessary and irrelevant. It is clear that the defendants could not have raised an issue as to the plaintiffs title in the suit. He could not have contested the position that the plaintiff was not entitled to possession because he was not a tenant. He could only have contested the plaintiff's claim on the one simple and short ground, viz. that the plaintiff was not in possession within six months of the filing of the suit.’
13. It is also observed (p. 385):
‘…In our opinion, it is only when a landlord or a tenant files a suit for possession as a landlord or a tenant and in his capacity as a landlord or a tenant and relying on his title as a landlord or a tenant that it becomes a suit of the description mentioned in s. 50 and s. 28 of the Act.’
14. It would, therefore, appear that the observations in that case are of no assistance to the plaintiffs inasmuch as that was a case under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act.
15. Mr. Lalit has also invited my attention to the case of Bishan v. Maharashtra W. & G. Co. In that case, decided by Chandrachud, J., as his Lordship then was, the plaintiffs had filed a suit for an injunction restraining the landlords from formation of queues in the passage abutting on the plaintiffs' shop premises so as to interfere with their right of peaceful enjoyment of their shop premises. His Lordship held that as the main relief sought by the plaintiffs was an injunction against the defendants asking them to ensure that the queues in the passage do not block their access to the shops, it could not be said to be a suit relating to the recovery of possession. Therefore, the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable. In fact this case has been distinguished and referred to in the subsequent Division Bench decision in Bombay Grain Dealers v. Lakhmichand. It is also significant to note that in this case at p. 234, we find the following observations:
‘These averments in the plaint and the particular reliefs which I have set out above leave no doubt that the plaintiffs are not attempting directly or indirectly to secure or obtain the possession of the passage but that they want an order preventing the defendants from permitting the formation of queues in the passage in a manner which will obstruct the access to the shops.’
16. Again at p. 236, we find the following observations:
‘None of these reliefs strikes me as a back door method to obtain possession of any part of the premises included or alleged to be included in the lease of the plaintiffs. If these reliefs are considered in the context of the plaint as a whole, it would be clear that though the suit is between a landlord and tenant, it neither relates to recovery of possession nor does it raise a claim or question arising out of the Act or any of its provisions.’
17. In fact this ruling has been also considered by the Division Bench in Bombay Grain Dealers Association's case and at p. 195, we find the following observations:
‘…There may be a case where the landlord is not doing anything of the sort in relation to the actual possession of the premises of which the plaintiff is the tenant. In such a case what the landlord is doing or attempting to do is to cause a nuisance to the tenant which prevents him from enjoying his property in the same manner as before. In a very remote way it might possibly be suggested that it relates to possession in the sense that to some extent what the landlord is doing is connected with the plaintiffs possession of the tenanted premises. That, however, does not bring the suit within the ambit of the Act, because what the landlord is doing has not the direct connection with possession of the tenanted premises, which is necessary to bring the case within s. 28 of the Act.’
18. That is how the decision of Chandrachud, J. in Bishan's case is explained by the subsequent Division Bench in Bombay Grain Dealers Association's case.
19. It would, therefore, appear that if I were to take the view that the stall in question is premises within the meaning of s. 5(8) of the Act the case would be covered by s. 28 of the Act, and, therefore, the City Civil Court will have no jurisdiction. But since I have taken the view that the stall in question is not premises within the meaning of s. 5(8) of the Act, it would follow that the City Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. [The rest of the judgment is not material to this Report.]
20. Appeal dismissed.