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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus to direct the respondents to implement G.O. Ms. No. 2674, Public Works Department, dated 4-11-1960, and to promote the petitioners (who belong to the category of Supervisors (Electrical) Grade I) as Assistant Engineers (Electrical) with effect from 10-9-1963 with consequential benefits.

Historically, a convention from the composite Madras State provided that promotions to Assistant Engineer from Junior Engineers (Electrical) and Supervisors (Electrical) Grade I were made in the ratio 4:1. The State issued G.O. Ms. No. 2674 dated 4-11-1960 prescribing a 2:1 ratio (after advice of the State Public Service Commission). After representations by Junior Engineers, the Government issued G.O. Ms. No. 2570 dated 8-11-1961 returning to the 4:1 ratio.

The petitioners were temporarily promoted under emergency provisions and were subsequently reverted because of lack of vacancies; they do not challenge that reversion. Their grievance is that, under the 2:1 ratio prescribed by G.O. Ms. No. 2674, they would have received promotion and thus seek enforcement of that G.O. against the Government by way of mandamus.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether G.O. Ms. No. 2674 dated 4-11-1960 is a rule made under Article 309 of the Constitution and hence carries the force of law such that the State is under a legal duty to make promotions in the 2:1 ratio prescribed by that G.O.
  2. Whether a writ of mandamus can be issued to compel promotion of the petitioners on the basis of G.O. Ms. No. 2674, given that their promotions had been temporary under emergency rules and they were reverted.
  3. Whether the subsequent G.O. Ms. No. 2570 dated 8-11-1961 (returning to the 4:1 ratio) which was issued without apparent publication and without explicit invocation of Article 309, nonetheless supersedes or displaces the earlier G.O. for purposes of enforceable legal rights.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners contend that G.O. Ms. No. 2674 dated 4-11-1960 has the authority of law and therefore creates a legal duty on the State to maintain promotions in the 2:1 ratio.
  • It was argued (by Mr. C. V. Dikshitulu, learned Counsel for the petitioners) that because the first G.O. was issued after consultation with the Public Service Commission (in accordance with Article 320), it has legal validity that the subsequent G.O. (issued without such consultation) does not possess, so the later G.O. cannot supersede the earlier law-backed direction.
  • The petitioners assert that under the 2:1 ratio prescribed by the earlier G.O. they would have been promoted and therefore seek retrospective promotion from the earlier date cited in the petition.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments presented in opposition; the text records the petitioners' contentions and the court's analysis addressing those contentions.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertakes a structured legal analysis before deciding whether mandamus is appropriate.

  1. Mandamus requirements: The court reiterates the settled rule that a writ of mandamus requires (a) the petitioner to establish that a legal duty is cast on the respondent to do or refrain from doing a particular public act, and (b) that the respondent, despite requests, is not discharging that statutory duty. Thus the petitioners must first show a statutory duty on the Government to maintain the 2:1 ratio specified in G.O. Ms. No. 2674.
  2. Nature of G.O.s and Article 309: The court examines whether G.O. Ms. No. 2674 is a rule under Article 309 (which empowers the appropriate legislature to regulate recruitment and conditions of service and, until legislation, permits rules to be made by the President or Governor under the proviso). The court notes that no State law has been enacted on the point and rules made under Article 309 presently regulate public services, but in the electrical branch there was no rule prescribing the promotion ratio.
  3. Formal requisites of subordinate legislation: The court explains the necessary characteristics of subordinate legislation: it must be authorized by the parent Act, made by a competent authority following required formalities, and published so the public is informed. Such a rule must furnish policy creating rights or liabilities to be enforceable as law. Conversely, an ordinary Government Order (G.O.) lacking those attributes does not create enforceable rights merely because it affects many people or refers to a source of power.
  4. Application to the present G.O.: Applying the test, the court finds that although the G.O. was issued in the Governor's name it was in truth an executive direction issued by the Government and not a rule made by the Governor under Article 309. The G.O.s were not published in the official gazette, did not purport to be made under Article 309, and no fresh rule under Article 309 was in fact made fixing the promotion ratio for the electrical branch.
  5. Consequence for enforceability: Because G.O. Ms. No. 2674 lacks the formal attributes of a rule under Article 309, it is an administrative direction and does not create any enforceable legal right in the petitioners or others. Therefore, it does not cast a statutory duty enforceable by mandamus under Article 226.
  6. Effect of the subsequent G.O.: The court holds that the Government was competent to change its executive direction by issuing the later G.O. dated 8-11-1961. The absence of consultation with the Public Service Commission before the second G.O. does not alter its character as an executive direction and does not render it ineffective for the administrative purpose of guiding promotions.
  7. Petitioners' temporary promotions: The court notes it is not disputed that the petitioners' earlier temporary promotions were made under emergency rules and thus conferred no right; their reversion is not challenged, so the court need not decide on the propriety of reversion.
  8. Practical conclusion on promotions: Given that the operative direction (as viewed by the court) is the 4:1 ratio, the petitioners have no grievance on the record — the counter (respondents) provided figures showing the category of Supervisors, Grade I, was not treated contrary to the 4:1 proportion. The petitioners must therefore await promotions according to that ratio.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is DISMISSED. The court explicitly states, "For the aforesaid reasons, the Writ Petition fails and is dismissed." It also records "Petition dismissed" and that there will be no order as to costs.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The petitioners are not entitled to have promotions enforced in accordance with G.O. Ms. No. 2674 dated 4-11-1960 because that G.O. does not have the force of law and did not create a legal right enforceable by mandamus.
  • The Government's subsequent executive direction (G.O. Ms. No. 2570 dated 8-11-1961) restoring the 4:1 proportion governs promotions administratively; the petitioners must await promotion opportunities under that proportion.
  • The temporary promotions obtained by the petitioners under emergency provisions did not vest any enforceable right, and their reversion stands unchallenged in this petition.
  • No order as to costs was made.

Broader legal implications: The opinion explains and applies principles differentiating administrative directions (G.O.s) from subordinate legislation made under Article 309 — emphasizing formal requisites (authority, competent maker, prescribed formalities, publication) for a G.O. to attain the status of enforceable rule. The court does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying these established principles to the facts; the decision concludes that the contested G.O. lacked the attributes of a rule under Article 309 and therefore was not enforceable by mandamus.

This summary is confined to and derived exclusively from the content of the provided opinion.

    P. Radhakrishna v. State Of Andhra Pradesh

    1. That is a Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of a writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to implement and enforce G.O Ms. No. 2674. Public Works Department, dated 4-11-1960 and to issue orders of promotion of the petitioners as Assistant Engineers (Electrical) with effect from 10-9-1963 with all the benefits of salary, rank and other rights and privileges consequential thereto.

    2. The facts, which are not in dispute, may briefly be stated. From the time of the composite Madras State, a convention had grown that promotion to the posts of Assistant Engineers from the category of Junior Engineers (Electrical) and the category of Supervisors (Electrical), Grade I would be according to the ratio of 4:1. The State Government of Andhra Pradesh, however, issued G.O Ms. No. 2674, Public Works Department, dated 4-11-1960 prescribing the ratio of 2:1 on the advice of the State Public Service Commission. Some representation was made by the Junior Engineers (Electrical). The Government re-examined the issue and went back to the original ratio of 4:1 and issued G.O Ms. No. 2570, P.W.D, dated 8-11-1961. The petitioners, who belong to the category of Supervisors (Electrical) Grade I were promoted as Assistant Engineers (Electrical) under emergency provisions of the rules and subsequently were reverted because there were no vacancies on which they could be continued. The grievance of the petitioners is that the petitioners ought to have been again promoted following the ratio prescribed by G.O Ms. No. 2674 dated 4-11-1960. Since the Government have been promoting from the Junior Engineers' category to the detriment of the petitioners, the petitioners are seeking the issue of a writ of Mandamus to oblige the Government to maintain the ratio of 2:1 and since the petitioners plead that under this ratio they would have got the promotion, they should be promoted with effect from the date mentioned earlier.

    3. It is not in dispute that the temporary promotions, which were made, in so far as the petitioners were concerned were made under the emergency rules. The petitioners therefore had no right to the posts. According to the provisions of the rules, they were reverted and that reversion is not questioned in this writ petition. It is therefore unnecessary to go into the question whether their reversion has been proper or not.

    4. It is now a firmly established rule of law that in order to successfully obtain a writ of Mandmaus it is necessary for the petitioners first to establish that a legal duty is cast upon the respondents to do or forbear from doing a particular thing in the discharge of a public duty, and secondly, that in spite of a request made in that behalf the respondents are not discharging or refraining from discharging the statutory duty cast upon them. The petitioners, consequently have to first establish that there is a statutory duty on the part of the Government to maintain the ratio of 2:1 between the two sets of Services as is laid down in G.O Ms. No. 2674 dated 4-11-1960. That naturally turns upon the question whether the said G.O is a rule made under Article 309 of the Constitution of India and it casts a legal duty on the Government to make-promotions only according to the ratio prescribed in that G.O

    5. Now, Article 309 authorises the appropriate Legislature to regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State. Until such a law is made by the legislature, the proviso to that Article provides that it shall be competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of Services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and for the Governor of a State or such person as he may direct in the case of Services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Stats, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services and posts. Such rules shall have effect of course subject to any Act of the Legislature in this behalf and the provisions of the Constitution. The State of Andhra Pradesh has not so far enacted any law regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State. The rules made by the Governor under Article 309 therefore at the moment regulate the affairs of the public services in the State. In so far as the electrical branch of the P.W.D of the State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned, there is no rule prescribing the ratio of promotions between the two categories of services mentioned above. As stated earlier, from the days of composite Madras, these promotions were made under a convention which had developed, that is to say, while four promotions were made from the Junior Engineers' category, one promotion was made from the Supervisors, Grade I. This convention however never found any place either in any Act enacted by the Legislature or the rules made by the Governor under the proviso to Article 309. This convention however was disturbed by G.O Ms. No. 2674 dated 4-11-1960 when it fixed the ratio of 2:1. That G.O again has been modified by a subsequent G.O Ms. No. 2570 dated 8-11-1961 which takes the position back to the ratio of 4:1. The first G.O Ms. No. 2674 dated 4-11-1960 admittedly has not been published in any Official Gazette nor is the second G.O of 8-11-1961 so published. The first and the second G.Os do not mention that they were issued in exercise of the powers vested in the Governor under the proviso to Article 309. In spite of this, it is argued by Mr. C.V Dikshitulu, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, that the G.O Ms. No. 2674 dated 4-11-1960 has the authority of law and since the second G.O is not clothed by any authority of law the first G.O still occupies the field and casts a legal obligation on the State Government to implicitly follow the ratio in regard to the promotion as 2:1. The contention has been that while the first G.O was issued after the Public Service Commission was consulted in accordance with Article 320, the second G.O was issued without the consultation of the Public Service Commission, The second G.O, it is submitted by the learned Counsel, does not therefore supersede the earlier G.O which still holds the field.

    6. In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to examine whether the said G.O can be said to be a rule made by the Governor in the exercise of the powers which he enjoys under Article 309 and consequently has the force of law. It cannot be validly contended that every order issued by the Government in the name of the Governor constitutes law merely because it affects a number of people as was argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. Similarly, it cannot be justifiably contended that the rules prepared under the Statute, even though not published in the official gazette, if communicated to the parties concerned would have the force of law. In order to have force of law to any subordinate legislation, it must firstly be authorised by the parent Act and secondly, the subsidiary legislation must be made by competent authority after following the formalities prescribed in that behalf and finally it must have been published for the information of the public. The essential characteristics of law including a subordinate law is that it shall lay down a policy either creating new rights or liabilities or affecting the existing one. It such a law is made by competent authority and in the manner prescribed, it will certainly have force of law and would be a binding rule of conduct and consequently it would be enforced in any court of law. What must follow is that every order passed by the Government, unless it is clothed with the authority of law would not confer any right or create any liability on the individual or groups of individuals nor could an action be founded on that in any court of law. Merely because a G.O can be traced to a statutory power under which rules could have been made, it cannot be said that the G.O is law and can be enforced in a court of law. The source of the power does not affect the character of the G.O issued. It is from the G.O that one has to find out whether the G.O has been issued as a rule under Article 309. Whether the G.O is law or an administrative instruction naturally depends upon the character or the nature of the G.O issued and it must be determined in view of the circumstances of each case. While the source of power can be taken into account merely because such a source exists, every act done by the authority cannot be said to be law, In order to have the validly made rule under Article 309, the Governor and not the Government must first of all exercise the powers vested in him under Article 309 and made a rule regulating the recruitment etc. to the services and then publish the same in the official gazette or in any other prescribed manner for the purpose of informing the public. If in the instant case, it is found that the Governor has not made any rule in exercise of the powers under Article 309, nor was it intended to be a rule under that provision of the Constitution and that it was not published in the Official Gazette, there could be little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the G.O lacks all the postulates of a rule under Article 309 of the Constitution.

    7. Applying this test to G.O No. 2674 dated 4-11-60 it would be clear that although the G.O is issued in the name of the Governor it was issued by the Government. It was never intended that the said G.O would be rule under Article 309 of the Constitution though it may contain legislative material. Nor in fact the Governor has made any rule under Article 309. The executive direction has been issued in the name of the Governor in compliance with the other provisions of the Constitution and certainly not in accordance with Article 309. Merely because the Governor's name appears in the G.O it cannot be contended that it amounts to a rule made by him under Article 309. It is an executive direction given for the guidance of those who are responsible for making promotions from the said two categories, That this is the correct interpretation of the G.O gathers support from the earlier practice prevailing right from the days of composite Madras State that promotions were made on the basis of some convention in the ratio of 4:1. That convention was recognised in a modified form in the G.O of 4-11-1960 which was subsequently modified by another G.O of the same character dated 8-11-1961. It will thus be plain that neither the convention nor the subsequent two decisions in the form of G.Os were at any time incorporated in the rules which were already in vogue under Article 309. No fresh rule was made by the Governor in exercise of his power under Article 309 at any time in so far as the services in the Electrical Branch of the P.W.D are concerned fixing the ratio between the two categories of services for the purpose of promotion. I am therefore clear in my opinion that G.O Ms. No. 2664 dated 4-11-1960 is only an administrative direction given by the Government in the name of the Governor but is not a rule made under Article 309 and consequently lacks all the attributes of a rule validly made under Article 309. It is obvious that such a G.O does not create any right either in the petitioners or in groups of persons which could be enforced in any court of law.

    8. What must follow from the above said discussion is that the Government was quite competent to alter the direction which they had earlier given by issuing the subsequent G.O dated 8-11-1961. The fact that Public Service Commission was not consulted before the second G.O was issued does not alter the character of the G.O The present position therefore is that the promotions to the said two categories are regulated by the executive direction fixing the proportion as 4:1 between the two categories of services. Since I hold that the said two G.O do not have the force of law but are mere executive directions, it is obvious that they do not cast any legal duty on the Government which can be enforced by a Writ of Mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

    9. It can hardly be disputed that if the proportion of 4:1 holds the field in so far as the promotions are concerned, the petioners cannot have any grievance. The counter gives all the necessary figures in regard to both these branches of services and from those figures it becomes plain that the category of Supervisors, grade I, has not been treated contrary to the proportion of 4:1.

    10. The petitioners therefore must await their chances of promotion according to the said ratio. They cannot in any case ask that their promotions should be made in accordance with G.O Ms. No. 2674 dated 4-11-1960 which stands superseded by the subsequent G.O Ms. No. 2570 dated 8-11-1961.

    11. For the aforesaid reasons, the Writ Petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

    12. Petition dismissed.

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    P. Radhakrishna v. State Of Andhra Pradesh
    (Jul 1, 1966)