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citation codes
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  • Rule 285-1 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules (in short, the Rules).
  • Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (for short High Court Rules)
  • Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules, the framers of the Rule
  • Sub-clause (iii) of Rule 285-1 of the Rules
  • Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules
  • ARTICLE 136 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • SECTION 111 COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • Section 219 of U. P. Land Revenue Act.
  • Rule 285-1 of the Rules
  • Rule 5 of the Rules
  • Uttar Pradesh Act
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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  • Rule 285-1 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules (in short, the Rules).
  • Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (for short High Court Rules)
  • Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules, the framers of the Rule
  • Sub-clause (iii) of Rule 285-1 of the Rules
  • Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules
  • ARTICLE 136 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • SECTION 111 COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • Section 219 of U. P. Land Revenue Act.
  • Rule 285-1 of the Rules
  • Rule 5 of the Rules
  • Uttar Pradesh Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Five special appeals were preferred against the judgment and order dated 27.4.2001 of a learned single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 16451 of 1999, Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut. The appeals were filed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, and by the auction-purchasers.

M/s Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. filed a writ petition seeking to quash: (a) the sale proclamation dated 28.3.1992; (b) the order dated 30.5.1992 of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Meerut, confirming the auction sale of the petitioner's properties; and (c) the order dated 5.4.1999 passed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, dismissing the petitioner's application under Rule 285-1 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules (the "Rules").

The underlying factual trigger was an application moved by the Secretary, Chini Mill Mazdor Hitkari Samiti, Meerut, before the Collector, Meerut, seeking recovery of certain amounts from the petitioner. The Collector initiated recovery proceedings for Rs. 75,99,445 as arrears of land revenue (salary, wages and gratuity of workmen). A sale proclamation was issued fixing 28.3.1992 for auction, an auction took place, and thereafter the petitioner filed an application under Rule 285-1 to set aside the auction sale; that application was rejected by the Commissioner on 5.4.1999. Several writ petitions and proceedings before the Board of Revenue also occurred; the learned single Judge ultimately allowed the writ petition and quashed the sale proclamation, the confirmation of sale and the Commissioner's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether special appeals under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 are maintainable against a judgment of a single Judge rendered in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution where the judgment relates to an order passed by the Commissioner under Rule 285-1 of the Rules.
  2. Whether the Commissioner, while deciding an application under Rule 285-1 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, functions as a "Court" or, at minimum, as a "Tribunal" for the purposes of Rule 5 (i.e., whether the order under Rule 285-1 has the character that bars a special appeal).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments (M/s Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd.)

  • A preliminary objection was raised that the special appeals were not maintainable because the subject-matter of the writ petition before the single Judge was an order passed by the Commissioner under Rule 285-1 of the Rules, and the Commissioner, while deciding that application, was acting as a Court. Counsel relied on the proposition that when a Court's or Tribunal's order is impugned under Article 226/227, no special appeal lies under Chapter VIII, Rule 5.

Appellants' Arguments (Commissioner and some auction-purchasers)

  • It was argued for some appellants that the view in the Full Bench decision (Ram Swaroop v. Board of Revenue) was incorrect. Specifically, the Commissioner, when entertaining an application under Rule 285-1 challenging an auction sale, does not function as a Court but exercises limited administrative or supervisory powers to set aside a sale for material irregularity or mistake in publishing or conducting it.
  • Learned counsel for appellants submitted that the Commissioner does not determine rights of the parties in the manner of a Court and thus should not be treated as sitting as a Court. Reliance was placed on Gouindbhai v. Gulam Abbas (AIR 1977 SC 1019) to support the limited nature of the Commissioner's jurisdiction and the contention that the Commissioner's role is different from that of a Court.
  • Accordingly, it was urged that special appeals under Rule 5 are maintainable in the present appeals.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Swaroop v. Board of Revenue, 1990 RD 291 (Full Bench) Held that Commissioner, when deciding under Rule 285-1, adjudicates rights in respect of immovable property and the proceedings are judicial in nature; Commissioner deemed to be sitting as a Court and orders are amenable to revisional jurisdiction of Board of Revenue. The court treated this Full Bench decision as binding and noted its conclusion that proceedings under Rule 285-1 are judicial; the decision was accepted as authority that the Commissioner functions as a Court (and at least as a Tribunal).
Gouindbhai v. Gulam Abbas, AIR 1977 SC 1019 Cited for the proposition that limited or supervisory powers (to set aside sale on irregularity) support the contention that a body may not be functioning as a Court. The appellants relied on this decision to argue that the Commissioner exercises limited powers and therefore should not be deemed to be functioning as a Court; the court recorded this reliance but did not accept it as overcoming the Full Bench authority.
Pratappur Sugar and Industries Ltd. v. Deputy Labour Commissioner, 2000 (4) AWC 2834 Considered the question of what constitutes a 'Tribunal' and the meaning of Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the High Court Rules; reproduced analysis and dictionary meanings and considered Article 136 jurisprudence. The court relied on the Division Bench reasoning in this case to apply the 'Tribunal' analysis and the Supreme Court tests to the present facts and Rule 5; paragraphs 7–12 were reproduced and applied.
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh, AIR 1950 SC 188 Held that the expression "Tribunal" in Article 136 can include adjudicating bodies constituted by the State and invested with judicial power (i.e., equivalent in scope to 'Court' for Article 136 purposes). The court cited this decision as part of the Supreme Court authorities that define 'Tribunal' and support applying Article 136 tests to determine whether an authority is a Tribunal for Rule 5 purposes.
Hari Nagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sunder, AIR 1961 SC 1669 Illustrates that bodies appointed by the State exercising appellate or adjudicatory powers can act as Tribunals and exercise judicial functions subject to Article 136 jurisdiction. Referred to as authority showing that entities exercising judicial powers, though not courts in the technical sense, are Tribunals and come within the scope of appellate jurisdiction under constitutional provisions.
Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 874 Explains distinction between 'Court' and 'Tribunal' and introduces the concept of "trappings of a Court" (powers to compel witnesses, administer oath, follow procedural rules, natural justice, decide on evidence) as tests for tribunal status. The court applied this test — examining whether proceedings before the Commissioner have the trappings of a Court — to conclude that the Commissioner at least functions as a Tribunal when deciding under Rule 285-1.
Associated Cement Companies v. P. N. Sharma and Anr., AIR 1965 SC 1595 Held that both Courts and Tribunals discharge judicial functions and the key test is whether a body is constituted by the State and clothed with State's judicial power to deal with disputes fairly and objectively. The court applied the Associated Cement principle as part of the Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine that the Commissioner had been conferred statutory authority and judicial power sufficient to make him at least a Tribunal.
Jai Prakash Agarwal v. Prescribed Authority, 1998 (4) AWC 10 : 1999 (1) UPLBEC 697 Used to show a consistent view that no special appeal lies where the single Judge's order was in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 in respect of judgments or orders of a Tribunal or Court. The court cited this as part of a line of authority supporting the proposition that special appeals are not maintainable in the circumstances described by Rule 5.
Rajni Kant Sahai v. State, 1998 (2) AWC 1295 Similar usage as other Allahabad High Court decisions indicating non-maintainability of special appeals where the impugned order is that of a Tribunal or Court. Cited as consistent precedent affirming the non-maintainability proposition under Rule 5.
Ram Kripal Singh v. U.P.S.R.T.C., 1999 (2) AWC 1147 : 1999 (2) UPLBEC 1617 Another decision relied upon to show the consistent approach that special appeals cannot lie against single Judge orders in the context of judgments/orders of Tribunals/Courts. Included among the line of authorities the court relied upon to support the non-maintainability conclusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a structured manner and relied primarily upon the language of Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules and Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting the word "Tribunal" in Article 136 to determine whether a special appeal was maintainable.

  1. The court identified the threshold provision: Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the High Court Rules precludes special appeal against a single Judge's judgment rendered in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 where the judgment relates to any judgment or order of a Tribunal or Court made under any State Act or Central Act in respect of State List or Concurrent List matters.
  2. The critical factual-legal question was whether the Commissioner's order under Rule 285-1 constituted a judgment or order of a "Court" or "Tribunal" such that the single Judge's decision quashing that order falls within Rule 5's bar on special appeals.
  3. The court observed that Ram Swaroop v. Board of Revenue (Full Bench) had already held that the Commissioner, when deciding under Rule 285-1, adjudicates rights and interests in immovable property, and the proceedings are judicial in nature; the Full Bench concluded the Commissioner would be deemed to be sitting in the Court and that the Commissioner's order is amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue.
  4. The court treated the Ram Swaroop Full Bench decision as binding. It then said that even if the Commissioner's role were characterized as that of a Tribunal rather than a Court, Rule 5 would still bar special appeals — so the Tribunal characterization was sufficient for the present purpose.
  5. To determine whether the Commissioner qualifies as a Tribunal, the court relied on established Supreme Court tests as expounded in authorities such as Durga Shankar Mehta, Engineering Mazdoor Sabha, Associated Cement, Hari Nagar Sugar Mills and others. The tests focus on:
    • whether the authority is constituted by the State;
    • whether it is clothed with the State's inherent judicial power to decide disputes between parties;
    • whether the authority has the "trappings of a Court" (procedural safeguards, ability to receive evidence, observe principles of natural justice, finality of decision etc.).
  6. Applying these principles to Rule 285-1, the court observed:
    • Power to set aside the sale is conferred upon the Commissioner by statutory provision (Rule 285-1), meaning the State vested the authority;
    • The Commissioner records findings after giving notice to the parties and an opportunity to adduce oral and documentary evidence;
    • Decisions must be consistent with natural justice and general principles of law;
    • Sub-clause (iii) of Rule 285-1 makes the Commissioner's order final, attaching finality to the decision.
  7. The court concluded that these factors show the proceedings before the Commissioner possess the trappings of a Court and that the Commissioner, while deciding under Rule 285-1, functions at least as a Tribunal. Because the single Judge's writ petition challenged the judgment or order of a Tribunal, Chapter VIII, Rule 5 barred the special appeals.
  8. The court expressly noted that it was not disputing the Full Bench in Ram Swaroop; rather, it conducted the Tribunal analysis to address the appellants' contention that even if the Commissioner was not a Court, he was not a Tribunal either — the court found such contention insufficient.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court held that the present special appeals are not maintainable and accordingly are DISMISSED AT THE ADMISSION STAGE.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The special appeals filed against the single Judge's judgment in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 16451 of 1999 were dismissed at the admission stage — the appellants may not proceed by special appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 in the circumstances described.
  • Scope: The court's determination rests on the conclusion that the Commissioner's proceedings under Rule 285-1 have the characteristics of a judicial body (at least a Tribunal) — therefore a single Judge's decision in respect of such a Tribunal's order is not subject to a special appeal under the cited Rule.
  • Precedential effect: The court applied and followed existing Full Bench and Supreme Court authorities; the opinion does not announce a novel legal principle beyond applying those authorities to the facts — the decision enforces the existing line of authority that bars special appeals in such circumstances.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what the opinion itself contains.

    Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut And Others v. M/S. Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut And Others

    1. These five special appeals have been preferred against the judgment and order dated 27.4.2001 of a learned single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 16451 of 1999, Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut. The appeals have been preferred by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, and also by the auction-purchasers.

    2. M/s. Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. filed the writ petition for quashing the sale proclamation dated 28.3.1992, the order dated 30.5.1992, passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Meerut, confirming the auction sale of the properties of the petitioner and the order dated 5.4.1999 passed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, dismissing the application filed by the petitioner under Rule 285-1 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules (in short, the Rules).

    3. The Secretary, Chini Mill Mazdor Hitkari Samiti, Meerut, moved an application before the Collector, Meerut, for recovery of certain amount from M/s. Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. The Collector, Meerut, initiated proceedings for recovery of Rs. 75,99,445 towards salary, wages and gratuity of the workmen as arrears of land revenue. A sale proclamation fixing 28.3.1992 for auction of the properties was issued and thereafter auction was held. The petitioner then filed an application before the Commissioner, Meerut under Rule 285-1 of the Rules for setting aside the auction-sale, which was rejected on 5.4.1999. During this period several writ petitions were filed and proceedings before the Board of Revenue also took place, details of which have been given by the learned single Judge in the impugned order. However, they are not very relevant for deciding the special appeals. The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the sale proclamation dated 28.3.1992, the order dated 30.5.1992, by which auction sale was confirmed and the order dated 5.4.1999 passed by the Commissioner under Rule 285-1 of the Rules.

    4. Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned senior counsel for the respondent, M/s. Jaswant Sugar Mill Ltd. has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal. Learned counsel has submitted that the subject matter of challenge in the writ petition before the learned single Judge was an order passed by the Commissioner under Rule 285-1 of the Rules, and as he was acting as a Court, while deciding the said application, the special appeals filed under Chapter VIII. Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules are not maintainable.

    5. The provision for special appeal is contained in Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (for short High Court Rules) and in view of the language of the Rule, no special appeal is maintainable against the judgment of a single Judge rendered in exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment or order of a Tribunal or Court made or purported to be made in exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. In terms of the language of the Rule, the present special appeal will not be maintainable if the judgment and order assailed in the writ petition was given by a Court or Tribunal. This view has been consistently taken by this Court (See Jai Prakash Agarwal v. Prescribed Authority, 1998 (4) AWC 10 : 1999 (1) UPLBEC 697 ; Rajni Kant Sahai v. State, 1998 (2) AWC 1295 and Ram. Kripal Singh v. U.P.S.R.T.C., 1999 (2) AWC 1147 : 1999 (2) UPLBEC 1617). Therefore, the question which requires consideration is what is the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Commissioner under Rule 285-1 of the Rules and whether he functions as a Court or Tribunal.

    6. The question whether the Commissioner functions as a Court while deciding the application under Rule 285-1 of the Rules was examined by a Full Bench in Ram Swaroop v. Board of Revenue, 1990 RD 291, and it was held as under :

    "Rule 285-1 as extracted above indicates that the Commissioner is to adjudicate certain rights and interest of the parties in respect of Immovable property.

    The order so passed by the Commissioner has been made final. Obviously the proceedings so taken by the Commissioner are judicial in nature. Though it could be said that the Commissioner is not sitting as a Court to decide the same, and there is no specific provision in this behalf, the Commissioner will be deemed to be sitting in the Court and the order passed by the Commissioner will be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue under Section 333 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act which is analogous to Section 219 of U. P. Land Revenue Act.

    The Commissioner while deciding the objection under Rule 285-1 of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Rules will be a 'Court' as such and the proceedings taken before him will be deemed judicial proceedings as such and the Commissioner who otherwise is a Court under U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act will be deemed to be a Court."

    7. Sri Ravi Kant, learned senior advocate appearing for some of the appellants, has submitted that the view taken in Ram Swaroop v. Board of Revenue (supra) is not correct and the Commissioner while hearing an application under Rule 285-1 of the Rules against an auction sale of the property does not function as a Court. Learned counsel has submitted that the rule confers powers upon the Commissioner to set aside the sale on the ground of some material irregularity or mistake in publishing or conducting it and, therefore, he exercises very limited jurisdiction which is vastly different from the jurisdiction exercised by a Court. It has been urged that as the rights of the parties are not determined by the Commissioner, he cannot be held to be functioning as Court. Reliance in support of this submission is placed upon Gouindbhai v. Gulam Abbas, AIR 1977 SC 1019 (Para 13). Learned standing counsel has supported the contention of Shri Ravi Kant and has urged that the Commissioner does not function as a Court and, therefore, the special appeals are maintainable.

    8. The decision in Ram Swaroop v. Board of Revenue (supra), has been rendered by a Full Bench of three Judges and, therefore, the same is absolutely binding upon us. Even if we accept the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that the Commissioner does not function as a Court but functions as a Tribunal, it will not make any difference as to the maintainability of the appeal.

    9. The question what are the attributers of a Tribunal and whether special appeal would be maintainable against the judgment of a single Judge wherein the subject-matter of challenge was an order passed by a Tribunal, was considered in considerable detail by one of us (G. P. Mathur, J.) in a Division Bench Judgment rendered in Pratappur Sugar and Industries Ltd. v. Deputy Labour Commissioner, 2000 (4) AWC 2834, and paragraphs 7 to 12 thereof are being reproduced below :

    "Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules provides that no special appeal shall lie against the judgment and order of one Judge in exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of any Judgment and order or award of a Tribunal. The word Tribunal is not defined in the High Court Rules and therefore, it will be useful to notice its meaning as given in the dictionaries which is as under :

    Wharton's Law Lexicon A seat of justice.

    Webster's Third New International Dictionary A Court or forum of Justice ; a person or body of persons having authority to hear and decide disputes so as to bind disputants ;

    something that decides or judges something that determines or directs a judgment or course of action.

    The new Lexicon Webster's Dictionary A group of persons empowered to decide a specific issue according to the law, arbitrator in a dispute, etc. Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of Current English Language Place of Judgment, board of officials or Judges appointed for special duty, e.g., to hear appeal against high rank, for exemption from military service.

    Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English A group of people appointed officially, Judges etc, with powers to deal with special matters.

    The dictionary meaning shows that Tribunal is a body authorised by law to decide disputes and impart justice. Article 136 of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court may, in its discretion grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any case or matter passed or made by any Court or Tribunal. The Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, have been made by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in exercise of powers conferred under Article 225 of the Constitution and all other powers enabling it in that behalf. It appears logical that while using the expression "judgment, order or award of Tribunal or Court" in Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules, the framers of the Rule had in their mind the language used in Article 136 of the Constitution. It will, therefore, be useful to refer to the decisions of the Supreme Court wherein the question as what is a Tribunal has been considered.

    In Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Stngh, AIR 1950 SC 188, it was held that the expression "Tribunal" as used in Article 136 of the Constitution of India meant the same thing as Court but includes within its ambit adjudicating bodies, provided they are constituted by State and are invested with judicial power as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions.

    In Hari Nagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sunder, AIR 1961 SC 1669, it was held that the Central Government exercising appellate powers under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956, even before it was amended by act 65 of 1960 act as a Tribunal exercising judicial functions and is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Hidayatullah, J., who gave the minority opinion, was of the view that by "Courts" is meant courts of civil jurisdiction and by "Tribunal" those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. It was further observed that among the powers of the State included power to decide such controversies which is called judicial power of the State and in exercise of this power, there is a clear division and broadly speaking certain special matters go before Tribunal and the residue goes to the ordinary courts of civil judicature. The same controversy was examined in great detail in a Constitution Bench decision in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 874 (Para 6) and what will constitute a Tribunal was explained in following words :

    ".............The expression "a Court" in the technical sense is a Tribunal constituted by the State as a part of ordinary hierarchy of Courts which are invested with the State's inherent judicial powers. The Tribunal as distinguished from the Court, exercises judicial powers and decides matters brought before it judicially or quasi-judicially, but it does not constitute a Court in the technical sense. The Tribunal, according to the dictionary meaning, is a seat of justice ; and in the discharge of its functions, it shares some of the characteristics of the Court. .............. The Tribunals which are contemplated by Article 136(1) are clothed with some of the powers of the Courts. They can compel witnesses to appear, they can administer oath. they are required to follow certain rules of procedure ; the proceedings before them are required to comply with rules of natural justice, they may not be bound by the strict and technical rules of evidence, but, nevertheless, they must decide on evidence adduced before them ; they may not be bound by other technical rules of law, but their decisions must, nevertheless, be consistent with the general principles of law. In other words, they have to act judicially and reach their decisions in an objective manner and they cannot proceed purely administratively or base their conclusions on subjective tests or inclinations. The procedural rules which regulate the proceedings before the Tribunals and the powers conferred on them in dealing with matters brought before them, are sometimes described as the 'trappings of a Court* and in determining the question as to whether a particular body or authority is a Tribunal or not, sometimes a rough and ready test is applied by enquiring whether the said body or authority is clothed with the trappings of a Court."

    In Para 8, it was observed as follows :

    ...........It would thus be noticed that apart from the importance of the trappings of a Court, the basic and essential condition which makes an authority or a body a Tribunal under Article 136, is that it should be constituted by the State and should be invested with the State's inherent judicial power......

    The same question was again examined by a Constitution Bench in Associated Cement Companies v. P. N. Sharma and Anr., AIR 1965 SC 1595, wherein, it was held as follows :

    "Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution ; but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to Tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the Tribunals and the Courts, and features which are distinct and separate. The basic and the fundamental features which is common to both the Courts and the Tribunals Is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign State.

    In considering the question about the status of any body or authority as a Tribunal under Article 136(1) the main test to be applied is whether the body or authority has been constituted by the State and has been clothed with the State's inherent judicial power to deal with disputes between parties and determine them on the merits fairly and objectively."

    10. The test applied by the Supreme Court in determining whether any body or authority has the status of a Tribunal for the purpose of Article 136(1) of the Constitution can safely be applied while interpreting Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. Therefore, what Is to be seen is whether the judgment or order which was subject matter of challenge in the writ petition filed under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution had been given by a body or authority which had been constituted by the State and had been clothed with the State's inherent judicial power to deal with disputes between the parties and to determine them on merits, fairly and objectively.

    11. Applying the test laid down above, it will be clear that the power to set aside the sale has been conferred upon the Commissioner by statutory provision, namely, Rule 285-1 of the Rules. Therefore, it is the State which has conferred the authority upon the Commissioner to determine and adjudicate upon the proper conduct of the auction sale. The Commissioner records findings after giving notice to the parties and giving them opportunity of adducing oral and documentary evidence. The controversy is decided fairly and objectively on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties. The decision taken has to be consistent with the principles of natural justice and general principles of law. Sub-clause (iii) of Rule 285-1 of the Rules lays down that the order passed by the Commissioner under this rule shall be final, and thus a finality is attached to the decision. The proceedings before the Commissioner have, therefore, "trappings of Court". All these factors lead to irresistible conclusion that the Commissioner while deciding a dispute under Rule 285-1 of the Rules at least functions as a Tribunal. Since the subject-matter of challenge before the learned single Judge in the writ petition was a judgment or order of a Tribunal, the present special appeals are not maintainable.

    12. We may clarify here that while making the observations as above, we are not doubting the correctness of the view taken in the Full Bench decision rendered in Ram Swaroop v. Board of Revenue (supra). We have gone into the question whether the Commissioner can be said to be a Tribunal only for the limited purpose that even if the argument of learned counsel for some of the appellants is accepted that he does not function as a Court, even then the special appeal would not be maintainable.

    13. For the reasons discussed above, we are clearly of the opinion that the present special appeals are not maintainable and are accordingly dismissed at the admission stage.

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