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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Acts
  • Section 3 together with Section 8(b) of the Madras General Sales-tax Act
  • Section 16 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,
  • Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, XXIV of 1946
  • commodity.5. Section 3(2) of the above Act
  • Section 182 of the Indian Contract Act
  • SECTION 182 CONTRACT ACT
  • Section 3(2) of Act 24 of 1946
  • Indian Contract Act,
  • Sales-tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 3 together with Section 8(b) of the Madras General Sales-tax Act
  • Section 16 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,
  • Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, XXIV of 1946
  • commodity.5. Section 3(2) of the above Act
  • Section 182 of the Indian Contract Act
  • SECTION 182 CONTRACT ACT
  • Section 3(2) of Act 24 of 1946
  • Indian Contract Act,
  • Sales-tax Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of Opinion (Srinivasachari, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from a number of suits by rice millers (licensees under the Food Procurement Order) in the Districts of East Godavari, West Godavari and Krishna, who sought refund of amounts collected by the Government. The underlying transactions occurred in the post-war period when the Government regulated foodstuffs and fixed prices under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, XXIV of 1946. Millers procured paddy and rice from producers at government-prescribed procurement prices and were directed by licence/agreements to sell to persons designated by the Collector at prices fixed by Government. When the Government later enhanced prices (including a bonus to producers), the Government sought to require the millers to make over the difference between purchase and the higher sale price to the Government. The millers complied with the orders initially but later filed suits claiming those amounts, contending they alone were entitled to the increased price and that the Government had no power to levy such a surcharge.

The suits raised several issues of fact and law (enumerated below). At the trial level, different subordinate judges reached divergent conclusions: some found the millers to be buyers/sellers entitled to the price difference and decreed recovery with interest; another held the Government's directions valid and dismissed the suits. The appeals were heard together and are disposed of by the High Court in a common judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the stocks held by the plaintiffs on the relevant dates were the exclusive property of the plaintiffs.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs are agents of the Government in respect of the sale of paddy and rice.
  3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of the increase in the price of the paddy and rice under the notification dated 19-11-1948 (and 6-12-1947 in one suit).
  4. Whether the order of the Government directing the collection of surcharge comes under the provisions of Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946.
  5. Whether the order of the Government directing levy of the surcharge is illegal and ultra vires and contrary to the terms of the licence and the agreement.
  6. Whether under Section 16 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, the plaintiffs are precluded from calling in question the orders passed under the Act in a Court of law.
  7. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The stocks of paddy/rice on the relevant dates were purchased with millers' own funds, stocked at their risk, and thus were their exclusive property; any increase in price should accrue to them alone.
  • The relationship between the millers and the Government was that of buyer and seller (not principal/agent); the millers paid for the goods and bore risk, so they were entitled to any profit from sale.
  • The Government's order requiring payment of the difference was beyond the powers conferred by Section 3(2) of the Essential Supplies Act and amounted to an unlawful levy/surcharge.
  • Cited authorities (including Attorney General v. Wilts United Dairies Ltd. and Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. State of Madras) to support that amounts collected unlawfully or conditions of licence not authorized by statute should not be recoverable by the State.

State's Arguments

  • The procurement agents/licensees acted under licences and agreements that required compliance with Government directions; they functioned effectively as agents or at least held a fiduciary position vis-à-vis the Government.
  • The licence terms and agreements (e.g., procurement agreement form Ex. B-1) show undertakings to purchase and sell at rates fixed by Government and to sell only to persons directed by the Collector; commission was the remuneration, and any price difference was not theirs to keep.
  • Section 3(2) of the Essential Supplies Act empowered the Government to regulate prices, require sale of held stock to specified persons at specified prices, and thus the Government was within power to require the difference to be made over.
  • The plaintiffs, by their conduct (accepting licences, procuring and selling under the licence), are estopped from denying those licence conditions (doctrine of approbate and reprobate); some plaintiffs had expressly agreed in writing to pay the difference.
  • Where orders are made under the Act (including Section 3(2) and delegated powers), Section 14 (and related provisions) may bar suits challenging such orders.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balthazar and Son v. E.M Abowath (AIR 1919 P.C. 166) The payment of commission alone is not conclusive to constitute a principal-agent relationship. Cited to support that mere commission paid to procurement agents does not by itself establish a strict agency relationship.
Lakshminarayan Ramgopal v. Hyderabad Government (AIR 1954 S.C. 364) Distinction between agent and servant: "A principal has the right to direct what work the agent has to do, but a master has the further right to direct how the work is to be done." Applied to show Government's directions resembled "master" control (how work is done) rather than classical agent-principal relations, supporting the conclusion that strict agency was not established.
Reading v. Attorney General (1951 AC 507) Where money is earned by use of an official position, the master (Crown) may be entitled to the money; fiduciary relationship can give the Crown right to money received by servant. Relied upon to support the existence (in substance) of a fiduciary relationship between procurement agents and Government, entitling Government to recover amounts earned by virtue of official appointment.
Municipal Council v. Bombay Company, Ltd. (ILR 52 Mad 207 ; AIR 1929 Mad 409) Action for money had and received may be treated as an equitable action; courts can treat matters as trust/fiduciary in character where appropriate. Used to support that recovery of sums unjustly held may be enforced as an equitable remedy (money had and received / trust fund approach) in British India.
John v. Dodwell and Co. (1918 AC 563 ; AIR 1918 PC 241) Observation that law and equity have been administered by the same courts as a single system; supports analogous equitable remedies. Referred to underline that equitable remedies (money had and received) were available and applicable in the jurisdictional context.
Firbosa Spolka Akoyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. (1942-2 All ER 122) Principle that legal systems provide remedies for unjust enrichment or unjust benefits derived from another that conscience forbids one to keep. Cited to frame the dispute in terms of unjust enrichment and to justify equitable recovery where millers retained benefits not meant for them.
United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd. (1940-4 All ER 20) Expression of the need to provide remedies where a person holds another's money which the latter did not intend to part with; labels of contract forms should not impede substantive rights. Quoted to support that technical forms of action should not obstruct substantive equitable rights to recover money not intended to be retained by the recipient.
Attorney General v. Wilts United Dairies Ltd. ((1922) 127 LT 822) Considered whether a statutory authority had power to require payment as condition of licence (here, 2d per gallon) — question whether levy authorised by statute. Cited by plaintiffs; Court distinguished the English case as inapposite because there the payment was a licence condition absent statutory sanction and was treated as a tax; the present case involved price difference arising under orders within statutory powers and not a licence fee/tax.
Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. State of Madras (1955-1 Mad LJ 346) Concerning obligation of registered dealer to collect and make over sales-tax as leviable by statute; the decision dealt with limits on recovery of unlawfully collected amounts under the Sales-tax Act. Cited by plaintiffs; Court held this authority was inapplicable because that case involved statutory tax collection, whereas the present case concerned no tax but price-difference under delegated powers.
Khetsidas v. Pratapmull Rameshwar (AIR 1946 Cal 197) Support for the proposition that directions requiring sale to specified persons and issuing a licence may fall within statutory powers. Referred to for the proposition that the direction in the licence to sell and pay the difference falls within the scope of powers under Section 3(2) of the Essential Supplies Act.
Santosh Kumar v. The State (AIR 1951 S.C. 201) On scope of powers under Section 3(1) and (2) of the Essential Supplies Act: the power to regulate/prohibit production, distribution and supply can include ad hoc or special orders directed at particular persons/things. Relied upon to confirm that Section 3 confers wide/residuary powers enabling special orders and directions to particular persons (thus supporting the legality of the impugned orders).
Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull and Netherlands Steam Ship Co. (1921-2 KB 608) Doctrine against 'approbate and reprobate' — a person cannot accept the benefit of a transaction as valid and later attack it as void to gain a further advantage. Applied to hold that plaintiffs who accepted benefits under licence/orders cannot later repudiate parts of the transaction (i.e., deny obligation to make over the price difference).
Moses v. Macferlan (1760-2 Burr. 1005) Classic statement of equitable principle that a defendant obliged by "natural justice and equity" should refund money improperly retained. Quoted to anchor the equitable basis for recovery where retention of the price difference would be unconscionable.
Prudhomme and Co. v. Hamel and Horley (cited by lower court as AIR 1992 P.C. 161 in the opinion) Case concerning whether a person is to be regarded as an agent or merely a favoured buyer in certain trades. Noted by the High Court as relied upon erroneously by the lower court and found not analogous or relevant to the present facts.
Venkatasubbay v. Satyanarayana Murty (1940-1 Mad LJ 465 ; AIR 1940 Mad 489) Discussed in the lower court's reasoning (reference to Bowstead on Agency) about passing of property where purchase is on behalf of another. Characterized by the High Court as among decisions relied on by the lower court but held to be irrelevant to the crucial issues in the instant dispute.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by addressing, step-by-step, (i) the character of the relationship between the millers and the Government, (ii) the legal power of the Government to issue and enforce the relevant orders under the Essential Supplies Act, and (iii) equitable and estoppel principles bearing on whether the millers could retain the price difference.

1. Nature of the Relationship (Agency / Buyer-Seller / Licence-holder)

  • The Court examined documentary evidence and the terms of licences and agreements (e.g., Ex. B-1). It found that the plaintiffs did not have scope to exercise discretion or judgment in procurement and sale: they were required to act according to Government directions.
  • Although the Indian Contract Act's definition of "agent" (Section 182) could superficially fit the plaintiffs (employed to do an act for another), other essential features of agency (such as acting on one's own judgment to create contractual relations for the principal) were absent.
  • The Court relied on the distinction articulated in Lakshminarayan Ramgopal (agent vs master/servant) to conclude that Government control here resembled master control (including directions as to how sales should be done) — but overall the relationship was neither a classic principal-agent nor a simple buyer-seller relationship.
  • Accordingly, the Court concluded the plaintiffs were licensees engaged to perform acts under the licence and the agreements submitted to Government direction and control; they were paid commission as remuneration but that alone did not establish strict agency.

2. Character of the Price Increase and Entitlement

  • The Court held the sale at higher prices was not a voluntary market profit by the plaintiffs: the higher sale price was made possible only by Government orders increasing prices and directing sales. Absent Government orders, plaintiffs could not have sold at higher prices.
  • The licence/agreements contained express or implied conditions requiring the licensees to make over the difference to Government (e.g., G.O. No. 1048 dated 19-11-1948: stocks could be seized if licensees did not agree in writing to pay the difference).
  • The plaintiffs' conduct — procuring and selling under the licence and having stocks released — permitted Court to infer their assent to make over the difference; some plaintiffs expressly agreed in writing to pay the difference.

3. Statutory Power under the Essential Supplies Act

  • The Court examined Section 3(1) and Section 3(2) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 and found clause (f) of Section 3(2) expressly empowered Government to require persons holding stock of an essential commodity to sell the whole or part of it at specified prices and to specified persons.
  • Relying on Santosh Kumar v. The State and other authority (Khetsidas v. Pratapmull Rameshwar), the Court held the impugned orders fell squarely within Section 3(2)'s delegated powers and were therefore within statutory competence.
  • The Court rejected the argument that the Government's demand was a tax/levy outside statutory power: it concluded it was not a tax in character but enforcement of conditions imposed under Section 3(2) framed to effectuate the public policy of balancing producer and consumer interests.

4. Equitable Doctrines: Fiduciary Duty, Unjust Enrichment, and Estoppel

  • Although the relationship was not a classical agency, the Court held a fiduciary-type duty arose from the licence/appointment: plaintiffs held a position requiring them to deal with stocks for public purposes and under Government direction, so gains made by reason of that position belonged to the Government.
  • Authorities on fiduciary obligations (Reading v. Attorney General) and equitable remedies for money had and received / unjust enrichment (Municipal Council v. Bombay Company; Firbosa; Moses v. Macferlan; United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd.) were invoked to justify recovery.
  • The doctrine of approbate and reprobate applied: plaintiffs who had accepted benefits under the licence (or expressly agreed) could not accept advantages of a transaction and later repudiate parts of it (Verschures Creameries Ltd. cited).
  • The Court found plaintiffs failed to discharge the onus (Issue No. 3) of showing entitlement to the increase in price under the notification; many plaintiffs had accepted or acquiesced to the licence terms requiring payment of the difference.

5. Procedural / Jurisdictional Point

  • The Court observed that if the orders were under Section 3(2) read with Section 4 and licences granted pursuant thereto, Section 14 of the Act might bar the filing of suits challenging such orders. Although the Court ultimately decided the case on merits, it noted that Section 14 would operate if the orders were in exercise of statutory powers.

6. Evaluation of Lower Courts' Analyses

  • The Court criticized some subordinate judges for relying on irrelevant documents (confusing Ex. A-2 with Ex. B-1) and for citing decisions not analogous to the present facts (e.g., Prudhomme and others, Venkatasubbay).
  • Where a subordinate judge had correctly concluded the orders were valid and dismissed the suits, the High Court endorsed that view; where subordinate judges had treated plaintiffs as buyers/sellers and awarded recovery, the High Court overruled those findings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the appeals filed on behalf of the State and dismissed the appeals filed on behalf of the plaintiffs (Krishna group and the other plaintiffs). Consequentially, the suits of all plaintiffs were dismissed.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The impugned orders and notifications enhancing prices and requiring the licensees to make over the difference fall within Section 3(2) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act and were validly made.
  • The millers/licensees were not entitled to retain the difference between procurement and higher sale price; a fiduciary relationship (or equivalent equitable duty) and the terms of the licences/agreements required that the increase (or difference) be made over to the Government.
  • Certain plaintiffs who had expressly agreed in writing to pay the difference were held to have consented and their appeals were necessarily dismissed.
  • Costs were apportioned as follows (as directed by the Court):
    • Plaintiffs in the Krishna Sub-Court who agreed in writing to pay the difference: liable to pay full advocate's fees in the lower Court and in the High Court.
    • Plaintiffs in the Krishna Sub-Court who did not give consent: liable to pay three-fourths (¾) of the advocate's fee payable in this Court and in the Court below.
    • Plaintiffs in suits in East and West Godavari Courts: ordered to pay the costs of the Government in both courts.
  • The Court did not purport to lay down any novel legal doctrine beyond applying existing equitable principles (fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, approbate and reprobate) and statutory interpretation of Section 3(2). The decision resolves the rights of the parties in these appeals but does not announce a sweeping new precedent beyond the application of the cited authorities to these facts.

Order: As recorded by the Court, "Order accordingly." (Appeals for State allowed; plaintiffs' appeals dismissed; suits dismissed; costs as directed.)

    State Of Madras v. Jayalakshmi Rice Mill Contractors Co.

    Srinivasachari, J.:— Identical questions are involved in these batches of appeals and so they were heard together and are disposed of by a common judgment.

    2. The claim in all these cases is for the refund of amounts collected by the Government from the rice millers in the Districts of East Godavari, West Godavari and Krishna, who were licensees under the Food Procurement Order, authorised to procure rice and paddy from the producers to sell them in the market at prices fixed by the Government. The difference between the prices at which they were purchased and the prices at which they were directed to be sold was asked to be made over to the Government. The various millers made over the difference in compliance with the order of the Government and later on filed suits for the recovery of those amounts on the ground that they alone were entitled to the difference in the price and the Government was not entitled to recover the same from them.

    3. These transactions relate to a period when immediately after the war, food stuffs had to be controlled for the proper and even distribution of food throughout India. It necessitated the Government to have resort to passing ‘Control Orders’ thereby restricting and controlling the sale of paddy and rice. The policy of laissez faire received as it were a set back during this time.

    4. The Indian Legislature passed the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, XXIV of 1946 with a view to maintain and increase the supplies of essential commodities and have them distributed equitably at fair prices. Under Section 3(1) of the Act, the Central Government may, for the implementation of the above object by a notified order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, and supply of any essential commodity.

    5. Section 3(2) of the above Act empowered the Government to regulate the production and supply of essential commodities by licences and permits to control the prices thereof. It also empowered the Government to require any person holding stock of an essential commodity to sell the whole or a specified part of the stock at such prices and to such persons, or class of persons as might be specified in the Order. These powers could be delegated to the Provincial Government under Section 4 of the Act. Accordingly under an order dated 12-11-1946 the powers were delegated to the Madras Government.

    6. The first order that was promulgated by the Provincial Government under the powers vested in it under Section 4 of the Act was the Foodgrains Control Order of 1942 which prohibited any person from engaging in any undertaking involving the purchase, sale or storage for sale any wholesale quantities of any foodgrains except under and in accordance with the licence issued by the Provincial Government or by an Officer authorised by the Government in this behalf.

    7. Under this Order a licence was granted and the licensee was expected to carry on the business in accordance with the instructions and directions embodied in the licence. Clause 9 of the licence prescribed that a licensee should comply with any instruction that might be given to him by the Government in regard to the purchase, sale or storage for sale of food grains.

    8. The food situation was deteriorating in these areas month by month. The Madras Government had also to take into account the growing discontent among the growers as the producers felt that the procurement prices in these areas were relatively low in the face of the prevailing high prices, and over the scarcity of all essential commodities other than foodgrains. But the Madras Government had to conform to the general price policy of the Central Government and refrain from increasing prices in foodgrains in the Provinces.

    9. It, therefore, decided upon a scheme of bonus to producers in order to give an incentive to the producers to attempt to have greater production by intensive production. The idea was that the food grower ought to be encouraged for greater cultivation and greater production. By this means the Government intended to meet the clamour for increased production.

    10. The Government, therefore, announced in July, 1947, a scheme sanctioning the grant of a bonus at Re. 1 per maund of paddy and Rs. 1-8-0 per maund of rice for all deliveries made from 1-12-1946 to 6-12-1947. This bonus was ordered to be paid half in cash and half in the shape of bonus coupons which the ryots could exchange for groundnut cakes and fertilisers.

    11. The increase in the price was passed on to the consumer. The new prices were to take effect from 7th Dec. 1947. In order to see that the producers got the increased price, procurement agents were appointed in every procurement area. This had the desired effect in that it gave a stimulus to intensive cultivation and increased production. Similarly the Government decided upon the payment of bonus on all millets during the months of September and October, 1947. This increase was also passed on to the consumer and the amount realised on account of this increase was paid Over to the ryots.

    12. Likewise, with regard to the procurement of paddy and millets the Government passed orders in exercise of its delegated powers. It passed an order on 15th June, 1946, (G.O.Ms 467, Food), which directed that-any occupier, tenant or resses or anyone in any other capacity was cultivating land with paddy or who was receiving any portion ??? such paddy as rent or otherwise, should sell the surplus of such paddy as may be determined ??? the Collector after each harvest to the Distric Collector or an agent appointed by him in the behalf. There was a procedure laid down for deter mining as to what would be regarded as surplus. This, therefore, prohibited the sale of surplus paddy or rice to any person other than the Collector ??? his nominee. Later on, in terms of the aforesaid order, an Intensive Procurement of Paddy and Rice Order was also passed. For the due performance of the duties of procuring agents, certain agreements were taken from them.

    13. Under these agreements the mill owner who was the procuring agent for the Government ??? to sell the stocks of paddy, rice or millets with him, only to the persons directed by the Collector and also undertook to sell it at such rates a might be prescribed by the Collector from time ??? time. He also deposited a certain amount with the District Supply Officer for the due performance of the obligations undertaken by him. Therefore the arrangement was that he was to purchase the from persons at particular rates in an area an bound to sell them at particular rates to particular persons as directed.

    14. It may be mentioned that these licensee were allowed a commission for their labour. It is the case of the Government that the mill owners were only concerned with the commission that was allowed to them for doing this work on behalf of the Government and any amount received by reason of the increase in the prices could only go to the Government firstly because the mill owner got back the amount that they paid for the purchase and, therefore, not entitled to the excess amount, and secondly because the increase in prices was effected with a view to benefit the producers.

    15. The plaintiffs contend that the stocks of paddy held by them on the date of the promulgation of the order was their exclusive property having been purchased with their own funds and having been stocked at their own risk, the increase ??? the price of the stock of paddy and rice would accrue to them alone. They further averred that in these transactions the relationship as between them selves and the Government was only that of ??? buyer and seller.

    16. It was also contended that the order of the Government for the payment to them of the difference in price was beyond the powers exercisable by them under the provisions of Section 3(2) of the Act XXIV of 1946. It amounted to a levy of surcharge which was not warranted by law. On these pleadings the following issues were raised:—

    (1) Whether the stocks held by the plaintiff on the evening of 20-11-1948, 6-12-1947 in the case of O.S No. 78/1950) are the exclusive property of the Plaintiffs?

    (2) Whether the plaintiffs are agents of the Government in respect of the sale of paddy and rice?

    (3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of the increase in the price of the paddy and rice under the notification dated 19-11-1948 (6-12-1947 in the case of O.S No. 78/1950)?

    (4) Whether the order of the Government directing the collection of surcharge comes undee the provisions of Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946?

    (5) Whether the order of the Government directing levy of the surcharge is illegal and ultra vires and contrary to the terms of the licence and the agreement?

    (6) Whether under Section 16 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, the plaintiffs are not entitled to call in question the orders passed under the said Act, in a Court of law?

    (7) To what relief is the plaintiff entitled?

    17. Evidence in the case consisted mainly of documents. Naturally in a case of this kind oral evidence would be of little value. The Subordinate Judge of Eluru first posed the question before him is to whether the relationship between the Government on the one hand and the mill owners on the other was that of a buyer and a seller or that of a principal and agent, and on a consideration of the various documents in the case, he held that the mill owners, the plaintiffs, could not be regarded as the agents of the Government.

    18. The consequence of such a finding was that inasmuch as the stocks of paddy and rice held by these mill owners were their own property, the earned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the excess received by reason of the increase in the price would go to the millers alone as they were the owners of the Rice and paddy.

    19. Coming to that conclusion he held that the plaintiffs in the suits before him, were entitled to a decree for the amount claimed by them together with interest at 6 per cent per annum till realisation. In the alternative, on the footing that the sales by the mill owners were to be regarded as;ales in compliance with an order of the Government, the learned Judge held that these orders issued by the Government could not be sustained because they were not notified orders.

    20. With regard to the suits filed in the Sub-Court, East Godavari, also the learned Judge held that the relationship between the plaintiffs and he Government was that of a buyer and seller and is such the Government was not entitled to the difference between the purchase price and the sale ???. As regards the question as to whether the Government had the power under Section 3(2) of Act 24 of 1946 to control the prices etc., he held that there was no provision in the aforesaid section ??? the Government to claim the difference ??? prices whenever the price was increased by the Government.

    21. He also held that the order of the Government ??? the collection of the surcharge (difference between the purchase price and the sale price) was of warranted under Section 3 of the Act. He held ??? this amounted to a levy of a surcharge and ??? was illegal and ultra vires. As a result ??? this finding the Subordinate Judge held that the mounts claimed by the plaintiffs from the Government were due to them. He, therefore, decreed the ??? with costs and interest at 6 per cent.

    22. While this was the view taken by the Subordinate Judge of West Godavari and the Subordinate ??? of East Godavari, the Subordinate Judge of ??? at Masulipatam took a different view. According to him the directions issued by the Government under the licence granted to the food ??? agents viz., the plaintiffs, were with-the competence of the Government and that, ???, the orders were legal and valid in law.

    23. He further held that if under the terms of the ??? the procurement agent had merely to carry it the directions of the Government, the amount ??? by the sale of the paddy at a higher price ??? go to the Government for disbursement as ??? like and not to the licensee. In the result he dismissed the suits. We have therefore before us appeals on behalf of the State against the decreeing of the suit, and appeals by the parties against the dismissal.

    24. According to the plaintiffs the relationship between themselves and the Government was only that of a seller and buyer and not that of principal and agent as alleged by the Government and inasmuch as the relationship was not that of an agent, the difference in the price accrued to them, because they paid the price of the food stuffs, they stocked them in their godowns and took the risk of any damage being caused.

    25. Under those circumstances the excess price, even if it was got by reason of the Government increasing the price was only available to them and not to the Government. On behalf of the State it was very strongly urged by the learned Government Pleader that the position of these procurement agents could not be anything else other than that of an agent. For this purpose the learned Government Pleader relied upon the terms of the agreement executed by the procurement agents.

    26. A form of such agreement is to be found in Ex. B-1 in appeal No. 29/53. The heading reads as an agreement executed by procurement agent. The teamed Government Pleader argued that the various undertakings mentioned in the said agreement such as to purchased paddy, rice etc., at the rates prescribed by the Commissioner of Civil Supplies or any officer authorised by him, the undertaking to store paddy and to be responsible for its safer custody and the further undertaking to sell the paddy and rice stored thus, only to the Collector or his nominee at the prices fixed by the Government, clearly indicated that the plaintiffs were only filling the role of an agent so far as the Government was concerned. It was also urged that the fact that the plaintiffs paid the purchase price thereof initially did not matter.

    27. It has to be observed that the relationship of an agency is a contractual relationship. As the clauses of the agreement would indicate, the procurement agent is directed to do an act for another and receive a commission for such act. The mere fact that a person is employed to do an act for another does not make the former an agent of the latter. Further, the fact that the agreement speaks of a procurement agent is not conclusive evidence of the relationship of principal and agent, for the name which the parties may choose to give to a transaction cannot be the sole criterion.

    28. The question of agency is always a mixed question of law and fact. The function of an agent is to enter into contract relations with third persons for and on behalf of his principal. An agent does some act suggested more or less by his discretion and judgment which has the effect of establishing a contractual relationship between his principal and third parties. In this case it would appear that the plaintiffs were employed and were subjected to the direction and control of the Government. There was no scope for the exercise of any discretion on the part of the plaintiffs.

    29. Agent has been defined in the Indian Contract Act, as a person employed to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings with third persons. The first portion of the definition would appear to lend support to the view that in this case also inasmuch as the plaintiffs, the licensees, were employed to procure paddy and rice from the producers for the Government and sell them, they could be said to satisfy the requirement of an ‘agent’ under Section 182 of the Contract. Act and could be styled agents.

    30. But it has to be observed that the other factore which generally are to be found to constitute ‘agency’ are absent here. The agent, for example, acts on his own judgment, of course within the limits of his authority. In the case of the licensees, the plaintiffs, there is no scope for the exercise of their discretion or their judgment. The plaintiffs merely acted as they are directed to do.

    31. They did not represent the Government in their dealings with the producers. They were merely constituted the medium for the purchase and sale of paddy and they were paid remuneration for their services. The fact that they were paid commission for their work would not by itself be enough to constitute the relationship of agency vide Balthazar and Son v. E.M Abowath (A Firm) AIR 1919 P.C 166. Taking into consideration the various circumstances governing the regulation of business as between the Government and the procurement agents, it could not be said that in the strict definition of the word, the relationship of principal and agent could be said to have been established, for all the ingredients necessary to constitute an agency are not to be found herein.

    32. The Supreme Court had occasion to point out the difference between an agent as defined in Section 182 of the Indian Contract Act and a servant in the case of Lakshminarayan Ramgopal v. Hyderabad Government, AIR 1954 SC 364. Their Lordships observed:

    “A principal has the right to direct what work the agent has to do, but a master has the further right to direct how the work is to be done.”

    33. Here the Government has the power to give directions to the licensees as to how and to whom the grain should be sold. This may be said to be more analogous to that of a master rather than of a principal.

    34. While therefore we hold that the relationship between the Government and the plaintiffs cannot be said to be that of a buyer and seller, we are of the opinion that there is no relationship of principal and agent either. It is a case of a person holding a licence for doing an act as per the conditions of the licence and in accordance with the terms of the agreement entered into by him with the Government.

    35. It was next argued that if there was no relationship of principal and agent established, the Government could not recover the difference in price realised, consequent upon the enhancement of the price. The contention was that the stocks of paddy were paid for by the plaintiffs and if by the Sale of such paddy any profit was made, such profit should enure for the benefit of the plaintiffs alone. This argument, it must be said, is founded upon an entirely erroneous basis.

    36. It may be pointed out that the sale of the stock of paddy or rice at a higher price was not a free and voluntary sale in the open market by the plaintiffs. The prices were not increased at the instance of the plaintiffs. They were enabled to sell at a higher price because of the order of Government. In the absence of any such order by the Government they could not have sold the goods at a higher price to enable them to earn a profit. It can never be regarded as a profit which accrued to them by reason of a rise in the market price of the commodities.

    37. It is futile to contend that they became entitled to the difference in the price, in the face of the express condition to sell at a higher price and make it over. It explicitly says: “Sell it at a particular higher price and pass on the difference to the Government”. The appointment of the plaintiffs as licensees under the Food Procurement Order has to be considered in the light of the policy of the Government underlying the appointment of procurements agents.

    38. The memorandum issued by the Government explaining their policy in relation to the price of food grains, clearly indicates that in view of the growing discontent among the producers of food grains that the procurement prices fixed were relatively low, having regard to the prevailing high prices of commodities other than food grains, the Government decided upon granting a bonus to every producer as a set off against the ??? between the prices at which he is paid for his food grains and the prevailing high prices of other commodities. Vide Ex. B-14, p. 24 in Documents in A.S 956/1953.

    39. Decidedly the increase in price was made to effectuate this policy. No part of it was to go to the Miller. The fact that there were persistent and repeated representations from the producers saying that a substantial increase in the procurement price was necessary, would be evident from G.O No. 1310 dated 6-12-1947 Vide Ex. B-12 (P. 78 in A.S No. 29 of 1953).

    40. The Government wanted to balance the equities between the producer and the consumer. This was done in the interests of National economy. Under these circumstances, it could not be urged that the increase in the price was intended for the benefit of the millers. The millers had no place it this. Their commission was left untouched.

    41. The Subordinate Judge, West Godavary fell into a grave error in confusing the position of a dealer under the Grain Purchase Order and that of a licensee under the Food Procurement Order. I so doing he relied upon a wrong document as the agreement governing the liability of the plaintiffs. He relied upon Ex. A-2 in the case while he should have referred to Ex. B-1.

    42. Relying upon an irrelevant document the Sub-ordinate Judge argues that the form of agreement does not empower the Grain Purchasing Officer to issue a direction claiming the difference in price whenever the prices were increased by the Government. The argument and the reasoning of the learned Judge is absolutely fallacious. The learned Judge has relied upon certain decisions, in order to come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs could ??? be regarded as agents of the Government.

    43. These decisions are entirely irrelevant and did not touch the point. Suffice it to refer to one of the cases relied upon by the lower Court i.e, ??? Prudhomme and Co. v. Hamel and Horley AIR 1992 PC 161. There the question related to the fact to whether a particular person could be regarde as an agent. Their Lordships observed that in man trades particularly in the motor car trade the called agent is merely a “favoured and ??? buyer” who undertakes to do his best ??? find a market for the manufacturer's stock, ??? is given some special advantage. This case ??? no analogy to the case now under consideration ??? fore us. Likewise is the case of Venkatasubbay v. Satyanarayana Murty, 1940-1 Mad LJ 465 : (AIR 1940 Mad 489).

    44. There the learned Judge, Patanjali Sastri, ??? relying upon a passage in Bowstead. On Agency ??? plained the position that where a person buys good on behalf of another the property in the goods ??? not pass to the latter until the price for the goo has been paid by the latter. It therefore ??? that the relationship of the plaintiffs qua the Government could never be likened to that of a ??? and seller.

    45. If the relationship inter se between the Government and the plaintiffs is not that of principal and agent nor could it be regarded as that of buyer and seller, the question arises as to whether the Government is not entitled to recover the difference in price from the plaintiffs, the millers. The plaintiffs in this case, as has been observed, are appointed to act for the Government and under a licence granted to them to carry out the directions contained in the licence.

    46. If such is the position, then a fiduciary relationship would be deemed to have been established. They owe to the Government a duty as fully fiduciary as the duty of a servant to his master of an agent to his principal although strictly speaking the relationship is not that of an agent or servant, and if there is a fiduciary relationship the profits and advantages gained would go for the benefit of the Government because of their having been appointed licensees under the Food Procurement Order. We are fortified in this view of ours by a decision of the House of Lords in Reading v. Attorney General, 1951 AC 507.

    47. That was a case where a sergeant in the Army on active service abroad consented on several occasions to accompany civilian lorries transporting illicit spirits to specified destinations. He were a military uniform to avoid inspection by the Police and for his services he received 20,000. The military authorities took possession of the amount, tried him by Court Martial finding him to be in possession of large sums of money and convicted him. After his release from prison, he tried to recover the amount.

    48. Viscount Jowitt the Lord Chancellor and Lord Porter held that as it was the official position held by the soldier, that enabled him to earn the money by its use, it gave the Crown, his master the right to the money as money had and received even though it was earned by a criminal act and even though the Crown suffered no loss. The law Lords further held that the Crown was entitled to the money on another ground also viz., the fiduciary relationship that existed between the soldier and the Crown.

    49. The right to recover money from a person who stands in a fiduciary relationship and which money has been received for and on behalf of another person, has been regarded as an equitable right.

    50. In this connection we may also advert to a decision of the Madras High Court in Municipal Council v. Bombay Company, Ltd. ILR 52 Mad 207 : (AIR 1929 Mad 409). One of the questions raised in that case was whether the respondent company who paid the company's tax to the appellant, the Municipal Council, under protest could recover the amount. Therein Courts Trotter C. observed that in the Courts in British India, an action for money had and received may be treated, as an action founded on equity binding on the conscience of the recipient of the money which is shown not to be his. The remedy being an equitable one is enforceable. The learned Chief Justice further observed:

    “There is no necessity to find an actual contract or to impute the function of a contract, in as much as every Court can treat the question as one not merely of contract but of trust fund where necessary.”

    51. Lord Haldane in John v. Dodwell and Co. 1918 AC 563 : (AIR 1918 PC 241) ruled that law and equity, have been administered by the same Courts as aspects of a single system in Ceylon, and therefore an action analogous to that for money had and received was maintainable in all cases. Courts Trotter C.J, in the aforementioned case ILR 52 Mad 207 : (AIR 1929 Mad 409) thought that those observations of Lord Haldane not merely applied to Ceylon but to British India as well and, therefore, so far as British India was concerned, there was no divergence between equitable and legal remedies.

    52. The question could be looked at from another point of view. Are the plaintiffs entitled to retain the difference in ??? price to which they could not be said to have become entitled, having regard to the terms of the licence under which they acted. They have benefited themselves unjustly. This unjust benefit is spoken of as ‘unjust enrichment’. Dealing with cases of this kind Lord Wright in Firbosa Spolka Akoyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. 1942-2 All ER 122 stated as follows:

    “It is clear that any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit derived from another which it is against conscience that he should keep.”

    53. The principle underlying this is to quote the words of Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan, 1760-2 Burr. 1005 the gist of this kind of action is that ‘the defendant upon the circumstances of the case is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money”. This principle has been very tersely put by Lord Atkin in United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd., 1940-4 All ER 20 at p. 27:

    “The man has my money which I have not delivered to him with any real intention of passing to him the property. I sue him because he has the actual property taken……… These fantastic resemblances of contracts invented in order to meet requirements of the law as to forms of action which have not disappeared should not in these days be allowed to affect actual rights.”

    54. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs, the procuring agents invited our attention to a decision of the House of Lords in Attorney General v. Wilts United Dairies Ltd. (1922) 127 LT 822 and argued that the instant case was exactly similar to the above case where the Ministry of Food was held to be not entitled to collect the fee from the company who had been granted licence to purchase milk and were asked to pay the Food Controller 2nd for each gallon purchased under the licence. That case is clearly distinguishable from the case before us. In the English case the payment of 2nd for every gallon was a condition for granting the licence for Lord Atkin's judgment makes it clear. Lord Atkin observed as follows:

    “The question of law that arises is whether the food controller had any legal authority for requiring the defendants to agree to pay the sums in question as a condition of the licence required.”

    55. There is no such thing in our case. The amount sought to be realised from the plaintiffs is not by way of a fee, levy or charge but only the difference in the price recovered by them on account of the enhancement of the price. The question in the English case clearly was whether the levy of 2nd was authorised by statute. The Law Lords held that there was no sanction of Parliament for this levy and so could not be imposed. That clearly held that it was a tax that was being imposed. That case can have no relevancy whatsoever.

    56. Learned counsel called in aid a decision of the Madras High Court in Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. State of Madras, 1955-1 Mad LJ 346 and urged that there was no obligation to pay to the Government an amount that he collected unlawfully. That case can never apply to the facts of this case. While construing Section 3 together with Section 8(b) of the Madras General Sales-tax Act the learned Judges held that what was expected of a Registered dealer under the Sales-tax Act was to collect the tax that is leviable lawfully on the purchases, and to make over the tax thus collected to the Government. The Act envisaged the collection of a tax as enjoined by the Act and not any other amount, and this amount the dealer is expected to make over to the Government and not any amount that he might have recovered illegally. In the instant case there is no levy of a tax and much less an illegal tax. So that case can have no bearing.

    57. A rather unsuccessful attempt was made to say that the amount sought to be realised was a levy or tax because the Government itself called it as ‘surcharge’. It was argued that consciously the Government was trying to realise the amount as a levy on the price of food-stuffs. This argument must be rejected straightway. The nomenclature cannot be conclusive about the character of a particular demand. There was no imposition of a ‘levy’ or ‘tax’.

    58. That the licence that was granted to them was on condition that they made over the difference in price, would be evident from G.O No. 1048, Food Department, dated 19-11-1948, Ex. B-19 (P. 116) in A.S 29/53. It says: “If the stock-holders do not agree in writing to pay the difference in price due to increase in price sanctioned by the Government the stocks in question should be seized and sold to other merchants”. This would make it abundantly clear that it was well understood by the licensees drat they had to make over the difference.

    59. The fact that they released the stocks and sold meant that the procurement agents agreed to pay the difference in price. The Court could very well presume their ??? because, otherwise the stocks would not have been released by them. Having considered this aspect of the case we will now consider as to whether the Government is not entitled to recover the amounts having regard to the terms of the licence granted by it. It was argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the food procurement order and the several notifications issued thereafter in that regard were beyond the scope and power of the Government under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act.

    60. It must be stated straightway that the order impugned clearly falls under Section 3(2) of the Act. Section 3(1) of the Act gives the Central Government the power to promulgate orders for securing, maintaining, increasing the supplies of any essential commodity or to regulate and prohibit the production, supply and distribution thereof. While this is the power vested in the Government under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act sub-section (2) gives wider powers for it reads as under:

    “Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) an order made thereunder may provide

    …… …… …… ……

    …… …… …… ……

    (c) for controlling the prices at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold

    (d) for regulating the licences, permits or otherwise the storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption.

    (e)…………

    (f) for requiring any person holding stock of an essential commodity to sell the whole or a specified part of the stock at such prices and to such persons or class of persons or in such circumstances as may be specified in the order.”

    61. Clause (f) extracted above clearly gives the power to the Government to direct the stock-holders of rice and paddy to sell them to persons designated by the Government. Therefore, there could be said to be no want of authority. A direction in the manner mentioned in the licence could also be said to fall within the ambit of the power vested in the Government. The Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Kumar v. The State AIR 1951 S.C 201 dealing with the scope of the powers under Section 3(1) and (2) of the Act ruled that the power to provide for regulating or prohibiting production, distribution and supply, conferred on an executive body may well include the power to regulate, prohibit by issuing directions to a particular produced or dealer or by requiring any specific act to be done or forborne in regard to production etc. It authorises the making of ad hoc or special orders with respect to any particular person or thing. In short there is a residuary power vested in the Government to pass any order in order to carry out the purposes of Section 3(1) of the Act.

    62. The power enabling the making of orders, requiring that the goods be sold to specified persons and for that purpose issuing a licence is not objectionable at all. The direction in the licence to sell and pay the difference must be regarded as falling within the scope of the power. Vide Khetsidas v. Pratapmull Rameshwar, AIR 1946 Cal 197.

    63. A question of estoppel by conduct would also arise in so far as the plaintiffs are concerned. The plaintiffs were allowed to procure the paddy and rice from the producers and growers on the strength of the licence granted to them and it is by virtue of the licence that they secured the stocks and subsequently sold them as per directions of the Government. They agreed to purchase and sell, in other words to deal in food grains subject to the conditions and terms imposed upon them in their licences and in the agreements executed by them.

    64. They cannot go behind the averment in the plaint saying that under a contract with the Government they were bound to sell paddy or rice to local grain purchasing officer or to such other person directed by the said officer. The plaintiffs were purchasing and selling paddy and rice in accordance with the said agreement. They became entitled to their fixed commission on the quantity of the stock bought and sold. Having got a benefit under an order on the footing that it was a valid order is it open to them to say that portion of the order asking them to make over the difference in price is invalid and could not be sustained. They cannot.

    65. This is based on the doctrine of ‘approbate and reporbate’. To quote the words of Scrutton Lord Justice,

    “A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is Valid and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. That is to approbate and reprobate the transaction.”

    66. Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull and Netherlands Steam Ship Co., 1921-2 KB 608 at p. 612.

    67. The plaintiffs have failed to show how the increase in prices consequent on the orders enhancing the prices was one which accrued to the benefit of the plaintiffs alone. Issue No. 3 which is as follows: “whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of the increase in the price of paddy and rice under the Notification dated 19-11-1948” throws the onus on the plaintiffs which, in our opinion, the plaintiffs have not discharged.

    68. It was raised in the written statement and argued before us on behalf of the State that if the order was one under Section 3(2) read with Section 4 of the Act, and the granting of the licences was in pursuance thereof, such an order could not be called in question in any Court and Section 14 of the Act operated as a bar to the filing of a suit. In the view that we have taken, that the impugned order was in exercise of the power conferred by the Act we feel that Section 14 would come into opera-ion and the suits filed must be held to be not maintainable. As the whole case was argued and the arguments did not confine to the preliminary point of the maintainability of the suit, a finding on this issue is not quite necessary.

    69. We cannot lose sight of the fact that some of the plaintiffs in appeal Suits Nos. 344, 351, 354, 644, 646, 649, 650, 766 and 767 in the suits filed before the Subordinate Judge, Krishna, are persons who agreed in writing to pay the difference in prices.

    70. This fact was brought to our notice by the learned Government Pleader and this is borne out by the relevant exhibits in the case. The learned counsel appearing for those plaintiffs could not controvert he fact. Their appeals will necessarily have to be dismissed.

    71. After giving the matters raised before us our careful considerations, we are of the opinion that the appeals filed on behalf of the State should be allowed and the appeals filed on behalf of the plaintiffs in the various suits (Krishna Group) should be dismissed.

    72. The result would be that the suits of all the plaintiffs would be dismissed. As regards costs we direct that so far as those plaintiffs in the suits filed in the Sub-Court, Krishna, are concerned who agreed to pay the difference, they be made liable to pay the full advocate's fee in the lower Court and in this Court while those plaintiffs in the sub-Court Krishna who did not give_their consent to paying the difference are concerned, they would be liable to pay ¾ of the advocate's tee payable in this Court and in the Court below. The plaintiffs in the suits in the various Courts in the Districts of East and West Godavari will pay the costs of the Government here and in the Court below. This judgment will govern all the appeals.

    M.K.S

    73. Order accordingly.

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    State Of Madras v. Jayalakshmi Rice Mill Contractors Co.
    (Mar 8, 1958)