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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Wagle, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code by the State seeking alteration of a sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on accused Gourishankar to a sentence of death.

The core facts found by the trial court and accepted on review are: the accused married the deceased Anusuya around 1950; the couple had four children (eldest about 11 years, youngest about 3). By about 1963 the accused's financial condition had deteriorated and he allegedly urged his wife to earn money by immoral means. The wife left the husband's house around March 1964 and lived with her brother Sadhu with the children. On 14 June 1964, at about 4 p.m. in a bazar at Wardha, the accused allegedly chased the deceased, seized her by the hair and inflicted multiple knife blows to her abdomen and other parts, causing intestines to protrude and resulting in instantaneous death. Multiple eye-witnesses and police witnesses saw or apprehended the accused with a blood-stained knife; post-mortem evidence established numerous and serious incised wounds sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

The accused was tried in the Court of Session, convicted under section 302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life (and a fine of Rs. 300). The accused did not appeal. The State filed the present revision/application under section 439 Cr.P.C. The High Court permitted the accused's counsel to argue points touching on conviction as well as sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the conviction under section 302 Indian Penal Code was properly sustained on the evidence.
  2. Whether the Sessions Judge exercised his discretion judicially in sentencing the accused to imprisonment for life instead of death (i.e., whether the life sentence should be enhanced to death on revision by the State).
  3. Whether the omission of subsection (5) of section 367 Cr.P.C. (by amendment) altered the legal approach so that death is no longer the normal sentence for murder or otherwise affected the Court's obligation in sentencing for murder.
  4. Whether any extenuating circumstances existed in the present case to justify imposing imprisonment for life rather than death.

Arguments of the Parties

State (Applicant) — represented by Mr. Dharmadhikari

  • Contended that the trial Sessions Judge did not exercise his sentencing discretion judicially in choosing life imprisonment over death.
  • Asked that the sentence of imprisonment for life be altered to death.
  • Also argued that the fine imposed should be set aside; the Court set aside the fine.

Accused (Respondent in Revision) — represented by Mr. Kamlakar

  • Contended that the prosecution had not proved its case; urged that the accused's defence before the Sessions Court had to be accepted.
  • Summarised accused's defence: he denied committing the killing, claimed he saw another person assaulting a woman in the bazar and, acting on humanitarian instinct, ran to rescue her; only then discovered the woman was his wife; his clothes became blood-stained in lifting her. He further alleged that Sadhu (the wife's brother) and others were responsible for the wife's "immoral" conduct and that prosecution witnesses gave false evidence to conceal that fact.
  • Argued that the Sessions Judge exercised discretion in sentencing and that the High Court should not lightly discard that exercised discretion; relied on Alamgir v. State of Bihar re limits of appellate/revisional interference in sentencing.
  • Argued (as to statutory amendment) that after amendment of section 367(5) Cr.P.C. courts are no longer obliged to treat death as the primary sentence for murder and need not give reasons for not imposing death.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nga Po Swa v. Emperor [1936] A.I.R Rang. 113 Authority cited by the Sessions Judge for the proposition that in absence of clear evidence of strong motive, an abnormal mood may make the extreme penalty not called for. The Sessions Judge relied on this decision; the High Court recorded that the Sessions Judge referred to it but analysed that the decision's factual basis differed from the present case.
Mitha v. Emperor [1933] A.I.R Lah. 123 Decision cited for the view that sheer brutality of assault in absence of provocation can lead to inference of unsoundness of mind, militate against capital sentence. The Sessions Judge relied on this Lahore decision; the High Court found the facts of Mitha distinguishable and held the Sessions Judge improperly analogised to it.
Alamgir v. State of Bihar [1959] A.I.R S.C. 436 Principle that the High Court may enhance sentence under section 439 Cr.P.C. only if the trial judge's sentence is unduly lenient or if he manifestly failed to consider relevant facts. Accused's counsel relied on this authority to argue against enhancement; the High Court explained the difference between ordinary sentence adequacy questions and the binary choice for murder (death or life) and applied the Alamgir test to decide whether interference was proper.
State v. Airarsing [1956] A.I.R Bom. 231 Held that appellate/revisional interference with a Sessions Judge's sentencing discretion is improper unless the discretion was exercised perversely or not exercised. The High Court relied on this Division Bench view to frame the standard for interfering with sentence and then concluded the trial Judge had not properly exercised discretion.
State v. Pandurang Shinde [1956] A.I.R Bom. 711 Reiterated that Sessions Judge has discretion to impose or not impose death, but the discretion must be judicially exercised and reasons should be given; High Court will not interfere normally unless discretion not properly exercised. The Court applied this precedent in assessing whether the Sessions Judge had exercised judicial discretion; concluded the Sessions Judge's reasoning was speculative and therefore interference was warranted.
Satya Vir v. State [1958] A.I.R All. 746 Considered the effect of repeal of section 367(5) Cr.P.C.; doubted the assumption that death remained the "normal" penalty solely because of the repealed provision. The High Court noted this earlier Allahabad decision but observed it did not finally decide the statutory point; used it in the discussion of amendment of s.367(5).
Ram Singh v. State [1960] A.I.R All. 748 Held that amendment of s.367 Cr.P.C. was procedural and did not affect law regulating punishment: courts need not elaborate reasons for not awarding death, but must apply sound judicial considerations. The High Court accepted the view in Ram Singh to hold that repeal of s.367(5) does not permit departure from sound judicial reasoning in preferring life imprisonment in a cold-blooded murder.
In re Veluchami (Madras High Court) Stated that although section 367(5) Cr.P.C. no longer required reasons, Sessions Judges must still exercise discretion thoughtfully and the extreme penalty is called for where crime is deliberate and no extenuating features exist. The High Court cited this decision in support of the proposition that deletion of the statutory requirement does not remove the obligation to exercise judicial discretion and to consider whether extenuating circumstances exist.
V. Thevar v. State of Madras [1957] A.I.R S.C. 614 Supreme Court held that unless there are extenuating circumstances, the normal punishment for murder under s.302 IPC is death; sentencing must focus on whether extenuating circumstances exist. The High Court relied on this Supreme Court authority to conclude that absent extenuating circumstances the proper sentence is death and that the statutory amendment did not alter that guiding principle.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two broad stages: (A) assessment of conviction and evidence; (B) assessment of sentencing and whether the Sessions Judge properly exercised discretion.

A. Conviction: application of law to facts

  • The High Court reviewed the eye-witness testimony (P.W.1 Panchafula, P.W.2 Nana, P.W.3 Ramrao, P.W.4 Anjani, P.W.5 Kesheo) and the medical evidence (Dr. Humane, P.W.8 and post-mortem notes, exh. P-17).
  • The medical evidence showed eleven injuries: multiple deep incised wounds primarily on the abdomen (injuries Nos. 2–7), protrusion and puncturing of organs, some wounds about three inches deep, and other wounds on scapular region, iliac border and face. The injuries to vital parts indicated an intention to cause death.
  • The Court accepted the prosecution witnesses' evidence that the accused chased the deceased, seized her and inflicted the knife blows, and was apprehended red-handed with the blood-stained knife (article 18) which Kesheo identified and snatched.
  • Given the eye-witness and medical evidence, the High Court held that the Sessions Judge was justified in concluding guilt under section 302 IPC and it was unnecessary to consider further the accused's alibi/defence that he was merely a rescuer.

B. Sentence: whether Sessions Judge exercised discretion judicially

  • The Sessions Judge had upheld conviction but took the view that the accused's mind was "far from normal" and that failure of the prosecution to show exact circumstances agitating the mind constituted an extenuating circumstance justifying life imprisonment instead of death. He relied on decisions (notably Nga Po Swa and Mitha) for the proposition that brutality absent provocation may infer unsoundness of mind.
  • The High Court examined these premises critically. It found that the Mitha decision rested on different facts (a loving father who killed his children and evidence of unsoundness), and therefore was inapposite; the Sessions Judge's analogy was misplaced.
  • The High Court held there was direct evidence establishing a motive: accused's repeated solicitation of his wife to earn by immoral means, her refusal and subsequent desertion with the children for about three months. That provided a sufficient motive to brood and could not be treated as absence of motive.
  • On the question of unsoundness of mind, the High Court emphasized the lack of evidence of any mental unsoundness. The inference that the accused's mind was "far from normal" was judged speculative and unsupported by medical or other material; agitation of mind from provocation does not automatically indicate unsoundness affecting criminal capacity within s.84 IPC.
  • The High Court also addressed the statutory and doctrinal question raised about the amendment (omission) of section 367(5) Cr.P.C. It analysed authorities from Allahabad, Madras and the Supreme Court and concluded:
    • The repeal of s.367(5) is procedural and did not alter the substantive law on punishment under the Penal Code.
    • Courts need not now formally elaborate reasons for not awarding death, but they cannot prefer life imprisonment in cold-blooded or revolting murders without sound judicial reasons; the discretion must still be exercised judicially and must appear to have been so exercised.
    • Supreme Court authority (V. Thevar) still stands: absent extenuating circumstances the normal punishment for murder is death and the sentencing court must determine whether extenuating circumstances exist.
  • The High Court found the Sessions Judge's sentencing reasoning defective for two linked reasons:
    1. He ignored or failed to give proper weight to facts the trial Judge himself had found (premeditation, brutality, daylight attack, use of an eight-inch blade, pushing away rescuers) which pointed toward aggravation rather than mitigation.
    2. He relied on speculative inferences (unsoundness of mind) unsupported by evidence.
  • Because the Sessions Judge had not exercised the sentencing discretion judicially (i.e., relied on speculative reasons and failed to consider material aggravating features), the High Court considered itself entitled to and obliged to exercise that discretion on revision.
  • The High Court additionally considered but rejected the accused's plea for mercy based on the presence of young children: it held that sparing the accused would not materially benefit the children and that sympathy for the accused was not a sufficient extenuating factor here.

Holding and Implications

Holding: CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 302 IPC CONFIRMED; SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE SET ASIDE AND ALTERED TO DEATH.

Specific orders made by the Court:

  • The revision application by the State was allowed and the rule made absolute.
  • The conviction under section 302 IPC as recorded by the Sessions Judge was confirmed.
  • The sentence of imprisonment for life and the fine of Rs. 300 imposed by the Sessions Judge were altered: the fine was set aside and the sentence was changed to death; the Court directed that the accused be hanged by the neck until death.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the accused's conviction stands and his sentence is enhanced from life imprisonment to death; the fine is set aside.
  • Legal/practical implication: the Court reaffirmed that deletion of the former requirement in section 367(5) Cr.P.C. to state reasons for not imposing death does not relieve courts of the obligation to exercise sentencing discretion judicially and to have sound reasons when choosing life imprisonment in a deliberate, revolting murder. The opinion confirms reliance on established authorities (including V. Thevar) that absent extenuating circumstances the normal punishment for murder is death.
  • The Court did not state or claim to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities; it intervened because it found the trial Judge's exercise of discretion unsatisfactory on the facts of this case.

Note: This summary is strictly limited to information and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No external facts or inferences beyond the opinion text have been introduced.

    State Of Maharashtra v. Gourishankar Kawadu Shende

    Wagle, J.:— This is an application under s. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code by State, praying that the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on accused Gourishankar be altered to a sentence of death.

    2. The accused was married to the deceased some time in 1950, and the families of both resided in Pul-file at Wardha. After marriage, the deceased lived with the accused till about the beginning of 1964, during which period, she gave birth to four children. The eldest amongst them is aged about eleven years, and the youngest is about three year old. The prosecution case is that the accused's financial circumstances deteriorated by about 1963, and he began to suggest to his wife that she would earn money by immoral means. In other words, the suggestion made by the accused was that she should sell herself for money and provide the means of livelihood for the family. The prosecution case further is that the deceased was unwilling to do so and, ultimately, by about March 1964, she left house of her husband along with her four children and came to reside with her brother Sadhu, who lived across the street. During the period from March to June 1964, the accused used to pay visits to Sadhu's house and see his wife.

    3. On June 14, 1964, at about 4 p.m, deceased Anusuya, accompanied by Panchafula (P.W 1) and Anjani (P.W 4)—the wives of two of her brothers went to the vegetable and fish market at Wardha. While they were in the fish market they saw the accused at some distance from them. Upon seeing these three females, the accused rushed towards them with a knife in his hand. These three females got frightened, two of them, viz. P.W 1 Panchafula and P.W 4 Anjani, sidestepped, whereas Anusuya, the deceased, began to run. She was chased by the accused. On coming near her, he caught hold of the deceased by her hair and, thereafter, gave blows with the knife in the abdomen of the deceased. The blows were delivered to such effect that her intestines came out and she fell down. While this was happening, one Nana (P.W 2), recent recruit to the police constabulary, ran to the rescue of Anusuya and caught hold of the accused from behind. The accused, however, gave a push with the elbow and Nana fell back. Nana again attempted to rescue Anusuya, but ultimately, he fell down, feeling a little giddy. While this was happening, Kesheo (P.W 5), the police constable on duty in the bazar, came there running and caught hold of the hand of the accused which held the knife. He then whistled, and two other police constables, including Narayan (P.W 6), came there. Kesheo (P.W 5) handed over the accused to Narayan (P.W 6) and one other constable, so that he should not escape. It was then discovered that Anusuya had died. The dead body of Anusuya was thereafter sent to the hospital and, upon post mortem, a number of injuries were found on her body, particularly, the abdomen. The accused was arrested during the course of investigation, and after the investigation was complete, he was sent up for trial and the Magistrate committed him to the Court of Session. Accused denied the charge.

    4. Before the Court of Session, the prosecution examined Panchafula (P.W 1)—the wife of deceased's brother, Anjani (P.W 4)—the wife of another brother, Nana (P.W 2)—a police constable, and Ramrao (P.W 3)—an independent witness present in the bazar, as the persons who had actually witnessed the incident of the accused delivering the blows on the deceased. The prosecution also examined Kesheo (P.W 5) as the policeman on duty who had apprehended the accused red-handed with the blood-stained knife in his hand and blood-stained clothes on his body. The prosecution also examined P.W 6 Narayan, who had taken the accused to the police station and who had filed first-information-report exh. 11. Dr. Humane (P.W 8) was examined to prove the postmortem notes and the result of his examination leading to the death of Anusuya. The case for the prosecution was that, probably, being dissatisfied with the decision of his wife in refusing his request to lead an immoral life and being further dissatisfied with his wife for having deserted him, the accused rushed at the deceased and caused her death intentionally. The eye-witnesses' evidence was believed by the learned Sessions Judge to hold that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved that it was the accused who had delivered the blows which had instantaneously resulted in the death of Anusuya. Relying upon the evidence of the medical officer Dr. Humane (P.W 8), the learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the injuries, which were caused to the deceased, were sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death and that, therefore, the prosecution proved its case that the accused had murdered his wife Anusuya on June 14, 1964, at about 4 p.m

    5. The learned Sessions Judge thereafter considered the circumstances, which were obtainable in this case, in the matter of the exercise of his discretion in regard to the sentence. The learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the evidence was irresistible to lead to an inference that the mind of the accused was far from normal and hence, he indulged in the brutal act of murder. The learned Sessions Judge also held that the failure on the part of the prosecution to show the exact circumstances agitating the accused's mind at the relevant time was, in his opinion, an extenuating circumstance which should weigh against imposing the maximum penalty of death. The learned Sessions Judge, therefore, having considered these circumstances and also having considered the effect of certain decisions of the other High Courts, held that the sentence of death should not be imposed. The accused was, therefore, convicted under s. 302, but sentenced to imprisonment for life. Against this order, the accused did not appeal. But the State filed the present application in revision. Since, however, a notice for enhancement also gives the right of arguing the question of conviction itself, we permitted Mr. Kamlakar, who appeared for the accused, to argue the case as an appeal against conviction.

    6. Mr. Kamlakar's contention was that the prosecution had, in fact, not proved its case at all. The accused's defence, which he had taken before the Court of Session, was the following. He denied completely the incident as deposed to by the prosecution witnesses. His case was that he was living happily with his wife, the deceased, but that it was the insinuation of her brother Sadhu which had turned her almost into a prostitute. She disclosed this fact to him about a year before this incident, and that upset him so much that he fell ill. During the course of his illness, his wife did not attend to him but, on the contrary, left the house along with the children and went to reside with her brother Sadhu. She continued her immoral means of earning money at the brother's house. This disgusted the accused. However, he kept quiet.

    7. On the day of the incident, at about 4 p.m, when he had gone to the bazar, he saw that a woman was being attacked by another person. Out of humanitarian instinct, he ran towards the woman and saw the assailant Krishna running way. He then found that the female who was attacked was his own wife. He picked her up and thereby had his clothes blood-stained. His case, therefore, was that he had done nothing. He had gone to the rescue of his wife but that nothing could be done because she was already dead. He further stated that the witnesses for the prosecution had given false evidence in order to hide the fact that it was Sadhu and his other brother's wife Panchafula who were responsible for the immoral life led by his wife.

    8. [His Lordship after considering the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, proceeded.].

    9. Considering all these circumstances, we hold that the learned Sessions Judge was justified in coming to the conclusion that it was the accused who had delivered the blows with the knife on the body of the deceased Anusuya which had killed her. The evidence given by P.W 8 Dr. Humane, considered along with post-mortem notes (exh. P-17), is clear enough to prove that whoever had assaulted Anusuya, had intended to cause her death. There were in all eleven injuries on her body. Injuries Nos. 3 to 11 were all incised wounds. Injury No. 1 in the post-mortem notes mentions that peritoneum with peritoneal fat was seen protruding out-side the body in the epigastrium region. Injury No. 2 mentions that the protruding organs were found punctured in the epigastrium region. Injuries Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 were all injuries on the abdomen and the intestines had come out. In some cases the depth of the injury was about 3 inches. Injuries Nos. 8 and 9 were in the scapular region, injury No. 10 was on the upper border of left iliac bone and injury No. 11 was on the face, right side. The six injuries to which we have made a reference are all on one of the most vital parts of the body. The vital organs had come out and were found to be punctured. The intention of the person, therefore, who caused those injuries is obvious, viz. to cause death. The medical evidence, therefore, is clear enough to indicate that whoever assaulted Anusuya intended causing her death. It is, therefore, clear on the evidence of eye-witnesses and the medical evidence that the accused had intentionally caused the death of Anusuya by causing knife injuries on her abdomen on June 14, 1964. The learned Sessions Judge, therefore, had come to the proper conclusion that the accused was guilty under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

    10. In the view that we have taken, it is not at all necessary for us to consider the defence taken by the accused that he was only a spectator and that he reached the spot after his wife was killed. We have believed the evidence of Panchafula (P.W 1), Nana (P.W 2), Ramrao (P.W 3), Anjani (P.W 4) and Kesheo (P.W 5), to hold not only that these witnesses had seen the accused deliver the blows on the body of Anusuya, but that, ultimately, the accused was caught red-handed with the knife in his hand. The knife is art. 18, and it was identified by Kesheo (P.W 5), who had snatched it from the hand of the accused. In the view that we have taken of this evidence, it is not necessary for us to consider the obvious cock and bull story given by the accused that he had seen somebody assaulting a woman; that out of humanitarian instincts he ran to rescue the woman and that when he went near her, he found that the woman was his own wife and that she was killed.

    11. The important question, however, in this case, is in regard to the sentence. The trial Court gave a reason, viz. that the accused was not normal in his mind, and held that this was an extenuating circumstance for giving the punishment of imprisonment for life to the accused. Mr. Dharmadhikari, who appears for the State, contends that this sentence has not been given by the learned trial Judge by exercising his discretion judicially. It is necessary, in this case, to consider the exact manner in which the learned Sessions Judge considered that there were extenuating circumstances in the present case.

    12. In paras. 48, 49, 50 and 51, the learned Sessions Judge considers this point in his judgment. In para. 48, the learned Sessions Judge holds that the acts of the accused had been brutal and barbarous and extremely revolting. But he then observes as follows:

    “…The fact, however, remains that unless the mind of the accused was extremely agitated and disturbed for some reason or the other not disclosed in evidence, the accused would not have embarked upon the barbarous perpetration of the crime.”

    13. He further observes that it appeared to him that even though it was an act of sheer brutality of the accused, the circumstances in which the act was committed, were such that he must have been very much disturbed and agitated in his mind due to the desertion by his wife along with her children. In para. 49, the learned Sessions Judge refers to a decision of the Rangoon High Court, Nga Po Swa v. Emperor . [1936] A.I.R Ran. 113., to hold that when there was no clear evidence of any strong motive for the offence, except the fact that it appeared to the learned Judges, that the accused was in an abnormal mood when he committed the offence, the extreme penalty was not called for. The learned Sessions Judge thereafter refers to Mitha v. Emperor . [1933] A.I.R Lah. 123. to hold that the sheer brutality of the assault in the absence of any provocation was a circumstance which would lead to the inference that the mind of the accused was in fact unhinged and far from normal. Under these circumstances, while upholding the conviction of the accused under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, the learned Judges held that it was not a case in which capital sentence should be imposed. These observations of the learned Judges of the Lahore High Court have been relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge in support of his conclusion that there was an extenuating circumstance in the instant case by reason of the brutality being exercised by the accused. Ultimately, the learned Judge holds that the conclusion is irresistible that the mind of the accused was far from normal and hence he indulged in the brutal act of murder. Lastly, the learned Judge holds that the failure on the part of the prosecution to show the exact circumstances agitating accused's mind at the relevant time was, in his opinion, an extenuating circumstance which should weigh against imposing the maximum penalty of death.

    14. The reason why the discretion was exercised by the learned trial Judge in imposing the lesser of the two sentences falls into two aspects. Firstly, the learned Sessions Judge holds that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove an immediate motive strong enough to impel the accused to do this act and that it was itself an extenuating circumstance. The second aspect of the case is that if a man acts with utter brutality without provocation then an inference could be raised that his mind was unhinged. We are of opinion that these assumptions are taken up by the learned Judge dissociated from the facts of the particular cases in which those assumptions were made. Reliance was placed particularly on the Lahore case, Mitha v. Emperor, in regard to the sheer brutality leading to an inference that the mind was unhinged. The facts of that case, however, disclose that there were circumstances on which the learned Judges came to the conclusion that an inference regarding unsoundness of mind must be raised. This was a case of a person murdering his two children and the evidence led by the prosecution had established that he was a loving father. It was also held proved on evidence that the mind of the accused was unsound, but it could not be said with any degree of certainty that he knew that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to the law within the meaning of s. 84, Indian Penal Code. On these two established facts, viz. that the accused was of unsound mind and that he was a loving father, an inference was raised that the fact that he kills his own children whom he loved, must lead to an inference that the mind of the accused must have been unhinged. We are of opinion that this inference or assumption, that is raised in that case, is based on the facts of that case and that there is nothing common between the facts of that case which led to the inference being raised and the facts of the present case.

    15. In the instant case we cannot ignore two circumstances, firstly, that for a period of about three months the wife had deserted the husband and she had also taken her four children with her. The second circumstance that we cannot forget is that an allegation was made by the wife that her husband had asked her to follow an immoral profession for the purpose of earning money to support the family. We cannot, in these two circumstances, hold that the husband had continued to be a loving husband. In view of these two circumstances, we are of opinion that the facts of the instant case distinguish it entirely from the facts of the Lahore case and that the learned Sessions Judge was certainly not justified in applying the analogy of the Lahore case to the facts of the instant case.

    16. The second circumstance on which reliance is placed by the learned Judge to hold that an irresistible inference arises that the mind of the accused was far from normal and that he then indulged in the brutal act of murder is more or less speculative. There is no evidence which would establish that the accused's mind was far from normal. It has not been shown by the prosecution, nor has any material been elicited by the accused, to hold that the accused's mind was in any way affected. In the absence of any such circumstance or evidence, we are of opinion that this inference raised by the learned Sessions Judge that the mind of the accused was far from normal is a speculation and has no reference to the facts of the case. It is undoubtedly true that a man does not commit murder of his wife unless his mind is agitated. But the agitation of the mind does not necessarily lead to an inference that it had affected his mental capacity so as to lead to an inference that the mind was unhinged or had become unsound.

    17. The learned counsel for the accused contended that the fact that the prosecution had failed to prove any motive had a substantial bearing on the point under consideration. His argument was that the accused's defence had necessarily to be considered by us before we could come to a conclusion whether the act of immorality, which is imputed to the deceased, was at the suggestion of the accused or at the suggestion of her brother Sadhu. If the suggestion had come from Sadhu and the accused's story is true that his wife had gone astray on account of the insinuation or persistent, persuasion of Sadhu, then there would be reason to hold that the accused could have some disturbance of his mind not brought about by his own actions. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the story given by the accused and the story given by the prosecution witnesses in regard to these insinuations regarding the immoral life.

    18. [His Lordships after considering the relevant material, proceeded.]

    19. This fact is then established by the prosecution that it was the accused who was calling upon his wife to lead an immoral life and that she had not only refused to lead an immoral life, but that she had left the house of her husband and had gone to live with her brother along with her four children. The prosecution, therefore, upon this evidence established that the accused had a grievance against the deceased, because she had refused to do what he had asked her to do, and in the bargain had left his house altogether. This, according to us, was a sufficient motive for a man to brood upon for a period of about three months during which his wife was living away from him. It cannot, therefore, be held that there was no motive, or that there was no provocation at all given by the wife to the husband, for this drastic action. It may be that such incidents do not play a large part in the life of some persons. But we cannot hold that they are not likely to play such a large part in the life of any man whatsoever. In certain circumstances, such an act will be a sufficient motive, and we are of opinion, that the prosecution has not failed to prove a motive.

    20. In this connection, we may point out that this particular factor that there was a motive distinguishes this case clearly from the facts of the Lahore case, Mitha v. Emperor. The observations of the learned Judges are prefaced by the words “in the absence of any provocation, sheer brutality of assault would lead to an inference etc.” We, therefore, hold that the learned Sessions Judge has speculatively held that the accused's mind was disturbed and that it was so far agitated that it would amount to an extenuating circumstance for not imposing the capital punishment.

    21. The facts established by the prosecution, therefore, are:

    (1) that the financial circumstances of the accused had deteriorated about a year before this incident;

    (2) that the accused was calling upon his wife, who had already borne four children from him, to lead an immoral life to earn money to give it to him;

    (3) that the wife refused to do so and left the house of her husband about three months before this incident; and

    (4) that, on the day of the incident, the accused had come with a knife in his hand to the bazar, and, upon the sight of the deceased along with others, he rushed at the deceased and gave blows with it on vital parts of her body taking out the intestines in the process.

    22. We are of opinion that these circumstances are serious enough to show that there could be no extenuating circumstance in the case of this accused for being considered for a sympathetic view in regard to the sentence.

    23. Mr. Kamlakar then urged that a discretion lay in the learned Sessions Judge in the matter of sentence. That discretion was exercised by the learned Judge and that the discretion having been exercised, we should not lightly discard that discretion. He then referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Alamgir v. State of Bihar . [1959] A.I.R S.C 436., in support of his contention. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with a case where the High Court had enhanced the sentence given by the lower Court and an appeal was filed by the accused before the Supreme Court. Their Lordships dealing with the question of sentence in regard to the conviction under s. 498 of the Indian Penal Code held that they were satisfied that the High Court was not justified in directing appellant No. 1 to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months by way of enhancement of sentence. Their Lordships observed that the High Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to enhance such sentence under s. 439, Criminal Procedure Code, but this jurisdiction can be properly exercised only if the High Court is satisfied that the sentence imposed by the trial Judge is unduly lenient, or, that, in passing the order of sentence, the trial Judge had manifestly failed to consider the relevant facts. In this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the adequacy of the sentence where there was ample latitude for a higher sentence or a lesser sentence. The point, however, before us is not a question of adequacy of sentence, but it is a case of an alternative only. There are only two sentences for an offence of murder, (1) death and (2) imprisonment for life, and the normal rules of adequacy of sentence, therefore, would not apply, because there is no latitude in regard to adequacy of sentence. This question, however, in regard to the sentence was twice dealt with by two Division Benches of this Court, once in State v. Airarsing . [1956] A.I.R Bom. 231. and, on the second occasion, in State v. Pandurang Shinde . [1956] A.I.R Bom. 711.. On both the occasions, the learned Judges were considering a sentence for murder under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Justice Shah (as he then was) in considering the alternative sentence observed as follows (p. 232):

    “…If we were called upon to try this case, we have no doubt that we would have imposed, if we were satisfied of the truth of the prosecution evidence, the death sentence. But the learned Sessions Judge having exercised the discretion which indisputably is vested in him, this Court would not be justified in interfering with the exercise of that discretion unless it is found that the exercise of discretion is perverse or in fact no discretion whatever has been exercised.”

    24. In dealing with the same point in State v. Pandurang the same learned Judge observed as follows (p. 714):

    “When an accused person is convicted of an offence of murder the normal sentence to be imposed is the sentence of death. If the Sessions Court does not impose the sentence of death, reasons must be assigned for not imposing that sentence. It is true that there is a certain amount of discretion vested in the Court of first instance to impose or not to impose the death sentence. But the discretion must be judicially exercised. If there are circumstances which in the view of the Court of Session justify it in not imposing the death sentence, normally this Court would not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.”

    25. Dealing with the facts of that case, however, the learned Judge observes further as follows (p. 714):—

    “But, in the present case, in our view, there appears to be no exercise whatever of the discretion vested in the trial Court. The learned Sessions Judge has himself pointed out that the offence was committed in broad daylight and it was a calculated cold-blooded and pre-meditated murder.”

    26. The learned Judge thereafter dealt with the question of sentence on merits. But these two decisions of the Division Benches of this Court have laid down that if it appears to this Court that the discretion has been exercised perversely or that the discretion has not at all been exercised, then this Court has the right to interfere in the matter of sentence.

    27. We have earlier pointed out that it is clear to us that the learned Sessions Judge has given reasons which appear to us to be more or less speculative. In fact, the learned Judge has, in various earlier paragraphs, found certain facts which he should have considered in the matter of sentence. In para. 45, while dealing with the defence of the accused, the learned Judge observes as follows:—

    “The act was clearly premeditated.”

    28. In para. 48, while considering the question of sentence the learned Judge observed as follows:—

    “True that the acts of the accused had been brutal and barbarous and extremely revolting.”

    29. Having come to the conclusion that the act was pre-meditated and that the acts were also brutal, barbarous and extremely revolting, the learned Judge should have taken these facts into consideration while exercising his discretion. Instead of taking these facts into consideration, the learned Judge proceeded to go on a speculative reason that the mind of the accused had got unhinged. We have earlier pointed out that there is no evidence in support of this finding of the learned Judge that the mind of the accused was unhinged or was in any way unsound. We are, therefore, of opinion that in the present case, the learned Judge, not having taken the necessary facts into consideration, or having relied upon reasons which are more or less speculative, has not exercised the discretion at all. It is, therefore, necessary for us to exercise the discretion.

    30. The next question that arises is about the sentence of death.

    31. Mr. Kamlakar urged that after the amendment of s. 367(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code, there is no obligation upon the Court after holding an accused guilty under s. 302, Indian Penal Code, to impose a death sentence in preference to the sentence for imprisonment for life. Before the amendment of s. 367(5) in 1956, the section read as follows:

    “367.(5) If the accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death, and the Court sentences him to any punishment other than death, the Court shall in its judgment state the reason why sentence of death was not passed.”

    32. A view was taken consistent with s. 367, that sub-s. (5) thereof entailed that the sentence of death was a primary sentence in regard to the offence of murder and that, if the said sentence was not imposed, there was an obligation upon the Judge to explain why. The decisions have consistently taken the view that the sentence of imprisonment for life is a lesser sentence than the sentence of death. These two facts considered together, viz. that the sentence of death is a higher punishment and that the reasons have got to be given in the judgment by the Judge giving a lesser sentence why the death sentence is not imposed, were held to lead to an inference that the capital sentence was the main punishment for death. Mr. Kamlakar urged that in 1956 this particular provision of sub-s. (5) of s. 367, Criminal Procedure Code, was omitted from the Criminal Procedure Code and this would only be the result of the Legislature having intended that there was no obligation upon the Court to consider capital sentence as the primary punishment for murder. In other words, the two sentences, one of death and the other of imprisonment for life, were co-ordinate sentences and that either could be given without giving any reasons for the same. The question is whether the amendment of s. 367(5) was intended for this reason and it has to be so carried out.

    33. On this point decisions of the two High Courts were brought to our notice. The Allahabad High Court in an earlier decision, Satya Vir v. State . [1958] A.I.R All. 746. did not decide this point but doubted the correctness of the argument of the counsel to the following effect (p. 747):—

    “The assumption that the sentence of death was the normal penalty for murder and imprisonment for life the exception which had to be justified by some reason, was based on the law as embodied in sub-s. (5) of S. 367, Cr. P.C before its repeal by the Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 26 of 1955 with effect from 1-1-1956. Since the omission of that sub-section, the question of proper sentence where the accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death is to be decided, not on any assumption of that nature, but like any other point for determination with the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision, as provided by sub-s. (1) of that section.”

    34. The same High Court, however, in a later decision dispelled this argument. In Ram Singh v. State . [1960] A.I.R All. 748. the learned Judges considered the same point and in para 10, the learned Judges observed as follows (p. 751):—

    “We do not think that the amendment of S. 367 Cr. P.C affects the law regulating punishment under the Penal Code. This amendment related to procedure, and now Courts are no longer required to elaborate the reasons for not awarding the death penalty; but they cannot depart from sound judicial considerations in preferring the lesser punishment. A court may record no reason for not passing the death sentence, but if it awards life imprisonment for a cold-blooded and revolting murder the absence of reasons will not save its preference from being unjudicial.”

    35. The Madras High Court, dealing with the same question in ‘In re Veluchami’8 observed as follows (p. 49):—

    “With regard to the sentence, we are constrained to observe that the learned Sessions Judge has given no reasons for imposing the lesser sentence, in paragraph 49 of his judgment though in paragraph 45 he expresses the view that the appellant had the excuse that he was wounded in his tenderest feeling by his wife's ultimate confession. Unfortunately, the State has preferred no revision upon the matter of sentence and we hence feel most reluctant to interfere. But, in the interests of justice, we are constrained to point out that this is a case in which the extreme penalty of the law definitely appears to be called for.” (Para. 7).

    36. While dealing with the question of the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code by deleting sub-s. (5) of s. 367, the learned Judges observed as follows (p. 49):—

    “… We are making these observations because we wish to make it very clear for the guidance of courts of trial, that while there is a judicial discretion vested in Sessions Judges to award the lesser penalty in a case of murder and the Criminal Procedure Code, as now amended, does not require reasons to be stated, this does not mean that any special pleading or formal excuse should displace such properly bestowed judicial discretion and thought. It is the duty of the courts to award the extreme penalty of the law, for purposes of deterrence, in all cases of murder, where the crime is deliberate and there are no extenuating features.”

    37. The later decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Singh v. State and the decision of the Madras High Court, ‘In re Veluchami Thevar’ have taken a clear view that the amendment of s. 367(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code has made no difference in the matter of sentence for an offence of murder under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

    38. In V. Thevar v. State of Madras . [1957] A.I.R S.C 614. their Lordships had to deal with the question of sentence under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and the observations of their Lordships, in para. 13 at page 619, are as follows:—

    “…If the court is convinced about the truth of the prosecution story, conviction has to follow. The question of sentence has to be determined, not with reference to the volume or character of the evidence adduced by the prosecution in support of the prosecution case, but with reference to the fact whether there are any extenuating circumstances which can be said to mitigate the enormity of the crime. If the court is satisfied that there are such mitigating circumstances, only then, it would be justified in imposing the lesser of the two sentences provided by law…. The question as to what punishment should be imposed is for the court to decide in all the circumstances of the case with particular reference to any extenuating circumstances.”

    39. Their Lordships clearly laid down that unless there are extenuating circumstances, the punishment for murder should be death, and not imprisonment for life. This case was in relation to an offence which was committed before the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XXVI of 1965 was enacted. The question is whether this decision would prevail after the amendment. We are of opinion that these observations would prevail inspite of the amendment.

    40. The amendment, in our opinion, does not affect the question regarding the exercise of the discretion. Section 367(5), Criminal Procedure Code, before amendment laid down what the Judge should state in his judgment after a particular decision is taken. In regard to the exercise of the discretion s. 367(5), as it stood before amendment, did not offer any guidance. If guidance was not offered by the section as it stood before amendment, the deletion by amendment could not affect the exercise of discretion.

    41. A discretion has to be exercised judicially. It must also appear that it is so exercised. This can be done if reasons for the exercise of the discretion are given in the order exercising the discretion. Whether the statute requires it or not reasons have to be given. The section could, therefore, have no relevance on the decision itself. We are in agreement with the learned Judges of the Madras and Allahabad High Courts on this point.

    42. The observations of the Supreme Court in V. Thevar v. State of Madras give the necessary guidance. The Supreme Court has clearly laid down that except in cases where there are extenuating circumstances, the normal punishment for the offence of murder under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code is death. We cannot, therefore, agree with the argument advanced by Mr. Kamlakar that, after the amendment of s. 367(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code, a change is brought about in the exercise of the discretion by the Courts in regard to the alternative sentence under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

    43. The last question is whether there are any extenuating circumstances in the present case. We are of opinion that there are none. On the contrary, the circumstances appear to us to be rather aggravated. No man should ordinarily call upon his wife to earn money for him by living a life of immorality. The wife was justified in refusing this request. She was also justified in refusing to live with her husband who had asked her to lead an immoral life for the purpose of earning money for him.

    44. The accused, therefore, asked his wife to do something, which no wife should be asked to do and no wife would willingly do. He brought a refusal upon himself and, naturally, must have been brooding. The entire evidence discloses no other circumstances which would lead the accused to do this act. There was no other provocation which was given by the deceased to the accused which would have justified the accused doing even a little harm to his wife. She left the house for a justifiable reason. She refused to do something which a wife should refuse to do every time. The refusal, therefore, which was brought about in a righteous manner, did not give any provocation to the husband to cause any harm to the woman, let alone her death.

    45. The manner in which the death was caused is also well expressed by the learned Sessions Judge as cruel, barbarous and extremely revolting. In broad day-light this man comes with a knife in his hand, with a blade 8 inches long. He runs after his wife immediately upon seeing her, catches hold of her by her hair and then goes on delivering blows one after the other. Twice he was hampered in this by one of the witnesses who wanted to save the woman, but the accused pushed him away and continued his barbarous act. The woman died on the spot. In our opinion, there are no extenuating circumstances at all in this case.

    46. Mr. Kamlakar urged that the children now left behind would be orphans if we direct the death penalty for the accused. That, in our opinion, cannot be a consideration for sympathy to be extended to the accused. All our sympathies are with the children. But we are of opinion that we can do nothing for them in this matter. Saving the life of this man, in our opinion, would be putting him in jail for a period of about not less than 15 years. The youngest child is about three years old. By the time this man comes out, the youngest child will have attained sufficient maturity to earn his livelihood. This man, therefore, is useless to them for all purposes. Whether we give him the sentence of imprisonment for life or the sentence of death, will be of no consequence to them,. We are, therefore, of opinion that it is necessary to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Sessions Judge in granting him the sentence of imprisonment for life.

    47. Mr. Dharmadhikari, who appears for the State, also states that the fine imposed should be set aside. The sentence of fine is set aside.

    48. We, therefore, allow the revision application and make the rule absolute.

    49. We confirm the order of conviction of the accused-opponent Gourishankar under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code passed by the learned Sessions Judge, but alter the sentence of imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 300 imposed by him on the accused thereunder, to a sentence of death. We direct that the accused be hanged by the neck till he is dead.

    50. Rule made absolute.

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    State Of Maharashtra v. Gourishankar Kawadu Shende
    (Sep 28, 1965)