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Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: H.S. Guru Raj Rao, K. Srikrishna, Advocates.
Judges
  • K. Bhaskaran, C.J
  • Jagannadha Rao
  • Syed Shah Mohd. Quadri, JJ.
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citation codes
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Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: H.S. Guru Raj Rao, K. Srikrishna, Advocates.
Judges
  • K. Bhaskaran, C.J
  • Jagannadha Rao
  • Syed Shah Mohd. Quadri, JJ.
Acts
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Full Bench Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The landlord (first respondent Shankarlal) owned two adjacent non-residential premises in Hyderabad: building No. 4-5-880 which he occupied, and Mulgi No. 4-5-879 which was in the possession of the tenant Puranmal. The landlord filed R.C. No. 211 of 1976 under Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 seeking eviction of the tenant from No. 4-5-879 on the ground that his major son, Babulal, educated but unemployed, intended to commence a business in those premises (a bona fide requirement).

The tenant resisted, arguing that the landlord was already in occupation of another non-residential building in the same city and therefore could not invoke Section 10(3)(a)(iii) to recover possession. The Rent Controller accepted the tenant's contention and dismissed the eviction application. The landlord appealed to the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad (R.A. No. 289/79), and during the appeal the original tenant died; his widow and two sons were impleaded as supplemental respondents.

The appellate authority reversed the Rent Controller, allowed the appeal and directed eviction on two grounds: (i) that the landlord bona fide required the premises for his son's business, and (ii) that the supplemental respondents were not tenants within Section 2(ix) of the Act. Two of the legal representatives (supplemental respondents) filed this revision under Section 22 of the Act challenging the appellate order. The matter was placed before a Full Bench on reference because of a conflicting Division Bench decision (Balaiah's case, AIR 1965 Andh Pra 435).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a landlord who is already in occupation of a non-residential building in a city, town or village is entitled under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act to recover possession of another non-residential building owned by him, and in the occupation of a tenant, for the purpose of carrying on his business or for commencing a bona fide proposed business.
  2. Whether the widow and sons (legal representatives) of the deceased tenant qualify as "tenant" under Section 2(ix) of the Act and are therefore entitled to protection as tenants in respect of the premises in occupation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Landlord's) Arguments

  • The landlord asserted a bona fide requirement for the mulgi (No. 4-5-879) to commence a business for his major son, Babulal, and sought eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) on that ground.
  • Implicit in the appellate judgment (which supported the landlord) was the position that the landlord could invoke Section 10(3)(a)(iii) even though he occupied another non-residential building in the same city, by treating the son's requirement as the landlord's bona fide requirement.

Respondents' (Tenant / Legal Heirs') Arguments

  • The tenant (and later his legal heirs) contended that because the landlord was already in occupation of a non-residential building (No. 4-5-880) in the same city, he could not invoke Section 10(3)(a)(iii) to evict from the other non-residential building (No. 4-5-879).
  • The legal representatives also relied on the protective definition of "tenant" under Section 2(ix) to claim succession to tenancy rights and protection from eviction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balaiah's case, AIR 1965 Andh Pra 435 The Division Bench held that a landlord occupying a non-residential building could, in certain circumstances, claim another non-residential building of his in the same city from a tenant (including situations where the landlord's family members required it); it drew analogies with S.10(3)(c). The Full Bench examined and rejected the Division Bench's reasoning, holding that Balaiah's conclusion is contrary to the clear language of S.10(3)(a)(iii) and does not represent the correct legal position.
Ramanujam's case, AIR 1982 Andh Pra 227 Relied upon for the proposition that the definition of "tenant" under Section 2(ix) is not confined to residential buildings and extends to non-residential buildings. The Full Bench accepted and followed the conclusion that successors living with the deceased tenant fall within S.2(ix) and thus are tenants for non-residential premises.
Jeeth Kaur's case, (1983) 1 APLJ (HC) 29 : AIR 1983 Andh Pra 219 Also cited to support that tenancy rights under S.2(ix) extend to non-residential buildings. The Full Bench relied on this decision, agreeing that the widow and sons are tenants within S.2(ix).
Thanappa's case, AIR 1952 Mad 553 Listed among authorities supporting the view that the landlord's family-member requirements should not defeat tenant protection under the relevant provision. The Full Bench cited this case as supportive of its view against the expansive reading in Balaiah's case.
Vemana Veerabhadrudu's case, (1958) 2 Andh WR 575 Cited as authority supporting the Full Bench's interpretation (against Balaiah's approach). Used by the Full Bench as supporting material for its interpretation that S.10(3)(a)(iii) bars a landlord already in occupation from recovering another non-residential building.
Ramaswamy Naidu's case, (1961) 1 Andh WR 400 Also cited in support of the view limiting landlords' rights to evict where they already occupy non-residential premises. The Full Bench relied on this as reinforcing its construction of S.10(3)(a)(iii).
Seshasayana Rao's case, (1953) 2 Mad LJ 647 : AIR 1954 Mad 531 Construed provisions in the Madras Act analogous to the Andhra provision; relied upon in Balaiah's case. The Full Bench noted these decisions were relied on in Balaiah, but observed those Madras decisions were virtually all overruled by Laswaran Chettiar's case; it did not express a view on their correctness.
Nagamanickam Chettiar's case, (1957) 1 Mad LJ 182 Another Madras decision construing the analogous provision in the Madras Act; relied on in Balaiah. The Full Bench declined to express a definitive view on its correctness, noting subsequent overruling by the Madras Division Bench in Laswaran Chettiar's case.
Kolandaivelu Chettiar's case, (1961) 1 Mad LJ 184 Madras authority construing identical provisions; relied upon in Balaiah. Noted by the Full Bench as among those decisions superseded by Laswaran Chettiar (AIR 1971 Mad 163).
Laswaran Chettiar's case, AIR 1971 Mad 163 Division Bench decision of Madras which dissented from the earlier Madras Division Bench/decisions and effectively overruled the earlier Madras authority relied upon in Balaiah. The Full Bench cited Laswaran Chettiar as having overruled the earlier Madras decisions that Balaiah had relied upon, reducing the precedential weight of those Madras authorities.
Pandu's case, AIR 1987 SC 857 Supreme Court construction of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) was cited; on its facts the Supreme Court did not decide the very question whether a landlord in occupation of a non-residential building could recover another non-residential building from a tenant, because facts showed the malgis had ceased to be non-residential premises. The Full Bench observed that Pandu's case did not pronounce on the specific question before it because of distinguishing factual circumstances; it therefore did not control the present issue.
M. Venkata Reddy's case, (1966) 2 Andh LT 352 Followed Balaiah's approach (as noted by the Full Bench). The Full Bench held that the observations in such cases following Balaiah could not be upheld in view of its construction of S.10(3)(a)(iii).
K. Venkaiah's case, AIR 1972 Andh Pra 123 Another Andhra decision following Balaiah's reasoning. The Full Bench recorded that observations in this case, following Balaiah, could not be upheld.
C. Manikya Rao's case, (1976) 1 Andh WR 100 Also followed Balaiah's approach. The Full Bench held that the observations in this case could not be upheld.
Karachi Stores' case, AIR 1982 Andh Pra 470 Decision concerned a matter falling under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. The Full Bench distinguished Karachi Stores as a Section 10(3)(c) case and therefore not relevant to the Section 10(3)(a)(iii) question before it.
Madala Chinna Subba Rao's case, (1983) 1 APLJ (HC) 125 Also a case falling under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. The Full Bench treated it as distinguishable and not determinative of the Section 10(3)(a)(iii) issue.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench engaged in a textual and purposive interpretation of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Act. It first extracted the operative elements of S.10(3)(a)(iii) (para 5 of the opinion):

  1. The application must seek an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of a non-residential building in the tenant's occupation;
  2. The eviction sought must be to meet the bona fide requirement of the landlord for carrying on or commencing a business; and
  3. At the relevant time the landlord must not be in occupation of another non-residential building in the same city, town or village which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled (whether under the Act or otherwise).

The Court emphasized that the Act is a social-welfare statute intended primarily to protect tenant interests while allowing limited protections to landlords. The Court found the wording of S.10(3)(a)(iii) to be clear and unambiguous: the legislature attached a rider that the landlord seeking recovery must not be occupying another non-residential building in the same locality which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled. The Full Bench applied the golden rule of interpretation—the ordinary grammatical sense of the statute should be adhered to—stating there is no scope to read into or out of the text so as to defeat the expressed legislative intent (paras 1, 6).

Addressing Balaiah's reasoning, the Full Bench analyzed the Division Bench's four-fold formulation and its broader construction that included family-member requirements and an analogy to Section 10(3)(c). The Court disagreed with Balaiah's inference (paras 7–9, 11). It held that:

  • Section 10(3)(a)(iii) and Section 10(3)(c) are independent provisions dealing with different factual situations; a person occupying only part of a building seeking another portion (S.10(3)(c)) is not analogous to a person already occupying an entire non-residential building seeking a different building (S.10(3)(a)(iii)).
  • Even if a liberal reading were given to the notion of "bona fide requirement" to include family members, that cannot alter the separate and explicit statutory bar that the landlord must not be in occupation of another non-residential building if he wishes to invoke S.10(3)(a)(iii). The Court reasoned that allowing the landlord to treat family-members' requirements as his own while simultaneously claiming that the building he occupies is exclusively his would be internally inconsistent and would subvert the statute’s protective purpose (para 10–10A).
  • Comparative considerations (such as convenience, sufficiency or suitability of the building already occupied) are irrelevant to the statutory bar in S.10(3)(a)(iii); those considerations cannot be imported to override the plain text.

The Full Bench also surveyed authorities relied upon by Balaiah (including Madras precedents) and noted that several of those Madras decisions were themselves overruled by Laswaran Chettiar (AIR 1971 Mad 163). It further observed that the Supreme Court's decision in Pandu (AIR 1987 SC 857) did not decide the present question on its facts. On these bases, the Full Bench concluded that Balaiah and cases following it did not correctly state the law applicable to S.10(3)(a)(iii).

On the separate procedural point, the Full Bench agreed with the single Judge below that the deceased tenant's widow and sons had lived with him until death and therefore qualify as "tenant" within Section 2(ix), and that that definition extends to non-residential buildings (paras 3–4).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Full Bench held that under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, a landlord who is in occupation of a non-residential building is not entitled to recover possession of another non-residential building of his in the same city, town or village which is in the occupation of a tenant. The statutory bar in S.10(3)(a)(iii) is absolute and not displaced by considerations of suitability, convenience, sufficiency, or bona fide need of other family members (paras 13).

Consequential orders (direct effect on the parties): The Full Bench allowed the revision, set aside the judgment of the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad (which had allowed eviction), and restored the order of the Rent Controller dismissing the landlord's eviction application. There was no order as to costs. The revision was therefore allowed (final line: "Revision allowed.").

Broader implications noted by the Court:

  • The Full Bench explicitly rejected the contrary principle propounded in Balaiah's case (AIR 1965 Andh Pra 435) and held that the rulings in Balaiah, and observations in Andhra decisions that followed Balaiah (such as M. Venkata Reddy, K. Venkaiah, and C. Manikya Rao), could not be upheld to the extent they conflict with this construction of S.10(3)(a)(iii).
  • The Court distinguished decisions that dealt with Section 10(3)(c) (for example Karachi Stores and Madala Chinna Subba Rao) as not controlling the present question under Section 10(3)(a)(iii).

The Full Bench’s ruling restores the Rent Controller’s protective approach toward tenants where the landlord is already occupying a non-residential building in the same locality and narrows the scope for landlords to rely on S.10(3)(a)(iii) to evict tenants in such circumstances.

Revision allowed.
Show full summary ...

    Smt. Vidya Bai And Another v. Shankerlal And Another

    K. Bhaskaran, C.J:— If the golden rule of interpretation that the ordinary meaning of the words used by the statute and the grammatical sense thereof should be adhered to, there could be little doubt that a landlord already in occupation of a non-residential building of which he is the owner or to the possession of which he is entitled under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (the ‘Act’) or otherwise, could not invoke Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act for eviction of a tenant in occupation of another non-residential building belonging to him (the landlord) in the same city, town or village, for the purpose of business which he (the landlord) is carrying on or for the purpose of a business which he bona fide proposes to commence. A Division Bench consisting of Basi Reddy, J., and Gopal Rao Ekbote, J., (as he then was), however, took a contrary view in Balaiah's case AIR 1965 Andh Pra 435. P.A Choudary, J., before whom this revision petition was posted for hearing earlier, doubted the correctness of the ruling of the said Division Bench; hence, on reference, this is before this Full Bench.

    2. Now the facts in brief. The first respondent herein (Shankarlal), hereinafter referred to as ‘the landlord’, in occupation of non-residential building No. 4-5-880, Sultan Bazar, Hyderabad, filed R.C No. 211 of 1976 on the file of the Rent Controller, Hyderabad, to evict Puranmal (hereinafter referred to as the ‘tenant’) from another non-residential building, Mulgi No. 4-5-879 owned by him (landlord) in the occupation of the tenant situate in the same city, under Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Act, on the ground that it was bona fide required by him for his personal business as his major son, Babulal, educated but unemployed, wanted to commence a new business in the said premises. The tenant resisted the claim for eviction contending, inter alia, that the landlord who was in occupation of the non-residential building No. 4-5-880 was not entitled to recover possession of the non-residential building No. 4-5-879 in his (tenant's) occupation in the very same city. The Rent Controller accepting the contention of the tenant, dismissed the application for eviction. The matter was carried in appeal to the Chief Judge, City Small. Cause Court, Hyderabad (R.A No. 289/79) by the landlord. During the pendency of the appeal Puranmal (the tenant) died. His legal representatives, his widow and two sons, were impleaded as supplemental respondents 2 to 4. The appellate authority reversed the decision of the Rent Controller, allowed the appeal and directed the tenant to put the landlord back into possession of the premises on two grounds: (i) that the appellant bona fide required the mulgi for commencing the business of his son, Babulal, and (ii) that the supplemental respondents 2 to 4 were not entitled to protection under the Act, holding that they were not tenants as defined in Sec. 2(ix) of the Act. Aggrieved by the decision of the appellate authority, two of the legal representatives of the said Puranmal, viz., supplemental respondents 2 and 3 before the appellate authority, have filed this revision under section 22 of the Act; in the revision, the 4th supplemental respondent, one of the sons of the deceased Puranmal, is shown as the second respondent.

    3. Before embarking upon the discussion on the main question, we may dispose of the short point whether the widow and sons of Puranmal, the original tenant, are entitled to protection from being evicted from the premises. Section 2(ix) of the Act reads as follows:—

    “(ix) ‘Tenant’ means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son or daughter of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the building as a member of the tenant's family up to the death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building, by its tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been framed out or leased by a local authority.”

    In the order of reference, the learned single Judge has entered a finding that the revision-petitioners and the second respondent herein had been living with Puranmal, the original tenant, till his death, and as such they were to be treated as ‘tenants’ of the mulgi in succession to their predecessor-in-interest. Placing reliance on the two decisions of this Court in Ramanujam's case AIR 1982 Andh Pra 227 and Jeeth Kaur's case (1983) 1 APLJ (HC) 29 : (AIR 1983 Andh Pra 219), the learned Judge also found that the tenancy right in terms of Sec. 2(ix) of the Act was not confined to residential buildings, but would extend to non-residential buildings. We have no reason to differ from the reasons stated and the conclusion reached by the learned single Judge on this point. We, therefore, hold that the appellate authority was in error in taking the view that as legal heirs of the deceased Puranmal, the revision-petitioners and the second respondent herein, were not to be treated as tenants as defined in Sec. 2(ix) of the Act in respect of the building No. 4-5-879.

    4. What we are more concerned with in this revision petition is the legal question as to whether a landlord having a non-residential building in his occupation is entitled to recover possession of another non-residential building situate in the same city, owned by him, in the occupation of a tenant, for the purpose of carrying on his business or for commencing a business in that premises. We would extract below Sec: 10(3)(a)(iii) and Sec. 10(3)(c) of the Act, omitting the portions not relevant for the present purpose:

    “(3)(a) A landlord may subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building—

    xxxxxxxxxx

    (iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise—

    (a) for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application, or

    (b) for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the Controller, the landlord bona fide proposes to commence;

    xxxxxxxx

    (c) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential or nonresidential, may, notwithstanding anything in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be.”

    The question involved here directly and substantially is only the interpretation to be given to Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. We have, however, extracted above Sec. 10(3)(c) of the Act also having noticed that in Balaiah's case (AIR 1965 Andh Pra 435) (supra) the Division Bench has made reference to that sub-section in an attempt to reinforce its conclusion reached on the scope and ambit of Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.

    5. Let us analyse the essential features of Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. To attract this clause, (i) the application to the Rent Controller should be for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of a non-residential building in his (tenant's) occupation; (ii) the eviction of the non-residential building sought should be to meet the bona fide requirement of the landlord for carrying on or commencing a business and (iii) during the relevant time the landlord is not in occupation of another non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned, which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under the Act or otherwise.

    6. The Act is a progressive legislative measure to provide social welfare and security, mainly to protect the interests of the tenants while providing certain safeguards for the landlords also. The object of Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is to enable the landlord to recover possession of his non-residential building in the occupation of a tenant under him if it is required for the purpose of the business which he carries on, or he bona fide proposes to commence. There is, all the same, a rider attached to this enabling provision; and that is, the landlord seeking recovery of such non-residential building should not be in occupation of another non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned, which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled. The intendment of the legislature is crystal clear; no landlord who is in occupation of a non-residential building which is his own or to the possession of which is entitled, should be permitted to invoke Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act to recover possession of another non-residential building belonging to him, evicting the tenant thereof. We find absolutely no ambiguity whatsoever in the expressions used in the statutory provision. The legislature has not left any scope for doubting the meaning of the words used, or the object sought to be achieved, the language used being simple and unequivocal. It would be presumptuous on our part to hold that the legislature did not mean what it stated in the statute; or it meant something more or something less than the meaning conveyed by the language used. The maxim is “a verbia legis non recedemdum est” (from the words of the law there should not be any departure). The legislature's anxiety appears to have been not to disturb the tenant in occupation by his landlord, if he was in occupation of a non-residential building. The very fact that he is in occupation of a non-residential building in which he carries on his business is sufficient reason for depriving him of the right to evict the tenant in occupation of another non-residential building belonging to or owned by him. The process of interpreting the law, as a general rule, it is not open to the Court to read into it what is not there, or to substitute it or a portion thereof by the opinion of the Court, on equitable or other considerations, so long as the intendment of the Legislature has been expressed categorically and in clear and unambiguous language, unless it is unconstitutional or opposed to the principles of natural justice. The Court may, in appropriate cases, indicate amendments to the provision which are desirable to make the provision in question more meaningful and equitable; and leave it to the Legislature for its consideration and action; but to go beyond that limit and to give a meaning which runs counter to the expressed will of the Legislature is not permissible. Judicial activism too has its limits; while it permits and requires interpretation of law in its proper perspective, it does not expect, in that process, to import ideas alien to the clear language used in the statutory provision. The Courts are to interpret law, not to make law.

    7. We would briefly refer to the facts in Balaiah's case (AIR 1965 Andh Pra 435) (supra), and the reasons stated by the learned Judges for the legal propositions sought to be propounded by them. In that case, the landlord filed a petition under Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act against the tenant on two grounds: firstly, that his son who had attained majority intended to start a new business; and, secondly, that the building required reconstruction. The Rent Controller allowed the petition holding that the requirement of the undivided son would be deemed to be the personal requirement of the landlord. The decision of the Rent Controller haying been confirmed in appeal, the defeated tenant preferred a revision, which was referred to a Division Bench by Venkateswam, J., before whom it was posted at the initial stage for hearing, in view of the importance of the question of law involved. On a closer examination of the provisions, the Division Bench thought that to attract Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, four things must exist: (1) it must be ‘any other non-residential building’; (2) the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building (in the city, town or village) which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled; (3) he requires it for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on or which he bona fide proposes to commence; and (4) his claim is bona fide.

    8. On the finding recorded by the Rent Controller, the Division Bench held that the first and the last requirements were not in controversy. So far as the third requirement is concerned, the discussion by the Division Bench is found in paragraph 9 of the judgment (at pp. 436-437). According to the learned Judges:

    “It seems now to be beyond any doubt that these expressions need not necessarily be confined to the physical requirement of the landlord himself. These and similar other expressions ought to be liberally construed and not in a narrow way. They are susceptible of a wide meaning. They include the landlord's “family and dependants and such person or persons who may be essential and necessary for occupation”. In order to find out who are such persons

    “it is not only permissible but it is proper and desirable for the Court to bear in mind the context of the social order, the habits and ideas of living and the social and religious customs of the community to which the individual concerned belongs”.

    Whether the need of a particular person is the need of the landlord will naturally have to be decided in view of the circumstances of each case.

    Broadly stated, however, these phrases not only include the members of the landlord's family but also all those persons who are socially or economically dependent on him and whose responsibilities he has accepted. This is based on the necessity of realising that the family in India whether joint or separate is the social unit of Indian civilisation and it is greater public importance to keep it together…..

    We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that when the major son, a coparcener in a joint Hindu family, intends to start a business, the third requirement of the said provision would be deemed to have been satisfied, as this requirement would be the requirement of the landlord. Such a case, therefore, plainly falls within S. 10(3)(a)(iii).”

    The second requirement formulated is dealt with in paragraph 10 onwards. The learned Judges felt that if the construction placed by the learned Advocate for the tenant on Sec. 10 that the landlord should not have in his occupation in the city a non-residential building for the purpose of the business which he was carrying on or which he proposed to commence; and in case he was in occupation of a non-residential building, he could take advantage of S. 10 only in a case where the said non-residential building was not his own or he was not entitled to its possession; it would create absurd results which the Courts must try to avoid. The learned Judges thought that it was impossible to think that the Legislature wanted to make a provision as contended for by the counsel for the tenant. Towards the end of paragraph 11, what is stated reads as follows:

    “Consequently a landlord who is carrying on the business in the city in a non-residential building whether of his own or which he has taken on rent, will in no case be entitled to claim another non-residential building of his for the purpose of expansion of his business or for the purpose of commencing a new business. We do not think that is the situation which the Legislature wanted to create. That this is not so would be clear from the object with which S. 10 appears to have been enacted.”

    In paragraph 12 of the judgment at p. 138, the learned Judges said:

    “It is evident from S. 10(3)(c) that a landlord can claim a portion of the same building given on rent whatever may be the nature of his requirement, viz., residential or nonresidential, subject of course to the satisfaction of other requirements of that provision. When a landlord can thus get a tenant evicted under S. 10(3)(c) in this manner, we fail to see why the landlord in an earlier clause would have been given altogether a different and diametrically opposite treatment. It is, therefore, impossible to construe S. 10(3)(a)(iii) to mean that the landlord cannot in any case evict a tenant from another of his non-residential building if he is in occupation of a non-residential building in the same city either for his business which he is carrying on or for a new business.

    We would, therefore, naturally prefer to so construe this provision which would be consistent with the legislative intent apparent from the subsequent clause, viz. 10(3)(c). That is another reason why we do not find any substance in the interpretation tried to be placed by the learned Adocate for the petitioner.”

    According to the learned Judges, the correct position in law is as summed up in paragraph 13 of that judgment (at p. 438), which we reproduce below:

    “We are, therefore, of the clear opinion that what the said provision means is this: when a landlord, who is in occupation of a non-residential building in a city, town or village requires another non-residential building of his own in the same city, town or village, as the case may be, from his tenant, for the purpose of the business which he is carrying on — which can mean shifting or expansion of the business which he is carrying on or for commencing a new business — can successfully claim eviction of his tenant if he is able to satisfy the Rent Controller that the non-residential building which he is occupying is not sufficient or suitable for the purpose of expansion of his business for the purpose of a new business which he bona fide proposes to commence, or that the shifting of his business has, in the circustances of the case, become inevitable. It would be open to him to prove that the non-residential building which he is occupying is not exclusively his own or that he is not entitled to its exclusive possession. Any one of the above mentioned cases falls, in our view, within the ambit of Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii).”

    (emphasis supplied)

    9. With respect to the learned Judges, we find ourselves not persuaded to accept their reasoning behind the decision, which, according to us, is manifestly contrary to the legislative intent as could be gathered from the clear expressions used in Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. We wonder why and how the learned Judges concluded that it was impossible to construe Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) to mean that the landlord could not in any case evict a tenant from another of his non-residential building if he was in occupation of a non-residential building in the same city for carrying on or commencing a new business, when the clause in unequivocal terms stated so.

    10. We would, giving a liberal interpretation, assume that the landlord's bona fide requirement might include the bona fide requirement of any other member of his family including himself. This might enable the landlord to claim the eviction of the non-residential building owned by him in the occupation of the tenant, even when the bona fide requirement is not that of himself personally, but is that of any other member or some members of his family; that is all. The more important and relevant question, however, is whether this would in any way change the nature and extent of his right to claim eviction of the tenant occupying a non-residential building belonging to him, situate in the same city, when he himself is in occupation of another non-residential building. One cannot blow hot and cold at the same time. If the bona fide requirement of the landlord should be deemed to include that of any other member of the applicant's family, by the application of the same reasoning and logic, the occupation of a non-residential building in the same city should be deemed to be occupation of every other member of the applicant's family also; and, therefore, the members of the family severally or jointly, cannot ask for the recovery of another non-residential building in the occupation of a tenant as long as the applicant, any other member or some of the members of his family are occupying a non-residential building for carrying on a business or commencing a new business. In other words, the landlord could not be heard to say that the non-residential building already in his occupation was occupied exclusively by him, not by any other member of his family, and, therefore, on behalf of every other member of his family, who bona fide required to carry on or to commence a business, he was entitled to recover a non-residential building, in the occupation of his tenant. This argument is destructive of the very character of the joint family conception, and this would definitely defeat the object and purpose of the legislation to protect the tenant from being evicted from the premises arbitrarily. For the view we expressed, we find support in Thanappa's case AIR 1952 Mad 553; Vemana Veerabhadrudu's case (1958) 2 Andh WR 575 and Ramaswamy Naidu's case (1961) 1 Andh WR 400.

    10A. We notice that the decisions in Seshasayana Rao's case (1953) 2 Mad LJ 647 : AIR 1954 Mad 531, Nagamanickam Chettiar's case (1957) 1 Mad LJ 182 and Kolandaivelu Chettiar's case (1961) 1 Mad LJ 184, construing identical provisions in Sec. 7(3)(c)(iii) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (25 of 1949) were relied on in Balaiah's case (AIR 1965 Andh Pra 435) (supra). It is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the correctness of the reasoning of the learned Judges in those decisions, inasmuch as virtually all those decisions stand overruled by the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court itself in Laswaran Chettiar's case AIR 1971 Mad 163 which incidentally also dissented from the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Balaiah's case (supra).

    11. With due respect again, we are constrained to add that in Balaiah's case (supra) the Division Bench erred in drawing an inference that because the landlord in occupation of a portion of a building was entitled to seek recovery of another portion of the building to meet his bona fide requirement in terms of Sec. 10(3)(c) of the Act, it must be deemed that a person invoking Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) also should be entitled to recover possession of a non-residential building from his tenant, when he was occupying another non-residential building in the same city. We fail to understand the rationale behind the conclusion. The two provisions are independent, not complementary to one another. In one case, it is a case of a person in occupation of only a portion of the building seeking to recover another portion of the same building to meet the bona fide requirement; in the other, it is a case of one who is already in occupation of the entire building seeking to recover possession of another building. The two situations are not comparable as equal or similar; and the fallacy of the Division Bench ruling lies in having drawn an inference on a comparison of what are not comparable as equal or similar things.

    12. Recently in Pandu's case AIR 1987 SC 857, the Supreme Court had occasion to construe the provisions of Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. The decision of our Division Bench in Balaiah's case (AIR 1965 Andh Pra 435) (supra) was also cited before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, did not pronounce anything in regard to the right of the landlord to recover possession of a non-residential building of his in the occupation of a tenant when he was already in occupation of another non-residential building, in the same city, town or village, in which he carried on business inasmuch as, on facts, it was found: “the malgis have ceased to be non-residential premises from 1970 onwards and hence their mere ownership cannot preclude the respondent from seeking the eviction of the appellant under Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii)”. The decision of the Supreme Court was based on the facts peculiar to that case.

    13. It is our considered opinion that under Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, a landlord in occupation of a non-residential building is not entitled, for carrying on his business or for commencing a business, to get back possession of another non-residential building in the occupation of a tenant; the bar under the Section against securing eviction of the tenant of such non-residential building is absolute; suitability, convenience and sufficiency of the non-residential building already in the occupation of the landlord for carrying on the business of the applicant (landlord) or to meet the bona fide need of any other member of the family of the applicant (landlord), independent of and over and above the need of the applicant (landlord), are all, in our view, irrelevant considerations in the context of construing the provisions in Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act which, in clear terms, interdicts the landlord, in absolute terms, from seeking recovery of the non-residential building belonging to him in the occupation of the tenant. We, therefore, hold that the ruling given by the Division Bench to the contrary in Balaiah's case AIR 1965 Andh Pra 435 (supra) does not represent the correct legal position. For the same reasons, the observations made by the learned Judges who decided M. Venkata Reddy's case (1966) 2 Andh LT 352 K. Venkaiah's case AIR 1972 Andh Pra 123 and C. Manikya Rao's case (1976) 1 Andh WR 100, following Balaiah's case (AIR 1965 Andh Pra 435) (supra) also could not be upheld. Karachi Stores' case AIR 1982 Andh Pra 470 is distinguishable as the same is one falling under Sec. 10(3)(c) of the Act. So also is the decision in Madala Chinna Subba Rao's case (1983) 1 APLJ(HC) 125.

    14. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the revision, setting aside the judgment of the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, and restoring the order of the Rent Controller. There would, however, be no order as to costs, in the circumstances of the case.

    Revision allowed.

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    Smt. Vidya Bai And Another v. Shankerlal And Another
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