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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act under section 12(3). Sub-clause (ii) of section 12(3) of the Madras Act
  • section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act (6 of 1957)(hereinafter called the Act)
  • section 23(3) of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, Government
  • provisions of this Act, including sub-section (2) of this section,
  • rule 33 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules, 1957,
  • section 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act.
  • Maharashtra Co-operative Housing Societies Act, 1960,
  • Madras Act by omitting clause (ii) of section 12(3)
  • section 12 (of the Madras General Sales Tax Act)
  • provisions of section 12(3) of the Madras Act,
  • SECTION 33 INDIAN INCOME TAX ACT
  • provisions of section 23 of the Andhra Act,
  • sub-section (4-C) of section 14
  • Section 57(1) of the Stamp Act
  • section 23(2) of the above Act,
  • sub-section (9) of section 149,
  • Madras General Sales Tax Act.
  • sub-section (2) of section 20
  • SECTION 57 STAMP ACT
  • section 56, sub-section (2),
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1922
  • rule 14(2)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act under section 12(3). Sub-clause (ii) of section 12(3) of the Madras Act
  • section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act (6 of 1957)(hereinafter called the Act)
  • section 23(3) of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, Government
  • provisions of this Act, including sub-section (2) of this section,
  • rule 33 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules, 1957,
  • section 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act.
  • Maharashtra Co-operative Housing Societies Act, 1960,
  • Madras Act by omitting clause (ii) of section 12(3)
  • section 12 (of the Madras General Sales Tax Act)
  • provisions of section 12(3) of the Madras Act,
  • SECTION 33 INDIAN INCOME TAX ACT
  • provisions of section 23 of the Andhra Act,
  • sub-section (4-C) of section 14
  • Section 57(1) of the Stamp Act
  • section 23(2) of the above Act,
  • sub-section (9) of section 149,
  • Madras General Sales Tax Act.
  • sub-section (2) of section 20
  • SECTION 57 STAMP ACT
  • section 56, sub-section (2),
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1922
  • rule 14(2)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These are a batch of special appeals arising out of orders of the Board of Revenue rejecting revision petitions filed under section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. The opinion describes three central questions raised in these appeals concerning the nature and exercise of the Board's revisional power under section 20, whether the Board's orders were vitiated by procedural defects (failure to afford opportunity, failure to consider contentions, or failure to give reasons), and whether certain assessments of tax on turnover were illegal and invalid.

The facts in Special Appeal No. 2 of 1963 (typical of the batch) are summarized as follows: the appellant operated a shop at Anakapalle dealing in jaggery; sugar-cane growers converted cane into jaggery and brought it to the appellant; the appellant graded, mixed and sold jaggery, sometimes acting as commission agent and at other times purchasing the jaggery outright. In sales documents the goods were shown as the appellant’s own and identity of growers was not preserved. The appellant collected various charges from buyers and paid growers after deducting commissions and other sums; it did not account to growers for all sums received.

Because jaggery was taxable only at the point of first sale during the relevant period and because there was no provision in the Andhra Act for collecting tax from a seller's agent (unlike the Madras General Sales Tax Act), the appellant maintained that it was not liable to pay tax in either capacity. The Government had issued G.O. Ms. No. 619 dated 21 March 1960, which the opinion records as recognising the position and deciding to waive the tax liable to be collected from agriculturists. The appellant had in fact paid tax in respect of turnovers that, in his submission, should have been liable only on the agriculturist-first sale and, in consequence, sought a refund by filing a revision petition under section 20 before the Board of Revenue.

The Board disposed of the revision petition in a brief order: "The Board sees no reason to interfere on behalf of the petitioners. The petition is rejected." The appellants then prosecuted special appeals to this Court challenging (inter alia) the Board's rejection as amounting to a failure to exercise jurisdiction and asserting procedural defects in the Board's disposal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the orders of the Board of Revenue in rejecting the revisions under section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act filed against the orders of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer are illegal and constitute a failure to exercise jurisdiction.
  2. Whether the orders of the Board of Revenue are vitiated by (a) failure to afford a reasonable opportunity to the appellants to present and prove their cases and/or (b) failure to consider the contentions of the appellants and/or (c) failure to assign any reasons to reject the revision petitions.
  3. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the cases, the assessment to tax on turnover is illegal and invalid.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Section 20 confers a power coupled with a duty and is designed for the benefit of the public; therefore, appellants had a right to move the Board of Revenue to rectify errors of law (i.e., the Board's revisional jurisdiction may be invoked by an aggrieved party).
  • The Board’s summary rejection without reasons amounted to a failure to exercise jurisdiction and, because the Board’s proceedings are quasi-judicial, appellants were entitled to be afforded an opportunity to be heard.
  • Reference was made to decided cases (e.g., East Asiatic Company (India) Ltd. v. State of Madras and Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd.) to support the submission that suo motu jurisdiction should be exercised in the interests of both the State and the assessee and that a party ought to be able to invoke such jurisdiction.

Government's Arguments

  • The power of revision under section 20 is principally a power to be exercised suo motu by the Board of Revenue; it does not prima facie confer a right on an assessee to compel the Board to exercise that power.
  • Any person aggrieved may move the Board, but when the Board acts it is acting suo motu; the mere submission by a party does not transform section 20 into a statutory right to revision.
  • Where the Board has not acted suo motu, section 23 (which confers a right of appeal to the High Court from orders of the Board passed suo motu) does not apply; hence the appeals to the High Court would not be maintainable on the footing that no suo motu order was passed by the Board.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as stated in the opinion)
East Asiatic Company (India) Ltd. v. State of Madras [1956] 7 S.T.C. 299 Passage on the wide ambit of suo motu revision — that such jurisdiction may safeguard the interests of the exchequer as well as the assessee. The appellants relied on a passage in this decision to support the contention that revisional jurisdiction should operate in the interests of both State and assessee. The Court notes the passage was cited but does not treat it as dispositive in the face of later controlling authority.
Kalluri Bheemalingam, In re (Bench of this Court) Held that the Andhra Act's scheme confines the Board's revisional power to suo motu action and that the right of appeal to the High Court is confined to Board orders passed suo motu. The Court treated this decision as dispositive: it concluded the matter was settled by that Bench, and followed its reasoning to hold revisions before the Board (on application by a party) are not maintainable and appeals are not maintainable.
Mela Ram & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab Invoked by appellants in support of a right to compel revisional action (as cited). The decision was distinguished and held inapplicable by the Bench referred to in this opinion; it was not treated as controlling.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Shahzadi Begum [1952] 21 I.T.R. 1 Invoked by appellants in support of their contention regarding revisional rights. The earlier Bench distinguished this decision and held it inapplicable to the statutory context of section 20; it did not support the appellants' claim for a right to compel revision under the Andhra Act.
Burmah Shell Co. Ltd. v. Board of Revenue [1963] 14 S.T.C. 13 Mentioned by the appellants as potentially supportive of their position. The Bench held the principle in that case was not applicable to the present context.
Kandaswami Gounder & Brothers v. State of Madras [1957] 8 S.T.C. 603 Decision on section 12(3) of the Madras Act (in pari materia with section 23 of the Andhra Act); used as an analogous authority. The Court followed this Madras decision with approval in the earlier Bench and treated it as supportive of the view that the Andhra Act confines revisional jurisdiction to suo motu action by the Board.
Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd. [1950] S.C.R. 536 Interpreted a provision of the Stamp Act (section 57) to hold the power was coupled with a duty to make a reference in appropriate circumstances. The Court observed that the Chief Controlling case turned on the particular language of the Stamp Act and therefore is not applicable to the Andhra Act's section 20; it did not accept that case as controlling here.
Julius v. Bishop of Oxford (1880) 5 App. Cas. 214 Referenced in relation to the proposition that a power stated in permissive terms might nevertheless be coupled with a duty in some contexts. Quoted in discussion of the Chief Controlling case; the Court did not apply it as determinative for section 20 of the Andhra Act.
Everest Apartments Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra (unreported Supreme Court decision) Considered the scope of a statutory power of revision (section 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act) and held the power was "potential but not compulsive" — Government may act but a party did not thereby acquire a statutory right to compel intervention. The Court regarded this unreported decision as supporting the conclusion that section 20 of the Andhra Act does not give an aggrieved party a right to compel the Board to exercise revisional jurisdiction; it helped to dispose of any lingering doubt on the point.
Commissioner of Income-tax, West Punjab v. The Tribune Trust, Lahore Discussed in relation to scope of revisional powers under the Income-tax Act and whether they create enforceable rights for applicants. The earlier Bench distinguished this case on the statutory language and held the two enactments were not materially equal; it did not accept Tribune Trust as controlling for the Andhra Act issue.
Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer Decision on section 33-A of the Income-tax Act (which expressly gave an assessee a right to move the Commissioner for revision). The Court said the decision concerned section 33-A and therefore could afford little assistance on section 20 of the Andhra Act (which lacks an analogous provision conferring a right on the assessee).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the text of section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act (and its sub-sections), reproduced in the opinion. The central analytical question was whether section 20 merely confers a power of suo motu revision on the Board of Revenue (i.e., a discretionary supervisory power for the Board to initiate revision on its own motion) or whether it also confers upon an aggrieved person a legal right to move the Board to exercise that power (which would, in turn, make the Board's refusal or non-consideration challengeable).

The Government's position, as set out by the learned Government Pleader, was that section 20 confers a suo motu power on the Board and not a prima facie right on an assessee to compel the Board to act; the Board may, if it chooses, act, but an application by a person aggrieved does not transform the power into a statutory right of the aggrieved. The Court accepted that if an aggrieved person had a statutory right to require the Board to consider and exercise the power, the non-consideration would give rise to a right of appeal to the High Court.

The appellants relied on authorities (including East Asiatic and the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority case) to argue that such powers may in some contexts be regarded as a duty or as making provision for intervention for the benefit of the party as well as the revenue. The Court reviewed these authorities but placed decisive reliance on an earlier Bench decision of this Court in Kalluri Bheemalingam, In re, which had interpreted the Andhra Act's scheme and concluded that the Act had deliberately omitted the provision (found in the Madras Act) that permitted revision on application by a party. The Bench in Kalluri Bheemalingam concluded that the revisional jurisdiction in the Andhra Act was exercisable suo motu only and that the right of appeal to the High Court under section 23 was confined to orders passed suo motu by the Board.

The Court further examined and distinguished other authorities relied on by the appellants (including decisions under different statutory regimes such as the Stamp Act and the Income-tax Act). It observed that the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority decision turned on the particular language of the Stamp Act and was therefore not applicable; similarly, the Tribunal/Income-tax decisions were distinguishable by reason of differing statutory texts. The unreported Supreme Court decision in Everest Apartments, which interpreted a differently worded statutory provision (section 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act), was noted as demonstrating that a government revisionary power could be "potential but not compulsive" — a principle the Court treated as consistent with the conclusion that section 20 does not create a statutory right in an aggrieved party to compel the Board to act.

On that basis the Court concluded there was no statutory right for the appellant to compel the Board to exercise revisional jurisdiction under section 20, and it was unnecessary to decide ancillary questions such as whether the assessee had a right to a personal hearing before the Board in the circumstances described.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's dispositive ruling is that the revisions before the Board of Revenue are not maintainable and the appeals are not maintainable. Accordingly, the special appeals were dismissed with costs (advocate's fee of Rs. 25 in each case except Special Appeal No. 1 of 1963, in which no costs were allowed).

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties is the dismissal of their special appeals and the affirmation that the Board's brief rejection of the revision petitions did not give rise to a right of appeal to the High Court on the footing that section 20 created a statutory right to compel revision.
  • The Court followed and applied (and treated as dispositive) the earlier Bench decision in Kalluri Bheemalingam, thereby confirming that, under the Andhra Act as enacted, the Board of Revenue's revisional jurisdiction under section 20 is to be exercised suo motu and that the statutory scheme does not provide a right to an aggrieved party to require the Board to initiate revision.
  • The Court expressly refrained from deciding whether appellants were entitled to a personal hearing before the Board, observing that such a decision was unnecessary once the statutory conclusion was reached.
  • The opinion does not purport to set a novel legal principle beyond applying and following prior authorities; it relies on existing decisions (including a Bench decision of this Court) to resolve the statutory construction question.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Appeals dismissed." Costs awarded as indicated in the text.

    Sree Ramachandra Ginning And Oil Mills And Others v. The State Of Andhra Pradesh

    Jaganmohan Reddy, C.J:— These batch of special appeals primarily involve the following questions, namely:—

    (1) Whether the orders of the Board of Revenue in rejecting the revisions under section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act (6 of 1957)(hereinafter called “the Act”) filed against the orders of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, are illegal and constitute a failure to exercise jurisdiction.

    (2) Whether the orders of the Board of Revenue are vitiated by (a) failure to afford a reasonable opportunity to the appellants to present and prove their cases and/or (b) failure to consider the contentions of the appellants and/or (c) failure to assign any reasons to reject the revision petitions; and

    (3) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the cases the assessment to tax on turnover is illegal and invalid.

    2. We will state the facts in Special Appeal No. 2 of 1963, which are typical of the facts of the other cases in which the above questions arise.

    3. The appellant, who has a shop in the market at Anakapalle, carries on business in jaggery and other commodities. Various growers of sugar-cane convert sugar-cane grown by them into jaggery and then bring the jaggery to the shop of the appellant. The appellant takes the jaggery, grades it into different qualities and sells the same in its sole discretion to various parties. The appellant collects from the purchaser the price of the goods sold, kolagaram at Rs. 1.50 per 100 maunds, dharmam at one anna per 15 maunds, valtar at per cent. and sales tax at Rs. 3 per cent. on the total, and where the buyer is not a member of the Anakapalle Merchants' Association, a cess of one anna for every 15 maunds of jaggery is also collected. To the ryot, the appellant pays the price after deducting therefrom its commission which varies between Rs. 3.12 to Rs. 6.25 per cent. including gumastha rusum at 2 annas per cent. and kolagaram at Rs. 3 or 3.50 per cent. Once the goods are delivered to the appellant, the appellant assumes responsibility therefor. The goods of the several growers are mixed up and sold according to quality. In the bills issued to the purchasers the goods are shown as the appellant's own. Although the jaggery sold to anyone purchaser may have been brought to the appellant by more than one grower, the identity is not preserved. The appellant does not account to the ryot grower for all the sums received by the appellant from the purchaser of jaggery.

    4. On these facts, the precise legal implications in the context of Explanation III to section 2(n) of the Act eluded the appellant and the authorities. As such, no claim for exemption of the turnover of Rs. 2,33,000.61 on the basis that the appellant was the second seller of jaggery, was put forward. The appellant is not liable to pay tax in any of the two capacities, (i) as buyer and (ii) as seller's agent inasmuch as jaggery was taxable during the relevant period only at the point of first sale. The jaggery belongs to the agriculturist and he sells it, utilising the appellant's services as commission agent, and in some cases the appellant purchases the jaggery and in respect of these sales the appellant is a buyer and not the agent of the seller. The turnover of jaggery thus purchased by the appellant is Rs. 2,33,000.61. But there is no provision in the Act for collecting the tax from the seller's agent as was the case under the Madras General Sales Tax Act. As such the appellant was not liable to pay the tax. This position was also recognised by the Government in G.O Ms. No. 619 of the Revenue Department, dated 21st March, 1960. In view of this G.O the Government had also decided to waive the tax liable to be collected from the agriculturists. The appellant has actually paid the tax in respect of transactions for which the agriculturist as the first seller was liable to pay tax, and since the Government have granted tax exemption for such transactions, the appellant is entitled to a refund of the tax paid. He is prepared if necessary to lead evidence to substantiate the above contentions. In order to rectify this legal error and obtain refund the appellant filed a revision petition under section 20 of the Act before the Board of Revenue, which, in a laconic order, stated : “The Board sees no reason to interfere on behalf of the petitioners. The petition is rejected.”

    5. Sri Anantha Babu and Sri Venkatappayya Sastry, who appear in all these cases, contend that section 20 confers a power coupled with a duty and is designed for the benefit of the public; as such, the appellants had a right to move the Board of Revenue to rectify the error of law. In rejecting the applications summarily and without giving any reasons, the Board failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it and it should, therefore, be directed to consider the same. The proceedings before the Board of Revenue, it is contended, are quasi-judicial proceedings and, therefore, the appellants should have been afforded an opportunity to be heard.

    6. Inasmuch as these contentions depend upon the content of the revisional power under section 20, we read that section as below:

    “The Board of Revenue may suo motu call for and examine the record of any order passed or proceeding recorded by any authority, officer or person subordinate to it, under the provisions of this Act, including sub-section (2) of this section, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of such proceedings and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.

    (2) Powers of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) may also be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner and the Commercial Tax Officer in the case of orders passed or proceedings recorded by authorities, officers or persons subordinate to them.

    (2-A) The power under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall not be exercised by the authority specified therein in respect of any issue or question which is the subject-matter of an appeal before, or which was decided on appeal by, the Appellate Tribunal under section 21.

    (3) In relation to an order of assessment passed under this Act, the powers conferred by sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be exercisable only within such period not exceeding four years from the date on which the order was served on the dealer, as may be prescribed.

    (4) No order shall be passed under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) enhancing any assessment unless an opportunity has been given to the assessee to show cause against the proposed enhancement.

    (5) Where an order passed under this section has been set aside by the Appellate Tribunal, or the High Court or the Supreme Court for any reason, the period between the date of such order and the date on which it has been so set aside shall be excluded in computing the period of four years specified in sub-section (3) for the purpose of making a fresh revision, if any, under this section.”

    7. The learned Government Pleader, Mr. Ramachandra Reddy contends that from the above provision it is evident that the power of revision has been conferred on the Board of Revenue to suo motu initiate proceedings and has not prima facie conferred a right upon the assessee to move the Board to exercise its powers under that section. No doubt any person aggrieved can move the Board and if the Board chooses to act under it, it can only be said to act suo motu. It is further contended that inasmuch as the provisions of section 23 of the Act confer a right on a dealer objecting to an order relating to an assessment passed by the Board of Revenue suo motu under subsection (1) of section 20 to appeal to the High Court, these appeals are not maintainable, as no orders have been passed by the Board suo motu.

    8. The question therefore is whether any aggrieved person has a right to move the Board under section 20. If he has a right, then certainly he would be entitled to require consideration of his application, the non-consideration of which gives him a right of appeal to the High Court.

    9. Mr. Venkatappayya Sastry has, by reference to a decision in East Asiatic Company (India) Ltd. v. State of Madras [1956] 7 S.T.C 299. cited a passage in the judgment of Ramaswami, J., as to what suo motu jurisdiction implied. At page 315, the learned Judge observed:

    “The jurisdiction of suo motu revision is not cribbed and cabined or confined by conditions and qualifications. The purpose of such an amplitude being given to suo motu revisions appears to be as much to safeguard the interests of the exchequer as the interests of the assessee. The State can never be the appellant and if there is an order against the State to its prejudice, and naturally the assessee in whose favour the order is passed does not prefer an appeal, the State would suffer unless its interests are safeguarded by the exercise of such supervisory jurisdiction as the one given to the authorities above-mentioned. So, when this revisional jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Board of Revenue under section 12 (of the Madras General Sales Tax Act) and when extensive rule-making powers have been granted to the Government under section 19 and when as a result of the practical working of the Act the Government have found that to safeguard the interests of the exchequer as well as the interests of the assessee, rule 14(2) should be enacted in order to make good the want of sufficient provision in the Act for giving effect to the purpose of this Act, it cannot be said that this is not intra vires of the rule-making powers conferred by section 19 of the Act.”

    10. These observations are relied upon for the purpose of supporting the contention that the revisional jurisdiction under section 20 of the Act should be exercised in the interests of both the State as well as the assessee. Once this position is admitted, the assessee also has a right to move the Board for the exercise of jurisdiction conferred under this section.

    11. In our view the matter is concluded by a decision of a Bench of this Court consisting of Satyanarayana Raju, O.C.J (as he then was) and Anantanarayana Ayyar, J., in Kalluri Bheemalingam, In re, on the very points that are now urged before us. In that case, the Board of Revenue had rejected the revision petitions filed by the assessees as not maintainable and when special appeals were filed before this Court, the office took objection to their maintainability, based on the terms of section 23 of the Act. Sri Anantha Babu there also contended that the revision to the Board of Revenue may be irregular or incompetent but still as the Board of Revenue exercises quasi-judicial functions, its orders must ex facie indicate that the Board has applied its mind to the various aspects of the case; that in exercising its revisional jurisdiction, the Board must consider the questions raised before it and also give reasons for its decision; and that, therefore, the orders of the Board of Revenue rejecting the revision petitions filed by the assessees fall within the ambit of section 23 of the Act and appeals against such orders would lie to the High Court. The Government Pleader contended that an appeal lies to the High Court under section 23(1) only where the Board of Revenue has acted suo motu under section 20(1) and not in cases where its revisional jurisdiction was invoked by an application preferred to it by a party and since an appeal lies from that order to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal the assessee could have filed an appeal and then apply to the High Court in revision. The Bench considered the analogous provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act under section 12(3). Sub-clause (ii) of section 12(3) of the Madras Act contained another mode in which the revisional jurisdiction could be brought into operation and that was by an application by a party while sub-clause (i) enabled the Board by itself without reference to a party to take cognizance of orders passed by subordinate authorities and to exercise revisional jurisdiction over them. It was pointed out by the Bench that the Andhra Act has made a departure from the Madras Act by omitting clause (ii) of section 12(3) with the result that the power of the Board of Revenue to entertain revision petitions at the instance of the aggrieved parties is omitted, and an appeal to the High Court is only provided against an order passed suo motu. It was also pointed out that as the provision now stands the revisional jurisdiction vested in the Board of Revenue can be exercised suo motu only and not on application by a party and the right of appeal vested in the High Court is confined only to the orders of the Board passed suo motu. It may be pointed out that under section 19 of the Act a right of appeal to the prescribed authority within thirty days from the date on which the order or proceeding was served on the assessee, has been provided for, and rule 33 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules, 1957, prescribes the authorities to which appeals may be preferred. Section 21 provides that any dealer objecting to an order passed or proceeding recorded (a) by any prescribed authority on appeal under section 19, or (b) by a Deputy Commissioner suo motu under sub-section (4-C) of section 14 or under sub-section (2) of section 20 may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within sixty days from the the date on which the order or proceeding was served on him. Section 22 provides that any dealer or the authority prescribed in this behalf may prefer a revision to the High Court against the order of the Appellate Tribunal on the ground that it has either decided erroneously or failed to decide any question of law. Satyanarayana Raju, O.C.J (as he then was) dealing with these provisions said:

    “From the scheme of the Act it is plain that section 20 empowers the Board of Revenue, with a view to safeguard the interests of the revenue, to entertain a revision suo motu. It is, therefore, that section 23 provides that any dealer objecting to an order relating to assessment passed by the Board of Revenue suo motu may appeal to the High Court.”

    12. The two decisions cited before the Bench by Sri Anantha Babu, viz., Mela Ram & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab, and Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Shahzadi Begum [1952] 21 I.T.R 1 in support of the contention urged by him, were distinguished and held inapplicable nor was the principle in Burmah Shell Co. Ltd. v. Board of Revenue [1963] 14 S.T.C 13. held applicable. The decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Kandaswami Gounder & Brothers v. State of Madras [1957] 8 S.T.C 603, which was decided on a consideration of the provisions of section 12(3) of the Madras Act, which are in pari materia with the provisions of section 23 of the Andhra Act, was followed with approval.

    13. Mr. Anantha Babu and Mr. Venkatappayya Sastry have strenuously contended that the Bench in the above case did not consider the point now urged before us, namely, that the power conferred under section 20 is a power coupled with a duty and partakes of a quasi-judicial nature, which confers a right upon the aggrieved party to move the authority to revise illegal orders. In support of this contention they have cited Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd. [1950] S.C.R 536. Kania, C.J, at page 544 on a reference to the observations of Lord Cairns in the case of Julius v. Bishop of Oxford 1880 5 App. Cas. 214, 222. said that those observations are entitled to great respect. In the case before the Supreme Court the question was whether the power conferred on the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority by section 57 of the Stamp Act to make a reference to the High Court is intended for the benefit of the Revenue Authority alone or whether it enures also for the benefit of the party affected by the assessment. It was held on the language of that section that the power was coupled with a duty to make a reference when the authority is called upon to do so by the party affected and that if he declines to do so it is within the power of the Court to direct him to discharge that duty and make a reference to the Court. Section 57(1) of the Stamp Act is in the following terms:

    “The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority may state any case referred to it under section 56, sub-section (2), or otherwise coming to its notice, and refer such case, with its own opinion thereon…”

    14. The decision turned upon the provisions of the Stamp Act and as such it is not applicable to the facts of this case.

    15. The contention advanced by the learned Advocates in our view is contrary to a recent unreported judgment of the Supreme Court in Everest Apartments Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Bombay v. The State of Maharashtra. That was a case under the Maharashtra Co-operative Housing Societies Act, 1960, under which the appellant-society was registered. One Shivdasani claimed to have paid the entrance fee, share money and other demands and complained that his membership was wrongly rejected by the society. The society denied the claim. Their Lordships stated they were not concerned with the details of the dispute, but what their Lordships were concerned with is this; on being informed of the rejection of his application for membership, Shivdasani filed an appeal under section 23(2) of the above Act, which was heard and decided in his favour by the District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bombay. The society filed an application before the State Government for revision purporting to be under section 154 of the Act. That application was rejected. The society was intimated of this result by the Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra (Agriculture and Co-operative Department) and the communication was as follows:—

    I am directed to state that following the hearing to you by the Deputy Secretary of this department on 10th March, 1965, in connection with the subject noted above, a note was received in this department from Shri M.G Mani, Advocate, wherein it was claimed that though an order was final under section 23(3) of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, Government had inherent revisionary powers under section 154 of the said Act to entertain such representations against such an order. I am to inform you that the matter has been examined by Government and to state that in such cases orders given under section 23(3) are final and Government has no revisional jurisdiction in such a matter.

    Yours faithfully,

    Sd./- D.A Ekbote,

    Under Secretary to Government.”

    16. The society filed a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in the High Court of Bombay against that order which was rejected by a short and laconic order which reads as follows:—

    “Government right in declaring no jurisdiction. It is wrong to say that respondent had withdrawn the application voluntarily. Attitude of the society unjust. Admittedly the promoters were members of Everest Co., and they wanted Rs. 3,000 from each one for themselves. Societies are not meant for self aggrandizement. No ground to interfere. Rejected.”

    17. Their Lordships considered the question whether the Government was right in law in declining to interfere because it has no revisional jurisdiction in such a matter, the answer to which depended upon the construction of section 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. After examining the other relevant provisions of the Act, section 154 was extracted, which is as follows:—

    “Section 154. Power of State Government and Registrar to call for proceedings of subordinate officers and to pass orders thereon. The State Government and the Registrar may call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any other matter of any officer subordinate to them, except those referred to in sub-section (9) of section 149, for the purpose of satisfying themselves as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed, and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer. If in any case it appears to the State Government or the Registrar, that any decision or order or proceedings so called for should be modified, annulled or reversed, the State Government or the Registrar, as the case may be, may after giving persons affected thereby an opportunity of being heard pass such order thereon as to it or him may seem just.”

    18. The two questions considered by their Lordships under that Act are : (i) Is the finality under section 23(3) (i.e, the appellate order of the Registrar) subject to section 154?; and (ii) Has a party a right to move the State Government under section 154? It was observed that the Act has provided for appeals in other sections and the decision on appeals is stated to be final; that yet the power of superintendence is given to the State Government in general terms in respect of any inquiry or proceeding with only one exception, namely, the proceedings of the Maharashtra State Tribunal when the Tribunal calls for and examines the record of any proceeding in which an appeal lies to it for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and that by mentioning one specific exception to the general power, the Act has indicated an intention to include every other inquiry or proceeding within the action by Government as contemplated by section 154. In so far as the submission that the power under this specific provision under the Act to which we have referred was not coupled with duty and as such the Government need not exercise the power even if moved to take action, unless the Government feels inclined, Hidayatullah, J., speaking for the Court observed:

    “There is no doubt that section 154 is potential but not compulsive. Power is reposed in Government to intervene to do justice when occasion demands it and of the occasion for its exercise. Government is made the sole judge. This power can be exercised in all cases except in a case in which a similar power has already been exercised by the Tribunal under section 149(9) of the Act. The exception was considered necessary because the legality or the propriety of an order having once been considered, it would be an act of supererogation to consider the matter twice. It follows, therefore, that Government can exercise its powers under section 154 in all cases with one exception only and that the finality of the order under section 23(3) does not restrict the exercise of the power. The word ‘final’ in this context means that the order is not subject to an ordinary appeal or revision but it does not touch the special power legislatively conferred on Government.”

    19. After distinguishing the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, West Punjab v. The Tribune Trust, Lahore, it was held that the words of the two enactments are not materially equal. Hidayatullah, J., proceeded to state:

    “As Government is not compelled to take action, unless it thinks fit, the party who moves Government cannot claim that he has a right of appeal or revision. On the other hand, Government should welcome such applications because they draw the attention of Government to cases in some of which Government may be interested to intervene. In many statutes, as for example the two major procedural Codes, such language has not only not inhibited the making of applications to the High Court, but has been considered to give a right to obtain intervention, although the mere making of the application has not clothed a party with any rights beyond bringing a matter to the notice of the Court. After this is done, it is for the Court to consider whether to act or not. The extreme position does not obtain here because there is no right to interference in the same way as in a judicial proceeding. Government may act or may not act; the choice is of Government. There is no right to relief as in an appeal or revision under the two Codes. But to say that Government has no jurisdiction at all in the matter is to err, and that is what Government did in this case.”

    20. In the Tribune Trust case the question was whether section 33 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which conferred revisional jurisdiction on the Commissioner, established a right to relief on the application of an assessee. Dealing with the contention of the assessees that the relief claimed by them under section 33 was wrongly denied to them, Lord Simonds (later Viscount) at page 225 said:

    “The fallacy implicit in this question has been made clear in the discussion of the first two questions. It assumes that section 33 creates a right in the assessee. In their Lordships' opinion it creates no such right. On behalf of the respondent the well-known principle which was discussed in Julius v. Bishop of Oxford was invoked and it was urged that the section which opens with the words ‘the Commissioner may of his own motion’ imposed upon him a duty which he was bound to perform upon the application of an assessee. It is possible that there might be a context in which words so inapt for that purpose would create a duty. But in the present case there is no such context. On the contrary, section 33 follows upon a number of sections which determine the rights of the assessee and is itself, as its language clearly indicates, intended to provide administrative machinery by which a higher executive officer may review the acts of his subordinates and take the necessary action upon such review. It appears that as a matter of convenience a practice has grown up under which the Commissioner has been invited to act ‘of his own motion’ under the section and where this occurs a certain degree of formality has been adopted. But the language of the section does not support the contention, which lies at the root of the third question and is vital to the respondent's case, that it affords a claim to relief. As has been already pointed out, appropriate relief is specifically given by other sections; it is not possible to interpret section 33 as conferring a general relief.”

    21. It is probably as a consequence of this decision that section 33-A was added in the Income-tax Act, 1922, giving the assessee also a right to move the Commissioner to exercise revisional powers. The decision of the Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer is on section 33-A and could therefore afford little assistance.

    22. The unreported decision of the Supreme Court, to which we have referred, as well as the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council, though no doubt on provisions in different Acts which are pari materia, sets at rest even a lurking doubt as to the ambit of the powers conferred under section 20 of the Act. It is unnecessary in this view to decide the other questions namely whether the assessee has a right to have personal hearing.

    23. In the view we have taken, the revisions before the Board are not maintainable and the appeals are also not maintainable and are accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 25 in each case except Special Appeal 1 of 1963 in which no costs are allowed.

    24. Appeals dismissed.

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