AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act.
  • section 41, clause (1), of the Income-tax Act.
  • SECTION 41 INDIAN INCOME TAX ACT
  • provisions of clauses 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7
  • section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act
  • section 41, clause (1), applies.12.
  • Wakf Validating Act, 1913),
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act.
  • section 41, clause (1), of the Income-tax Act.
  • SECTION 41 INDIAN INCOME TAX ACT
  • provisions of clauses 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7
  • section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act
  • section 41, clause (1), applies.12.
  • Wakf Validating Act, 1913),
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On June 14, 1950, H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad created a trust called the "Sahebzadas of Sarf-e-khas Trust" and transferred Government securities of the face value of Rs. 2,50,00,000 to it. The trust deed established a single trust fund and provided that trustees would pay specified monthly allowances to named persons listed in schedules, provide pensions to certain named persons, award scholarships out of an annual amount of Rs. 50,000 (clause 6), and permit discretionary additional payments up to Rs. 25,000 in any year for relief to deserving beneficiaries (clause 7). The deed also provided that the trustees could apply the balance of income for charitable objects for the benefit of the Mohamedan community, with power to accumulate income.

Attached to the deed were: a first schedule specifying the stock certificates forming the trust fund, a second schedule listing 663 named Sahebzadas and Sahebazadis with monthly allowances, and a third schedule listing 12 persons with pensions for life. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal held that the amounts Rs. 50,000 (clause 6) and Rs. 25,000 (clause 7) were subject to income-tax at the maximum rate under the first proviso to section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act. Pursuant to that determination a reference was made to this court under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act asking whether the levy of tax at the maximum rate under the first proviso to section 41(1) in respect of either or both of those amounts was valid.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the levy of tax on the assessees at the maximum rate under the first proviso to section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act in respect of either or both of the amounts referred to in clauses 6 (Rs. 50,000) and 7 (Rs. 25,000) of the trust deed dated June 14, 1950, is valid.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • Section 41 of the Income-tax Act has no application to this trust (i.e., the section should not be applied to the facts of this case).
  • The beneficiaries who receive amounts under this trust are specified in every accounting year and therefore must be taxed individually in the ordinary manner rather than under section 41's proviso.
  • The amounts of Rs. 50,000 (clause 6) and Rs. 25,000 (clause 7) constitute separate and distinct trusts and thus should be taxed separately rather than treating the entire trust income as a single assessable fund.

The opinion does not contain a detailed statement of the Revenue's counter-arguments in separate bullet form; however, the Court's analysis records the legal positions taken and the Tribunal's earlier conclusion that tax at the maximum rate under the first proviso to section 41(1) was applied to the specified amounts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Ahmedabad v. M/S. Balwantrai Jethalal Vaidya [1958] 34 I.T.R 187 (Bom.) Explains the object of section 41: to assess either the beneficiaries or the trustee, with the trustee's liability coextensive with that of the beneficiaries (trustee's liability cannot be larger than beneficiaries'). The court relied on this decision to reject the contention that section 41 applies only where beneficiaries are specifically named; it supported the interpretation that section 41 is mandatory and governs assessment of trustee income even where beneficiaries are not specified.
Habibur Rahman v. Commissioner of Income-tax Held that where beneficiaries and their shares are specified, the accounting year can be used to determine who the beneficiaries are in that year for assessment purposes. The court distinguished this case: in Habibur Rahman the beneficiaries and their shares were specified in the deed; in the present matter the deed did not specify beneficiaries and their shares in the same way, so Habibur Rahman did not support the assessee's position.
Yakub Versey Laljee v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1946] 14 I.T.R 548-553 (Bom.) Contains the observation that the question is in respect of the accounting year only; and tests whether shares and beneficiaries are determinate or indeterminate for the application of section 41 proviso. The court noted that the observation about accounting years did not support the assessee; the decision was cited for the proposition that indeterminate shares bring a case within the first proviso and that the test is determinacy of beneficiaries/shares.
Mahalaxmiwala v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1954] 26 I.T.R 177 (Bom.) (Chagla C.J. & Tendolkar J.) Interpreted the word "or" in the first proviso to section 41(1) as disjunctive, supporting the broader application of the proviso to different factual permutations (e.g., not receivable on behalf of any one person OR indeterminate shares). The court relied on this interpretation to support its reading of the first proviso and to conclude that the proviso applies where beneficiaries or their shares are not specifically determinable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by considering the assessee's arguments and the language and purpose of section 41 and its first proviso, following a textual and precedent-based approach:

  1. The court construed section 41(1) broadly. It rejected the assessee's contention that the phrase "entitled to receive on behalf of any person" must mean only "on behalf of any specified or named person or persons." Relying on the Balwantrai decision, the court observed that the purpose of section 41 is to provide a special regime under which either beneficiaries or trustees can be assessed, and that the trustee's liability is coextensive with beneficiaries'. The court held that section 41 is mandatory and applies whether or not beneficiaries are specifically designated in the deed.
  2. The court analyzed the first proviso to section 41(1) in two parts and explained their application as follows (drawing on its reading of precedent and the statutory language):
    • The first part (where income is "not specifically receivable on behalf of any one person") applies to all trustee-received income that is not receivable for a designated, specified person — including income receivable on behalf of a single unspecified person or multiple unspecified persons (for example, classes like "poor students" or persons of a particular faith).
    • The second part (where individual shares of named persons are indeterminate or unknown) applies where beneficiaries are specified by name but their individual shares in the income cannot be determined; in such cases tax is to be levied at the maximum rate under the second part.
  3. Applying those principles to the facts, the court observed that certain payments (amounts listed in the second and third schedules under clause 3(c) and clause 4) are covered by section 41(1) itself because those beneficiaries and their shares were determinable. However, the sums under clause 6 (Rs. 50,000 for scholarships) and clause 7 (up to Rs. 25,000 discretionary relief) fall within the first part of the first proviso because they are not payable on behalf of any specifically designated individual; they are payable to classes or beneficiaries to be selected by trustees in their discretion. The court concluded that the present case "clearly falls under the first part of the first proviso."
  4. The court addressed the accounting-year argument (relying on Habibur Rahman and extracts from Yakub Versey Laljee) and explained that those authorities did not support the assessee's position because, in those cases, beneficiaries and shares were ascertainable for the accounting year. Here the trust deed did not specify beneficiaries or their shares in the manner required to avoid the proviso. The court further noted that even if the case were taken to fall under the second part of the proviso, the result would be the same because the individual shares of the beneficiaries on whose behalf income is receivable are indeterminate.
  5. Finally, the court rejected the contention that the Rs. 50,000 and Rs. 25,000 amounts constituted separate trusts. The court emphasized that there is a single trust fund (Rs. 2,50,00,000) and the deed merely prescribes different modes of application of income; the trustees are the same and thus the entire income is subject to taxation each year under the special provisions of section 41.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): The reference is answered against the assessee — the levy of tax at the maximum rate under the first proviso to section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act in respect of the amounts referred to in clauses 6 (Rs. 50,000) and 7 (Rs. 25,000) of the trust deed is valid. The court awarded advocate's fee of Rs. 250.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The assessee's challenge to the maximum-rate levy under the first proviso to section 41(1) is dismissed; the tax treatment imposed by the Tribunal (levy at the maximum rate for the sums under clauses 6 and 7) is upheld and the reference is answered against the assessee.
  • Scope and precedent: The opinion explains and applies existing case law to construe section 41 and its proviso but does not state that it is creating any novel legal principle beyond applying the statutory provision and prior authorities to the facts. The opinion does not discuss broader policy consequences beyond the case-specific application.

    Trustees Of Sahebzadas Of Sarf-E-Khas Trust v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Andhra Pradesh.

    Chandrasekhara Sastri, J.:— This is a reference under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The facts which give rise to this case are as follows:

    On June 14, 1950, a trust called Sahebzadas of Sarf-e-khas Trust was created by H.E.H the Nizam of Hyderabad. Securities of the face value of Rs. 2,50,00,000 were transferred to the trust. The relevant portion of the deed of trust was as follows:

    “Whereas the settlor is the absolute owner and possessed of the Government securities specified in the first schedule hereunder written of the aggregate face value of Rs. 2,50,00,000 (Rupees two crores and fifty lakhs) and whereas the settlor as the head of his family has been maintaining certain descendants of the Nizam of Hyderabad known as ‘Sahebzadas and Sahebazadis of Sarf-e-khas’ by sanctioning monthly allowances in favour of such descendants in keeping with the status and degree of relationship of such descendants with the settlor and whereas the estates comprised in the said Sarf-e-khas which formed part of the personal assets of the settlor together with the administration thereof was handed over by the settlor to the Government of Hyderabad in accordance with the Firman-e-Mubarak executed by the settlor on the 5th day of February, 1949, and whereas after the transfer of the estate comprised in the said Sarf-e-khas and the administration thereof to the Government of Hyderabad the income of Sarf-e-khas is no longer available for payment of allowances to such descendants and whereas out of the natural love and affection which the settlor bears for such descendants of the Nizam of Hyderabad from time to time whose names are particularly set out in the first column of the second schedule hereunder written and for diverse other good causes and considerations him thereunto moving he, the settlor is desirous of creating a wakf-ul-aulad of the said securities of the face value of Rs. 2,50,00,000 (Rupees two crores and fifty lakhs) in manner hereinafter appearing and whereas the trustees have agreed to become the first trustees of these presents and whereas prior to the execution of these presents the securities specified in the first schedule hereunder written have been handed over by the settlor to the trustees, now this indenture witnesseth as follows:

    “1. In consideration of the premises and of the natural love and affection which the settlor bears towards certain descendants of the Nizams from time to time known as Sahebzadas and Sahebzadis of Sarf-e-khas whose names are particularly mentioned in the second schedule hereunder written and for diverse other good causes and considerations him thereunto moving he the settlor doth hereby transfer unto the trustees the said securities of the face value of Rs. 2,50,00,000 (Rupees two crores and fifty lakhs) specified in the first schedule hereunder written and which securities are hereinafter for brevity's sake referred to as ‘the trust fund’ (which expression shall include all other properties and securities or investments of any kind whatsoever into which the same or any part thereof may be converted or varied from time to time and such as may be acquired by the trustees or come to their hands by virtue of these presents or by operation of law or otherwise howsoever in relation to these presents) and all the right title, interest, property claim and demand whatsoever at law and in equity of the settlor into and upon the trust fund and every part thereof to have, receive and take all and singular the trust fund unto the trustees upon the trusts and with and subject to the powers provisions, stipulations and declarations hereinafter appearing and contained of and concerning the same.

    “2. The trust hereby created shall be known as ‘the Sahebzadas of Sarf-e-khas Trust’.

    “3. The trustees shall hold and stand possessed of the trust fund upon trust:…

    (c) from and after the 1st day of July, 1950, to pay to each of the persons whose names are mentioned in the first column of the second schedule hereunder written every month out of the income of the trust fund the sum mentioned against their respective names for and during the term of their respective lives…

    “4. To pay out of the income of the trust fund to each of the persons whose names are mentioned in the first column of the third schedule hereunder written every month from the 1st day of July, 1950, the sum mentioned against their respective names in the second column of the third schedule hereunder written for and during the term of their natural life and on and after the death of any such person the amount payable to him or her shall be added to and form part of the balance of the income of the trust fund and shall be dealt with as provided in clause eight (8) hereof.

    “6. To spend every year out of the income of the trust fund an equivalent to rupees fifty thousand Halli Sicca for giving scholarships to such of the Sahebzadas or Sahebzadis of Sarf-e-khas and their issue for education (primary, technical or otherwise) in the Madrassa-e-Aiza or any other educational institution in Hyderabad or for further or higher education anywhere in India or abroad, as the trustees in their absolute discretion think proper.

    “7. Out of the balance of the income of the trust fund the trustees may in their absolute discretion spend such sum not exceeding rupees twenty-five thousand in any one calendar year towards payment of an increased monthly allowance to any Sahebzadas or Sahebzadis and their issue who may be in poor circumstances and deserving of monetary aid and whose monthly allowance is below rupees one hundred and the decision of the trustees as to who are poor and deserving of monetary aid shall be final and binding on all persons claiming under this trust.

    “8. Subject to the provisions of clauses 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 hereof the trustees shall hold and stand possessed of the balance of the income of the trust fund upon trust to utilise the same for all or any one or more of the following charitable objects and purposes for the benefit of the Mohamedan community in general and the Sunni Mohamedans in particular in such shares and proportions and in such manner in all respects as the trustees shall in their absolute discretion think fit, with liberty to the trustees in their absolute discretion to accumulate the income for any year or years and spend such accumulations or any part thereof in any subsequent year or years for the same purpose.”

    2. To this deed of trust are attached schedules. The first schedule specifies the stock certificates of the total face value of Rs. 2,50,00,000 which constituted this trust fund. The second schedule consists of the list of 663 Sahebzadas and Sahebazadis of Sarf-e-khas showing the monthly allowances payable to each. The third schedule gives the names of 12 persons showing their pensions for life. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal held that with regard to Rs. 50,000 mentioned in clause 6 and Rs. 25,000 mentioned in clause 7, income-tax has to be levied at the maximum rate under the first proviso to section 41, clause (1), of the Income-tax Act. On these facts, the question referred is as follows:

    “Whether the levy of tax on the assessees at the maximum rate under the first proviso to section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act in respect of either or both of the amounts referred to in clauses 6 and 7 of the trust deed dated June 14, 1950, is valid?”

    3. On behalf of the assessee, three points are argued before us: (1) section 41 of the Indian Income-tax Act has no application to this case; (2) the beneficiaries who have received under this trust are specified in every accounting year and they have to be taxed individually; and (3) in any view, the amount of Rs. 50,000 specified in clause 6 and the amount of Rs. 25,000 specified in clause 7 have to be taxed separately as they are liable to be treated as separate trusts. We shall consider the first point. Section 41 and the first proviso thereto are as follows:

    “In the case of the income, profits or gains chargeable under this Act which the Courts of Wards, the Administrators-General, the Official Trustees or any receiver or manager (including any person whatever his designation who in fact manages property on behalf of another) appointed by or under any order of a court, or any trustee or trustees appointed under a trust declared by a duly executed instrument in writing whether testamentary or otherwise (including the trustee, or trustees under any wakf deed which is valid under the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913), are entitled to receive on behalf of any person, the tax shall be levied upon and recoverable from such Court of Wards, Administrator-General, Official Trustee, receiver or manager or trustee or trustees, in the like manner and to the same amount as it would be leviable upon and recoverable from the person on whose behalf such income, profits or gains are receivable, and all the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly:

    Provided that where any such income, profits or gains or any part thereof are not specifically receivable on behalf of any one person, or where the individual shares of the persons, on whose behalf they are receivable are indeterminate or unknown, the tax shall be levied and recoverable at the maximum rate: but, where such persons have no other personal income chargeable under this Act and none of them is an artificial juridical person, as if such income, profits or gains or such part thereof were the total income of an association of persons.”

    4. It is argued for the assessee that the expression “entitled to receive on behalf of any person” in clause (1) means “entitled to receive on behalf of any specified or named person or persons” because under this clause, the tax shall be levied upon and recoverable from such trustee in the like manner and to the same amount as it would be leviable upon and recoverable from the person on whose behalf such income, profits or gains are receivable. It is common ground that the word “person” in clause (1) of section 41 includes “persons”. We have to refer to the decision in The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Ahmedabad v. M/S. Balwantrai Jethalal Vaidya* [1958] 34 I.T.R 187 Bom.., where it is pointed out that the object of section 41 is to assess either the beneficiaries or the trustee and the liability of the trustee is coextensive with that of the beneficiaries and cannot in any case be a larger or wider liability. In the present case, the department assessed income-tax under the first part of the first proviso to section 41, clause (1). The argument of Sri Rajah Ayyar is as follows: the beneficiaries are not specified, i.e, it cannot be said who the beneficiaries are, as under the deed of trust it is left to the discretion of the trustees to nominate them-So, it cannot be said that the trustees are entitled to receive the income on behalf of any specified person within the meaning of section 41, clause (1). The first proviso to section 41(1) refers to “such income” i.e, the income referred to in clause (1), which is the income the trustee is entitled to receive on behalf of any specified person or persons. Therefore, neither section 41, clause (1) nor the first proviso is applicable to this case. It follows that this income can be assessed only in the ordinary manner under the other provisions of the Act. Section 41 of the Act is a special provision which prescribes that the authority shall assess the income received by a trustee or trustees who are entitled to receive the income on behalf of others. This section is not confined to income which a trustee is entitled to receive on behalf of a specified beneficiary or specified beneficiaries. The expression “such income” in the first proviso to section 41, clause (1), refers to income which the trustee is entitled to receive as a trustee whether the beneficiaries are specified or not and is not, confined to income which he is entitled to receive on behalf of any specified person or persons. As pointed out in the decision referred to above, section 41 is mandatory and the assessment of the income returned of a trustee can only be made in accordance with these special provisions laid down in that section. For these reasons, we are unable to accept the contention that the tax in this case cannot be levied under section 41 of the Act.

    5. Next, it is contended that the first part of the first proviso does not apply to this case. The first part of the first proviso reads as follows:

    “Provided that where any such income, profits or gains or any part thereof were not specifically receivable on behalf of any one person, the tax shall be levied and recoverable at the maximum rate…”

    6. It is argued that this applies only to a case where the income profits or gains are not specifically receivable on behalf of any one person, i.e, it must be receivable on behalf of only one person, who is not specified and that, in this case, the income is receivable on behalf of several persons, who are not specified and hence the first part of this proviso does not apply. In our view, the first part of this proviso applies to all income receivable by a trustee which is not receivable by him on behalf of any person, who is designated or specified. It applies to income receivable on behalf of a single person, who is not specified or on behalf of several persons, who are not specified or designated. The trustees may receive the income for the benefit of a poor student or poor students in general or person or persons belonging to or possessing a particular faith or religion without it being specified who that person or persons are. In all such cases, it cannot be said that the income is “specifically receivable by the trustee on behalf of any one person”. The first part of the first proviso in our opinion applies to such cases. If, on the other hand, the income is receivable by the trustee on behalf of any specified person, section 41, clause (1), itself applies and not this proviso.

    7. Then, coming to the second part of the first proviso it is clear to us that it applies to a case where the income profits or gains are receivable by the trustees on behalf of several persons, specified, but whose individual shares in the income are indeterminate or unknown. The income may be receivable by the trustees for the benefit of a number of persons named or specified in the proviso, say A, B, C, D and E. If individual shares of A, B, C, D and E in the said income are indeterminate and unknown, then the tax is to be levied at the maximum rate under the second part of the first proviso to section 41(1); but, if, on the other hand, the shares of the beneficiaries, A, B, C, D and E respectively are not indeterminate, but are specified or known, section 41, clause (1), itself applies and not the proviso. In the present case itself, the amounts referred to in the second and third schedules attached to the deed of trust read with clause 3, sub-clause (c), and clause (4), are covered by section 41, clause (1), itself and not by the first proviso. In our opinion, the present case clearly falls under the first part of the first proviso under section 41(1). Even assuming that it falls under the second part of the first proviso to section 41, the result is the same because the individual shares of the beneficiaries on whose behalf the income is receivable are indeterminate and the tax has to be levied under the proviso at the maximum rate.

    8. It is next contended by Shri Rajah Ayyar, learned counsel for the assessee, that it is the accounting year that will have to be looked into for the purpose of levying tax and in this particular case it is determined every year who the beneficiaries are and what are the amounts they have to receive for the next year, i.e, the assessment year, and that therefore the tax cannot be levied under the first proviso to section 41. Reliance is placed for this proposition on a decision in Habibur Rahman v. Commissioner of Income-tax. In that case, the deed of trust provided that the beneficiaries should be benefited concurrently and in the same proportion. The beneficiaries were stated to be ultimately the assessee's children and descendants. The learned Judges held that it was rightly determined that there were 24 persons who were entitled to share the profits in the accounting year. In the deed of trust which was being considered by the learned Judges in that case, his beneficiaries are specified and their shares are also specified. What had to be done was to find out who the members of the family were in each accounting year. But it is not the situation here.

    9. Next we have to refer to the decision in Yakub Versey Laljee v. Commissioner of Income-tax. Reliance is placed upon the following statement at page 553 of the report:

    “The question before the court is necessarily in respect of the accounting year only and does not affect the rights of the parties in respect of the income which may accrue in a later year.”

    10. We do not think that this observation in any way supports the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee. On the other hand, the learned judges in that case held that the test for the application of section 41, clause (1), is whether the shares and the beneficiaries are not indeterminate and unknown. As in that case, they being indeterminate, the learned Judges held that the case fell within the first proviso and that the tax was recoverable at the maximum rate. In Mahalaxmiwala v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1954] 26 I.T.R 177 Bom.. Chagla C.J and Tendolkar J. pointed out that the word “or” used in the first proviso to section 41, clause (1), is disjunctive and not conjunctive. The learned judges referred to with approval the following statement in the decision in Yakub Versey Laljee v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1946] 14 I.T.R 548-553. Bom..:

    “Having regard to the facts found on the construction of the clause it is clear that within the meaning of section 41, proviso (1) in the accounting year the income cannot be predicted to belong to a particular individual, or if more than one with their determinate specific individual shares.”

    11. This, it was pointed out, is the correct interpretation of the first proviso. In this case, what was considered was whether under the deed of trust, it could be said that the beneficiaries and their individual shares are specified. If the deed of trust does not so specify the beneficiaries and their individual share, then, in our opinion, the first proviso to section 41, clause (1), applies.

    12. Next, it is contended by Rajah Ayyar, the learned counsel for the assessee, that the amount of Rs. 50,000 referred to in clause 6 of the trust deed and the amount of Rs. 25,000 referred to in clause 7 are separate and different trusts and have to be taxed separately. We cannot accept this contention. The trust is one trust and the trustees are the same. The amount of Rs. 2,50,00,000 is one trust fund. What the deed provides for is only that the different portions of the income from the trust fund have to be spent in different manner. The entire income received by the trustees under this trust is to be taxed each year. For these reasons, we answer the question referred to this court against the assessee, advocate's fee Rs. 250.

    13. Reference answered accordingly.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Trustees Of Sahebzadas Of Sarf-E-Khas Trust v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Andhra Pradesh.
    (Mar 29, 1961)