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  • s. 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act
  • s. 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act
  • sub-section (2) of section 22
  • Finance Act of 1938,
  • Finance Act of 1939,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • s. 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act
  • s. 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act
  • sub-section (2) of section 22
  • Finance Act of 1938,
  • Finance Act of 1939,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This reference concerns a notice under s. 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act seeking to bring to tax an amount of Rs. 5,10,788 shown as interest for the assessment year 1947–1948. The assessee is a partnership known in the opinion as the Kamptee firm (R.B. Bansilal Abirchand Firm, Kamptee), composed of four Daga brothers together with three minor family members. There was another firm, the Bisesar House firm, in which the four Daga brothers (as a group) and the late Sir Manekji Dadabhoy were partners.

In the return for 1947–1948 the Kamptee firm showed a net business loss of Rs. 1,09,311 after accounting for interest receipts and payments. The return included an item of Rs. 5,10,788 paid as interest by the Bisesar House firm but that amount had been excluded from assessment by the Income-tax Officer (ITO), who accepted the Kamptee firm's return.

In the separate assessment of the Bisesar House firm the ITO disallowed the same Rs. 5,10,788 on the ground that the advances were effectively from the partners themselves and so could not be allowed as firm expenses. On appeal, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (Bombay Bench) reversed the ITO by order dated February 23, 1950, holding that the Kamptee firm was a distinct legal entity and that the advances had been made by the Kamptee firm (credited to the Kamptee firm's account) and not by the individual partners personally. That Tribunal finding meant the amount could be regarded as income of the Kamptee firm.

Following the Tribunal's order, the Department issued a notice under s. 34(1)(b) to reopen the Kamptee firm's assessment and bring the Rs. 5,10,788 to tax. The reference posed to the court was whether, on the facts and circumstances, the ITO had "information in his possession" so as to have jurisdiction to issue the s. 34(1)(b) notice.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under the facts and circumstances of this case, there was any "information in the possession" of the Income-tax Officer which justified reopening the assessment and issuing a notice under section 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act in respect of Rs. 5,10,788.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (represented by Mr. Thakar)

  • The item of Rs. 5,10,788 was disclosed in the Kamptee firm's original return; nothing was concealed and therefore there was no new "information" in the ITO's possession when he issued the s. 34(1)(b) notice.
  • At the time the Kamptee firm's assessment was dealt with, the assessment of the Bisesar House firm had already proceeded on the basis that the Kamptee firm (or its partners) were partners of the Bisesar House firm; consequently the Kamptee firm could not have had any information unknown to the ITO.
  • Reliance was placed on earlier case law (under the unamended s. 34) to show that a mere reiteration or re-statement of the legal position, or correction of a mistaken view of the law, does not constitute "information" sufficient to reopen an assessment. Specific cases cited by Mr. Thakar included: Income-tax Appellate Tribunal v. B.P. Byramji & Co. (1945 14 I.T.R. 174) and New Victoria Mills Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1953 24 I.T.R. 388).

Respondent's / Department's Position (as described in the opinion)

  • The Tribunal's decision in the Bisesar House assessment of February 23, 1950, altered the legal and factual position by holding that the Kamptee firm was a separate legal entity and that the advances were made by the Kamptee firm (credited to its account). This alteration constituted "information" within s. 34(1)(b).
  • Once that Tribunal order was in the Department's possession, any officer could reasonably form the view (have "reason to believe") that the Rs. 5,10,788 had escaped assessment or had been under-assessed in the Kamptee firm's assessment, thereby justifying a notice under s. 34(1)(b).
  • The Department relied on the distinction between the post-1948 amended wording of s. 34(1)(b) ("information in his possession" and "reason to believe") and the earlier formulation which used "definite information" and "discovers".

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal v. B.P. Byramji & Co., 1945 14 I.T.R. 174 The case emphasized the words "definite information" in the unamended s. 34 and held that a successor officer's correction of a legal view of his predecessor did not amount to "definite information" to reopen an assessment. The Court distinguished this authority because it was decided under the unamended section and on facts where the "definite information" consisted only of a legal view about applicability of different Finance Act rates. The present case involved an operative factual finding by the Tribunal about the relationship between two firms, not merely an exercise in legal re-characterisation.
New Victoria Mills Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 1953 24 I.T.R. 388 Under the unamended section, the Tribunal's earlier holding that a sum was an allowable expenditure was held not, by itself, to constitute "definite information" justifying reopening the assessment. The Court distinguished this decision for similar reasons: it dealt with the unamended "definite information" language and facts where the Tribunal's prior holding foreclosed the Department's contention. In the present case, by contrast, the Tribunal in a connected assessment made a decisive finding altering the legal/factual position.
K.T. Kubal & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 1962 49 I.T.R. 433 The Supreme Court held that a mere change of opinion by the Tribunal on admissibility of expenditures (especially where observations were obiter and the items were not before the Tribunal on appeal) did not constitute "information" under s. 34(1)(b). The Court distinguished Kubal on the facts: in Kubal the Tribunal's remarks were obiter and related to items not before it on appeal; here the Tribunal adjudicated a question that was before it and its order was operative and affected the parties' rights, and therefore amounted to "information".
Maharaj Kumar Kamal Sing v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 1958 35 I.T.R. 1 The Supreme Court held that the word "information" in s. 34(1)(b) included information as to the true and correct state of the law, and therefore could cover relevant judicial decisions. The Court cited this decision to support the proposition that judicial decisions (even unconnected ones) can amount to "information"; while saying it was not necessary to rely fully on that reasoning for the present case, the opinion used the authority to reinforce that a connected Tribunal decision would certainly amount to "information".

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by construing the post-1948 text of s. 34(1)(b). The 1948 amendments removed the words "discovers" and "in consequence of definite information" that appeared in the earlier version, replacing them with the phrases "has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe". The Court observed that this textual change altered the inquiry: the operative requirement is now that the ITO have information in his possession and, on that information, have reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, rather than the higher threshold previously associated with "definite information" and "discovers".

The Court then analysed the factual chronology. Although the Rs. 5,10,788 item had been disclosed in the Kamptee firm's return, that disclosure was made against the background of the then-prevailing view in the Department and in the Bisesar House assessment that the Kamptee firm (or its partners) were partners in the Bisesar House firm and therefore the payment could not be allowed as a firm's expense. The Tribunal's subsequent order in the Bisesar House appeal (23 February 1950) altered that position by holding that the Kamptee firm was a separate legal entity and that the advances were credited to the Kamptee firm itself.

The Court reasoned that this alteration in the legal and factual position — namely, a Tribunal determination that the Kamptee firm was distinct and that the payments were to that firm — constituted "information" within the meaning of s. 34(1)(b). The Court considered and distinguished authorities relied upon by the assessee where prior decisions under the unamended s. 34 had been held not to constitute "definite information." Key distinguishing points were:

  • The earlier authorities (B.P. Byramji and New Victoria Mills) were decided under the unamended section where emphasis was placed on the word "definite" and where the facts involved merely a correction of legal view or had the Tribunal foreclosing the Department's contention; those fact patterns differed from the present case.
  • In K.T. Kubal the Tribunal's remarks were obiter, concerned items not pleaded in appeal, and amounted to a change of opinion by the Tribunal on the same material — therefore not "information". By contrast, in the present matter the Tribunal adjudicated a question that was before it and produced an operative order altering the parties' rights.
  • The Court also cited Maharaj Kumar Kamal Sing to show that "information" can include judicial decisions as to the state of the law; while the Court did not rely entirely on this expansion, it used the authority to reinforce that a connected Tribunal decision would certainly supply "information".

On these bases the Court concluded that the Tribunal's order constituted information in the ITO's possession and that, consequently, the ITO would have "reason to believe" that the Rs. 5,10,788 had escaped assessment or had been under-assessed in the Kamptee firm's assessment. The Court thus found the issuance of the s. 34(1)(b) notice to be valid.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the referred question in the affirmative: the Tribunal's order in the Bisesar House assessment, which altered the legal and factual relationship between the Kamptee firm and the Bisesar House firm, constituted "information in [the Income-tax Officer's] possession" within the meaning of s. 34(1)(b), and thereby invested the ITO with jurisdiction to issue a notice under that provision.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The s. 34(1)(b) notice issued to reopen the Kamptee firm's assessment in respect of the Rs. 5,10,788 was held to be valid; the assessee was ordered to pay the costs of the Commissioner.
  • Legal principle articulated by the Court: An alteration of the legal position of an assessee firm by an operative order in a connected proceeding (for example, a Tribunal decision in the assessment of another firm with common partners) can constitute "information" under s. 34(1)(b) that may give the ITO reason to believe that income has escaped assessment. (The Court cited Maharaj Kumar Kamal Sing for the proposition that "information" may include judicial decisions, although it noted that it was not necessary to rely on that point fully in this case.)
  • Broader precedent-setting: The opinion distinguishes earlier decisions under the unamended s. 34 and explains the effect of the 1948 amendments. The Court framed the present outcome as a consequence of those amendments and the particular factual circumstances; it did not purport to lay down an unqualified rule beyond the scope of the facts described in the opinion.

Answer rendered: the s. 34(1)(b) notice was valid on the facts; costs awarded to the Commissioner.

    R.B Bansilal Abirchand Firm v. The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur & Bhandara

    Kotval, J.:— We are concerned in this reference with a notice issued under s. 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act whereby the Department sought to bring to tax an amount of Rs. 5,10,788 paid as interest in the assessment year 1947–1948. The circumstances in which the notice came to be issued may be briefly stated as follows:—

    2. The assessee is a partnership consisting of four partners (the four Daga brothers) who were referred to in the arguments before us as the Kamptee firm. They had also admitted to the benefit of the partnership three minor members of their family. This firm was known as “R.B Bansilal Abirchand Firm, Kamptee.” We shall refer to it hereafter as the assessee or the “Kamptee firm”. There was also another firm known as the “Bisesar House” Firm in which the four Daga Brothers, the major partners of the Kamptee firm were partners along with a fifth partner the late Sir Manekji Dadabhoy who owned an eight annas' share while the Daga Brothers owned the remaining eight annas' share. The assessee made a return of income-tax for the assessment year 1947–1948 wherein they showed a total net loss of business of Rs. 1,09,311. This figure was worked out after showing certain receipts and payments on account of interest. The total receipts of interest shown were Rs. 4,87,129 from which were deducted certain payments on account of interest to the extent of Rs. 22,398 leaving a net income from interest of Rs. 4,64,731. Adjusting this income against the profit and loss account statement of that year the assessee showed a net loss of Rs. 1,09,311 as stated above. In the return the assessee firm had undoubtedly shown the amount of Rs. 5,10,788 paid as interest by the Bisesar House Firm but it appears that they had excluded it from assessment upon certain grounds. The Income-tax Officer accepted the return and excluded the amount of Rs. 5,10,788 from the tax.

    3. In the meanwhile, proceedings for the assessment of the Bisesar House firm had been taken and the Bisesar House firm had claimed that this amount of Rs. 5,10,788 should be legitimately allowed to them in the assessment for the year 1947–1948. The Income-tax Officer had disallowed it on the ground that the self-same partners of the Kamptee firm were also the partners in the Bisesar House firm and therefore whatever advances the Kamptee firm had made to the Bisesar House firm were advances from the partners in the Bisesar House firm itself and so could not be allowed to the firm as legitimate expenses of business. This view of the Income-tax Officer ultimately came to be challenged before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench, and by an order passed on February 23, 1950, the Tribunal reversed the decision of the Income-tax Officer. The Tribunal held that the constitution of the Kamptee firm was quite different from that of the Bisesar House firm and that the advances to the Bisesar House firm were made by the Kamptee firm as such and not by the several partners of the Kamptee firm who also happened to be partners in the assessee firm. They also found that the advances brought into the Bisesar House firm were not credited to the accounts of the individual partners of the Kamptee firm but were credited to the account of the Kamptee firm itself. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the Income-tax Authorities were wrong in disallowing Rs. 5,10,788 in the assessment of the Bisesar House firm for the assessment year 1947–1948.

    4. It may be noticed here that the very finding given in the assessment of the Bisesar House firm by the Tribunal to which we have just referred showed that the Kamptee firm itself received the amount of Rs. 5,10,788 and that the amount was not paid to its partners. To that extent undoubtedly the finding would affect the finding reached by the Income-tax Officer in the assessment of the Kamptee firm to which we have already adverted. The result, therefore, was inevitable. A notice was issued under s. 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act and the Department sought to bring to assessment the item of Rs. 5,10,788, and it is the validity of that notice that is questioned in the present reference. The question referred is.

    “Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, there was any information before the Income tax Officer seeking to reopen the assessment so as to invest him with jurisdiction to issue notice under section 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act?”

    5. Now, it is not in dispute in the present case that the amount is liable to tax. The only contention that has been taken before the Tribunal and as appears from the reference made was that the action taken by the Income-tax Officer was bad in law in so far as it was not in compliance with the requirements of s. 34(1)(b). The point as it is adumbrated in the question referred is that the mere fact that the Tribunal sitting in judgment over the assessment of the Bisesar House firm altered the order of the Income-tax Authorities below and held that the amount of Rs. 5,10,788 was paid not to the partners but to the Kamptee firm, did not amount to “information in his possession” so far as the Income-tax Officer was concerned and nor could it be said that in consequence he had “reason to believe” and that, therefore, there was no jurisdiction in him to proceed under s. 34(1)(6). It is not in dispute that the relevant provision of law which is attracted in the present case is s. 34(1) as it stood before the amendment in 1956 but after the amendments of 1948. The relevant provision reads thus:

    “34. Income escaping assessment. (1) If—

    (a) the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return of his income under section 22 for any year or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for that year, or have been under-assessed, or assessed at too low a rate, or have been made the subject of excessive relief under the Act, or excessive loss or depreciation allowance has been computed, or

    (b) notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the part of the assessee, the Income-tax Officer has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income, profits and gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for any year, or have been under-assessed, or assessed at too low a rate, or have been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act, or that excessive loss or depreciation allowance has been computed,

    he may in cases falling under clause (a) at any time within eight years and in cases falling under clause (b) at any time within four years of the end of that year, serve on the assessee, or, if the assessee is a company, on the principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any; of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22 and may proceed to assess or reassess such income, profits or gains or recompute the loss or depreciation allowance; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section:

    Provided that—

    (i) the Income-tax Officer shall not issue a notice under this sub-section, unless he has recorded his reasons for doing so and the Commissioner is satisfied on such reasons recorded that it is a fit case for the issue of such notice;

    (ii) the tax shall be chargeable at the rate at which it would have been charged had the income, profits or gains not escaped assessment or full assessment, as the case may be; and

    (iii) where the assessment made or to be made is an assessment made or to be made on a person deemed to be the agent of a non-resident person under section 43, this sub-section shall have effect as if for the periods of eight years and four years a period of one year was substituted.”

    6. The contention that has been raised on behalf of the assessee is that the facts and circumstances established do not warrant the conclusion that the Income-tax Officer had “information in his possession” that income, profits and gains have escaped assessment for any year or have been under-assessed.

    7. In the first place, the present section makes a considerable departure from the law as it stood prior to its amendment in 1948. Prior to that amendment the section ran as follows:

    “34.(1) If in consequence of definite information which has come into his possession the Income-tax Officer discovers that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment in any year, or have been under-assessed, or have been assessed at too low a rate, or have been the subject of excessive relief under this Act, the Income-tax Officer may, in any case in which he has reason to believe that the assessee has concealed the particulars of his income or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars thereof, at any time within eight years, and in any other case at any time within four years of the end of that year, serve on the person liable to pay tax…a notice…”

    8. It will be noticed that the amendments made a radical departure in two respects firstly in that the amendments omitted the word “discovers” from the body of the section, and secondly, instead of the words “in consequence of definite information” the words now used are “has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe”. The difference brought about in the section after the amendment would in the first place render somewhat otiose the view previously taken as to the effect of the word “discovers” and all the learning that has gathered round that word, particularly as to whether it must dc something new that the Income-tax Officer finds before he can act. At present, the requirements of the law are that he must have information in his possession and on the basis of that information he must have reason to believe; and the question is whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case he had such information and he had reason to believe.

    9. Mr. Thakar urged that there was no information in the possession of the Income-tax Officer when he issued the notice under s. 34(1) on January 9, 1952. He has pointed out that the item of Rs. 5,10,788 which is now sought to be brought to tax was already shown in the return initially filed by the assessee firm. He pointed out that all that the firm there stated was that since that income had already been taxed in the hands of the Bisesar House firm, it could not be the subject of double taxation and, therefore, though the assessee firm had shown it in its return it had claimed that it could not be taxed. On that view, he submitted that not a single fact was hidden from the Income-tax Officer and, therefore, when he sought to serve a notice under s. 34(1)(b) he could not be said to have any information in his possession at all which was unknown to him previously.

    10. It seems to us however that the case is not as simple as that. No doubt, the amount of Rs. 5,10,788 was shown in the initial return, filed by the assessee firm, but at the time that income was dealt with by the Income-tax Officer, the assessment of the Bisesar House firm had already been made and the view taken was that the Kamptee firm was a partner in the Bisesar House firm or at any rate its partners were partners of the Bisesar House firm and, therefore, the amount of Rs. 5,10,788 could not be claimed by the Bisesar House firm as a legitimate expense for the simple reason that the payment of interest to partners could not be an expense made by the firm to which the partners belong. Upon this view, undoubtedly the Income-tax Officer who decided the assessee firm's assessment could not have any “information”, because the facts as they were already known were indicated in the return of the assessee firm. But it was later on when the Bisesar House firm filed its appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal that the legal position was completely altered. According to the Tribunal, R.B Bansilal Abirchand firm was a completely different legal entity from the Bisesar House firm, and, therefore, what was originally not allowed as a legitimate expense could thereafter be allowed as a ligitimate expense. In that event, and upon that view inevitably the payment of Rs. 5,10,788 became an income of the Kamptee firm because that firm was not a part and parcel of the Bisesar House firm but was a different legal entity. Now, it was these facts and this legal position which for the first time were brought to light by the order of the Tribunal on February 23, 1950. We have no doubt that this complete alteration in the relative position of the two firms adjudged by the Tribunal constituted “information” within the meaning of s. 34(1)(b) and that consequent upon that information any officer of the Department would have reason to belie the that the item of Rs. 5,10,788 was either not brought to tax or under-assessed.

    11. Mr. Thakar referred to some cases upon this point to show that even under these circumstances the alteration in the findings as to the legal relationship between the Kamptee firm and the Bisesar House firm would not constitute “information”. According to him, it was nothing except reiteration of the true legal position and, therefore, could not be held to be information which had come into the hands of the Income-tax Officer. The two eases cited were Income-tax Appellate Tribunal v. B.P Byramji & Co. . 1945 14 I.T.R 174. and New Victoria, Mills Co., Ltd. v. Commr. of Inc.-tax . 1953 24 I.T.R 388.. These are unfortunately both cases under the provisions of s. 34 before its amendment and the deletion of the word “definite” before “information” in the section. It will lie noticed that in both the eases emphasis has been laid upon the words “definite informal ion” as they occurred in the unamended section. But apart from that, the two cases were decided upon facts which were wholly different. In Income-tax Appellate Tribunal v. B.P Byramji & Co., the assessee had been assessed under the Finance Act of 1938, whereas in the proceedings commenced by the notice under s. 34 subsequently the same assessee was sought to be re-assessed on the short ground that he should have been assessed not under the Finance Act of 1938 but under the Finance Act of 1939, and as stated in the judgment itself it was admitted (p. 178):

    “…that the ‘definite information’ consisted only of his (Income-tax Officer's) view of the law as to whether the rates of the Finance Act of 1938 or 1939 were applicable and that in his view, the rates in the latter Act should have been applied.”

    12. It was in these circumstances that the Nagpur High Court held that the view of the successor of the Income-tax Officer even though it was correct was not based on any definite information coining into his possession but he only corrected a mistaken view of the law applicable, setting his own opinion against that of his predecessor, and that was not a sufficient ground for re-opening the assessment under s. 34 as amended in 1939. The circumstances here are wholly different. In the present case, what has been found is based on the facts and circumstances of the assessment of the Bisesar House firm and upon those facts it was found that the Kamptee firm was not a partner of the Bisesar House firm, and the circumstances, therefore, upon which that finding was reached would constitute information.

    13. Similarly in the case of New Victoria Mills Co., Ltd. v. Commr. of Inc.-tax the Department had sought to bring to tax an item which had previously been adjudicated upon by the Tribunal and it was held that since the Tribunal had held that the sum was an allowable expenditure of the company that alone could not be said to be definite information which led to the discovery that the assessee's income had escaped assessment and, therefore, the revision of the assessment under s. 34 was not justified. It may incidentally be mentioned also that the words which fell for interpretation in that case were the words of the unamended section “definite information”.

    14. Reliance was next placed on a recent decision of this Court in K.T Kubal & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Commr. of Inc.-tax . 1962 49 I.T.R 433.. The facts in that case were peculiar. The assessee company had paid certain amounts by way of commission to one of its employees and the Department had taken the view that those amounts were not paid as legitimate expense but for certain secret commissions in the nature of illegal gratification and, therefore, it disallowed certain portions of those items but allowed lesser amounts under four heads. When appeals were preferred by the assessee regarding the portions disallowed, the Tribunal made a casual remark in its judgment that even the portions which have been allowed ought not to have been allowed and that the deductions should have been wholly disallowed. Consequent upon that remark, a notice under s. 34 came to be issued and this Court ultimately held that the notice was bad. This Court had occasion to observe in that case that a mere change of opinion on the part of the Tribunal regarding the admissibility of certain amounts as business expenditure would not constitute “information” within the meaning of s. 34(1)(b).

    15. It may be mentioned here that the High Court stressed two facts, namely, that the items regarding which the observation was made by the Tribunal were not the subject-matter of the appeal before the Tribunal; in other words, those items being allowed by the Income-tax Officer, the Department had not come up in appeal before the Tribunal and, therefore, the Tribunal's remarks were completely obiter so far as those items were concerned. Secondly, all that the Tribunal did in that case was that upon the same facts and information it changed its view. That, therefore, was held not to be “information” within the meaning of s. 34(1)(b). In the present case, the distinguishing feature is that when the Tribunal, dealing with the Bisesar House's assessment, remarked that the Kamptee firm was a different legal entity from the Bisesar House firm, that very question was up before it for adjudication and, therefore, it came to a legal determination upon that question and it did not as in Kubal's case make any obiter remarks unconnected with the case. The order passed in the present case by the Tribunal in the Bisesar House assessment would be an effective or operative order and to that extent alter the rights of the parties. Therefore, that order showing that alteration would constitute “information” within the meaning of s. 34(1)(b).

    16. It seems to us that upon the facts stated here there is not the slightest doubt that the altered situation as indicated in the order of the Tribunal dated February 23, 1950, showing the true relationship between the assessee firm and the Bisesar House firm affected the assessment of the assessee firm and gave information to the Income-tax Officer upon which he could have reason to believe that the assessee firm had not been assessed on this item or had been under assessed. In our opinion, an alteration of the legal position of an assessee firm in consequence of an order passed in an ancillary proceeding of another firm having common partners would itself constitute “information”, within the meaning of s. 34(1)(b). In a recent decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court of India in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Sing v. Commr. of Inc.-tax . 1958 35 I.T.R 1. it has been held that the word “information” in s. 34(1)(b) included information as to the true and correct state of the law, and so would cover information as to relevant judicial decisions of course, it is not necessary in the present case to go as far as that.

    17. But we have cited this decision to show that even an unconnected judicial decision giving information as to the state of the law would itself amount to “information” within the meaning of s. 34(1)(b); much more so then would a judicial decision in a connected case and between assessees who have common partners be “information”. If it amounted to information, there was no dispute raised that the officer would have “reason to believe”.

    18. In the result, therefore, we answer the question posed in the affirmative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the Commissioner.

    19. Answer accordingly.

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    R.B Bansilal Abirchand Firm v. The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur & Bhandara
    (Jul 25, 1963)