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  • Act Court under s. 19(1) of the new Act
  • Act Court under s. 19,
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  • Act Court under s. 19(1) of the new Act
  • Act Court under s. 19,

    Gurbasappa Mahadevappa Gunaki (Original Decree-Holder), v. Neelkanthappa Shivappa Humberwadi (Original Judgment-Debtor), .

    Chagla, C.J:—

    A money decree was passed in favour of the appellant, who is the decree-holder, on February 28, 1945. He applied for execution of his decree on February 15, 1947. The B.A.D.R Act, Act XXVIII of 1939, was applied to Chikodi where the Court passed this decree on May 1, 1945, and under that Act the last date for making an application to the Board set up under that Act was October 30, 1945. Before the executing Court the judgment-debtor contended that as no application for the adjustment of his debt had been made by the creditor the debt was extinguished and execution proceedings could not lie in respect of the decree. The executing Court framed two issues as to whether the judgment-debtor's debts exceeded Rs. 15,000 and whether he was an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act. On the first issue it held in favour of the judgment-debtor. With regard to the second issue it held in favour of the decree-holder holding that the judgment-debtor was not an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act. From that decision an appeal was preferred to the learned Extra Assistant Judge at Belgaum and the view that the learned Assistant Judge took was that the executing Court had no jurisdiction to determine the status of the judgment-debtor or the other issue with regard to his debts, nor could the executing Court hold whether the debt was extinguished or not. According to the learned Judge it was only the Court established under the B.A.D.R Act that could determine this issue. Therefore he set aside the order of the executing Court and directed that the application for execution should be transferred to the B.A.D.R Act Court under s. 19(1) of the new Act of 1947.

    Now, with respect to the learned Judge, he has not truly appreciated the position. Under s. 19 it is not that all pending proceedings have to be transferred. The test that has got to be applied is whether at the date when the proceedings were pending an application for adjustment of debts could have been made under s. 4 of the Act. Under s. 4 an application can only be made before the 1st August 1947 if a Board was established after February 1, 1947. In this case the Board was established before February 1, 1947. Therefore, really, s. 4 has no application at all. The application for adjustment of debts had to be made, under the old Act. Therefore, this application for execution having been filed on February 15, 1947 could not be considered to be a pending proceeding within the meaning of s. 19(1) and therefore it could not be transferred under that section. If that be so, what is the position? Section 15 is mandatory and it directs that all debts in respect of which no application had been made under s. 4 within the period specified in the section shall be extinguished, and the question is whether it is for the executing Court to take notice of the provisions of this section or whether it is for the special Court set up under the B.A.D.R Act to determine the question that arises under this section. It is difficult to understand how, if a pending proceeding cannot be transferred to the B.A.D.R Act Court under s. 19, the special Court can deal with any question that can arise under s. 15. As far as the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder are concerned, they have put themselves, as it were, outside the pale of the special Court set up under the B.A.D.R Act. But that does not mean that the Civil Courts of the land cannot decide issues that arise under the B.A.D.R Act. The whole policy underlying the Act is that special Courts were to be set up for a limited period, that applications were to be received for a limited period, and the work of debt adjustment was also to be carried on for a limited period, but after the work of debt adjustment was completed and after the Courts under the Act were wound up, questions are bound to arise for determination under the provisions of that Act. A decree may come up before the executing Court long after the whole machinery under the B.A.D.R Act has been wound up and the decree would have to be construed by the executing Court, and therefore when a question arises under a decree as to whether the debt is extinguished or not and if the execution proceedings in which that question arises cannot be transferred to the B.A.D.R Act Court, it would be for the Civil Court to decide that question under s. 15. Therefore, in our opinion, in this particular case as the application for execution filed by the decree-holder on February 15, 1947 could not be transferred to the B.A.D.R Act Court under s. 19, it was for the executing Court to determine the question raised by the judgment-debtor and therefore the executing Court rightly determined the questions that it did.

    We would therefore set aside the order of the lower appellate Court and direct the lower appellate Court to hear the appeal preferred by the judgment-debtor on merits and dispose of it according to law.

    A point has also been raised by Mr. Kalagate that an appeal does not lie from the order of the lower appellate Court. That contention is obviously untenable. According to Mr. Kalagate the right of appeal under the B.A.D.R Act is limited and the right of appeal is provided under s. 43 and sub-cl. (3) says that no second appeal shall lie against any decision, order or award of the Court under this Act. The short and simple answer to Mr. Kalagate's contention is that the order made by the executing Court was not an order under the B.A.D.R Act. It was an order made under s. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and the right of appeal must be regulated by the Code and not by the B.A.D.R Act.

    Appellant to get his costs of this appeal.

    Decree reversed.
    J.G.R
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    Comments

    Gurbasappa Mahadevap... v. Neelkanthappa Shivap...
    (Feb 14, 1951)