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    Niranjan Lal Ram Chandra v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Agra.

    C.S.P Singh, J.:— The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench, Delhi, has referred the following two questions for our opinion:

    “1. Whether the second revised return filed on February 8, 1972, was a valid return under the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 139 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

    2. If the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative, then whether the time for the completion of assessment was extended up to February 7, 1973, under section 153(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

    2. The assessee during the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1966–67, was carrying on business in the purchase and sale of motor parts, etc.

    3. He filed a return under s. 139(1) showing an income of Rs. 55,489. Thereafter, he filed a revised return under s. 139(5) on the 2nd of March, 1971, showing an income of Rs. 50,273. A second revised return was filed on the 8th of February, 1972, showing an income of Rs. 38,138. The assessment was completed on 6th February, 1973. The assessee appealed, and contended before the AAC that the assessment was time-barred, the contention being that limitation for making the assessment had to be counted from the 2nd of March, 1971, the date on which the first revised return was filed in view of s. 153(1)(c), and should have been completed by the 2nd of March, 1972, and the ITO erred in calculating the limitation from the 8th of February, 1972, which was the date on which the second revised return was filed. In substance, it was urged that a second revised return could not be filed under s. 139(5), and, as such, the extended period of limitation provided by s. 153(1)(c) was not available in cases where a second revised return is filed. This contention has been rejected both by the AAC and the Tribunal.

    4. Counsel for the assessee urged that s. 139(5) contemplated a single revised return, and once that had been filed, a further revision of the return could not be made. In case this contention is correct the assessment made would be barred by time, for, s. 153(1)(c) extends the period of limitation by an year, from the date of the filing of a return under s. 139(4) or s. 139(5). In order to resolve this dispute we will extract s. 139(5):

    “139. (5) If any person having furnished a return under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), discovers any omission or any wrong statement therein, he may furnish a revised return at any time before the assessment is made”.

    (Underlining* ours)

    5. It is the word “therein” which occurs in s. 139(5), which have given the impetus to this argument. It is undoubtedly true that a revised return may be furnished at any time before the assessment is made by a person who has furnished a return under s. 139(1) or s. 139(2), and once a revised return has been filed under s. 139(5), the original return is supplanted by the revised return, as a result of the; amendment made in the original return as effected by the revised return. See Amjad Ali Nazir Ali v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Kanpur., [1977] 110 ITR 419 (All). In the case of Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Delhi Central., [1973] 90 ITR 236 (All), Hari Swarup J., speaking for himself, held that once a revised return has been filed, the original return must be taken to have been withdrawn, and to have been substituted by a fresh return for the purpose of assessment. Pathak J., one of the other members of the Bench, did not, however, express himself on this proposition. The logical result of Amjad Ali's case, [1977] 110 ITR 419 (All) is that a revised return supplants the original return by effecting a revision therein. From this it follows that a return filed under s. 139(5) being a voluntary return is of the nature of a return under s. 139(1), or at best a return under both these provisions. The same consequence results from the view taken by Hari Swarup J. in Dhampur Sugar Mills' case, [1973] 90 ITR 236 (All). For, if the original return filed under s. 139(1) is taken to be withdrawn, and the revised return substitutes itself in its place, it becomes a return under s. 139(1). This being the position of a return filed under s. 139(5), we feel no difficulty in holding that a second revised return can be filed under s. 139(5) correcting omissions or wrong statements made in the first revised return, for, the first revised return filed under s. 139(5) would, in law, be a return under s. 139(1) also. The result of filing a second revised return would be to extend the period of limitation for purposes of s. 153 (1)(c). In taking this view, we are mindful of the prevalent practice of filing more than one revised return, which the department has been accepting consistently, and also of the difficulty in which the assessee would be placed in case they are unable to correct bona fide mistakes or omissions in the first revised return.

    6. We, accordingly, answer both the questions in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to its costs, which is assessed at Rs. 200. Counsel fee is assessed at the same figure.

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    Niranjan Lal Ram Chandra v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Agra.
    (Nov 5, 1979)