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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • rule was sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order 14, C.P.C
  • Articles 18 and 25 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 25 of the Limitation Act
  • Order 14 Rule 2A of C.P.C
  • Order 14, Rule 2(1), C.P.C3)
  • Order 7, Rule 11(d), C.P.C4)
  • provisions of sub-rule (2),
  • Order 7, Rule 11(c) C.P.C
  • Order 14 Rule 2(1), C.P.C
  • Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C
  • O. 7, Rule 13, C.P.C
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • rule was sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order 14, C.P.C
  • Articles 18 and 25 of the Limitation Act
  • Article 25 of the Limitation Act
  • Order 14 Rule 2A of C.P.C
  • Order 14, Rule 2(1), C.P.C3)
  • Order 7, Rule 11(d), C.P.C4)
  • provisions of sub-rule (2),
  • Order 7, Rule 11(c) C.P.C
  • Order 14 Rule 2(1), C.P.C
  • Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C
  • O. 7, Rule 13, C.P.C
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed suit O.S No. 96/90 seeking recovery of Rs. 4,27,000/- along with costs and other reliefs against the respondents. The suit was based on the petitioner's right to recover amounts related to dastband, a claim initially recognized in W.P No. 1407/88 and formalized by G.O.Ms No. 902 dated 19-7-1988. Although the petitioner was entitled to the amount, only Rs. 10,659/- was paid. The petitioner claimed interest from 1-4-1959 to 1-10-1990, citing the abolition of cash grants in 1959 and the subsequent government order. The respondents resisted the suit, denying the cause of action and contending the suit was barred by limitation under Articles 18 and 25 of the Limitation Act. During trial, on the respondents' application I.A No. 74/93, the learned Sub Judge held that the suit claim beyond eight months was barred by limitation and dismissed the suit, directing the petitioner to amend the relief accordingly.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Sub Judge erred in disposing of the limitation issue without following the procedure under Order 14 Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C).
  2. Whether the question of limitation is a pure question of law suitable for disposal as a preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2(1), C.P.C.
  3. Whether the learned Sub Judge was correct in dismissing the suit when the respondents' application was for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d), C.P.C.
  4. Whether the order of the learned Sub Judge was legal and within jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The learned Sub Judge proceeded without following the mandated procedure under Order 14 Rule 2A, C.P.C, failing to determine whether the issue of limitation was to be tried as a preliminary issue.
  • The limitation question is not a pure question of law; it is a mixed question of law and fact and thus not suitable for disposal as a preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2(1), C.P.C.
  • The learned Sub Judge erred in dismissing the suit instead of treating the respondents' application as one for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d), C.P.C.
  • The order was illegal, without jurisdiction, and caused grave injustice to the petitioner.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vedapalli Suryanarayana v. Poosarla Venkata Sankara Suryanarayana, (1980) 1 Andh LT 488 Rejection of plaint on ground of bar of limitation is impermissible under Order 7 Rule 11(c), C.P.C. The court relied on this precedent to hold that the plaint could not be rejected on limitation grounds and that the learned Sub Judge erred in rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(c), C.P.C.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court found that the learned Sub Judge failed to follow the mandatory procedure under Order 14 Rule 2A, C.P.C, which requires the court to determine whether an issue should be tried as a preliminary issue before disposing of the suit. The court emphasized that limitation is not a pure question of law but a mixed question of law and fact, involving examination of the cause of action, its commencement, parties' conduct, and resultant effects. The Sub Judge wrongly treated the limitation issue as a pure question of law and disposed of the suit without deciding all pending issues, contrary to the requirement under Order 14 Rule 2(1) and Order 20, C.P.C. The court also noted the distinction between rejection of the plaint and dismissal of the suit, highlighting that dismissal leads to res judicata and finality, whereas rejection under Order 7 Rule 11 allows for a fresh suit. The learned Sub Judge's order was held to be illegal, without jurisdiction, and causing injustice by prematurely dismissing the suit without full trial.

Holding and Implications

The revision petition is allowed.

The impugned order of the learned Sub Judge is set aside, and I.A No. 74/93 stands dismissed. The matter is remitted back to the trial court for disposal according to law from the stage it stood when the order on I.A No. 74/93 was passed. Each party shall bear its own costs. The decision ensures that the suit proceeds through proper trial procedures, requiring full consideration of all issues, including the mixed question of limitation, thus preventing premature dismissal and preserving the parties' rights to a fair adjudication. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing procedural and substantive law principles.

    Khaja Quthubullah v. Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Others

    1. In this Revision petition the order of the learned Sub Judge, Medak in O.S No. 96/90 regarding I.A No. 74/93 I dated 19-3-1993 is challenged. Although the respondents have been notified of the petition, no representation is made on their behalf. Only Mr. L. Prabhakar Reddy, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has advanced his arguments in support of his contentions raised in the petition.

    2. This revision petition arises this way: The petitioner filed suit O.S No. 96/90 for recovery of Rs. 4,27,000/- with costs and such other reliefs as the court deems fit as against the defendants who are the respondents in this case. The suit was resisted by the respondents. The basis of the suit was the right of the plaintiff to recover the amounts towards dastband which was ultimately allowed in W.P No. 1407/88 after a long battle and on the plea that although the petitioner was entitled to get such amount, he was paid only Rs. 10,659/-. The amount was awarded ultimately by passing the G.O.Ms No. 902 dated 19-7-1988 and under the circumstances, the respondents having withheld such legitimate claim of the petitioner, were liable to pay interest to the petitioner in addition to other benefits. That appears to be the gist of the plaint allegations. In para 11 of the plaint, the petitioner set up the cause of action for such a claim during the year 1959 initially when the cash grants were abolished and thereafter by virtue of the G.O passed by the Government on 19-7-1988 after the disposal of the writ petition and therefore, he was entitled to recover the interest on such amount for the period from 1-4-1959 to 1-10-1990.

    3. The respondents resisted the suit while denying the allegations made in the plaint inter alia contending that the suit had no cause of action and the cause of action set up in para 11 was not true. The trial court settled the issues, called upon the parties to take up the trial on such issues. Plaintiffs evidence was closed on 29-7-1991 and when the case was posted for the evidence of the present respondents who are the defendants on 5-3-93, they filed I.A No. 74/93 contending that the suit of the petitioner was barred by limitation in view of Articles 18 and 25 of the Limitation Act since the claim of the petitioner was exceeded the period of three years. This application was opposed by the petitioner. After hearing both the sides and after considering the material before him, the learned Sub Judge came to the conclusion that the suit claim for the period beyond 8 months was barred by limitation under Article 25 of the Limitation Act and therefore, dismissed the suit, however, directing the plaintiff to amend the relief in the plaint to restrict the claim for the period which was permissible in law and to proceed accordingly.

    4. In this petition, the order, of the learned Sub Judge is challenged on various grounds. Mr. Prabhakar Reddy, learned Advocate for the petitioner has formulated the following contentions in the form of postulations of law:

    1) The Learned Sub Judge following a wrong procedure in dealing with the matter without recourse to the procedure contemplated under Order 14 Rule 2A of C.P.C without first of all determining whether the issue in question was to be tried as a preliminary issue or not

    2) The learned Sub Judge was wrong in dealing the question of limitation as a pure question of law to dispose it of as a preliminary issue under Order 14, Rule 2(1), C.P.C

    3) The learned Sub Judge was not legally right in dismissing the suit while the application of the respondents was for rejection of the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11(d), C.P.C

    4) The order of the learned Sub Judge is illegal, without jurisdiction and has caused, great injustice to the petitioner.

    5. After hearing the learned advocate for the petitioner and after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and the legal implications flowing there from, this court is convinced that the order of the learned Sub-Judge has over-stepped the powers and jurisdiction in disposing of such an application viz., I.A No. 74/93 and in passing the order directing the plaintiff to amend the plaint while dismissing the suit partly. It is true that the contesting defendants raised the question of bar of limitation and therefore, Issue No. 6 was cast to the effect that whether the suit is barred by limitation. Admittedly, there are as many as 7 issues in the suit raising both questions of law and fact to be called as issues of fact and issues of law. Neither the petitioner nor the respondents moved the court to try issue No. 6 as a preliminary issue. The learned Sub Judge while dealing with the matter has presumed that he was disposing of Issue No. 6 as a preliminary issue. Order 14 Rule 2(1), C.P.C mandates that notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the court shall subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues. In otherwords, the court is obliged to pronounce judgment on all the issues amounting thereby that there must be a decision in accordance with Order 20, C.P.C The only escape from this rule was sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order 14, C.P.C where both issues of law and fact arise in the same suit and the court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force and for that purpose, the court may postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue. The law has categorically used the words pronouncement of judgment, decision, postponement of settlement of issues etc. In that view of the matter unless the court decides to take up an issue as a preliminary issue for determination and disposal, the whole suit cannot be disposed of without deciding the other issues of law and fact. In this case, the learned sub judge has totally failed to apply his mind regarding this mandatory provision. The learned Sub Judge appears to have misguided himself in thinking that the bar of limitation or the question of limitation is a pure question of law. The law appears to be settled, that the question of limitation is not a pure question of law, but it is a mixed question of law and fact. In fact adverting to such situations where the rejection of the plaint is sought under Order 7 Rule 11(c), C.P.C, this court has authoritatively held in Vedapalli Suryanarayana v. Poosarla Venkata Sankara Suryanarayana, (1980) 1 Andh LT 488 that a plaint is not liable to be rejected on the ground of bar of limitation since it would be something different from disposal of the matter on other grounds. The bar of limitation has so many ingredients. If a party to the litigation sets up a contention that the suit is barred by limitation, the court has first of all to examine (1) the cause of action in the suit, (2) when the cause of action commences, (3) when the parties act in a particular fashion as to fix the cause of action and (4) ultimately what is the result flowing from such cause of action. Even while operating Articles 18 and 25 of the Limitation Act, the Court was bound to examine as to when the parties stood at conditions to fulfil their obligations, and when the money became liable to be paid. These are questions of fact to be’ examined on the basis of the evidence produced by the parties in the case based on the pleadings. If we go through the pleadings in the suit, it is very clear that the parties have remained at issues on several matters. Particularly when the cause of action was specifically set up in the plaint which was challenged by the defendants in the written statement, it emanates many questions of fact which were in controversy the court was bound to decide them based upon the evidence produced. Without resorting to probe such serious matters, learned Sub Judge very lightly treated the question of limitation as if it is a pure question of fact. The learned Advocate Mr. Prabhakar Reddy putting serious efforts to probe into the matter has taken this court through the exposition of the great author Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th Edition, pages 65 to 75). The jurisprudential concept of question of fact, question of law and mixed question of law-and fact are well detailed in lucidity in the said authoritative expressions of the learned author and item that there remains no doubt that the question of limitation would be a mixed question of law and fact. Under the circumstances, the learned Sub Judge was not right in deciding the question of limitation as a preliminary issue.

    6. The learned Sub Judge erred in rejecting the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11(c) C.P.C when the law appears to be that no plaint can be rejected on the ground of bar of limitation as laid down in Vedapalli Suryanarayana's case (1980 (1) Andh LT 488) supra.

    7. The learned Sub Judge appears to have not applied his mind for the distinction between rejection of the plaint and dismissal of the suit. As rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, the rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C would not bar him to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action by virtue of O. 7, Rule 13, C.P.C whereas the dismissal of the suit which should be a decision in accordance with Order 20, C.P.C would be a finality of the matter exposing the parties to the suit to res judicata and other legal consequences. Thereby the learned Sub Judge has put the parties and in particular, the petitioner to almost the stage of causing injustice, instead of directing them to lead evidence on all the issues and ultimately deciding the question of limitation even assuming that the suit may be found to be barred by limitation. Therefore, the order of the learned Sub Judge cannot be supported.

    8. In the circumstances, the order of the learned Sub Judge cannot be supported and it deserves to be set aside. Accordingly the impugned order of the learned Sub Judge is set aside. Consequently, I.A No. 74/93 shall stand dismissed.

    9. In the result, the revision petition is allowed and the matter is remitted back to the trial court for disposal according to law from the stage where it stood when the order on I.A No. 74/93 was passed. Parties shall bear their respective costs.

    Revision allowed.

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    Comments

    Khaja Quthubullah v. Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Others
    (Jul 8, 1994)