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  • provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Succession Act.
  • s. 41 in Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act,
  • ss. 305 and 306 of the Indian Succession Act. These sections
  • SECTION 41 PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT
  • s. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act
  • FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT
  • s. 306 of the Indian Succession Act)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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  • provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Succession Act.
  • s. 41 in Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act,
  • ss. 305 and 306 of the Indian Succession Act. These sections
  • SECTION 41 PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT
  • s. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act
  • FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT
  • s. 306 of the Indian Succession Act)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns a revisional application filed by the heirs and legal representatives of Damji Lavji Damani (the original licensee) against an order of the Court of Small Causes at Bombay. The original ejectment application (No. 98/1232.E of 1960) was initiated by the licensor to eject the licensee from certain premises under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. The licensee died intestate on May 31, 1962. Subsequently, the licensor applied to set aside the abatement of the ejectment application due to the licensee's death, sought condonation for delay, and requested that the legal representatives of the deceased licensee be brought on record as defendants. The Court of Small Causes granted this application by an order dated February 21, 1963, which was challenged by the licensee's heirs in this revisional proceeding.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether ejectment proceedings under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act survive the death of a licensee and can be continued against his legal representatives.
  2. Whether a licence, being a personal right, is heritable or transferable such that legal representatives can be made parties to ejectment proceedings after the licensee's death.
  3. The applicability of procedural rules under Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure and succession provisions under sections 305 and 306 of the Indian Succession Act to ejectment proceedings initiated under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (Heirs and Legal Representatives of the Licensee)

  • The ejectment application against the licensee terminated upon his death, as the licence is a personal right and not heritable.
  • The proceedings under section 41 cannot be continued against legal representatives because the licence does not create rights in them.
  • Relied on the decision in Ranganatham Pillai v. Govindarajulu Naidu, where it was held that the cause of action under section 41 expires with the death of the licensee.

Licensor's Position (Implied from the Court's Analysis)

  • The licence granted to Damji Lavji Damani had been revoked prior to the ejectment application, making him a trespasser.
  • The ejectment proceedings are property-related and thus survive the death of the licensee and can be continued against his legal representatives.
  • Procedural provisions under Order XXII of the CPC and sections 305 and 306 of the Indian Succession Act apply, allowing continuation of proceedings against legal representatives.
  • Contentions raised by the licensee in the written statement (that he was a sub-tenant and not merely a licensee) relate to proprietary rights that legal representatives could continue to assert.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ranganatham Pillai v. Govindarajulu Naidu, [1950] II Mad. L.J 280 Held that ejectment proceedings under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act expire with the death of the licensee, as the licence is not heritable. The court respectfully disagreed with this precedent, holding that ejectment proceedings survive the death of the licensee and can continue against legal representatives.
Hirendra Bhusan v. Purna Chandra, 1948 52 C.W.N 843 Interpreted "occupant" under section 41 to include tenants or licensees and persons holding under them; supported continuation of proceedings against legal representatives. The court accepted this interpretation as correct and relied upon it to support continuation of proceedings after death.
Chinnan v. Ranjithammal, 1930 I.L.R 54 Mad. 554 Held that a licence is personal, not annexed to property, and not transferable or heritable; licensees cease to have rights upon transfer or revocation. The court agreed with the principle that licences are personal and not heritable but distinguished this from the procedural question of continuation of ejectment proceedings.
Vadapalli Narasimham v. Dronamraju Seetharamamurthy Held that representatives of a tenant on sufferance are mere trespassers and do not succeed to any tenancy interest. The court noted this authority to analogize that licensees and their representatives hold no proprietary right after revocation or death.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the nature of a licence under the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, emphasizing that a licence is a personal right, not annexed to property, nor transferable or heritable. It acknowledged that upon revocation of a licence, the licensee’s possession becomes trespassory.

However, the court distinguished between the personal nature of the licence and the procedural capacity to continue ejectment proceedings after the death of the licensee. The court considered the provisions of Order XXII, Rules 1 and 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allow suits to continue against legal representatives if the right to sue survives. It also referred to sections 305 and 306 of the Indian Succession Act, which provide for survival of property-related causes of action to executors or administrators, barring certain personal causes of action.

Since ejectment proceedings under section 41 concern property rights and recovery of possession, the court held that such proceedings do not abate upon the death of the licensee. Rather, they survive and can be continued against legal representatives. The court rejected the precedent set in Ranganatham Pillai v. Govindarajulu Naidu, which held to the contrary, and found the interpretation given by the Calcutta High Court in Hirendra Bhusan v. Purna Chandra more persuasive.

The court also noted that the licensee had pleaded proprietary rights (as a sub-tenant) in his written statement, which his legal representatives could continue to assert, reinforcing the need to continue the proceedings against them.

Holding and Implications

The revisional application is dismissed.

The Court upheld the order allowing the ejectment proceedings to continue against the legal representatives of the deceased licensee. This decision confirms that ejectment proceedings under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, being property-related, survive the death of the licensee and are not extinguished by the personal nature of the licence. The ruling clarifies the procedural applicability of Order XXII of the CPC and sections 305 and 306 of the Indian Succession Act to such proceedings. No new precedent beyond the facts of this case was established; the direct effect is to allow continuation of ejectment suits against legal representatives in similar circumstances.

    Sakinabai D.L Damani v. Salebhai Hasanali Engineer

    K.K Desai, J.:— This is a revisional application by heirs and legal representatives of one Damji Lavji Damani, being the original respondent, (hereinafter referred to as “the licensee”,) in the Ejectment Application No. 98/1232.E of 1960 filed by the opponent (original applicant), (hereinafter referred to as “the licensor”), in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay under s. 41 in Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, seeking to eject the licensee from the premises mentioned in the application. The licensee died intestate at Bombay on May 31, 1962, leaving him surviving as his only heirs and legal representatives the petitioners in this revisional application. By his application dated November 12, 1962, the licensor applied to the Court of Small Causes to set aside the abatement of his application and to condone delay in the making of the application and to bring on the record of the ejectment application the names of the above petitioners as defendants Nos. 1 to 8 as legal representatives of the licensee.

    2. The petitioners in this revisional application contend that the Court of Small Causes ought not to have made the order dated February 21, 1963, granting the application of the licensor. Their case is that the Court below ought to have held that since the licensor's case against the deceased licensee was that he was a licensee and his licence had been revoked, the ejectment application came to an end (altogether) upon the death of the licensee on May 31, 1962. The proceedings for ejectment under s. 41 of the Act are such as cannot be continued against the legal representatives of the licensee. The reason for this, according to the petitioners, is that a licence is not heritable. The proceedings under s. 41 could only lie against a licensee. These proceedings filed against any particular person are not liable to be continued against his legal representatives, because a licence is not heritable and does not create any rights in the legal representatives of the original opponent in the ejectment application. In this connection, the petitioners rely upon the decision of a single Judge of the High Court at Madras in the case of Ranganatham Pillai v. Govindarajulu Naidu . [1950] II Mad. L.J 280.. In the above case, a landlord had filed an ejectment application under s. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act against two defendants. Defendant No. 1 to whom the licence had been granted (licensee) died pending the hearing of the ejectment application. The applicant applied to the trial Court for having defendant No. 2 brought on record as legal representative of defendant No. 1 in the ejectment application. The trial Court granted that application. In the revisional petition before the High Court of Madras, on behalf of defendant No. 2, it was contended that

    “the cause of action contemplated by section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, where a licensee happens to be the person against whom a proceeding is sought to be taken in the first instance is something which necessarily expires with the death of the licensee”.

    3. The contention urged was that with the death of defendant No. 1 there was no proceeding to be continued against defendant No. 2 as “holding under or by assignment from” defendant No. 1 within the language of s. 41 of the Act. The contention was accepted by the Court. In that connection, the Court disapproved of the observations made by the High Court of Calcutta in the case of Hirendra Bhusan v. Purna Chandra . 1948 52 C.W.N 843, at p. 848.. The Court referred to the decision of the High Court of Madras in the case of Chinnan v. Ranjithammal . 1930 I.L.R 54 Mad. 554.. It is necessary to point out that the first part of the observations in the case of Chinnan v. Ranjithammal quoted in the case of Ranganatham Pillai v. Govindarajulu Naidu relates to the position of a licensee whose licensor sells away the immovable property in question. It is observed that upon transfer and sale of the property the licensee ceases to have any rights altogether and the licence stands revoked upon transfer and sale of the property. The Court further observed (p. 556):

    “…A license is not annexed to the property in respect of which it is enjoyed, nor is it a transferable or heritable right, but is a right purely personal between grantor and licensee. Unless a different intention appears, it cannot even be exercised by the licensee's servants or agents (section 56). Accordingly in their occupation of the plot, and especially so since the death of Ponjolai, the defendants have been mere trespassers….We need not look further for authority than to Vadapalli Narasimham v. Dronamraju Seetharamamurthy4, for the proposition that the representatives of a tenant on sufference are mere trespassers, since they cannot be regarded as succeeding to any interest in the tenancy; and what is true of a tenant on sufference would seem to be true also of a licensee.”

    4. Now, in connection with the above observations of the High Court of Madras in case of Chinnan v. Ranjithammal, we respectfully agree that a licence is not annexed to the property, nor is it transferable or heritable. We further agree that a tenant on sufferance is a mere trespasser and what is true of a tenant on sufferance would seem to be true also of a licensee. The total result of the above position is that upon revocation of a licence the licensee ceases to have any lawful right to enter upon and/or to continue in occupation of the property in question. The character of his possession and occupation subsequent to the valid revocation of the licence is that of a trespasser.

    5. In this very connection and in connection with the contents of s. 41 of the Act, in the case of Hirendra Bhusasn v. Purna Chandra, the Calcutta High Court, inter alia, observed (p. 848):

    “…According to sec. 41, ‘occupant’ comprises a ‘tenant or occupier or any person holding under or by assignment from him’, and the first paragraph of the section suggests that by ‘occupier’ is meant a person occupying the property by permission of the applicant or any person through whom the applicant claims, that is to say, a licensee. The effect of the section, generally stated, therefore, is that the landlord may demand possession of a tenant or a licensee or a person holding under or by assignment from such tenant or licensee, as the case may be, and if the demand be not complied with, he may apply for summons against the person who failed to deliver possession on such demand”.

    6. Raghava Rao J., in deciding the case of Ranganatham Pillai v. Govindarajulu Naidu, dissented from the views expressed by the High Court of Calcutta as quoted above. As we will presently point out, it appears to us that the construction of s. 41 of the Act as decided by the High Court of Calcutta in the manner mentioned above is correct. With respect, we do not agree with Raghava Rao J. that the opinion expressed by the High Court of Calcutta is erroneous.

    7. Now, in this connection, we will first refer to the relevant provisions in s. 41 of the Act which run as follows:

    “41. Summons against person occupying property without leave.—When any person has had possession of any immoveable property…as the tenant, or by permission, of another person, or of some person through whom such other person claims,

    and such tenancy or permission has determined or been withdrawn,

    and such tenant or occupier or any person holding under or by assignment from him (hereinafter called the occupant) refuses to deliver up such property in compliance with a request made to him in this behalf by such other person,

    such other person, (hereinafter called the applicant) may apply to the Small Cause Court…”

    8. Apparently, the provisions in s. 41 provide for a summary application for ejectment of parties who by consent may have been enjoying rights of occupation of properties. These parties have been mentioned in the section as (i) tenants, (ii) occupants by permission of another person and (iii) occupants to whom permission may have been granted by the parties who had permission. Against all such parties, ejectment proceedings are liable to be instituted under s. 41. The only condition for institution of such application is that the tenancy or permission must be determined or must have been withdrawn. According to the licensor, the original licensee Damji Lavji Damani was given a licence to be on the premises mentioned in the application. His licence had been revoked by the licensor prior to the institution of the ejectment application. The obvious result of that revocation was as already discussed above that the licensee was from the date of revocation of the licence a trespasser in occupation of the premises mentioned in the application. He thereafter had no right whatsoever according to the licensor to continue to occupy the premises. The question is as to how the proceedings by way of ejectment application were affected by reason of licensee's death on May 31, 1962. Now, in this connection the provisions which became applicable were the provisions in O. XXII, rr. 1 and 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The relevant parts of these rules provide:

    “1. The death of a…defendant shall not cause the suit to abate if the right to sue survives,”

    “2. (1) Where…a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit…”

    9. In connection with the question of the right to sue surviving upon death of a person, the relevant statutory provisions are contained in ss. 305 and 306 of the Indian Succession Act. These sections provide as follows:

    “305. An executor or administrator has the same power to sue in respect of all causes of action that survive the deceased, and may exercise the same power for the recovery of debts as the deceased had when living.

    306. All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or administrators; except causes of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party; and except also cases where, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory.”

    10. The maxim of law in this connection is actio personalis moritur cum persona (the right of personal action dies with the person). The converse of this has been accepted as correct by all Courts throughout. The converse is that property rights in favour of and/or against any person continue to exist in favour of or against legal representatives of a deceased party-litigant. It is for this reason that one finds the above provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Succession Act. The question in connection with bringing legal representatives on record (in the language of s. 306 of the Indian Succession Act) would be:—whether the cause and/or the suit relates to defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or it relates to other personal injuries not causing the death of the party and whether it is such as after the death of the party the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. In this connection, reference may be made to the provisions in the Fatal Accidents Act and similar statutes. In our view, it is not possible for us to form the opinion that the ejectment application proceedings against persons mentioned in s. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act are proceedings not relating to property rights and/or recovery of properties. These are not proceedings which are relating to personal causes of action. These proceedings do not die with the death of a party to the proceedings whether he may be applicant and/or opponent. On the contrary, these being proceedings for recovery of properties and for enforcing rights to properties, are such as could always be continued against legal representatives of a deceased party to the proceedings.

    11. Having regard to the above discussion, with respect, we are unable to accept as correct the ratio of the decision in the case of Ranganatham Pillai v. Govindarajidu Naidu mentioned above. We respectfully disagree with the observation in that case that the ejectment proceedings under s. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act are something which necessarily expire with the death of the licensee. In our view, these are proceedings which are liable to be continued upon death of the opponent in the proceedings against his legal representatives.

    12. In this connection, it is necessary to mention that by the written statement filed by the licensee, it was, inter alia, contended that he was not a licensee as alleged in the application. In fact, he was a sub-tenant. Having regard to his position as a sub-tenant, he also contended that by the notice mentioned in the application the applicant was not entitled to terminate his rights as a sub-tenant. He had acquired rights of a tenant. He was not liable to be ejected from the premises.

    13. Now, these were contentions relating to exercise and enforcement of proprietary rights on behalf of the licensee. It is difficult to see how the legal representatives of the licensee were not entitled to adopt these contentions and if they were right how they were liable to be ejected in the ejectment application proceedings. We have referred to the above contentions made in the written statement only because these go to show that contentions of various kinds relating to proprietary rights would generally arise in ejectment applications filed under s. 41 of the Act. In connection with the licensor's contention that the lisensee had become a trespasser having regard to revocation of his licence and the contentions of the licensee of the nature mentioned above, it is clear that the proceedings were liable to be continued upon death of the licensee against his legal representatives.

    14. In the result, the revisional application is dismissed. Rule discharged with costs.

    15. Rule discharged.

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    Sakinabai D.L Damani v. Salebhai Hasanali Engineer
    (Mar 15, 1965)