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  • provisions of Ss. 144-A and 144-B of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • S. 13(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
  • S. 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • FINANCE ACT 1972
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • provisions of Ss. 144-A and 144-B of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • S. 13(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
  • S. 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • FINANCE ACT 1972
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a reference under S. 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 addressed by B.P. Jeevan Reddy, C.J. Eleven questions were referred to the Court: eight by Revenue and three by the assessee. The assessee is a trust formed by an instrument dated 24-1-1944 claiming to be a religious and charitable trust; its objects are set out in Clause 2 of the deed (sub-clauses (a)–(k)), including Clause 2(h) which concerns industrial homes and training in handicrafts.

The assessment years in question are A.Y. 1972–73 and A.Y. 1973–74 (previous years being calendar years 1971 and 1972 respectively). For A.Y. 1972–73 the I.T.O. assessed total income at Rs. 2,64,670 after adding back amounts under sections 11–13; the assessee appealed and the matter went to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (A.A.C.) and then to the Tribunal. For both years the I.T.O. followed the S. 144-B procedure (draft order, objections, referral to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner (I.A.C.) who gave directions). After directions by the I.A.C. and completion of assessments under that procedure, the I.T.O determined incomes at Rs. 8,61,690 (one year) and Rs. 36,50,739 (the other year).

The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeals and dismissed Revenue's appeals by an order dated 27-9-1977. Revenue filed an application for rectification under S. 254(2), which was dismissed on 22-12-1979. Both parties then obtained the present reference to the Court. The Court proceeded to answer the referred questions individually.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the I.A.C. was competent under Ss. 144-A and 144-B to give directions to the I.T.O. in the manner he did (Revenue's Question No.1).
  2. Whether Clause 2(h) of the Deed of Trust dated 24-1-1944 is of charitable nature (Revenue's Question No.2).
  3. Whether donations made by the assessee-trust to other charitable trusts are caught by S. 11(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (Revenue's Question No.3).
  4. Whether the authors/trustees had substantial interest in M/s. J.K. Commercial Corporation (Revenue's Question No.4).
  5. Whether interest/rent received by the assessee from various concerns was inadequate within the meaning of S. 13(2)(a) (Revenue's Question No.5).
  6. Whether shares of M/s. J.K. Synthetics Ltd. received earlier by the trust are hit by S. 13(2)(h) (Revenue's Question No.6).
  7. Whether transactions in shares by the assessee disentitle it from being a charitable institution under S. 2(15) (Revenue's Question No.7).
  8. Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding there was no mistake apparent on the face of the record in its order dated 27-9-1977 (Revenue's Question No.8).
  9. Whether the Tribunal erred by not adjudicating issues relating to the I.T.O.'s jurisdiction to consider three new issues in reassessment (Assessee's Question No.1).
  10. Whether the I.T.O. exceeded jurisdiction in considering and adjudicating three new issues relating to eligibility for exemption when those issues were neither part of original assessment nor directions by the Appellate Authority (Assessee's Question No.2).
  11. Whether the second proviso to S. 13(1)(c) saved transactions made before 1st June, 1979 from disability under S. 13(2)(h) (Assessee's Question No.3).

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Contentions

  • Under Question 1: The I.A.C. had power under S. 144-A to call for records and issue directions; therefore his opinion/instruction (including on Clause 2(h)) was within his powers despite not being part of the draft assessment order or the assessee's objections.
  • Under Question 2 & related: Clause 2(h) was open to interpretation that it might not be charitable (implicit in Revenue challenging Tribunal's interpretation).
  • Under Question 3: Donations made to other charitable trusts by the assessee might be hit by S. 11(3) (i.e., could amount to application of income to purposes other than charitable or might otherwise cause loss of exemption).
  • Under Question 4: The shareholding of two persons (Purshottam Das Singhania and Balkrishna Singhania) held for and on behalf of the trust should be included when determining "substantial interest" in J.K. Commercial Corporation.
  • Under Question 5: Any interest below nine per cent should be deemed inadequate (contention that loans charged at 6% were inadequate).
  • Under Question 6: Bonus shares issued should be treated as investments, and because J.K. Synthetics was controlled by authors of the trust, the bonus shares fall within S. 13(2)(h).

Assessee's Contentions

  • Under Question 1: The I.A.C.'s opinion on Clause 2(h) went beyond the scope of the draft assessment order and the assessee's objections and thus the I.A.C. acted beyond powers conferred by S. 144-B(4); the I.A.C. should have given notice and heard the assessee under S. 144-A if invoking that power.
  • Under Question 2: Clause 2(h) should be read in the context of the entire objects clause and understood as providing training and stipends rather than regular wages or a commercial business — hence charitable.
  • Under Question 3: Contributions to other charitable trusts fall within the trust's powers (sub-clause (k)) and are applications to charitable purposes; thus such donations are not applications to non-charitable purposes under S. 11(3).
  • Under Question 4 & 6 & 7: Various factual contentions that shareholdings were not substantial (13% found), bonus shares are not fresh investments but an accretion to existing holding, and limited share dealings were changes of investment rather than business.
  • On applicability of amended S. 12 to A.Y. 1973–74: The assessee's counsel argued that the amended S. 12 should not apply to the assessee's relevant previous year and thus might not apply to A.Y. 1973–74; the Court rejected that contention.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raliance v. C.I.T., (1979) 120 ITR 921 : 1980 Tax LR 8 (SC) Authority on the unit for applying the Income-tax Act and the relation between "previous year" and "assessment year" (showing previous year may differ and interpretation of applicability of amendments). The Court relied upon this decision (as cited in the opinion) to reject the assessee's contention that the substituted S. 12 (effective 1-4-1973) did not apply to the assessee's assessment year; it supported the proposition that assessment year is the unit of application and earlier previous year constructs do not prevent application of the amended provision to the relevant assessment year.
C.I.T. v. Isthmian, (1951) 20 ITR 572 : AIR 1953 SC 439 Authority illustrating that the previous year may differ from assessee to assessee and on temporal application of tax law provisions (used together with other decisions to support the unit of assessment year principle). Used by the Court (along with other decisions) to demonstrate that the amended S. 12 applied as of 1-4-1973 for the relevant assessment year; the Court relied on these authorities to dismiss the specific argument that the substitution did not cover the assessee's case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed each referred question and explained its reasoning as follows:

Question 1 (I.A.C.'s competence under Ss. 144-A and 144-B)

The Court examined S. 144-B(4), which permits the I.A.C. to issue directions only "in respect of the matters covered by the objections" after considering the draft order and objections and after giving the assessee an opportunity to be heard for directions prejudicial to the assessee. The Court held that while S. 144-A independently confers power on the I.A.C. to call for records and issue directions, that power is separate and, if invoked, requires that the I.A.C. give notice and an opportunity to the assessee to be heard before issuing such directions.

Because the I.A.C. expressed an opinion on Clause 2(h) without notice and hearing under S. 144-A, and because the opinion went beyond the draft order and the assessee's objections, the Court agreed with the Tribunal that the I.A.C. had exceeded his powers. The Court therefore answered Question 1 in favour of the assessee.

Question 2 (Interpretation of Clause 2(h))

Clause 2(h) authorises the trustees to establish industrial homes to teach arts and handicrafts to unemployed persons and to make provision for payment to them. The Court held the clause's primary purpose is imparting training; the payments contemplated are in the nature of stipends, not regular wages or running a commercial business. The Court emphasised that Clause 2(h) must be read with the deed's other objects and interpreted in light of the totality of the objects. On that basis, Clause 2(h) is charitable.

Question 3 (Whether donations to other charitable trusts are hit by S. 11(3))

The Court first summarised S. 11(1)–(3) and the two versions of S. 12 (pre-1-4-1973 and substituted as from 1-4-1973). It analysed two factual categories: (a) contributions made out of income accumulated under S. 11(2); and (b) contributions made out of voluntary contributions received by the assessee-trust.

For (a), the Court agreed with the Tribunal that contributing to other charitable trusts is within the trustees’ powers (relying on Clause 2(k) of the trust deed) and that such contributions, absent allegations of device or mala fides, do not amount to applying income to non-charitable purposes under S. 11(3).

For (b), the Court examined both pre-amendment and post-amendment S. 12 and concluded that in either formulation voluntary contributions intended for charitable purposes are to be treated for S. 11 purposes as income devoted to charitable purposes and, therefore, contributions by the assessee-trust to other charitable trusts are not to be treated as non-charitable application under S. 11(3).

The Court also addressed an incidental argument by the assessee that the substituted S. 12 (effective 1-4-1973) did not apply to A.Y. 1973–74; the Court rejected this, stating that the unit for applying the Act is the assessment year and relying on prior decisions to support the proposition. Consequently, the Court answered Question 3 in favour of the assessee.

Question 4 (Substantial interest in J.K. Commercial Corporation)

The Tribunal had detailed the shareholding and found the authors/trustees held only 13% which, in light of Explanation 3 to S. 13(4), is below the 20% threshold for "substantial holding." The Court agreed with the Tribunal and with the A.A.C.'s rejection of Revenue's attempt to aggregate other persons' shares held for the trust. The Court answered Question 4 in favour of the assessee.

Question 5 (Adequacy of interest/rent under S. 13(2)(a))

The Court reviewed facts: loans at 6% (rising to 7½% in the later calendar year) and a lease of Kamla Castle at Rs. 1,250/month. The Tribunal concluded the loans were secured and the difference in rate was meagre, so interest was not inadequate. For Kamla Castle the Tribunal noted the property was donated in the relevant previous year and its balance-sheet value and seasonal nature of hill-station rentals; therefore the rent was not necessarily inadequate. The Court found no infirmity in those findings and answered Question 5 in favour of the assessee.

Question 6 (Bonus shares and S. 13(2)(h))

The I.T.O. said bonus shares should be treated as an investment falling within S. 13(2)(h) because J.K. Synthetics was controlled by authors of the trust. The Tribunal found issuance of bonus shares cannot be treated as a new investment and that the transaction was bona fide; the Court agreed with the Tribunal and answered Question 6 in favour of the assessee.

Question 7 (Share dealings as business under S. 2(15))

The Tribunal found that the share dealings were changes of investment by a prudent person and not business activities; the Court accepted this unchallenged finding and therefore did not consider whether carrying on business would have caused the trust to cease being charitable. Question 7 was answered in favour of the assessee.

Question 8 (Rectification application)

The Tribunal's final order following the opinion of the third member was not challenged before the Court by Revenue; accordingly, Question 8 was answered in favour of the assessee.

Assessee's three referred questions

The Court recorded the assessee's concession that its three referred questions raised minor issues and therefore declined to answer them.

Holding and Implications

The Court resolved the referred questions largely in favour of the assessee and against Revenue. The substantive answers given by the Court (as expressed in the opinion) may be summarized as:

  • Question 1: Answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee — the I.A.C. acted beyond power in giving directions/opinions without notice/hearing under S. 144-A when those directions were outside the matters covered by the objections under S. 144-B(4).
  • Question 2: Clause 2(h) is charitable — answered in favour of the assessee.
  • Question 3: Donations to other charitable trusts are not hit by S. 11(3); answered in favour of the assessee.
  • Question 4: No substantial interest in J.K. Commercial Corporation — in favour of the assessee.
  • Question 5: Interest/rent held not to be inadequate — in favour of the assessee.
  • Question 6: Bonus shares not treated as an investment falling under S. 13(2)(h) — in favour of the assessee.
  • Question 7: Share dealings were changes of investment, not business — in favour of the assessee.
  • Question 8: Tribunal's rectification order correctness stands — in favour of the assessee.
  • Assessee's 3 questions: Declined to be answered as minor; the Court did not adjudicate them further.

Final disposition: The Court disposed of the reference accordingly and ordered that there shall be no order as to costs.

Implications: The decision resolves the referred factual and legal issues between the parties in the assessee's favour on the questions considered. The opinion does not purport to create an expansive new principle beyond its application to the issues before the Court; the Court did not state that it was laying down a novel precedent beyond applying existing statutory interpretation and authorities cited.

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax (Central) v. J.K. Charitable Trust

    B.P Jeevan Reddy, C.J:— In this reference made under S. 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as many as eleven questions are stated, eight at the instance of Revenue and three at the instance of the assessee. The questions referred at the instance of Revenue are:—

    “1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and on the input of the provisions of Ss. 144-A and 144-B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the I.A.C was not competent to give directions to the I.T.O in the manner he did?

    2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the object CI. 2(h) of the Deed of Trust dated 24-1-1944 is of charitable nature?

    3. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the donations made to other charitable trusts would be hit by the provisions of S. 11(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

    4. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the authors of the trust and/or its trustees had substantial interest in M/s. J.K Commercial Corporation?

    5. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the interest/rent received by the assessee from various concerns was not adequate within the meaning of S. 13(2)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

    6. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the shares of M/s. J.K Synthetics Ltd., received by the assessee trust in earlier years would not be hit by the provisions of S. 13(2)(h) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

    7. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the transactions carried on by the assessee in shares would disentitle the assessee from being treated as Charitable Institution within the meaning of S. 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

    8. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified is law in holding that there is no mistake apparent on the face of the record in its order dated 27-9-1977?”

    2. The three questions referred at the instance of the assessee read thus:—

    “1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in law in not adjudicating upon the issues as specifically raised and pleaded on behalf of the assessee trust regarding the lack of jurisdiction of I.T.O in considering three new issues during re-assessment proceedings, although the said issues were neither considered in the relevant original assessment nor were the subject matter of directions by the Appellate Authority, while setting aside the original assessment?

    2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and having regard to the relevant directions contained in the Appellate Order remanding the asstt. proceedings to the I.T.O, the I.T.O exceeded his jurisdiction in considering and adjudicating upon three new issues relating to the eligibility of the Trust for exemption, although the said issues were neither considered in the relevant original assessment or were the subject matter of directions by the Appellate Authority while setting aside the said original assessment?

    3. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case; the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the second proviso to S. 13(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 did not save the transactions for use or application of funds made before 1st June, 1979, from the disability arising under S. 13(2)(h) of the said Act?”

    3. The assessee Ls a trust. The asessment years concerned are 1972–73 and 1973–74. Calendar years 1971 and 1972 were respectively ‘the previous years’. The assessee trust was created by an instrument of trust executed on 24-1-1944. The assessee claims to be a religious and charitable trust. The objects of the trust are’ found in CI. 2 of the deed of trust. It reads thus:—

    (a) The construction of temples, Dharmshalas and chotras, wells, school building and building or structures of the similar nature whether temporary or permanent and making provisions for their equipment, upkeep and maintenance.

    (b) The promotion of education of poor and deserving students including grant of prizes, scholarships, studentship to students of any school, college, or other institutions.

    (c) Construction and/or establishment of school, colleges and/or other educational institutions, hostels for students and making provisions for their equipment, upkeep and maintenance.

    (d) Grant-in-aid to schools, colleges and/or educational institutions.

    (e) To bind as apprentices to any profession trade, industry or manufacture, poor and deserving youths on payment of such minimum and such terms and conditions as the trustees may deem fit.

    (f) To give loans to poor and deserving students to enable, them to prosecute their studies in Europe, America, India or elsewhere in such subject and for such period as the trustees may think fit and on such terms as to repayment of the loan in such instalments, at such rate of interest or without interest or otherwise and subject: to such provisions and conditions as the Trustees may deem fit.

    (g) To establish, erect, fit up and furnish one or more polytechnic institutes or institutes for the training of youngmen in the technical, mechancial scientific and other pursuits as the Trustees may determine and to make provision for their upkeep and maintenance.

    (h) The establishment, equipment, upkeep and maintenance of industrial homes for men as well as women out of employment for teaching them all such arts, handicrafts and home industries including carpentty, joinery, designing, drawing, painting, cane-work, carpet making, spinning, weaving, laundary work, dry-cleaning, cooking, confectionary, “knitting, sewing, embroidery and such other industries as the Trustees may deem fit and making provision for payment to them daily, weekly or monthly such wage or remuneration according to place, work or otherwise as the trustees may determine.

    (i) Provision of medical relief for the poor including construction, equipment, upkeep and maintenance of dispensaries, and hospitals, including maternity hospital for the poor and free anti-natal and post-natal or other medical help or advice and treatment as the Trustees may determine.

    (j) The establishment, upkeep and maintenance of rent free houses for poor and incapacitated persons, the supply of necessaries to the poor and the incapacitated, giving of alms to them and for their general benefit as the trustees may from time to time determine.

    (k) And generally for the benefit of the poor and the incapacitated and/or such deserving persons including the marriage of poor women and the advancement of any other object or general public utility as the trustees may in their absolute discretion deem fit and in such way as they may consider most advantageous to the recipients.

    4. For A.Y 1972–73. the assessee filed a return declaring an income of Rs. 2,499.27 P. For the rest of the income, it claimed exemption under S. 11. The I.T.O, however, added back Several amounts under the provisions of Ss. 11 to 13 and assessed the income at Rs. 2,64,670.00. The assessee filed an appeal, which was allowed in part. The A.A.C remitted the matter to the I.T.O with certain directions. The assessee carried the matter in further appeal to the Tribunal, which was allowed and the order of the A.A.C was set aside. The matter, however, was remitted to the I.T.O On this occasion, the I.T.O prepared a draft of the proposed order of assessment, as contemplated by S. 144-B(1), invited, the assessee's objections and forwarded the draft and the objections of the assessee to the I.A.C The I.A.C heard the assessee and gave certain directions, in accordance with which the I.T.O completed the assessment whereunder he determined the total income of the assessee at Rs. 8,61,690.00.

    5. With respect to A.Y 1973–74, the proceedings followed practically the same course. In this proceedings too, S. 144-B was followed and assessment completed, determining the assessee's income at Rs. 36,50,739.00.

    6. The assessee preferred appeals against both the asessment orders, which were disposed of by a common order dated 10-2-1977 by the A.A.C, allowing the appeals in part, which resulted in both the Revenue and the assessee filing appeals to the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeals preferred by the assessee and dismissed the appeals filed by Revenue by its order dated 27-9-1977. Thereafter an application for rectification was filed under S. 254(2) by Revenue, which was ultimately dismissed on 22-12-1979. It is then that both Revenue and the assessee applied for and obtained this reference. We shall proceed to deal with each of the questions separately.

    Question No. 1:

    7. While narrating the facts, we have mentioned the fact that with respect to both the assessment years, the I.T.O followed the procedure prescribed by S. 144-B. As required by the said Section, he presented a draft assessment order, invited the objections of the assessee and forwarded both of them to the I.A.C The I.A.C heard the assessee and gave certain directions. While giving these directions, the I.A.C appears to have opined that CI. 2(h) of the objectives of the Trust cannot be said to be charitable. The objection of the assessee to this opinion was that it was beyond the purview of draft assessment order and the objections of the assessee and hence the I.A.C acted beyond his powers in expressing the said opinion. The Revenue, however, relied upon the provisions contained in S. 144-A to sustain the said opinion or instruction, as it may be called. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that the I.A.C had no jurisdiction to give any instructions, which were beyond the purview of the draft assessment order and the objections filed by the assessee.

    8. In our opinion, the Tribunal was right:

    Sub-section (4) of S. 144-B read as follows:—

    “144-B(4) if any objections are received the Income-tax Officer shall forward the draft order together with the objections to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner shall, after considering the draft order and the objections and after going through (wherever necessary) the records relating to the draft order, issue, in respect of the matters covered by the objections, such directions as he thinks fit for the guidance of the Income-tax Officer to enable him to complete the assessment.

    Provided that no directions which are prejudicial to the assessee shall be issued under this sub-section before an opportunity is given to the assessee to be heard.”

    9. So far as reliance upon S. 144-A is concerned, it undoubtedly confers upon the I.A.C power to call for and examine record of any proceeding relating to a pending assessment and issue appropriate directions for the guidance of the I.T.O But, this is an independent power and if the I.A.C wanted to invoke this power and give a particular direction (with respect to interpretation of CI. 2(h) of the objectives of the trust), he ought to have given the assessee a notice about it and heard it in that behalf before giving any such directions. Since he has not done that, the said opinion or instructions, as it may be called, cannot be sustained Question No. 1 (referred at the instance of Revenue) is accordingly answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against Revenue.

    Question No. 2:

    10. This question relates to interpretation of Cl. 2(h) of the deed of trust. We have already set out Cl. 2. Cl. (h) empowers the trustees to establish, equip and maintain industrial homes for teaching unemployed persons arts like handicraft and other home industries and to make provision for payment to them daily, weekly or monthly, such wages or remuneration as the trustees may determine on the basis of place, work or otherwise. The main idea underlying the clause is to impart training (teaching) in arts and handicraft to unemployed men and women. No doubt, the clause provides for payment for such work, but in the context, it must be understood as a payment in the nature of a stipend. It cannot be equated to regular wages, nor can the said clause be understood as establishment of a regular unit engaged in business in the said arts and handicrafts. As rightly pointed out by the Tribunal, CI. 2(h) should not be read in isolation, but must be read along with other objects and interpreted having regard to the totality of the objects. The second question is accordingly answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against Revenue.

    11. Question No. 3 is the most important question, which we shall take up after we deal with other questions.

    Question No. 4:

    12. This question raises the issue whether the authors of the trust and/or the trustees had substantial interest in M/s. J.K Commercial Corporation. The Tribunal has set out in detail the shareholding of each of the authors of the trust and/or the trustees and has found that their share holding in J.K Commercial Corporation is only 13 per cent. According to Explanation 3 to S. 13(4), the share holding must be 20 per cent to become a substantial holding. The Department's contention was that shares held by two other persons Purshottam Das Singhania and Balkrishna Singhania for and on behalf of the assessee trust should also be taken into account, which was negatived by the A.A.C and the Tribunal, and, in our opinion, rightly. This question is accordingly answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

    Question No. 5:

    13. This question arises with reference to CI. (a) of subsec. (2) of S. 13. The issue is whether the interest/rent charged by the assessee-trust on loans advanced and buildings leased out to certain concerns are hit by the said provision on the ground that the interest/rent charged is not adequate. Our attention was invited to the loans advanced to three companies in interest at the rate of six per cent. The Revenue's contention was that any interest below nine per cent must be deemed to be inadequate. The Tribunal, however, found that they were secured loans and though the rate of interest during the calendar year 1971 was six per cent, during the calendar year 1972 interest paid by the borrowers was 7½ per cent. Having regard to the facts of the case before them and the meagre difference between the interest actually charged and the interest which ought to have been charged, the Tribunal held that the interest charged was not inadequate. So far as the lease-rent of the building is concerned, it is brought to our notice that the property called ‘Kamla Castle’, Mussoorie, was leased out at a meagre rent of Rs. 1,250/- per month. It was submitted that it is a big bunglow at an important hill station and, therefore, the rent stipulated must be deemed to be inadequate. The Tribunal, however, pointed out that this property was donated by Sri Padam Pat Singhania in the ‘previous year’ relevant to A.Y 1971–72 and its value, as per the balance-sheet, was Rs. 2,86,347/-. The Tribunal also took into consideration the fact that properties in hill stations do not fetch income throughout the year but only during the tourist season. Accordingly, it held that the rent charged cannot be said to be inadquate. We are unable to see that the said finding is open to objection in any manner. Question No. 5 is accordingly answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

    Question No. 6:

    14. It appears that certain shares of J.K Synthetics Ltd. were donated to the assessee trust. They were 40,000 in number, J.K Synthetics Ltd. appears to have issued bonus shares, 20,000 in number, The I.T.O was of the opinion that value of the bonus shares should be deemed to be an investment and as J.K Synthetics Ltd. was controlled by the authors of the assessee trust, the transactions fall within the mischief of S. 13(2)(h) of the Act. This view of the I.T.O was repelled by the Tribunal and here again we agree with it. The issuance of bonus shares cannot be treated as an investment by the assessee trust. It is not suggested that it was a bogus plea or that it was not a bona fide transaction. Question No. 6 is accordingly answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

    Question No. 7:

    15. It was found by the Tribunal that a few dealings in shares entered into by the assessee were not by way of business, but it was only a case of change of investment as would have been done by any other wise and prudent person. This finding of the Tribunal has not been seriously challenged before us and we accept the same. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the trust ceased to be a religious/charitable trust in case it carries on business. Question No. 7 is accordingly answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against Revenue.

    Question No. 8:

    16. This question relates to correctness of the order passed by the Tribunal on the rectification application. The final order passed by the Tribunal, following the opinion of the third member, has not been challenged before us by the learned standing counsel for Revenue. Accordingly, we answer question No. 8 in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against Revenue.

    17. So far as the three questions referred at the instance of the assessee are concerned, it is conceded before us by the learned counsel for the assessee that these questions raise minor issues and need not be gone into by us. Accordingly, we decline to answer these three questions.

    18. We shall now take up question No. 3 referred at the instance of Revenue, which was the main question canvassed before us. Before we take up the question proper, it would be appropriate to briefly notice the relevant provisions of the Act, as they stood at the relevant time. S. 11(1) provided, inter alia, that income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable/religious purposes shall not be included in the total income, to the extent to which the said income is applied to charitable/religious purposes in India Sub-sec. (2) of S. 11 provided that even if the income is not so applied but is accumulated or set apart for application to such purposes in India, even then it shall be exempt, provided certain conditions specified in the sub-section are complied with. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 11 then said that in case any income referred to in sub-sec. (2) is applied to purposes other than charitable or religious purposes or ceases to be accumulated or set apart for application to such purposes, it shall cease to be exempt and shall be included in the income of the previous year, in which it is so applied for other purposes or ceases to be accumulated or set apart for application to such purposes. S. 12, as it obtained prior to 1-4-1973, contained two sub-sections. Under sub-sec. (1), any income of a trust created for charitable/religious purposes, derived; from voluntary contributions and applicable solely to charitable or religious purposes, shall be exempt, Sub-sec. (2) dealt with a case where a charitable/religious trust received contributions from another religious/charitable trust, to which S. 11 applied. The sub-section said that such contributions shall, in the hands of the recipient trust, be deemed to be income derived from property for the purposes of S. 11 and all the provisions of S. 11 shall apply accordingly. It would be appropriate to set out S. 12 in its intirety, asit obtained prior to 1-4-1973:—

    “12(1). Any income of a trust for charitable or religious purposes or” of a charitable or religious institution derived from voluntary contribution and applicable solely to charitable or religious purposes shall not be included in the total income of the trustees or the institution, as the case may be.

    (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1), where any such contributions as are referred to in sub-sec. (1) are made to a trust or a charitable or religious institution to which the provisions of S. 11 apply, such contributions shall in the hands of the trust or institution receiving the contributions be deemed to be income derived from property for the purposes of that section and the provisions of that section shall apply accordingly.”

    19. Section 12 was substituted in its entirety by Finance Act, with effect from 1-4-1973. The substituted S. 12 reads as follows:—

    “12. Any voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly for charitable or riligious purposes or by an institution established wholly for such purposes not being contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution shall for the purposes of S. 11 be deemed to be income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes and the provisions of that section and S. 13 shall apply accordingly.”

    20. Section 13 provided situations where the exemption provided by Ss. 11 and 12 shall not apply. The several provisions of S. 13 are designed to ensure the religious/charitable nature of the trust and to ensure further that its functioning does not result in any benefit to the authors of the trust or relatives or concerns controlled by them.

    21. Now, the question is whether the donations made by the assessee-trust to other charitable trusts are hit byS. 11(3) of the Act. For the sake of convenience, we may set out sub-sec. (3) in full. It reads:—

    “(3) Any income referred to in sub-sec, (1) or sub-sec. (2) as is applied to purposes other than charitable or religious purposes as aforesaid or ceases to be accumulated or set apart for application thereto or is not utilised for the purpose for which it is so accumulated in the year immediately following the expiry of the period allowed in this behalf shall be deemed to be the income of such person of the previous year in which it is so applied, or ceases to be so accumulated or so set apart or, as the case may be, of the previous year immediately following the expiry of the period aforesaid.”

    22. The Tribunal was of the opinion that contribution to the charitable trusts is within the power and competence of the trustees. It has relied upon sub-clause (k) of CI. (2) of the deed of trust, which, inter alia, empowers the trustees to apply the income of the trust for “the advancement of any other object of general public utility as the trustees may in their absolute discretion deem fit and in such way as they may consider most advantageous to the recipients.” We are inclined to agree with-it. A charitable purpose may be served in more than one way. One is to directly contribute for the promotion of that cause; the other Ls to contribute money to another charitable organisation, which advances that cause. In the absence of allegations of device and/or mala fides, the amount contributed to other charitable institutions out of the income accumulated under sub-sec. (2) is outside the mischief of sub-sec. (3) of S. 11. In other words, such contribution does not amount to application of the income for purposes other than charitable or religious.

    23. A good amount of controversy, however, raged as to the position where such contributions are made, not out of the income accumulated under sub-sec. (2), but out of contributions received by the assessee-trust. We have already set out S. 12 as it obtained prior to 1-4-1973 and also as it obtained with effect from the said date. Out of the two assessment years, A.Y 1972–73 is governed by the unamended S. 12, whereas AY. 1973–74 is governed by the amended S. 12. The change in S. 12, however, makes no difference in so far as the facts of the present case are concerned. Under S. 12(1), as it stood prior to 1st April, 1973, the income of a charitable/religious trust, derived from voluntary contributions and applicable solely to charitable/religious purposes, was not liable to be included in the total income of the trust or the trustees as the case may be. It is not the case of the Revenue that the contributions were made to the assessee-trust with a direction to apply them to purposes other from charitable or religious; evidently, the persons/organisations contributing the amounts to the assessee-trust intended them to be applied to charitable or religious purposes. Once we hold that contribution to another charitable trust is an application for charitable purposes, no further question arises. In other words, such contribution to another charitable trust by the assessee-trust cannot be treated as the income of the assessee trust in the year of contribution. Even if we apply S. 12 as it obtains from 1st April, 1973, and applicable to A.Y 1973–74, the result is not different. According to the amended S. 12, voluntary contributions received by a religious/charitable trust shall, for purposes of S. 11, be deemed to be income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable/religious purposes and the provisions of Ss. 11 and 13 shall apply accordingly. Therefore, so far as A.Y 1973–74 is concerned, the position (with respect to the amounts contributed by the assessee-trust to other charitable trust from out of contributions received by it) is the same as the one obtaining with respect to income derived by the assessee-trust from the properties held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes.

    24. An incidental issue was also debated before us. It was contended by the learned counsel for the assessee that the amended S. 12 does not apply to A.Y 1973–74 and that it applies to and with effect from A.Y 1974–75. It is not possible to agree. S. 12 was amended (substituted) by Finance Act, 1972, with effect from April 1, 1973. The contention of the learned counsel was that the said Section applies only to financial year 1973–74, which would mean A.Y, 1974–75, but not to A.Y 1972–73, for which the ‘previous year’ in the case of the assessee, happens to be the calendar year 1972. His contention was that since S. 12 has been substituted with effect from a date subsequent to the expiry of the assessee's ‘previous year’, it does not apply to it. We are unable to appreciate this argument. The unit for applying the Act is assessment year. Until recently, the previous year differ from assessee to assessee. It could be the preceding financial year or any other period of 12 months ending on any date in the previous financial year. That this is so is made clear by several decisions including Raliance v. C.I.T, (1979) 120 ITR 921 : 1980 Tax LR 8 (SC); C.I.T v. Isthmian, (1951) 20 ITR 572 : (AIR 1953 SC 439) and other decisions collected at page 110 of Kanga and Palkhivala's the Law and Practice of Income-tax', 8th Edition, Volume 1. We do not think it necessary to reiterate all the decisions on this question inasmuch as we have held that whether it is unamended S. 12 or the amended S. 12 the question must be answered in favour of the assessee.

    25. For the above reasons, question No. 3 is answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference is disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.

    26. Answer accordingly.

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    Commissioner Of Income-Tax (Central) v. J.K. Charitable Trust
    (Apr 9, 1991)