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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellants 1 and 2 were employees of respondent 1 and were dismissed prior to 1952. The Labour Union of which the appellants were members presented demands that included reinstatement of these two dismissed employees. The Government referred all these demands to the Industrial Court under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

On 18-6-1953 the Industrial Tribunal made an award directing respondent 1 to reinstate the appellants from the date of their dismissal. The Industrial Appellate Tribunal confirmed that award on 19-4-1954. The employer (respondent 1) challenged the award before Coyajee J., contending that the Government had no jurisdiction to make the reference and that the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with the appellants' cases. Coyajee J. upheld the employer's contention and quashed the Appellate Tribunal's order. The dismissed employees (the appellants) appealed to this Court (opinion delivered by Chagla, C.J.).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether persons who were dismissed prior to the Government reference fall within the statutory definition of "workman" (Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act) for the purposes of a reference under Section 10(1)(c).
  2. Whether an industrial dispute concerning the dismissal of such persons can be validly referred to and adjudicated by the Industrial Court and the Industrial Appellate Tribunal (i.e., whether those bodies had jurisdiction to order reinstatement of employees dismissed prior to the reference).
  3. Whether the latter part of the definition of "workman" in Section 2(s) (which mentions a workman discharged during a dispute) should be read as limiting the meaning of "workman" or as an extension to cover dismissals occurring during the pendency of a dispute.

Arguments of the Parties

Employer's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Gupte)

  • Because the appellants were dismissed prior to the Government reference dated 16-9-1952, they did not fall within the definition of "workman" in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • Consequently, no industrial dispute could be raised with regard to the appellants' dismissals and the Industrial Tribunal/Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain or decide those matters.
  • The phrase "workman" should be construed to mean a person employed at the date when the dispute was referred; by contrast, the part of Section 2(s) referring to a workman "discharged during that dispute" should be read as a limitation or proviso rather than as an extension.
  • Implicitly, the employer argued that if the Court accepted the broader view, the separate provision for dismissal during a dispute would be redundant.

Appellants' / Trade Union's Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The purpose of the labour legislation is to prevent wrongful dismissal and to confer jurisdiction on labour courts to adjudicate and to order reinstatement or compensation for wrongful dismissals.
  • A person who has been employed at any time in an industry and who satisfies the characteristics set out in Section 2(s) falls within the meaning of "workman" for the purposes of proceedings under the Act.
  • The Trade Union, which sought the reference, was vitally interested in the grievance (wrongful dismissal) and the grievance was one the employer could remedy, satisfying the limitations explained by this Court in earlier authority.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Narendra Kumar v. All-India Ind. Trib, AIR 1953 Bom 325 Interpretation of the phrase "any person" in Section 2(k): the Court held that "any person" must be read with two restrictions — (1) the dispute must be one in which the workman raising it is directly and substantially interested, and (2) it must be a grievance which the employer is in a position to remedy. The Court applied those two restrictions to the present facts and concluded that the Trade Union's reference satisfied them (the Trade Union was vitally interested and the grievance—wrongful dismissal—could be remedied by the employer), so Narendra Kumar supported jurisdiction to adjudicate the dismissal even though the dismissal preceded the reference.
Western India A.A v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, AIR 1949 PC 111 Consideration of whether labour courts have jurisdiction to order reinstatement of a dismissed servant; interpretation of "employment" / "non-employment" in Section 2(k) and the latter part of Section 2(s) concerning a workman dismissed during the pendency of a dispute. The Court noted that the Federal Court's decision arose from a case where the worker was dismissed pending an industrial dispute; the Federal Court did not establish the employer's narrower proposition that only workmen dismissed during the pendency of a dispute fall within Section 2(s). The present Court used this to reject the employer's restrictive reading and to hold that the latter part of Section 2(s) is an extension, not a limitation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a textual and purposive analysis of Sections 2(k) ("industrial dispute") and 2(s) ("workman") of the Industrial Disputes Act.

1. The Court first quoted the definitions: Section 2(k) defines "industrial dispute" as any dispute between employers and workmen (or similar permutations) connected with employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person. Section 2(s) provides an exhaustive definition of "workman" as any person employed in an industry to do skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward, and further includes, for proceedings under the Act, a workman discharged during that dispute.

2. The Court rejected the employer's contention that "workman" must be a person employed at a particular point in time (specifically, at the date of reference). The Court held the definition does not impose such a temporal restriction; rather, it identifies the nature and characteristics of the persons who may be deemed "workmen."

3. The Court reasoned that a person who has been employed at any time in an industry and who meets the Section 2(s) characteristics is a "workman." Whether that person can raise an industrial dispute depends on the definition of "industrial dispute" in Section 2(k); the two sections must be read together.

4. The Court analysed the odd consequences of the employer's position — namely, that a wrongfully dismissed employee could not raise a dispute unless the dismissal occurred during the pendency of another dispute — and rejected the conclusion that the Legislature intended such a lacuna. The Court emphasized the object of the labour legislation: to prevent wrongful dismissal and to enable labour courts to order reinstatement or compensation.

5. With reference to Narendra Kumar, the Court applied the two restrictions on "any person" to the instant facts and found them satisfied: the Trade Union was vitally interested in the grievance and the employer was in a position to remedy the grievance of wrongful dismissal.

6. The Court examined the Federal Court decision in Western India A.A. and observed that it dealt with a dismissal occurring during the pendency of a dispute; that decision did not support the narrower proposition advanced by the employer. Instead, the Court read the latter part of Section 2(s) as an extension of the definition of "workman" to include dismissals during a pending dispute (so that the Industrial Court can entertain dismissals which occur after a dispute has been raised and while it is pending).

7. The Court concluded that the dismissed employees in the present case fell within the definition of "workman" and that both the Industrial Court and the Industrial Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the dispute concerning their reinstatement. Accordingly, Coyajee J.'s holding that the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction was held to be erroneous.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED. The order of the learned Judge (Coyajee J.) quashing the Industrial Appellate Tribunal's order is set aside, and the order of the Industrial Appellate Tribunal is restored.

Implications and immediate effects:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Industrial Appellate Tribunal's direction to reinstate the appellants is restored; respondent 1 is ordered to pay the costs of the appellants throughout.
  • Costs allocation: "Mr. Kantawala's clients to bear their own costs" (as stated in the opinion).
  • Procedural direction: Liberty is given to the appellants' attorneys to withdraw the sum of Rs. 500 deposited in Court.
  • On precedent and law: The opinion clarifies that a person dismissed prior to a Government reference may still fall within the statutory meaning of "workman" and that the Industrial Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate such dismissal; the Court construed the latter part of Section 2(s) as an extension, not a limitation. The opinion does not state that it sets a broader binding precedent beyond the resolution of the appeal, but it reverses the lower court's jurisdictional ruling in these facts.

Order in the original text: "D.R.R — Appeal allowed."

    P.L Mayekar And Another v. Amichand Narayan And Others,

    Chagla, C.J:— This is an appeal against the decision of Coyajee J. by which he quashed an order passed by the Industrial Appellate Tribunal, and he came to make the order under the following circumstances. Appellants 1 and 2 were employees of respondent 1 and they were dismissed prior to 1952. Certain demands were put forward by the Labour Union of which the appellants were members and among the demands were reinstatement of these two dismissed employees, and the Government referred all these demands to the Industrial Court under S. 10(1)(c), Industrial Disputes Act.

    2. On 18-6-1953, the Industrial Tribunal made an award and directed respondent 1 to reinstate the appellants from the date of their dismissal. There was an appeal to the Industrial Appellate Tribunal and on 19-4-1954, the Industrial Appellate Tribunal confirmed the award made by the Industrial Tribunal. The employer, respondent 1, challenged this award before Coyajee J., and his contention was that the Government had no jurisdiction to refer to the Industrial Tribunal the cases of the appellants and the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with those-cases. Coyajee J. upheld the contention of the employer and the two dismissed employees have now come in appeal.

    3. What is argued by Mr. Gupte on behalf of the employer is that looking to the definition, of “industrial dispute” and “workman”, inasmuch as the appellants were dismissed prior to the reference made by Government on 16-9-1952, they did not fall within the definition of “workman” and no industrial dispute could be raised with regard to them. We will presently examine this contention, but it seems to us rather a startling submission to make that under the Industrial Disputes Act a workman who has been wrongly dismissed cannot raise an industrial dispute with regard to his wrongful dismissal.

    4. We should have thought that the very purpose of labour legislation was to prevent employers wrongfully dismissing their employees, and if they did so to confer jurisdiction upon Labour Courts to adjudicate upon the question as to whether the employee was wrongfully dismissed or not and also to confer jurisdiction upon Labour Courts in the case of a wrongful dismissal to compel the employer either to reinstate the employee or to pay compensation. But as the argument has been seriously urged by Mr. Gupte and has been accepted by the learned Judge below, we must proceed to examine that argument.

    5. Now, “industrial dispute” is defined in S. 2(k) and the definition is:

    “‘industrial dispute’ means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person”;

    6. And “workman” is defined in S. 2(s) and it is an exhaustive definition to the effect that it means any person employed (including an apprentice) in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward, and then the definition includes within the ambit of “workman” something more and that is

    “for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during that dispute, but does not include any person employed in the naval, military or air service of the Government”.

    7. Without looking at the authorities, on a plain construction of this section, it is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Gupte that a workman means a person who was employed at the date when the dispute was referred by Government under S. 10(1)(c). Mr. Gupte contends that if a workman has already been dismissed, no industrial dispute can be referred with regard to his dismissal to the Industrial Court.

    8. Now, the definition of “workman” does not indicate that the workman must be employed at a particular moment of time. What is emphasised is that he must be employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward; in other words, the definition is intended to point out what the nature and characteristic of a person is who can be deemed to be a workman within the meaning of the Act.

    9. In our opinion, a workman as defined in this sub-section means any person who is employed at any time in an industry. If he satisfies the definition of “workman” under S. 2(s), then whether he can raise an industrial dispute or not must be judged by the definition of “industrial dispute” given-in S. 2(k). Therefore, in order to determine whether an industrial dispute has been properly raised or referred, one must read S. 2(k) and S. 2(s) in conjunction.

    10. If, therefore, the dispute; is the result of a difference between employers and workmen or an employer and a workman and that dispute is connected with regard to employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person, then the dispute as such can be referred by Government under S. 10(1)(c) and in respect of which the Industrial Court can assume jurisdiction.

    11. What is urged by Mr. Gupte is that the only dismissed workman in respect of whom an industrial dispute is raised is a workman who has been dismissed during the pendency of an industrial dispute. Therefore the rather curious contention urged is that the definition of “workman” limits the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to try only those disputes with regard to dismissed workmen who have been dismissed during the pendency of a dispute, but if a workman is dismissed prior to the raising of the dispute, then the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to entertain that dispute.

    12. To analyse that argument in a different way what Mr. Gupte urges is that if a workman is dismissed he cannot raise any dispute with regard to his own dismissal because the industrial dispute must follow upon his dismissal, but if some other dispute is pending and he is dismissed, he can raise a dispute with regard to his dismissal. The result of accepting this contention is apparent even to Mr. Gupte himself and therefore he is compelled to say that undoubtedly this shows a rather serious lacuna on the part of the I Legislature in enacting this Act. But, before we accuse the Legislature of being guilty of serious blemishes in the drafting of a statute, it is the duty of the Court to see whether a fair and reasonable interpretation can be put upon the language used by the Legislature bearing in mind the object which the Legislature had in placing a particular piece of legislation on the statute book.

    13. There is no reason whatever, looking to the definition of “workman”, to restrict the expression “employed” to the point of time which Mr. Gupte suggested it should be restricted. So long as the workman was employed by the employer against whom he wishes to raise the industrial dispute and the dispute is of the nature required by the definition of “industrial dispute”, he is a workman falling within the definition of S. 2(s).

    14. Turning to the authorities, reliance is first placed on a decision of this Court in — ‘Narendra Kumar v. All-India Ind. Trib’, AIR 1953 Bom 325 (A). What we were considering there was the proper interpretation to be placed upon the expression “any person” used in S. 2(k). We realised that the Legislature in that section had used a wider expression than the expression “workman” used in the earlier part of that sub-section, and what was urged before us was that the expression “any person” was so wide that no restriction should be put by us upon construing that expression.

    15. We negatived that contention and we pointed out that the expression “any person” must be understood as implying two important restrictions and the two restrictions were that the dispute with regard to any person must be a controversy in which the workman raising it against his employer is directly and substantially interested and it must also be a grievance which the employer was in a position to remedy.

    16. Now in this case it so happens that the reference was sought by the Trade Union and not by the appellants themselves and therefore Mr. Gupte relies on this decision for the proposition; that as the reference was by the Trade Union it must be with regard to a question of non-employment of any person as construed by us in this decision, and Mr. Gupte says that this worker who was dismissed before the dispute cannot satisfy the definition of “any person”.

    17. It is difficult to understand why the principle laid down by us in this decision does not apply to the facts of the case before us. Assuming that the Trade Union was raising the dispute on behalf of any person, in that controversy the Trade Union was vitally, interested and the grievance that they made, viz. that the employer had wrongfully dismissed the employee, was a grievance which could have been remedied by the employer. Therefore both the conditions laid, down by us in that decision are satisfied.

    18. Reliance is then placed on a judgment of the Federal Court in — ‘Western India A.A v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay’, AIR 1949 PC 111 (B). That was a judgment given in appeal against a judgment of this Court, and the only-question that arose before the Federal Court, as indeed it arose before us, was whether the Labour Courts had jurisdiction to order reinstatement of a dismissed servant, and it was in that, connection that the Federal Court was called upon to consider the expression “employment” or “non-employment” used in S. 2(k).

    19. Now it so happened that in that case the worker was dismissed pending an industrial dispute and the question arose with regard to his reinstatement, and therefore the Federal Court-had to consider the definition of “workman” given in S. 2(s) in the light of the latter part which includes, as already pointed out, the case of a workman dismissed during the pendency of a dispute.

    20. The decision of the Federal Court does not lay down the proposition for which Mr. Gupte is contending that when a workman is dismissed he would fall within the definition of “workman” given in S. 2(s) only if he is dismissed during the pendency of an industrial dispute.

    21. Mr. Gupte then argued that if that be the correct view, then it was unnecessary for the Legislature to provide for the case of a workman who had been dismissed during the pendency of an industrial dispute. In our opinion, it was very necessary that case should be provided for because but for that extension of the meaning of the expression “workman” an Industrial Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain an application with regard to the dismissal of a workman which had taken place after the industrial dispute had been raised and which was pending before it.

    22. Therefore, this latter part of the definition of “workman” extends the meaning of workman and extends the ambit of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. Instead of reading this latter part of the definition as an extension of the meaning of the expression “workman”, Mr. Gupte wants us to read it as a qualification or a limitation upon the meaning of the word “workman” or rather as a proviso to what the Legislature has already indicated earlier in S. 2(s).

    23. That, in our opinion, is an entirely wrong canon of construction. The Legislature, in the first place, gives the meaning of the expression “workman” and then, because a certain case does not fall within that definition, it proceeds to enumerate that case and provides that case will also fall in the definition already given of the expression “workman”. Therefore, in our opinion, it would be wrong to confine the case of a dismissed workman to the latter part of S. 2(s).

    24. In our opinion, the case of a dismissed employee who wishes to raise an industrial dispute falls directly within the definition of “workman” and it is only in cases where a workman has been dismissed pending an industrial dispute that we must look to the latter part of the definition of S. 2(s). In our opinion, both the Industrial Court and the Industrial Appellate Tribunal had Jurisdiction to decide the dispute with regard to the two appellants. In our opinion, therefore, with respect, the learned Judge was in error in holding that the Industrial Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction.

    25. The result is that the appeal must succeed. The order of the learned Judge will be set aside and the order of the Industrial Appellate Tribunal restored.

    26. Respondent 1 must pay the costs of the appellants throughout. Mr. Kantawala's clients to bear their own costs.

    27. Liberty to the appellants' attorneys to withdraw the sum of Rs. 500 deposited in Court.

    D.R.R
    Appeal allowed.
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    Comments

    P.L Mayekar And Another v. Amichand Narayan And Others,
    (Apr 6, 1955)