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  • S. 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • S. 4 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act.
  • S. 4 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act
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citation codes
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  • S. 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • S. 4 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act.
  • S. 4 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Writ Petition Challenging Consolidation Authorities' Orders

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition challenged an order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 16-11-1970, which dismissed the revision filed by the petitioners and allowed the revision of opposite party No. 3 (Gaon Sabha).

The dispute concerned plot No. 63 (measuring one bigha 5 biswa and 6 biswansis) in village Salarpur, Pargana Dewa, Tahsil Nawabganj, district Barabanki. The plot was recorded as "Banjar" in the basic year entry of the village record.

Procedural history relevant to the dispute:

  • The petitioners' father previously sued for declaration of bhumidhari rights over the grove; the suit was dismissed by the Munsif, and the Civil Judge dismissed the ensuing appeal.
  • A second appeal to the High Court was pending when a notification under S. 4 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act intervened, causing that second appeal to abate.
  • Under S. 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the petitioners objected claiming bhumidhari rights and adverse possession; Gaon Sabha contested, asserting the plot was Banjar and alleging there was no Gaon Sabha resolution or authority to engage counsel.
  • The Consolidation Officer (order dated 8-5-1967) allowed the petitioners' objection, recognizing them as bhumidhars; the Settlement Officer Consolidation (order dated 9-11-1967) allowed the appeal in part, characterising a portion marked 'A' as in petitioners' possession and grove, portions 'C' as Banjar vested in Gaon Sabha, and portion 'B' as only permitting retention of scattered trees (not grove).
  • The Deputy Director (16-11-1970) overturned the Settlement Officer on several points, allowed Gaon Sabha's revision, dismissed the petitioners' revision, and ordered that the basic year Banjar entry should continue.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Gaon Sabha (or its Chairman/Land Management Committee) had valid authority, by an appropriate Gaon Sabha resolution under paragraph 128 of the U.P. Gaon Samaj Manual, to file written statements, appeals or revisions in the consolidation proceedings.
  2. Whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation could lawfully rely on the prior findings of the Munsif and the Civil Judge (from civil litigation) as evidence when the second appeal before the High Court had abated due to consolidation proceedings.
  3. Whether the Deputy Director erred in treating scattered trees as insufficient to constitute a "grove" (and in failing to address whether the presence of trees made cultivation impossible), and whether questions about ownership of trees could be determined by consolidation authorities when the land was purportedly outside the consolidation scheme.
  4. Whether the orders of the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation were made without jurisdiction because Gaon Sabha's participation (appeal/revision) was unauthorized.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Mr. S. Mirza)

  • No Gaon Sabha resolution authorized the litigation, written statement, appeal or revision before the consolidation authorities, contrary to paragraph 128 of the U.P. Gaon Samaj Manual; therefore Gaon Sabha's filings were not maintainable.
  • The Deputy Director improperly relied upon the findings of the Munsif and Civil Judge from the earlier civil proceedings, notwithstanding that the second appeal abated due to consolidation notification — reliance on those findings was said to be illegal.
  • The Deputy Director incorrectly concluded that a few trees would not make the land a grove and failed to examine whether the trees rendered cultivation impossible.
  • Certain observations in the Deputy Director's judgment were asserted to be plainly incorrect (unspecified in the summary beyond the above points).

Respondent No. 3 (Gaon Sabha) Arguments (as presented by Mr. B.R. Gupta)

  • A resolution dated 16-6-1963 (Annexure C-1 to the counter-affidavit) was said to authorise litigation on behalf of the Gaon Sabha; respondent conceded that the objection and earlier proceeding dates show activity from 7-9-1962 and a written statement dated 22-2-1963, but was unable to point to clear authority for filing the written statement or appeals. The respondent nonetheless relied on precedent interpreting paragraph 128 to support maintainability where a resolution exists.
  • With respect to reliance on the Munsif and Civil Judge judgments, respondent relied on Sheo Charan v. Tota Ram (1971 All WR (HC) 226) to contend that consolidation authorities may treat earlier civil judgments as having evidentiary value and must give them appropriate weight, and on Khayali Ram v. Joint Director of Consolidation (1968 All WR (HC) 306) for the proposition that civil judgments are material which consolidation authorities may consider.
  • Respondent argued that the dispute related to the whole of plot No. 63, so a finding as to one portion (portion 'A') could not be treated as determinative of the whole plot in the manner alleged by the petitioners.
  • Respondent conceded only one clerical mistake in the Deputy Director's judgment (the name of the Vaki Commissioner).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (from the opinion)
Gram Samaj Kairadih v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P. (1969 All WR (HC) 500) Interpreting paragraph 128 of the U.P. Gaon Samaj Manual: the Chairman/Land Management Committee cannot file written statements, appeals or revisions without a prior resolution or subsequent ratification; absent such resolution, the filings are not maintainable. The court applied the principle that Gaon Sabha litigation requires proper resolution under paragraph 128 and relied upon that precedent to hold that Gaon Sabha's appeal and revision were unauthorised and therefore not maintainable in the instant case.
Sheo Charan v. Tota Ram (1971 All WR (HC) 226) Consolidation authorities may consider judgments from civil or revenue courts as evidence; such judgments have evidentiary value and reasons are required to reach a different conclusion after an elaborate civil/revenue trial. Respondent relied on this authority to justify the Deputy Director's consideration of earlier civil judgments. The court stated that it did not agree with the law laid down in this decision (as a controlling proposition) and did not base its decision on it.
Khayali Ram v. Joint Director of Consolidation, U.P. (1968 All WR (HC) 306) A civil court judgment may be good material for consolidation authorities to consider when deciding similar issues; such matters should be raised before consolidation authorities so they can give a finding thereon. The respondent relied on this precedent to support the Deputy Director's use of prior civil judgments. The court considered the authority but held it did not apply to a case where the prior proceedings had abated (by reason of consolidation notification) and found it not helpful in the present circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded primarily from procedural-authority considerations under the Gaon Samaj Manual and from an examination of the Deputy Director's reliance on antecedent civil findings.

Key steps in the court's reasoning (based on the opinion text):

  • The court examined the record to determine whether the Gaon Sabha had the requisite authorisation (a resolution of the Land Management Committee/Gaon Sabha) to litigate before the consolidation authorities. Paragraph 128 of the U.P. Gaon Samaj Manual requires either a prior resolution or ratification for actions taken by the Chairman in urgent cases.
  • Applying the principle from Gram Samaj Kairadih, the court concluded that Gaon Sabha's appeal and revision were unauthorised because the requisite resolution or ratification was not shown to have been passed at the proper time in relation to the filings. The absence of proper authorisation rendered Gaon Sabha's submissions and subsequent revision proceedings not maintainable.
  • The court considered the Deputy Director's reliance on earlier civil decisions (Munsif and Civil Judge). While acknowledging that earlier court judgments can have evidentiary value for consolidation authorities, the court noted the particular factual posture here: the second appeal had abated due to the consolidation notification. The court expressed disagreement with some authorities that would permit full reliance in such circumstances and indicated that it would not base its decision on those precedents.
  • The court addressed the Settlement Officer's partial finding that portion 'A' was in petitioners' possession as grove and portions 'C' were Banjar. The Deputy Director had set aside the Settlement Officer's confirmation of bhumidhari rights, but the High Court found that because Gaon Sabha's challenge (appeal/revision) was unauthorized, the administrative/appeal proceedings that overturned earlier findings were themselves without jurisdiction.
  • The court observed that certain observations by the Deputy Director (for example, treating scattered trees as insufficient to render land a grove, or treating ownership of trees as a matter not determinable by consolidation courts if the land is outside the consolidation scheme) were part of the Deputy Director's reasoning; however, the dispositive ground for the court was the lack of jurisdiction arising from Gaon Sabha's unauthorised litigation under paragraph 128.
  • Given its conclusion on authorization and jurisdiction, the court found the impugned orders of both the Settlement Officer and the Deputy Director to be "absolutely without jurisdiction" and therefore remand was unnecessary.

Holding and Implications

Holding:
The writ petition is allowed. The court's principal ruling was that the Gaon Sabha's appeal and revision were unauthorized and in violation of paragraph 128 of the U.P. Gaon Samaj Manual, rendering the subsequent orders of the consolidation authorities without jurisdiction.

Specific outcomes and direct consequences:

  • The writ petition was decided in favour of the petitioners.
  • The orders of the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the Deputy Director Consolidation were declared absolutely without jurisdiction and set aside; no remand to the Deputy Director was ordered.
  • The petitioners were awarded costs.

Implications beyond the parties:
The opinion resolves the case on a procedural jurisdictional ground (absence of proper Gaon Sabha authorisation under paragraph 128). The court did not purport to create a new substantive precedent on the characterization of "grove" versus "Banjar" beyond the immediate effect on the administrative orders in this matter. Therefore, the decision's primary consequence is the direct restoration of the petitioners' position by setting aside the unauthorized administrative orders; the opinion does not announce a broad new principle altering prior law on the evidentiary value of civil judgments beyond the court's stated disagreement with some authorities in the particular factual context of abatement.

Disposition: Petition allowed.

    Dhani Ram And Others v. Dy. Director Of Consolidation And Others Opposite Parties.

    1. This writ petition is directed against the judgment and order of Sri R.C Sharma, Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 16-11-1970, by which he has dismissed the revision of the writ petitioners and allowed the revision of opposite party No. 3.

    2. The dispute relates to plot No. 63 measuring a bigha 5 biswa and 6 biswansis situate in village Salarpur Pargana Dewa Tahsil Nawabganj district Barabanki. It was recorded Banjar in the basic year in the village record. Earlier to the consolidation proceedings the petitioner's father filed a suit for declaration of his bhumidhari rights over the grove. The suit was dismissed by Munsif Barabanki. The appeal filed by the petitioner's father was also dismissed by the Civil Judge, Barabanki. A second appeal was pending in the High Court at the time of the notification under S. 4 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act and the second appeal abated. In the objection taken under S. 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act the petitioners claimed to be bhumidhars of the plot in dispute stating that the plot grove was ancestral. They also claimed rights by adverse possession. Opposite party No. 3 Gaon Sabha contested the objection and alleged that the plot was Banjar and not a grove and the entry of Banjar in the village papers was correct. It is alleged in the petition in para 6 that no resolution was passed by the Gaon Sabha as also that there was no authority of the Gaon Sabha to engage a lawyer. The Consolidation Officer by his order dated 8-5-1967 allowed the objection of the petitioners to be Bhumidhars of the same. The Settlement Officer Consolidation by his order dated 9-11-1967 allowed the appeal in part and held that a portion of the plot which is marked as ‘A’ at the sketch map prepared by the Commissioner was in possession of the petitioners and their grove with regard to the areas of the portions marked as ‘C’ he held that they were not in the character of grove, nor in their possession on the date of vesting and they were rightly recorded as Banjar and vested in Gaon Sabha. With regard to portion marked as ‘B’ he also held that the objectors could retain possession over the trees as scattered one but the same cannot be treated as their grove.

    3. The Deputy Director by his order dated 16-11-1970 allowed the revision of opposite party No. 3 and dismissed that of the petitioners. While dealing with previous civil litigation he held as follows:—

    “The concurrent findings of the learned Munsif and the learned Civil Judge that the land in dispute was not a grove may not have attained finality but they certainly constitute a strong piece of evidence of the fact that in the first litigation after the abolition of zamindari the land in dispute was not held to be a grove.”

    4. He has been very much influenced by the finding of the learned Munsif and the Civil Judge, little realising that a second appeal had been preferred in the High Court which could set aside the above orders but which, for intervention of the Consolidation of Holdings proceedings, abated. About the finding of the Settlement Officer Consolidation that the portion marked as ‘A’ is grove he held as follows:—

    “This order is obviously improper because the whole plot has to be treated as one unit for giving a finding whether it is a grove or not. Holding that a portion of the plot has the character of grove is basically incorrect.”

    5. He further held as under:—

    “At the most they might be owners of those trees but such ownership is not to be determined by the consolidation courts when the land in dispute is outside the Scheme of Consolidation.”

    6. After discussing the matter he came to the conclusion that there was no force in the revision application filed by the petitioners and dismissed the same. He set aside the order of the learned Settlement Officer Consolidation confirming the Bhumidhari rights over a portion of the plot on the objectors. As a result he held that the basic year entry in the record shall continue.

    7. Mr. S. Mirza appearing for the petitioners has placed four contentions before me. They are as follows:— (1) No resolution of Gaon Sabha was passed to contest the matter before the consolidation authorities at the time of the filing of the written statement by them nor any resolution is on record for filing any appeal or revision. This is in violation of paragraph 128 of the U.P Gaon Samaj Manual. For a convenient perusal the provisions of paragraph 128 of the Gaon Samaj Manual is reproduced below:—

    128. “The conduct of Gaon Samaj litigation shall not depend upon individual discretion of the Chairman of the Land Management Committee, but shall be a matter of a resolution of the Land Management Committee as a whole. In urgent cases, however, the Chairman can take action on his own and seek ratification of the Land Management Committee afterward, by including it in the agenda of the next ensuing meeting.”

    8. He has relied on the case, Gram Samaj Kairadih v. Deputy Director of Consolidation U.P, Lucknow (1969 All WR (HC) 500), a judgment by Mr. Justice D.S Mathur, as he then was. At page 503 paragraph 19, while interpreting paragraph 128 of the Gaon Samaj Manual it was held:—

    “To sum up, the Chairman of the Land Management Committee could not have filed a written statement or preferred an appeal or revision without the Land Management Committee having passed a resolution, or the action of the Chairman being ratified by the Land Management Committee in the next ensuing meeting. The Land Management Committee had not passed such a resolution till the decision of the first revision, nor was the action taken by the Chairman ratified in the next meeting of the Land Management Committee. Hence, neither the written statement nor the appeal nor the revision, was maintainable. In the circumstances, when no written statement could be filed, no second revision could also be preferred by the Chairman after the passing of the resolution by the Land Management Committee, at a belated stage. The second revision under S. 48 of the Act was thus also liable to dismissal.”

    (2) The Deputy Director has taken into consideration the finding of the Munsif and Civil Judge in the Civil case relating to this matter while the second appeal abated because of notification under S. 4 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act. The Deputy Director has completely misled himself into relying on the findings of Munsif and Civil Judge and therefore committed an illegality.

    (3) The Deputy Director having incorrectly observed that couple of trees would not make the land a grove, he has not applied his mind to the question whether cultivation was possible because of the existence of the trees or not.

    (4) Certain observations made by the Deputy Director in his judgment are absolutely incorrect.

    9. Mr. B.R Gupta appearing for respondent. No. 3 has replied to the contentions raised by Mr. Mirza as follows:—

    (1) That a resolution was passed on 16-6-1963 which is Annexure C-1 to the counter-affidavit which authorised the fighting of the litigation before the consolidation authorities. He conceded that the case was started on 7-9-1962 when objection under S. 9 was filed by the petitioners. He also admitted that a written statement on behalf of Gaon Sabha was filed on 22-2-1963. He has not been able to point out to me whether there was any authority of the Gaon Sabha or of the Chairman, Land Management Committee for filing of the written statement. In this view of the matter the authority referred in 1969 All WR (HC) 500 (Gram Samaj Kairadih v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P Lucknow) and the portion cited completely applied to the present case.

    (2) With regard to point No. 2 he has said that there is evidently value of the judgments of Munsif and Civil Judge. He has relied on a decision, Sheo Charan v. Tota Ram (1971 All WR (HC) 226), wherein at page 231 in paragraphs 14 and 15 it has been held as follows:—

    “14. The Consolidation Authorities are courts of special but limited jurisdiction. They are empowered to decide matters finally which fall within the scope of their jurisdiction. But, in exercising that jurisdiction, they cannot ignore pieces of evidence which may result from other legally valid proceedings. These pieces of evidence must be given, by the Consolidation Authorities themselves, the effect which the statute under which they come into existence is meant to confer upon them.

    15. Incidentally, I may also mention that there was a judgment of a Civil Judge in the instant case where, in a partition suit between the parties, it had been held that the petitioner had not lost his rights under the lease of 1977. It is true that a second appeal against it was pending in this court when the consolidation proceedings started. Under the law as it stands now the suit abated. But the judgment of the Civil Judge had evidentiary value for the consolidation authorities. Reasons for coming to a different conclusion should be cogent and reasonable after the matter has been elaborately tried by a civil or Revenue Court.”

    10. On the basis of this authority he has argued that the Deputy Director of Consolidation was completely right in taking into consideration the judgments of the Munsif and Civil Judge as they had evidentiary value. He has also cited another decision of the High Court. Khayali Ram v. Joint Director of Consolidation, U.P Lucknow (1968 All WR (HC) 306). At page 307 it has been held:—

    “A Judgment of the civil court in a previous litigation between the parties may or may not be strictly relevant under the Indian Evidence Act but it is certainly a good material which could be taken into consideration by the consolidation authorities while deciding the issue like the one involved in the present case. It is, therefore, necessary that such a question should have been raised before the consolidation authorities so as to enable them to give a finding thereon.”

    11. This later decision does not apply to a case of abatement and I do not think it can be helpful in the present case. With regard to the first case of Mr. Justice Beg, frankly speaking I do not agree with the law laid down in the same. I would have referred the matter to a larger Bench if I was not to decide a writ petition on ground ??? already referred to above, but in the circumstances of the case a reference will not be necessary as the decision of this case will not depend on this.

    (3) That the dispute was about plot No. 63 and there could not be a finding about part. Therefore, the argument, that the portion marked as ‘A’ having been declared grove could not have been interfered, has no basis.

    (4) That there is only one mistake in the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. He has wrongly mentioned the name of the Vaki Commissioner.

    12. As already indicated above I am allowing the writ petition on the first point that the appeal and revision filed by Gaon Sabha were absolutely unauthorised and against the provisions of paragraph 128 of the U.P Gaon Samaj Manual.

    13. The writ petition is decided in favour of the petitioners.

    14. The orders of the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the Deputy Director Consolidation are absolutely without jurisdiction and as such it is not necessary to remand the case to the Deputy Director of Consolidation. With these observations the writ petition is allowed. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs.

    15. Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Dhani Ram And Others v. Dy. Director Of Consolidation And Others Opposite Parties.
    (Jul 5, 1977)