Shah, J.:— In our opinion, this Letters Patent Appeal must be rejected as not maintainable. The appellants filed a civil suit against the respondent in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Sangli, for possession of the suit premises under Section 13(1)(hh) of the Bombay Rent Act. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court. The appeal preferred by the appellants in the District Court was allowed and the appellants' suit for possession was decreed. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision in appeal, the respondent filed a Writ Petition in this Court purportedly under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge by his judgment and order dated 24/25th February, 1987, allowed the Writ Petition, set aside the decree for possession passed by the District Court and restored the order of dismissal of the suit passed by the trial court. The appellants have filed this appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act challenging the decision of the learned Single Judge.

2. In our opinion, though the Writ Petition was stated to be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, in substance the reliefs claimed were under Article 227 of the Constitution and the reliefs granted were also in exercise of the powers of superintendence under Article 227.

3. No inter-appeal, therefore, lies in this Court under clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act.

4. Shri Page, the learned counsel, appearing for the appellants, however, submitted that since admittedly the respondents had invoked the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and not under Article 227 as is evident from the mention of Article 226 in the petition, the exercise of the powers by the learned Single Judge was also under Article 226 and, therefore, appeal would lie to a Division Bench of this Court. He further submitted that under sub-section 3(A) of Section 13 the landlord is required to produce at the time of the institution of the suit a certificate issued by the Tribunal constituted under sub-section 3(B) of Section 13 of the Act and the suit for possession under Section 13(1)(hh) of the Act is not maintainable unless the landlord produces along with the plaint the certificate granted by the Tribunal as provided in sub-section 3(A) of Section 13 of the Act. He, therefore, submitted that in a Writ Petition the challenge is essentially to the order of the competent authority granting the certificate under sub-section 3(A) of Section 13 of the Act and the mere fact that the original suit was filed in the civil Court against the respondent did not alter the position. In support of his contentions Shri Page relied on a Special Bench decision of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Kusum, 1981 Mh. L.J 93. He particularly relied on conclusions Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, 33 and 34 which are at pages 188 and 189 of the report. These conclusions are:

“25. An appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge in a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution is expressly barred by clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

26. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue directions, orders and writs is not supplemental to or in furtherance of the power of superintendence under Article 227.

27. Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution operate in different fields.

28. In exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court exercises original jurisdiction as contrasted with its appellate and revisional jurisdictions. Where the original proceeding which led to the proceeding under Article 226 concerned civil rights, the proceeding under Article 226 would be an original civil proceeding.

33. Where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226.

34. If in deciding such an application made under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the Court gives in the final order ancillary directions which pertain to Article 227, this would not deprive the party of his right of appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order ought to be appealed against is under Article 226.”

5. In a Writ Petition filed against a decree passed by the District Court in a suit under the Rent Act the High Court exercises power of superintendence under Article 227 and not under Article 226. Merely because the petition is styled as one under Article 226, it cannot alter the nature of the proceeding or the exercise of the power by the High Court in writ petition. The dispute is between the private parties and the suit is tried by the civil court. In a suit filed on the ground mentioned in section 13(1)(hh) the filing of a certificate of the competent authority at the time of the institution of the suit is a condition precedent for the filing of the suit and the certificate is only a piece of evidence which ultimately the court takes into account. The court decides the suit on its merits taking into consideration all the evidence on record. It is the substance of the matter which is relevant for determining the question as to whether the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 226 or its powers of superintendence under Article 227. Nomenclature is not the criterion to determine the same. The conclusion No. 27 in the said judgment is that Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution operate in different fields. The conclusions Nos. 33 and 34 in the said judgment clearly show that importance has to be given to the substance of the matter and also the nature of the reliefs granted. Even if there are certain incidental reliefs which may fall under Article 227 of the Constitution but the main relief is one under Article 226 of the Constitution, then the appeal naturally would be competent. The same would be the case where the relief granted is one under Article 226 and no relief whatsoever is granted under Article 227 of the Constitution.

6. Shri Apte relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Umali v. Radhikabai, 1986 Supp SCC 401 : AIR 1986 SC 1272, wherein the view taken by the Special Bench in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Kusum cited supra was upheld. The scope of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and the applicability of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are discussed in this judgment. It is sufficient to refer to the observations in paragraphs Nos. 99, 100 and 106. It is not necessary to elaborate except to say that the observations in paragraph No. 106 of the said judgment clearly support the view that we have taken. In paragraph No. 106, the Supreme Court has observed:

“…… In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226.”

7. Here converse is the case. As a matter of fact, in the present case there is no question of any relief being asked for or being granted under Article 226 of the Constitution. The test for deciding the question of appelability under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is the nature of exercise of powers and not the nomenclature adopted by the petitioner in the petition. In deciding the petition in this case the learned Single Judge has obviously exercised powers of superintendence under Article 227 and not under Article 226. If that be so, the appeal would not be maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The appeal is, therefore, rejected as not maintainable.

Appeal dismissed.