Deshmukh, J.:— These appeals arise out of the original proceedings before the Deputy Charity Commissioner holding enquiry under the Bombay Public Trusts Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) to determine whether there was a public trust and whether certain properties were the properties of that trust. A preliminary point of law has been raised by Shri M.V Paranjpe, learned counsel for respondent No. 1, that these appeals under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court are filed without the leave of that Judge. According to him, the proceedings before the District Court under s. 72 of the Act are proceedings in the nature of an appeal from the order and decision of the Charity Commissioner and as such the First Appeal heard by a learned Single Judge of this Court is a decision of this Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction over a decision of the District Court given in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. This being so, the relevant provisions of the Letters Patent cl. 15 will be attracted and both the present appeals filed without the leave are incompetent.

2. The facts out of which the two appeals arise may be noted very briefly. Respondent No. 2 Devidas Baliramdas Bairagi filed application No. 3477 of 1952 under protest under s. 18 of the Act for a declaration that certain properties described in that application were his private properties and not public trust. A little later in the same year 1952 the present appellant filed application No. 3532 of 1952 under s. 18 in respect of the same properties for a declaration that they constituted a public trust and the properties belong to that trust. Both these applications were heard by the Assistant Charity Commissioner and he arrived at the finding under s. 20 of the Act that house No. 206 constituted a public trust property and directed it to be so registered under the provisions of s. 21 of the Act. So far as house No. 13 was concerned his finding was that it was private property of respondent No. 2 who had transferred it to respondent No. 1 before the year 1952 in satisfaction of a decree obtained by respondent No. 1 against respondent No. 2. The appellant as well as respondent No. 2 went in appeal to the Charity Commissioner under s. 70 of the Act. The Joint Charity Commissioner who heard both the appeals confirmed the findings and held that house No. 13 was the private property of respondent No. 2. He further held that house No. 206 was a public trust but the property was subject to a charge of Rs. 2,000 in favour of respondent No. 1 in relation of an earlier transaction. Both of them then filed applications under s. 72 in the District Court. Appellant's application was No. 76 of 1964 in which he contended that the charge in favour of respondent No. 1 against house No. 206 was not binding on the trust at all. He also filed another application No. 77 of 1964 that house No. 13 was a property of the public trust. The present respondent No. 2 filed Misc. Application No. 92 of 1964 in the District Court for a decision that house No. 206 was his private property and not a public trust. All the three applications which were transferred to the learned Assistant Judge, Sholapur, were heard together by him. He rejected all the three applications maintaining the orders passed by the Charity Commissioner. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed First Appeal No. 830 of 1965 in the High Court regarding the charge on house No. 206. He also filed First Appeal No. 831 of 1965 regarding the finding in respect of house No. 13. Both these appeals were heard together by Kantawala, J. (as he then was) and both came to be dismissed by a common judgment dated July 23, 1969. Against the dismissal of the two First Appeals, the present two Letters Patent Appeals have been filed without the leave of the learned Single Judge. According to Shri Paranjpe, these appeals without the leave under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent are incompetent and should be rejected. We have heard the learned counsel on both sides only on the preliminary point and would dispose of the preliminary objection in the first instance.

3. There is no doubt that this matter has come to the Civil Court under s. 72 of the Act after the Assistant Charity Commissioner completed the enquiry under ss. 19 and 20 of the Act and after the appeals filed to the Charity Commissioner under s. 70 of the Act came to be disposed of. So far as the plain language used in s. 72 of the Act is concerned, it only provides to a person aggrieved a remedy by way of an application to the Court under the Act. The Court is defined under s. 4 of the Act to mean in the Greater Bombay, the City Civil Court and elsewhere, the District Court. Having approached the District Court under s. 72 of the Act and after its disposal as provided by sub-s. (2) of s. 72, the appeals came to be filed in this Court. As the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in the two appeals has aggrieved the present appellant the present appeals without the leave of the learned Single Judge are filed.

4. Mr. Paranjpe's argument in a nutshell is that the jurisdiction exercised by the District Court under s. 72 of the Act is appellate in its character and that the jurisdiction of the District Court under s. 72 should be considered as an exercise of the appellate jurisdiction as contemplated by cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. In that view the two First Appeals heard by the learned Single Judge were decided in the Appellate Jurisdiction of the High Court over the decisions which were themselves in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction. There is no doubt that so far as the provisions of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent are concerned, where the exercise of jurisdiction by a Single Judge of this Court is in the appellate jurisdiction of this Court in respect of a decree or order made by the lower Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction leave of the learned Single Judge must be obtained without which no appeal can be filed. The only question that requires determination, therefore, is whether the jurisdiction exercised by the District Court under s. 72 of the Act should be considered as the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction for the purpose of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent.

5. Mr. Paranjpe, counsel for the respondents, took us through the provisions of the Act as well as the Civil Procedure Code for the purpose of pointing out how the appellate jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court and what is the nature of that jurisdiction. An enquiry under the Act commences when an application comes to be made by a party under s. 18 or otherwise it is permissible for the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner to commence an enquiry suo motu. The provisions of sub-s. (5) of s. 18 deal with the contents of the application which a party is required to make. This enquiry whether at the instance of a party or suo motu, by the Deputy Charity Commissioner is intended under the Act for the purpose of registering public trust. Section 19 deals with the enquiry that is to be made and more particularly for the determination of the statutory issues which are required to be raised under the Act. On each of these issues the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner has to give findings in the manner prescribed. The Rules in that behalf, broadly speaking, provide for a public notice before an enquiry if held and is clearly an inquiry with the help of assessor. Once findings are given under s. 20, they become appealable under s. 70. Besides s. 20 which deals directly with remedy of an appeal to the Charity Commissioner, there is power in the Charity Commissioner for a suo motu revision or a revision on the application of a party of the findings given, as provided by s. 70-A. This revisional jurisdiction is to be exercised on the conditions stipulated by that section. In the matter of certain orders passed under sub-s. (2) of s. 51 by the Charity Commissioner an appeal has been provided to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under s. 71 of the Act. Besides s. 70 and s. 70-A other orders can be passed by the Charity Commissioner under ss. 40, 41, 41-C and 43(2)(a) and (c) and s. 50-A of the Act. Against all these orders a general remedy has been provided by s. 72 of the Act by way of an application to the District Judge.

6. Mr. Paranjpe broadly drew our attention to sub-s. (1-A) of s. 72 which says that no party to such application shall be entitled to produce additional evidence whether oral or documentary, before the Court, unless the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted or the Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause the Court thinks it necessary to allow such additional evidence. The proviso says that whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by the Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission. He also brought to our notice sub-s. (2) of s. 72 which says that the Court after taking evidence, if any, may confirm, revoke or modify the decision or remit the amount of the surcharge and make such orders as to costs as it thinks proper in the circumstances. Referring to these two provisions of sub-ss. (1-A) and (2) of s. 72 of the Act, Shri Paranjpe argued that these provisions are almost identical with the provisions of O. XLI, r. 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure which deals with the production of additional evidence in Appellate Court, under the Code. The opening clause of sub-r. (1) of r. 27 of O. XLI enacts same prohibition, viz. that the parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence in the Appellate Court. However, two sub-ss. (a) and (b) provide the circumstances under which additional evidence could be permitted to be produced by the Appellate Court and that additional evidence could be either oral or documentary. Clause (a) of that rule says that if the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, then it is possible for the party to persuade the Appellate Court and the Appellate Court will ordinarily allow such evidence to be led. Under cl. (b) if the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. Under sub-r. (2) of r. 27, the Appellate Court, when it decides to permit additional evidence to be produced, is obliged to record the reason for its admission. Reading these provisions of O. XLI, r. 27 along with the provisions of sub-s. (1-A) and (2) of s. 72 of the Act Mr. Paranjpe argued that the procedure which is laid down for hearing the appeals under the Civil Procedure Code with all its limitations and restrictions of leading evidence, is adopted in the remedy before the District Court under s. 72 of the Act. He made a broad statement that leading evidence is an absolute right of a party before a trial Court or before any Tribunal which is holding inquiry for the first time. That function is performed in the civil Courts by those Courts which are exercising original jurisdiction. A party dissatisfied by the judgment, decree or order of the trial Court is awarded a further remedy by the Legislature by way of an appeal to a higher Court and ordinarily additional evidence is not permitted to be led in the Appellate Court. On the evidence as led in the trial Court, the Appellate Court re-examines the record and either confirms, modifies or revokes the orders of the Courts below or otherwise passes order as provided by the relevant provisions dealing with the Appellate Tribunal. By way of analogy Mr. Paranjpe argued that the proceedings of enquiry before the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner are primary proceedings and there parties are entitled to lead such evidence as they like. When the matter reaches the appellate stage before the Charity Commissioner, the Charity Commissioner merely hears the parties as provided by sub-s. (5) of s. 70 and for reasons to be recorded in writing, he is entitled to annul, reverse, modify or confirm the finding or the order appealed against or he may direct the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner to make further inquiry or to take such additional evidence as he may think necessary or he may himself take such additional evidence. When the hearing before the Charity Commissioner is over and an application comes to be made to the Court, the procedure provided for hearing of the application under s. 72 of the Act is similar to the procedure provided for the hearing of the appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure. Though the expression used by the Legislature is ‘may…. apply’, the real nature of the remedy seems to be the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the Court over the decision of the Charity Commissioner. He also referred us to the provisions of ss. 96 and 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure only to draw a parallel between some of the provisions of s. 72 of the Act and s. 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

7. It is true that s. 107 of the Civil Procedure Code is more detailed and contains some provisions which are not to be found in s. 72 of the Act. However, according to him, by and large the jurisdiction under s. 72 of the Act is very much similar to the jurisdiction provided by these substantive sections of the Civil Procedure Code. It is the nature of the jurisdiction that is being contemplated by cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. In terms of the language of cl. 15, if the judgment of the High Court is passed in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, the appeal contemplated under cl. 15 requires a prior permission of the learned Single Judge who has disposed of that appeal. Shri Paranjpe said that there was no occasion so far as he knows to consider the provisions of s. 72 of the Act in this light but there was one occasion when the provisions of s. 75 of the Act were required to be interpreted along with the provisions of s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act of 1908. In Pradhan v. Bombay State Federation Etc. . 1956 58 Bom. L.R 894. the facts were that the application under s. 72 was filed beyond the period of 60 days contemplated by that section. Section 72 of the Act says that any person aggrieved by the decision of the Charity Commissioner may, within sixty days from the date of the decision, apply to the Court to set aside the said decision. The party aggrieved had spent some time in obtaining a copy of the order of the Charity Commissioner. If that time was calculated and was permitted to be excluded, the application filed under s. 72 was within time. The objection relating to limitation raised before the Division Bench failed as the learned Judges observed that the application under s. 72 of the Act was in the nature of an appeal and it was possible to exclude the time spent in obtaining the copy under the provisions of s. 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908. In view of the fact that s. 75 of the Act lays down that in computing the period of appeal under this chapter, the provisions of ss. 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall apply to the filing of such appeals. Though sub-s. (2) of s. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, is general in its language and covers remedies like suit, appeal or application for which different period of limitation has been laid down by a special or local law, cl. (a) thereof makes ss. 4, 9 to 18 and 23 applicable only so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. What was argued therefore was that s. 75 of the Act lays down in express terms that in computing the period of appeal under the Chapter, viz. Chapter XI of the Act in which it falls, the provisions of ss. 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to the filing of such appeals. That being so the provisions of s. 12(2) of the Limitation Act of 1908 dealing with the exclusion of time for copy of judgment and order would be attracted only if the remedy is an appeal under Chapter XI of the Act and not otherwise. The Division Bench considered an argument very much similar to the one made before us and pointed out that the recently introduced sub-s. (1-A) of s. 72 of the Act gives support to the argument before them that the nature of the remedy of an application before the City Civil Court or the District Court is very much similar to an appellate remedy. At any rate so far as the additional evidence was concerned for all practical purposes the Court under the Act was like an Appellate Court. It is pointed out that had the District Court been a Court of first instance, there would have been no restriction on the rights of the parties to call such evidence as they liked before that Court. If that is so, the question is whether s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act must be so strictly construed or it must receive a liberal construction.

8. The learned Judges proceeded to point out that every law of limitation must of necessity operate harshly upon the person whose right to go to Court is taken away or whose remedy is barred and therefore Courts have always construed laws of limitation in favour of the person against whom limitation is pleaded. They further took a liberal view of the provisions of s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act of 1908 and came to the conclusion that the intention of the Legislature was to give the benefit of s. 12 in all those cases where it would be necessary for the party to challenge an order of the lower Court or of a Tribunal in order to succeed and, if it is necessary for the party to do so, then before the party approaches the higher Court he must obtain a copy of that order which he is challenging. Even though there may not be an obligation on the party to obtain a copy under the rules provided under the provisions of the Act or the rules prescribed therein, it is pointed out that a party who wants to challenge that decision or order must know the reasons therefor. He has a right to read the order to find out the reasons and then to form his opinion whether he should pursue his remedy. On that broader approach and by the application of ss. 12(2) and 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908, read with s. 75 of the Act the learned Judges excluded the time taken for obtaining the copy and held that the application before the Court was in time. Shri Paranjpe, therefore, argued that accepting the same reasoning we should hold that not only the jurisdiction under s. 72 of the Act is similar to the appellate jurisdiction but it is in fact an exercise of appellate jurisdiction as contemplated by cl. 15 of the Letters Patent.

9. In answering the preliminary objection Shri Lalit, learned counsel for the appellants, relied upon the language of s. 72 of the Act and some passages from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes. According to him when the words used by the Legislature are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their natural meaning and it is not proper to go beyond those words in search of what is usually pointed out to be ‘the intention’ of the Legislature. The intention of the Legislature is primarily that which the words chosen by them express. In case where the language chosen is ambiguous or is not very clear, the Court may interpret and find out the intention of the Legislature. However, where there is no such scope it is not for the Court to take help of abstract propositions like the nature of the Original Civil Jurisdiction and the contents of the Appellate Jurisdiction.

10. Having considered the rival contentions we are of the view that the provisions of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent must be so construed as the words and expressions used therein would have their natural meaning and unless the words appear to be capable of two different meanings, it would not be possible to go beyond the express language of that clause. The primary question that is raised by the argument of Shri Paranjpe is whether from the nature of the remedy provided or from the inquiry that is permitted to be made, should that remedy itself be styled as appellate remedy or the exercise of an appellate jurisdiction, even though the Legislature does not choose to use that language. It must naturally be assumed that the Legislature is well aware of the different natures of jurisdiction that can be created and bestowed upon various Tribunals and Courts.

11. In fact, reference to the provisions of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1969, the Code of Civil Procedure and Chapter XI of the Act would make the position quite clear. Section 7 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869, declares that the District Court shall be the principal Court of Original Civil Jurisdiction in the district, within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. Having described the District Court as the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction, the very next s. 8 lays down that except as provided in ss. 16, 17 and 26, the District Court shall be the Court of Appeal from all decrees and orders passed by the subordinate Courts from which an appeal lies under any law for the time being in force. This section which immediately follows s. 7 bestows upon the District Court an appellate jurisdiction. The kind of appellate jurisdiction which is contemplated by cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, is the one under s. 8 of that Act, though the Court that exercises it, is the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction under s. 7. Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that save where otherwise expressly provided in the Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. If the provisions of s. 96 are read along with the provisions of s. 8 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, it is amply clear that over the orders and decrees passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, or decrees and orders passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, in respect of suits whose monetary jurisdiction is below Es. 10,000, an appeal would lie to the District Court.

12. We may incidentally point out that the provisions of s. 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not identical with the provisions of s. 72 of the Act. Under sub-s. (2) of s. 72 of the Act the authority of the District Court extends only to the extent of confirming, revoking or modifying the decisions and remitting the amount of the surcharge and making such orders as to costs as it thinks proper in the circumstances. The language of s. 107 says that the Appellate Court under the Civil Procedure Code can determine a case finally or remand the case or frame issues and refer them for trial or take additional evidence or require such evidence to be taken. Sub-section (2) of s. 107 further clarifies the position by saying that subject to sub-s. (1) the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. The scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure would show that an appeal is continuation of the suit and the Appellate Court has all the powers of the trial Court subject of course to the provisions of sub-s. (1) of s. 107. The matters under the Civil Procedure Code are ordinarily in the nature of lis between two contesting litigants and either of them has a right as provided by the Code to approach the higher Courts for relief. What is important is that these provisions dealing with the District Court and its powers, styles the District Court's jurisdiction as appellate jurisdiction, when the matter reaches that Court after a trial is held by the Civil Judge. If we then refer to the provisions of Chapter XI of the Act the title no doubt is ‘functions of Charity Commissioner, Procedure, jurisdiction and appeals’. Shri Paranjpe argued that amongst other things this Chapter deals with appeals and therefore the application under s. 72 should also be treated as a sort of appeal. We do not find any substance in this argument because the title merely takes into account the functions of the Charity Commissioner and the procedure to be followed while approaching him and the title merely deals with the jurisdiction and appeals to the Charity Commissioner. The remedy under s. 72 commences after the appeal of the Charity Commissioner is decided. In this Chapter an appeal has been provided to the Charity Commissioner from the findings of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner. That is the provision of sub-s. (7) of s. 70. By the added s. 70-A a revisional jurisdiction has been bestowed upon the Charity Commissioner in certain cases under certain circumstances. As we have already pointed out, in respect of one order passed by the Charity Commissioner an appeal has been provided to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Legislature which passed this Act uses the expression ‘appeal’ under ss. 70 and 71 and it describes in so many words the nature of the jurisdiction to be exercised under s. 70-A by the Charity Commissioner either on an application or suo motu for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of the findings or order recorded or passed by the Deputy Charity or Assistant Charity Commissioner and also authorises him to annul or modify or confirm or reverse the said findings. The same Legislature, however, chooses the expression ‘may…apply’ when the remedy to an aggrieved person is provided under s. 72. This distinct and different language used by the Legislature must be given its natural meaning unless it is found that in the circumstances the expressions used are rather ambiguous and do not seem to convey the meaning the Legislature had in its mind.

13. It may be remembered that a remedy like an appeal is a creature of law. Unless an appeal is so provided, there does not seem any right in a litigant to approach some higher Court or Tribunal by way of an appeal. The expression ‘appeal’ is also a term of art. The Legislature which is fully aware of the difference between the various remedies has chosen, in the circumstances of this case, to use the expression ‘may…apply’ under s. 72 as against the expression an ‘appeal’ under ss. 70 and 70-A. Ordinarily, it is true, that when original jurisdiction has been exercised the litigating parties have a right to lead evidence. It is a fundamental right of a party of being heard. The hearing which denies the right of leading evidence could hardly be described as hearing. However, we do not think how the Legislature could not divide the right of being heard into different parts and provide a particular Tribunal for leading evidence and another Tribunal having a higher exercise and position to re-examine the entire evidence recorded by way of an independent remedy. Whether this remedy would be an appeal must depend upon the language used by the Legislature. It may be that the functions performed by the Court under this remedy may have similarity with the functions performed otherwise by the Appellate Courts. It may be that the Legislature has resorted to this time saving by directing evidence to be recorded before the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner and a further examination of that evidence by way of an appellate remedy by a higher department. However, when the first remedy to approach a civil Court is made available the Legislature has in terms provided an application and not an appeal. It would not be therefore proper to confuse the nature and the functions by the Court under s. 72 with the technical remedy of an appeal which has to be so provided by the Legislature.

14. We will at once point out that the learned Judges who dealt with the case of Pradhan v. Bombay State Federation Etc. had a very different proposition before them. Primarily they were concerned with the obstacle of limitation which was being created in the way of a party by resorting to the technical provisions of Chapter XI and more particularly s. 75 of the Act. It is in that context when the days for obtaining copies were to be excluded that they read the remedy provided under s. 72 of the Act in a liberal way for the purpose of bringing it under the provisions of ss. 12(2) and 29(2) of the Limitation Act of 1908. While making this liberal construction, the language used by the learned Judges is worth noting. They point out that the application to the Court was directly in the nature of an appeal but they have nowhere called it as an appeal so provided by the Legislature. While considering the nature and type of function performed by the Court under s. 72, the learned Judges have construed liberally the provisions of s. 75 of the Act as also ss. 12(2) and 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908. It is possible that the Courts might look at the particular provisions in a liberal manner for the purpose of technical provisions like the Limitation Act. However, when it comes to the construction of provision which awards a positive right to a party it would be appropriate that the provisions are construed in a manner which are conducive to the right of the party.

15. In the present case the narrow question is, whether the Letters Patent Appeal could be filed, as the language goes, as of right or must be filed only with the leave of the learned Single Judge? Undoubtedly both are rights of appeal. In one case the party can directly approach a Division Bench and try his luck. In the other case, he has first to obtain leave of that Judge, who had decided the matter, and then file the appeal. Undoubtedly, the second remedy is more onerous and seeks to curtail the right of appeal to some extent. If it could be held in the present case that the Court under s. 72 was itself exercising the appellate jurisdiction, then undoubtedly the present appeals filed without the leave of the learned Single Judge are incompetent. Such appeals lie only with his leave and not otherwise. If otherwise, it could be held, as the natural meaning of the expression suggests, that s. 72 provides a remedy by way of an application only, and though the inquiry held by the District Court seems to have some semblance of an appellate jurisdiction, it is not a jurisdiction created by the Legislature as an appellate jurisdiction. It is only where the jurisdiction is appellate and a decision in exercise of such jurisdiction is given, and the High Court has also exercised the appellate jurisdiction that the bar contemplated by cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of obtaining leave of the Court seems to come in.

16. Shri Paranjpe's argument in the present case comes to this. Construe the provision under s. 72(1) as exercise of appellate jurisdiction on the liberal construction by looking to the type of functions performed under that section. Even though, therefore, the Legislature does not style the exercise of that jurisdiction as appellate jurisdiction, we should describe it so and on that assumption deprive the present appellants of their legitimate remedy of an appeal to a Division Bench of this Court under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. This would be against the normal canons of construction. Even in the judgment on which Mr. Paranjpe relies, viz. Pradhan v. Bombay State Federation etc., the approach of the learned Judges was whether the technical obstacle like the limitation could be got over by liberal construction.

17. The idea, therefore, is to keep a remedy alive and it should not be foiled on mere technicalities of the provisions. If that principle is applied to the present case, we think that a liberal construction of s. 72 is not warranted at all. Apart from the fact that the language of s. 72 does not permit such a construction, even the broader portent of the canons of construction does not seem to permit us to take that view.

18. We are, therefore, satisfied that whatever the type of function that the Court performs under s. 72 of the Act when an application is received by it from any aggrieved party, it is certainly not appellate jurisdiction as is contemplated by cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. If that is so, the decree or the order of the District Court was not in the exercise of the Appellate Jurisdiction, even though the High Court exercised the appellate jurisdiction while hearing First Appeals Nos. 830 and 831 of 1965.

19. The preliminary objection thus fails and is rejected.

20. Preliminary objection rejected.