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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On June 2, 1982 at about 8.00 A.M., on Srikalahasti-Naidupet road near Poyakothu Village, the deceased Thammineni Srinivasulu Naidu (aged about 35 years) died after falling from a tractor bearing registration AAC 358 and being run over. The death was attributed to the rash and negligent driving of the driver (referred to as R.W. 2 in the opinion). The deceased's widow, three minor children and mother (respondents 1 to 5) claimed compensation of Rs. 80,000/-.

The Tribunal below found that the death was due to rash and negligent driving and held that the deceased was not shown to be an agriculturist cultivating land on lease, but must have been an agricultural labourer contributing Rs. 200/- per month to his family. The Tribunal fixed annual dependency at Rs. 2,400/-, applied multipliers (noted in the record as "14, 18" because of the deceased's age of 35 years) and awarded a principal sum noted in the record as Rs. 34.032/-. It also awarded Rs. 1,000/- towards medical expenses and Rs. 5,000/- for loss of consortium to the widow. The Tribunal found that the deceased contributed to the accident by standing on a rod while the vehicle was being driven; accordingly, it reduced the compensatory amount by one half and awarded Rs. 20,016/- (half of the principal amount awarded).

The registered owner (first appellant) and the driver (second appellant) filed the present appeal against the Tribunal's award.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there was admissible evidence to establish that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver (R.W. 2), thereby fastening liability on the appellants.
  2. Whether the second appellant (vendee/transferee) was the legal owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident despite non-effectuation of transfer in the registration ('C') certificate under Section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  3. Whether the owner (second appellant) is vicariously liable for the tortious act of the driver when the driver allegedly took a passenger (the deceased) unauthorisedly in a tractor and contrary to any supposed prohibition.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • There was no evidence that the driver drove the vehicle rashly and negligently, and thus liability cannot be fastened on the appellants.
  • The first appellant was the registered owner and the second appellant had purchased the vehicle but the transfer of registration under Section 31 had not been effected; therefore, the vendor continues to be the owner and the second appellant (vendee) is not liable to pay compensation. The appellants relied on the full Bench decision in F.B.M Kondaiah v. Yaseen Fatima (1985 II A.L.T. 88).
  • The second appellant is not liable because the driver allegedly took the deceased unauthorisedly into the tractor; the driver was not instructed to take passengers and, as a tractor, the vehicle was not lawful for carrying passengers—so the owner should not be held liable for the unauthorised acts of the driver.

Respondents' / Tribunal's Position (as adopted by the Court)

  • The Tribunal had found, and evidence supports, that the death resulted from rash and negligent driving by the driver; the claimants sought compensation in the sum of Rs. 80,000/-. The Tribunal fixed dependency and awarded damages (principal sum noted as Rs. 34.032/-, medical expenses Rs. 1,000/-, loss of consortium Rs. 5,000/-, and reduced the main award by half to Rs. 20,016/- because the deceased partly contributed to the accident).
  • The driver's confession in a criminal case (C.C. No. 95 of 1982) wherein he admitted rash and negligent driving and was convicted under Section 304-A IPC was relied upon as admissible evidence in the civil proceedings under Section 18 of the Evidence Act and as substantive evidence under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • Where a transferee takes delivery of the vehicle along with the 'C' Certificate (and route permit where applicable), the title is treated as transferred to the transferee unless there is an express contractual stipulation to the contrary; consequently, the transferee (second appellant) was held to be the owner.
  • Even if the driver exceeded his authority in allowing a third party to travel, the victim (or legal representatives) cannot be denied remedy under Sections 110-A and 110-B of the Act; any remedy the owner may have against the driver is a separate matter between owner and driver.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
F.B.M. Kondaiah v. Yaseen Fatima (1985 II A.L.T. 88) An authority relied on by appellants to argue that vendor remains owner until transfer of permit is effected (circumstances where contract expressly retains ownership with vendor until formal transfer). The court distinguished the present facts from Kondaiah, noting that in Kondaiah the contract contained express covenants that the vehicle would remain registered in the seller's name until transfer of permit by the authority. The court held that Kondaiah does not assist appellants here because there was no such contractual stipulation in the present case.
Parma Lal v. Chand Mal (1980 2 SCC 314) Delivery of possession of a vehicle together with the registration certificate (and permit where applicable) effects the transfer of title to the transferee; transferee has duty to report transfer to registering authority under Section 31 but title passes by delivery. The court relied on Parma Lal to support the proposition that where possession and registration documents are handed over, title stands transferred to the transferee; the obligation under Section 31 to report transfer is ministerial and does not prevent transfer of title on delivery.
J.C. Chennarayudu v. N. Lakshmamma (AIR 1980 A.P. 143) Where parties expressly agree that transferor will remain owner until the registration is effected, the transferor retains ownership and liability until formal transfer occurs. The court cited this case to show that where there is a specific agreement that the transferor remains owner until registration, the transferor will remain liable in the interregnum; but in the present case there was no such agreement, supporting the conclusion that the transferee is the owner on delivery.
M. Vishalakshmi v. Luthern Church (AIR 1978 A.P. 310) Where the master gave express directions to the driver not to pick up passengers and the driver disobeyed those directions and picked up passengers, the master was held not vicariously liable under Section 110-B (because the driver acted contrary to express instructions). The court distinguished Vishalakshmi on the ground that that case involved an express prohibition by the master; because no similar express instruction was proved in the present case, Vishalakshmi did not absolve the owner here from vicarious liability to third parties.
Jiwan Dass Roshan Lal v. Karnail Singh (AIR 1980 Pun. & Har. 167) Supports the proposition that where a driver contravenes directions, the master may be absolved in appropriate circumstances (similar view to Vishalakshmi as stated in the record). The court acknowledged the same legal proposition but held it inapplicable to the present facts since there was no evidence of an express direction from owner to driver forbidding the picking up of passengers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by addressing the principal contentions raised on appeal in a step-by-step manner:

  1. Evidence of Rash and Negligent Driving:
    • The court noted direct evidence from P.W.2 that the deceased boarded the tractor driven by R.W.2 and that the accident occurred because of negligent driving.
    • The court referred to the driver's confession in the criminal case (C.C. No. 95 of 1982) where the driver admitted rash and negligent driving and was convicted under Section 304-A IPC. Although a criminal judgment is not binding in civil proceedings, the court held that the driver's admission is admissible under Section 18 of the Evidence Act and constitutes substantive evidence for the purpose of proceedings under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. On that basis, the court concluded that the accident occurred due to the driver's rash and negligent driving.
  2. Ownership and Effect of Non-Transfer of Registration under Section 31:
    • The court analysed Section 31's statutory obligation on the transferee to report the transfer and have the registration certificate updated, but treated that obligation as largely ministerial.
    • The court explained that delivery of possession of a movable vehicle together with the 'C' Certificate (and route permit where applicable) operates to transfer title to the transferee absent an express contractual stipulation to the contrary. The court relied on Parma Lal for that principle and on J.C. Chennarayudu to indicate the contrasting situation where parties expressly agree that the transferor retain ownership until registration.
    • The court examined Kondaiah (relied on by appellants) and identified that decision as being founded on an express contractual covenant that kept ownership with the seller until official transfer; because no such contractual stipulation existed in the present case, the court held that Kondaiah did not help the appellants.
    • Accordingly, the court concluded that the second appellant (transferee) was the owner of the vehicle from the date of delivery with the 'C' Certificate and that mere non-transfer of the registration certificate did not mean he ceased to be owner.
  3. Vicarious Liability for the Driver's Unauthorised Acts:
    • The court engaged authority (M. Vishalakshmi and Jiwan Dass) which indicates that where an owner/master gives express directions to a driver not to pick up passengers and the driver disobeys, the owner may be absolved under Section 110-B in suitable circumstances. The court, however, emphasised that these authorities are distinguishable where there is an express instruction from the owner that the driver must not pick up passengers.
    • In the present case, there was no evidence of any express direction from the owner forbidding the taking on of passengers; therefore, the court found the rationale for absolving the owner inapplicable.
    • The court articulated the remedial structure: if a driver exceeds his authority and picks up a paying passenger, the owner may have a cause of action against the driver to recover any damages paid, but such an internal remedy does not defeat the third party's right to compensation under Sections 110-A and 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act.
    • Applying these principles to the facts, the court held that the appellants could not deny liability to the victim's legal representatives and that it remained open to the owner to seek redress against the driver.
  4. Conclusion on Liability:
    • After addressing these contentions, the court concluded that the appellants were liable to pay damages to the legal representatives of the deceased.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED. The court held that (1) the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver, supported by witness evidence and the driver's admission; (2) the second appellant (transferee) was the owner of the vehicle for the purposes of liability because title passed on delivery together with the 'C' Certificate absent any contract to the contrary; and (3) the appellants were liable to pay damages to the legal representatives of the deceased, notwithstanding any contention that the driver acted unauthorisedly in permitting the deceased to travel.

Implications:

  • The direct consequence of the decision is that the Tribunal's award (as described in the record) stands and the appellants are liable to satisfy the compensation ordered by the Tribunal. The appeal was dismissed and there was no order as to costs.
  • The court made clear that, in appropriate circumstances where the driver has contravened express instructions from the owner, the owner may be absolved; however, absent such express instructions the third party's statutory right to compensation under Sections 110-A and 110-B cannot be defeated. The owner may separately seek recovery from the driver for amounts paid, but that is distinct from the third party's right to compensation.
  • The opinion does not state that a new legal precedent was laid down; it applies and distinguishes existing authorities to the facts of the case. No broader legal principle beyond the application of the cited authorities to the facts was proclaimed as a novel rule.

Order: The appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

    R. Venkatappa Naidu And Another v. Thammivevi Sugunamma And Others

    1. On June 2, 1982 at about 8.00 A.M on Srikalahasti-Naidupet road near Poyakothu Village, the deceased Thammineni Srinivasulu Naidu aged about 35 years who get into the tractor bearing AAC 358 died due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver, R.W 2, when the deceased fell down under the wheels and was run over. The widow, the minor children and the mother-respondents 1 to 5 herein laid the claim in a sum of Rs. 80,000;-. The Tribunal below found that the death was due to rash and negligent driving of the driver, out held that the deceased was not proved to be agriculturist cultivating Ac. 3-00 of land on lease basis However, it held that he must be an agricultural labourer and was contributing a sum of Rs. 200/- per month to his family viz., his wife, three minor children and mother. As a result, the annual dependency was fixed at Rs. 2,400/-, applied 14, 18 multiplier since he was aged 35 years and awarded a sum of Rs. 34.032/-. It also awarded a sum of Rs. 1,000/- towards medical expenses and Rs. 5,000/- towards loss of consortium to the widow. It is found that the deceased also has contributed for the accident since he was standing on a rod when the vehicle was being driven by the second appellant. As a result half of the amount thereof viz., Rs. 20,016/- was awarded. As against the amount awarded the appeal has been filed by the owner and the driver the first and second appellants respectively.

    2. The contention of Sri S.V Ramana Reddy learned counsel for the appellants is that there is no evidence that the driver drove the vehicle rashly and negligently, as a result the liability cannot be fastened on the appellants. We have the direct evidence of P.W 2 who has stated that the deceased got into the tractor driven by R.W 2 and the accident took place due to negligent driving. In C.C No. 95 of 1982 on the file of the Addl. Munsif Magistrate, Srikalahasti, the driver has confessed that he had driven the vehicle rashly and negligently and on that basis he was convicted for an offence under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code and he was sentenced to pay fine. In view of the fact that the driver himself has confessed that he had driven the vehicle rashly and negligently, though the judgment in the criminal court is not binding on the civil Court, but that admission is admissible under Section 18 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, it constitutes a substantive evidence in the proceedings under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (Act 4 of 1939) for short, “the Act”. Accordingly, I hold that the accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver.

    3. It is next contended that the first appellant is the registered owner and the second appellant has purchased the vehicle from the Ist appellant and till the transfer is effected by the registering authority under Section 31 of the Act, the vendor continues to be the owner; the vendee-second appellant is thereby, not liable to pay compensation. In support thereof, he placed reliance on the full Bench decision of this Court in F.B.M Kondaiah v. Yaseen Fatima 1985 II A.L.T 88. Section 31 obligates the transferee to report to the registering authority concerned of the Transfer of the Vehicle along with the certificate of registration and get the registration transferred in his name. Therefore, when the transfer is effected, it is the duty of the transferee to apply to the registering authority under Section 31 and get the registration transferred. This is only a statutory obligation. The vehicle is a moveable one and transler is effected by delivery of possession of the vehicle by the vendor to the vendee along with ‘C’ Certificate and if it is a stage carriage the route permit, etc., and the title gets transferred. If the value is more than Rs. 100/- and if it is duly got registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act 1908 at the option of the parties, the right, title and interest in the property stood in the name of the vendor stands extinguished and the same stands transferred to the vendee from the date of registration of the conveyance deed. Therefore, the effect of registration under Section 31 is only a ministerial act of statutory obligation and the title does not cease to exist in the transferee till the mutation is effected in the registration certificate, unless there is a special contract to the contrary. In Parma Lal v. Chand Mal 1980 2 SCC 314 the facts are that along with the vehicle, AJM 455, the road permit and also the memo of sale as well as ‘C’ Certificate were handed over to the plaintiff. Under Section 31 of the Act, the transferee within thirty days of the transfer of ownership shall report the transfer to the registering authority with the prescribed fee and enter the transfer of ownership in the ‘C’ Certificate, etc. Instead, he gave notice to the sellers viz., original owners. Since they did not take any action he laid the suit for refund of the purchase price. The suit was dismissed. On appeal it was confirmed. It was held that under Section 31 the transfer of ownership is permitted and it casts an obligation on the transferee to report to the registering authority concerned regarding the transfer of the vehicle along with a certificate of registration and then get the registration transferred in his name. It is the duty of the plaintiff to have applied for transfer to the registering authority under Section 31. If the plaintiff did not choose to move the registering authority, he cannot be heard to say that he is entitled to refund of the purchase money or damages. From this it is implicit that on delivery of possession of the vehicle together with the registration certificate and if it is a stage carriage or public carrier, the route permit, the title in the vehicle stands transferred to the transferee and the transfer becomes concluded. In J.C Chennarayudu v. N. Lakshmamma AIR 1980 A.P 143, Madhava ???eddy, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Division Bench was to consider a case where both the transferor and the transferee had agreed that the transferor would continue to be the owner of the vehicle until it is duly registered under Section 31 and that the purchaser is legally entitled to ply the vehicle on the public roads in terms of the contract. The question therein was whether the transferee is liable to pay compensation for damages due to the accident occurred in the interregnum. In that context the Division Bench has hold that a specific undertaking was also given by the transferee to the transferor that he would not transport prohibited goods or contraband in the vehicle. Such an undertaking would not have been given by the transferee to the transferor, if the entire right, title and interest in the vehicle stood transferred to the transferee. That stipulation was necessary only because the transferor retained interest in the vehicle that he was aware that any liability which can be fastened to the vehicle would be the liability of the transferor until there is a valid transfer of the ‘C’ Certificate and the road permit. Tn those circumstances, it was held that in view of the terms of the agreement between the parties, the transferor continues to be the owner of the property until the transfer is effected in the ‘C’ Certificate and the road permit. Thereby, the transferor is liable to pay damages to the accident occurred in the interregnum. Far from helping the appellants, the ratio therein supports the view I have taken that in a case where there is transfer without any pre-conditions, then the title to the vehicle stands transferred the moment it was registered and the vehicle was delivered to the transferee-vendee. Therefore, from the date when it was transferred he continues to be the owner. In Kondaiah's case (1 Supra), relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants, the express covenants in Ex. B 1 are that the vehicle will remain registered in the name of the seller till the transfer of permit is effected by the Secretary, State Transport Authority, Hyderabad. Thereafter immediately the purchaser shall get the vehicle transferred to his name. Till such time the seller shall appear before the concerned authorities in the capacity of the owner, if need be. Thus the covenants in the contract under Ex. B- 1 clearly show that the vendor continues to be the owner of the property till it is duly transferred in the ‘C’ Certificate by the Secretary, State Transport Authority. Thereby, the above ratio is also of little assistance to the appellants. Accordingly, I have no hesitation to hold that, unless there is any contract to the contrary between the transferor and the transferee, the moment the possession of the vehicle together with ‘C’ Certificate and if it is a stage carriage or public carrier, route permit is delivered, the title in the vehicle stands transferred to the transferee-purchaser and from that date he is the legal owner. Merely because the ‘C’ Certificate has not been transfered in bis name, he does not cease to be the owner of the property. What would be the consequence for non-transfer is altogether a different fact or for which we are not concerned in this case. The effect of a contract of insurance is not relevant in this case as the Insurance Com???any is absolved of its liability and there is no appeal against it. Accordingly I hold that the second appellant-transferee is the owner of the vehicle.

    4. It is next contended that the second appellant is not liable for the tortious act committed by the driver. The driver had taken the deceased unauthorisedly in the vehicle. He was not instructed to take any passengers and the vehicle is only a tractor. He cannot take any passenger in the tractor as per law. Therefore, the owner is not liable for the unauthorised acts of the driver. Prima facie the contention appears to be plausible, but I find it very difficult to accept this argument. It is true that this Court in M. Vishalakshmi v. Luthern Church AIR 1978 A.P 310 held that the master ordered the driver to take the car for servicing to certain place permitting one police constable known to him to travel in car; the master further told the driver not to pick up any passenger en route but the driver picked up passengers on the way to make some gain for himself and committed an accident during the transit resulting in death of the passengers; the master could not be held liable for payment of compensation under Section 110-B. In that case there is an express instruction given by the master to the driver not to pick up any passenger en route but contrary to the direction the driver picked up the passengers, who sustained injuries or death due to the accident. Thereby the Master would be absolved of the vicarious liability of the owner. That case is distinguishable for the reasons that there is express direction given by the master. In Jiwan Dass Roshan Lal v. Karnail Singh AIR 1980 Pun. & Har. 167. S.S Sandhawalia, C.J of the Punjab & Haryana High Court also has taken the same view stated earlier. There is no dispute as regards the proposition of law as such. But the question in this case is whether the owner has given any specific direction to the driver and the driver has contravened the directions issued by the owner. After all, the passenger is not aware of the authority of the driver or the instructions given by the owner. If the driver has exceeded his authority and picked up the passengers, it is always open to the owner to proceed against the driver and recover the damages which were mulcted on the owner for the tortious acts committed by the driver. But that would be entirely a different fact. Where the third party was inducted to get into the vehicle on payment of fare and, on receipt of it, when be was permitted to travel in the vehicle, then ostensibly the driver acted during the course of his employment., and the vicarious liability has to be fastended on the owner subject to the owner recovering the same from the driver according to law for his unauthorised acts. But the innocent passenger or his legal representatives cannot be denied of the legal right given under Secs. 110-A and 110-B of the Act. In a recent judgment I have considered the liability of the owner of the tractor with regard to the tortious act committed by the driver and also in another case as regards the liability of the owner for picking up the passengers in a goods carriage by the driver contrary to the provisions of the Act. Therein it was held that if the driver contravenes any of the provisions of the Act, it is always open to the authorities to take appropriate action as per law but the liability to the third party cannot be denied on the ground that the driver has contravened the provisions of the Act. Accordingly I hold that the ratio in those cases is of little assistance to the appellant. It is open to the second appellant to proceed against the driver to recover the damages suffered due to the acts unauthorisedly done by the driver. It is not a case of the first appellant that he instructed his driver not to pick up any passenger en route but contrary thereto the driver has committed the tortious act.

    5. Considered from this perspective, I hold that the appellants are liable to pay damages to the legal representatives of the victim.

    6. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

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    Comments

    R. Venkatappa Naidu And Another v. Thammivevi Sugunamma And Others
    (Mar 15, 1989)