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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: T. Ananta Babu, Advocate.
  • For the Respondent: E. Manohar, Advocate.
Judges
  • Kuppuswamy
  • Shiv Shanker, JJ.
Acts
  • Art. 431-B of the Limitation Act 1908,
  • Indian Limitation Act of 1908.
  • Indian Limitation Act, 1908.8.
  • Art. 96 of the Limitation Act
  • Indian Limitation Act 1908
  • LIMITATION ACT 1908
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: T. Ananta Babu, Advocate.
  • For the Respondent: E. Manohar, Advocate.
Judges
  • Kuppuswamy
  • Shiv Shanker, JJ.
Acts
  • Art. 431-B of the Limitation Act 1908,
  • Indian Limitation Act of 1908.
  • Indian Limitation Act, 1908.8.
  • Art. 96 of the Limitation Act
  • Indian Limitation Act 1908
  • LIMITATION ACT 1908
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Court Opinion Summary — Alladi Kuppuswami, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff is a Mutt at Tirupathi represented by its Matadhipathi. The plaintiff sued in O.S. No. 81 of 1965 for a declaration that a permanent lease executed in 1898 by a then-Matadhipathi in favour of Govindachari, and a subsequent alienation in 1940 in favour of the father of the defendants, were void, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff mutt; the plaintiff also sought possession and mesne profits.

The chain of title in the suit property involved a permanent lease (1898) followed by multiple transfers (sales in 1920, 1927, 1928) and a sale on 19-4-1940 to the father of defendants 1–4. In a family partition the property fell to the share of the first defendant, who is the appellant in the present appeal.

At trial the defendants contended that the permanent lease was for necessity (and therefore binding) and that the suit was barred by limitation. The trial court held the permanent lease was supported by necessity and that the defendants had perfected title by adverse possession, and dismissed the suit.

The plaintiff mutt appealed (A.S. No. 508/70). The appellate single-judge (Venkatrama Sastry, J.) held the suit was not barred by limitation and that the permanent lease was not supported by legal necessity; that judgment set aside the trial court's order and decreed the suit, with mesne profits to be determined separately.

The first defendant (the appellant) then preferred this further appeal against the judgment of Venkatrama Sastry, J. The principal question argued on this appeal was whether the suit was barred by limitation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit by the matadhipathi (manager) to recover possession of endowed immovable property is barred by limitation.
  2. Whether Article 96 of the (new) Limitation Act (allowing a suit within twelve years from date of appointment of the plaintiff as manager, or twelve years from date of death/resignation/removal of transferor, whichever is later) applies to revive a suit that had already been barred under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, in light of Section 31 of the new Act.
  3. Whether the permanent lease (an alienation) executed by a matadhipathi is binding on the mutt by reason of "necessity" (i.e., whether the alienation was supported by legal necessity).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Ananta Babu)

  • The suit is clearly barred by limitation.
  • Section 31 of the new Limitation Act provides that nothing in the new Act shall enable any suit for which the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 had already expired prior to commencement of the new Act; therefore, Article 96 of the new Act cannot be invoked to revive a suit which was already barred under the 1908 Act.
  • Under the 1908 Act the period for such a suit ran from the death, resignation or removal of the transferor; that period had expired long before the commencement of the new Act.

Respondent's Arguments (learned Advocate General / plaintiff's position as accepted below)

  • The suit was filed within twelve years from the date of appointment of the plaintiff as manager (16-5-1960), and therefore was within time under Article 96 of the new Limitation Act.
  • Article 96 creates an additional or different starting point for limitation (appointment of the successor) and thus permits suits that otherwise would have been time-barred under the 1908 Act.

Other Relevant Contentions Recorded at Trial

  • The plaintiff contended that the permanent lease constituted an alienation and was not binding on the mutt; the plaintiff sought declaration and recovery of possession.
  • The defendants at trial contended the lease was for necessity (hence binding) and asserted bar by limitation; the trial court found the lease supported by necessity and adverse possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.A. 109/72 (dated 11-12-1972) — Sambasiva Rao, J. Supported the view that the new Limitation Act does not revive suits already barred under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The court noted a similar view had been expressed in this decision and agreed with it; it relied on that alignment in concluding the present suit was barred.
Decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court (general reference) Establish the substantive law of endowments that alienation of endowed property by a matadhipathi is not binding on the mutt unless supported by legal necessity, and that a permanent lease is of the same nature as an alienation. The court relied on this established substantive rule as background to explain the nature of the right to sue (i.e., that the right existed under the law of endowments both before and after the new Limitation Act), and to show that limitation governs the period to assert that established right.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court focused primarily on limitation law and the interplay between the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 ("old Act") and the new Limitation Act (which contains Article 96 and Section 31).

The court accepted the factual premise that under the old Act the right to sue to recover endowed property arising from an alienation by a previous manager must be exercised within twelve years from the date of death, resignation or removal of the transferor (citing Art. 431-B of the Limitation Act, 1908 as the relevant provision in the old Act). The court found that the period prescribed by the old Act had expired before the new Act came into force.

The respondent argued (as accepted by the single-judge below) that Article 96 should operate to permit the suit because it allows a suit within twelve years from the date of appointment of the plaintiff-manager, and the present suit had been filed within twelve years of the plaintiff's appointment (16-5-1960). The appellant argued that Section 31 of the new Act prevents Article 96 from reviving suits already barred under the old Act.

The single-judge had reasoned that Article 96 created a new variety of suits (with a different terminating event for limitation) and therefore was not within the scope of Section 31. The present court rejected that analysis for these principal reasons:

  • Limitation statutes do not create substantive causes of action or "types" of suits; they prescribe periods of limitation for suits that arise under substantive law. The underlying right to sue to challenge an alienation existed under the law of endowments prior to the new Act (as affirmed by Privy Council and Supreme Court decisions) and continued to exist after the new Act.
  • Article 96 changed the starting point for limitation (allowing the later of appointment of successor or death/resignation/removal of transferor to be the terminus a quo), but it did not create a new substantive right or an altogether different category of suit that did not exist under the old Act.
  • Section 31 was deliberately enacted to prevent the new Limitation Act from reviving suits which had already become barred under the old Act; the legislature intended to exclude from the new provisions those suits where the period of limitation under the 1908 Act had already expired prior to commencement of the new Act.
  • The Law Commission's rationale for Art. 96 (to provide equity where there was a long gap between managers or where the appointment date would be a fairer starting point) explains why the new termination points were provided, but does not negate the clear legislative bar contained in Section 31 for suits already barred under the old Act.

On that basis the court held that because the suit had become barred under the old Act before the new Act came into force, Section 31 prevents the new Act (and Article 96) from enabling institution of the suit. Having reached that conclusion, the court considered the question whether the lease was supported by legal necessity to be moot and unnecessary to decide.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed and the suit is barred by limitation. The court held that Article 96 of the new Limitation Act does not apply to revive suits which were already barred under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 by reason of Section 31 of the new Act. The appeal was allowed with costs throughout.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's suit to declare the permanent lease void and to recover possession is time-barred and cannot be maintained; the appellate court's prior decree in favour of the plaintiff has been set aside by this decision. The first defendant's appeal succeeds and costs are awarded to the appellant.
  • Scope of decision: The court resolved the case on the limitation point and expressly did not decide whether the permanent lease was supported by legal necessity. The opinion relies on established principles concerning endowed property but does not purport to create a new substantive precedent beyond its holding on the interplay of Section 31 and Article 96. The court noted agreement with S.A. 109/72 on the point of non-revival by the new Act.
Show full summary ...

    C.V. Purushotham v. Chinna Jeeyangar Mutt, Tirupati

    Alladi Kuppuswami, J.:— The first defendant in O.S No. 81 of 1965 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge's Court, Chittoor is the appellant. The plaintiff in the suit is a Mutt at Tirupathi represented by the present Matadhipathi. The suit was filed for a declaration that the permanent lease executed by the then Matadipathi on the 19th Chitra of Vikari corresponding to 1898 in favour of one Govindachari and the subsequent alienation on 19-4-1940 in favour of C.V Rajanujam, father of defendants 1 to 4 are void, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff mutt and for possession and mesne profits, past and future. According to the case of the plaintiff, the suit property belonged to the plaintiff-mutt. One of the previous heads of the mutt executed a permanent lease in 1898 in favour of Govindachari. The grandson of the lessee sold the suit property in 1920 to one Ramaswamy Chetty who in turn sold in 1927 to K. Narasimhulu Reddy and another. Both of them sold again to Pedda Subba Reddy in 1928. On 19-4-1940 the said Pedda Subba Reddy sold the property to the father of defendants 1 to 4. In a partition between the members of the defendants' family it fell to the share of the first defendant. The plaintiff contended that the permanent lease constituted an alienation of the property and was not binding upon the mutt. The plaintiff therefore claimed a declaration that the lease was not binding upon the Mutt. The plaintiff, therefore claimed a declaration that the lease was not binding and for recovery of possession of the property from the defendants.

    2. The matadipathi who granted the lease in 1898 died on 13-9-1906. There were number of matadipathis who succeeded one alter another. The last of them died on 21-9-1960 and the plaintiff was appointed on 16-5-1960. The defendants contended that the lease was for necessity and, was therefore binding on the mutt. They also contended that the suit was barred by limitation. The trial court held that the permanent lease was supported by necessity and was binding on the mutt. It also held that the defendants had perfected their title to the suit property by adverse possession. In the result it dismissed the suit with costs. The plaintiff mutt preferred A.S No. 508/70 to this court. Our learned brother, Venkatrama Sastry J. took the view that the suit was not barred by limitation. He also held that the could not agree with the finding of the lower court that the permanent lease was supported by legal necessity. In the result, the judgment of the trial court was set aside and the appeal was allowed and the suit was decreed. A declaration was granted that the permanent lease was not binding on the mutt and that the mutt was entitled to recover possession of the suit property. It was directed that the mesne profits both past and future should be enquired into in a separate application.

    3. The first defendant has preferred this appeal against the judgment of Venkatrama Sastry, J.

    4. Sri Ananta Babu, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the suit is clearly barred by the limitation. This is the main question that has to be considered in this appeal.

    5. Under Art. 96 of the Limitation Act a suit by the Manager of a Hindu Religious or Charitable Endowment to recover possession of movable or immovable property comprised in the endowment which has been transferred by a previous manager for valuable consideration can be filed within twelve years from the date of death, resignation or removal of the transferor on the date of appointment of the plaintiff as manager of the endowment, whichever is later. It was contended by the learned Advocate General that as the suit has been filed within twelve years from the date of appointment of the plaintiff as manager, namely, 16-5-1960 the suit is within time this contention was accepted by Venkatrama Sastry, J. It was however, argued by Sri T. Ananta Babu: learned counsel for the appellant that Sec. 31 of the Act provides that nothing in this Act shall enable any suit, appeal or application to be instituted, preferred or made for which the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 expired before the commencement of this Act. It was submitted that the period of Limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 for a suit to recover possession of Immovable property comprised in the endowment which has been transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration, was twelve years from the date of death resignation or removal of the transferor. It cannot be denied the period of limitation for filing a suit under the old Act had expired long before coming into force of the new Act. It was therefore, submitted that Art. 96 of the new Act has no application by reason of Sec. 31 of the Act.

    6. The learned Advocate General did not and could not dispute that the period of limitation for the suit prescribed by the Indian limitation Act of 1908 had expired before the commencement of the new Act. Even in the judgment appealed against’ after discussing the provisions of law and decisions on the subject it was observed that a permanent lease being an alienation is not binding on the mutt if it was not for legal necessity. The cause of action which once accrues continues. The right of the mutt would be extinguished in regard to that property at the end of the period prescribed by the law of limitation. Each succeeding mahant does not get a revival of the cause of action in his favour. The appointment of successor was never considered to give a fresh start of limitation under the law as it stood prior to 1963. Thus, it follows that as the suit had to be filed within twelve years from the date of death, resignation or removal of the transferor under Art. 431-B of the Limitation Act 1908, the period of limitation prescribed by that Act had expired before the commencement of the new Act. Hence, by reason of Sec. 31 of the Act, nothing in the Act would enable any such suit to be instituted. We have therefore, no hesitation in holding that Art. 96 has no application and the suit was barred.

    7. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that Art. 96 applied and therefore, the suit was not barred by limitation was accepted by our learned brother, Venkatrama Sastry, J., as he was of the view that sec. 31 only speaks of suits which are instituted as per the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act 1908 and not to the types of suits which are provided by the new limitation Act. He proceeded to observe:

    “Under the Limitation Act, 1908 the right to file a suit under Art. 134-B would arise on the death, resignation or removal of the transferor. But under the new Limitation Act, a suit can also be filed within twelve years from the date of appointment of the plaintiff as the manager. The latter type of suits introduced by the new Act are therefore a new variety of suits introduced by the new Act and not covered by the Indian limitation Act of 1908. If the terminus quo was repeated as in the case of 1908 Act, Sec. 31 would no doubt come into play, but when the terminus quo in column 3, has been changed in the new Act it cannot be said that the new suit contemplated by Art. 96 is the same suit for which the period of limitation was prescribed under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.”

    8. With great respect to the learned judge we are unable to agree with this reasoning in our view, it is not correct to say that the suits introduced by the new Act are a new variety of suits not covered by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. As a matter of fact, limitation acts do not provide for the Institution of a suit of any particular type or variety. An Act dealing with limitation provides only for the period of limitation in respect of different types of suits, which a party has the right to bring having regard to the substantive law. Under the Law of endowments, as settled by the decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, alienation of endowed property by a matadhipathi is not binding on the mutt unless it is supported by necessity and a permanent lease is cousidered to be of the same nature as an alienation. After the death, resignation or removal of the maradnipathi the succeeding matadhipathi is entitled to sue for a declaration that the alienation is not binding on the institution. This right is a right under the law governing the en-dowments and existed when the Indian Limitation Act 1908 was in force and continued to exist even after the new Act. As far as the right to institute such a suit is concerned, there is no change in the law and there cannot be any change by reason of the new Limitation Act. Whereas under the old Act the suit had to be instituted within twelve years after the death, resignation or removal of the transferor, under the new Act it can be instituted within twelve years after the appointment of the successor or within the twelve years after the death, resignation or removal of the transferor which ever is later. It is true that this change was made in view of the recommendation of the Law Commission in its third report relating to the Limitation Act. The Law Commission said that the Endowment Commissioner may find it necessary to challenge alienation by one of the previous managers after decades or there may be a gap of twelve years between the death resignation or removal of one manager and the appointment of his successor. In such a case it would be more equitable to make the date of the plaintiff's appointment as manager the starting point for limitation. But there may be cases and circumstances where the existing provision may be more favourable to the institution. To provide for both contingencies, the later of the two dates should be taken as the starting point of limitation. Hence, Art. 96 was enacted in the new Act in the present form. But at the same time it was provided in clear terms by sec. 31 that the Act will not apply to the case of any suit in respect of which the period of limitation prescribed by Indian Limitation Act, 1908 expired before the commencement of this Act. While making a change in the law, the legislature thought it necessary to provide that suits which have already been barred by limitation under the Limitation Act, 1908 should not be allowed to be instituted taking advantage of the provisions of the new Act. We are therefore, of the view that as the suit was barred under the old Act, the new Act does not enable any suit to be instituted.

    9. We find that a similar view has been expressed in S.A 109/72 dated. 11-12-1972 by Sambasiva Rao, J. We agree with that view. As we have held that the suit is barred by limitation, the further question whether the alienation is supported by necessity or not, does not arise.

    10. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs throughout.

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    Comments

    C.V. Purushotham v. Chinna Jeeyangar Mutt, Tirupati
    (Nov 27, 1974)