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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued for possession of a parcel of land alleged to belong to the Ram Chandra Maharaj Birajman Mandir. Harbilas was identified as the sarbarakar. In 1951 the temple purportedly granted the disputed property to Chiraunjilal (defendant No. 2, respondent) by a lease deed dated 1-9-1951. The lease permitted additions and alterations but prohibited sub-letting or transfer; it allowed removal of material on vacating. The initial lease term was one year with rent paid monthly.

The plaint alleged that in January 1956 Chiraunjilal vacated and executed a sale deed transferring the property to defendant No. 1 (appellant), in breach of the lease conditions, and that defendant No. 1 remained in unlawful possession despite requests to vacate. Defendant No. 2 did not contest the suit; defendant No. 1 contested, claiming that he (and his predecessor defendant No. 2) were owners and that constructions and estoppel supported his position.

At trial (Munsif, Shikohabad) the plaintiff's suit for possession was decreed (original suit No. 119 of 1958; decree dated 25-1-1960). The Civil Judge, Mainpuri, in civil appeal No. 98 of 1960, by judgment dated 5-12-1963, confirmed the trial court's decree. The present appeal is by defendant No. 1 against those decrees to the court presiding (H.N. Kapoor, J.).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the allegations in the plaint, defendant No. 2 being a lessee who sold the property, the lease was determined by forfeiture and, in the absence of a notice under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, a suit for possession is not maintainable.
  2. Whether the trial court was justified in decreeing possession along with the materials (constructions) when the constructions were made by defendant No. 2 who later sold the property to defendant No. 1.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Defendant No. 1)

  • The appellant claimed that his predecessor-in-interest (defendant No. 2) was the owner, and by transfer he became the owner; thus he contested the suit for possession.
  • It was contended that there were no constructions when defendant No. 2 took the land and that defendant No. 2 made constructions; defendant No. 1 also made constructions with the knowledge of Harbilas, giving rise to estoppel.
  • Initially argued that defendant No. 2 was a licencee (not a lessee) and that the licence was irrevocable because permission was given for permanent constructions; this licence argument was subsequently abandoned by the appellant.
  • Argued that the situation amounted to holding over under the lease and that the lease was not determined by notice as required under Section 106 or Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act — therefore the requisite notice was lacking and the suit was not maintainable on that ground.
  • Argued before the lower appellate court that the Munsif ought not to have granted decree for possession along with the materials when the constructions were made by defendant No. 2 who had sold his interest to the appellant.

Respondent's / Plaintiff's Arguments

  • Respondent argued that defendant No. 2 had breached an express condition of tenancy by selling the property despite an express prohibition on sub-letting or transfer; such breach caused forfeiture and determined the lease.
  • It was contended that once forfeiture occurred the lease stood determined and, therefore, no separate notice under Section 111(g) was necessary to maintain the suit for possession.
  • Respondent stressed that defendant No. 2 did not contest the suit or file an appeal and that practically no relief was sought against defendant No. 2, since possession could be taken from defendant No. 1; reliance was placed on the practical non-participation of defendant No. 2.
  • Respondent also relied on the proviso to Section 114-A (as argued) to suggest that notice under that provision could render a separate Section 111(g) notice unnecessary in the facts of the case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lala Kishan Chand v. Sheo Datt, 1958 ALJ 427 Supports that holding-over requires determination by notice and that a holding-over lease is governed by Section 116 (lease renewed from year to year or month to month according to Section 106). The court relied on this authority to conclude that, because rent was payable monthly, the lease was deemed renewed month-to-month after expiry of the initial year, and that notice under Section 106 / Section 111(h) (and Section 111(g) where relevant) is required to determine such a holding-over tenancy.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed both contested points separately and applied statutory provisions of the Transfer of Property Act as they appear in the record.

  1. On the second point (right to remove materials): the court accepted that the lease expressly permitted the lessee to remove material on surrender of possession. The court found that the appellant, as transferee of materials, should have been given an opportunity to remove those materials prior to ejectment. The lower appellate court's refusal to allow removal was criticized and the court treated the point seriously in favour of the appellant on this discrete issue.
  2. On the first point (necessity of notice under Section 111(g) / Section 106 / Section 116 etc.):
    • The court examined the lease deed dated 1-9-1951 and determined it was a lease (for one year) and not a licence. The rent structure — annual rent of Rs. 100 with monthly payments of Rs. 8/4/5 pies — indicated a bilateral transaction capable of being a lease by unregistered document.
    • The permission to re-erect shops and construct a shed, even if involving permanent structures, did not convert the lease into a licence.
    • The court accepted the appellant's later argument (abandoned earlier licence argument) that the matter involved holding over: Section 116 makes clear that holding over renews a lease from year to year or month to month as specified in Section 106. Because rent was payable monthly, the lease was deemed renewed month-to-month after the first year.
    • Consequently, the court concluded that notice as contemplated by Section 106 and by Section 111(h) (and the notice required under Section 111(g) in the event of forfeiture/renunciation) is required to determine such a holding-over tenancy. The court relied on the Division Bench authority Lala Kishan Chand v. Sheo Datt to support that principle.
    • The respondent's contention — that an express breach (sale in breach of a no-transfer clause) caused automatic forfeiture making notice unnecessary — was rejected. The court emphasised the express wording of Section 111(g), which provides that even when the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or claiming title in himself, the lease is forfeited only when the lessor (or transferee) gives written notice of intention to determine the lease.
    • The court distinguished Section 114-A: that provision requires a notice in certain circumstances where a breach is capable of remedy and operates to afford the lessee an opportunity to remedy the breach. The court held that the notice contemplated under Section 114-A is not the same as that required under Section 111(g). Section 111(g)'s requirement of notice for determining a lease by forfeiture was held to be independently necessary.
    • Applying these statutory rules to the facts, the court concluded the lease had not been properly determined by the lessor or his transferee because the required notice under Section 111(g) (and the related provisions) had not been served. As defendant No. 1 could plausibly claim to hold through defendant No. 2, it was not open to the plaintiff to obtain possession without first determining the lease by the statutory notice procedure.
  3. On these bases the court found that the suit could not have been decreed without determining the lease by the required notice; the matter therefore failed on this ground.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED; THE DECREES AND JUDGMENTS OF THE LOWER COURTS ARE SET ASIDE.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The trial and lower appellate decrees in favor of the plaintiff are set aside because the lease had not been properly determined in accordance with the statutory notice requirements (Section 111(g) and the provisions governing holding over, including Section 106 and Section 116).
  • Parties are ordered to bear their own costs throughout.
  • The court recorded a prior direction that the appellant deposit security at the rate of Rs. 15 per month on 7-5-1965; the appellant will be able to recover any amount in excess after adjusting rental at the rate specified in the lease (Rs. 100 per year or Rs. 8/5/4 pies per month) — this adjustment was expressly noted by the court.

Broader implications: The opinion confines itself to application of the Transfer of Property Act's notice provisions to the facts; it does not claim to announce any new general precedent beyond applying established statutory rules and the cited authority. No broader or novel legal doctrine was declared beyond the statutory interpretation and application recorded above.

    Daya Ram v. Chiraunji Lal And Another

    H.N Kapoor, J.:— This is a defendant's appeal against the decree and judgment dated 5-12-1963 of the Civil Judge, Mainpuri in civil appeal No. 98 of 1960 confirming the decree and judgment dated 25-1-1960 of the Munsif Shikohabad in original suit No. 119 of 1958 by which the plaintiff's suit for possession of the property in suit was decreed.

    2. The plaintiff brought the suit on the allegations that the land in dispute belonged to Sri Ram Chandra Maharaj Birajman Mandir Ram Chandraji and Harbilas was its sarbarakar. The property was given to Chiraunjilal defendant No. 2 (respondent) in 1951 by means of a lease deed dated 1-9-1951. He was allowed to make additions and alterations but he was not allowed to sub-let or transfer the property. He could, however, remove the material at the time of vacating the possession. Initially the lease was for one year only. It was alleged that Chiraunjlal defendant No. 2 vacated the property and put defendant No. 1 in possession by executing a sale deed in his favour in January, 1956 which was against the conditions of the lease. Defendant No. 1 was in unlawful possession since then. He did not vacate the premises though he was asked to do so, hence the suit. Defendant No. 2 (respondent) did not contest the suit. Only defendant No. 1 (appellant) contested the suit on the ground that his predecessor-in-interest, i.e, defendant No. 2 was the owner of the property in suit and as a result of transfer defendant No. 1 became the owner. It was claimed that there were no constructions on the land when it was taken by defendant No. 2 who made constructions. It was further claimed that defendant No. 1 also made construction to the knowledge of Harbilas and as such he was estopped. It was also contended that defendant No. 2 had not vacated the premises in terms of the conditions of the lease deed and defendant No. 1 had succeeded to all the rights of ownership of defendant No. 2. There were some other pleadings also.

    3. The trial court framed issues on the pleadings of the parties and arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff was the owner of the property and that Harbilas was the sarbarakar. It further held that defendant No. 2 was a lessee and not a licencee and that the suit was not barred by estoppel and acquiescence. It also held that the suit was maintainable even without getting the sale deed cancelled. It also observed that the plea of Section 41 Transfer of Property Act was also taken half-heartedly but it was not proved that defendant No. 1 was a bona fide purchaser. The following two points only were argued before the lower appellate court.

    “1. On the allegations in the plaint, defendant No. 2 was a lessee. He sold the property treating it as his own as such he incurred forfeiture. When forfeiture came about, the plaintiff ought to have given a notice under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act and in absence of such a notice, the suit for possession is not maintainable.

    2. The learned Munsif ought not to have granted decree for possession along with the materials when the constructions were made by defendant No. 2 who sold his property to the defendant appellant.”

    4. The lower appellate court held that under the circumstances of this case notice under Section 111(g) Transfer of Property Act was not necessary as the suit was brought against the person by the owner who was not the lessee and that person also did not claim to be holding under the lessee of the plaintiff. But he set up a case that he himself was the owner and his predecessor-in-interest too was the owner and not the lessee of the plaintiff. On the second point it held that the learned Munsif was perfectly justified in not allowing the defendant-appellant to remove the material before his ejectment. With these findings, the lower appellate court dismissed the appeal. Feeling aggrieved, defendant No. 1 has filed this appeal.

    5. Both these points have been reagitated before me. So far the second point is concerned, even the learned counsel for the respondents found it difficult to support the findings of the lower court. Under the lease, it was clearly provided that the lessee would be able to remove his material whenever he surrendered possession or he had to give possession. The defendant-appellant who was, in any view of the matter, transferee of the materials should have been allowed an opportunity to remove the materials before giving possession of the property to the plaintiff.

    6. The first point was argued at considerable length by learned counsel for both the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant had first argued that defendant No. 2 held possession of the land in dispute as licencee and not as a lessee and that the licence was irrevocable as permission was given for making permanent constructions. He subsequently gave up that argument. I have myself examined carefully the lease deed. There can be no doubt that the lease was created by means of the document dated 1-9-1951. It was for one year. The rent for the entire year was Rs. 100/- and the monthly rent was Rs. 8/4/5 pies which was payable monthly. This was a bilateral transaction. As such the lease could have been created by an unregistered document. Defendant No. 2 was given permission to re-erect shops and to construct a shed for running a chakki. It would not become a licence simply because permission was given to the lessee to raise constructions on the land even if some constructions may be of a permanent nature.

    7. Learned counsel for the appellant next argued that it was a case of holding over under the lease and that lease was not determined by means of a notice as contemplated by Section 111(g) or Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In my opinion, there is force in this contention. It is not dispute that even in the case of holding over the lease is to be determined by giving notice under Section 106 of the said Act. It was so held by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Lala Kishan Chand v. Sheo Datt . 1958 ALJ 427.. Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act clearly provides that the effect of holding over would be that the lease is renewed from year to year or from month to month according to the purpose for which the property is leased out as specified in Section 106. In the present case, because the monthly rent was payable, it would be deemed that the lease was renewed from month to month after the expiry of the stipulated period of one year. Defendant No. 2 was allowed to remain in possession of the property till January, 1956 when he transferred the property to defendant No. 1. Thereafter defendant No. 1 was allowed to remain in possession of the property, till the suit was brought in March, 1958. Such a notice is a must under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as well as under Section 111(h) of the said Act. Learned counsel for the respondents has argued that in the present case there was a breach of the condition of tenancy and the property was sold although it was specifically provided in the lease deed that the property could not be sublet or sold and as such the lease stood determined by forfeiture. He has also argued that defendant No. 1 was claiming ownership of the property and was setting up ownership in the hands of his predecessor-in-interest, i.e, defendant No. 2 and as such it was not necessary to determine the lease by means of a notice but the same stood determined by forfeiture. He has laid great stress on the fact that defendant No. 2 did not contest the suit nor filed appeal and that practically no relief was claimed against him because possession of the property could be taken from the hands of defendant No. 1. I do not agree with this contention. Defendant No. 2 was a necessary party and the suit had been decreed against both the defendants. The contesting defendant claimed under defendant No. 2. There can be no doubt that he succeeded to the rights of defendant No. 2. It was, therefore, not possible to bring a suit for possession without determining the lease. It is significant that under Section 111(g) the lease is required to be determined even when the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title. That clause may be reprodued with advantage:

    “111A lease of immovable property determines—

    (a) …………………………

    (b) …………………………

    (c) …………………………

    (d) …………………………

    (e) …………………………

    (f) …………………………

    (g) by forfeiture; that is to say, (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease.”

    8. It is thus clear that even when the lessee sets up title in himself or in third person, the lease is to be forfeited by means of notice and, does not stand automatically forfeited. In the present case, it is certainly not possible to claim relief against defendant No. 1 without determining the lease of defendant No. 2 as defendant No. 1 can easily take the plea that he was holding the property through defendant No. 2.

    9. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that this clause could have applied when the lessee himself set up a title in himself or in a third person but not when a third person was resisting the suit and setting up a title in himself or in the original lessee. He has also placed reliance on the proviso to Section 114-A which provides that notice under Section 114-A is not necessary when there is a breach of an express condition against the assigning, disposing of the property leased etc. In my opinion the notice contemplated under Section 114-A is not the same as contemplated under Section 111(g). Section 114-A is as follows:

    “Where a lease of immovable property has determined by forfeiture for a breach of an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter, no suit for ejectment shall lie unless and until the lessor has served on the lessee a notice in writing—

    (a) specifying the particular breach complained of; and

    (b) if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the lessee to remedy the breach;

    and the lessee fails, within a reasonable time from the date of the service of the notice, to remedy the breach, if it is capable of remedy.

    Nothing in this section shall apply to an express condition against the assigning, under letting, parting with the possession, or disposing of the property leased or to an express condition relating to forfeiture in case of non-payment of rent.”

    10. Section 114-A clearly provides for a notice under certain circumstances when the breach of an express condition can be remedied so that a further opportunity may be allowed to the lessee to remedy the breach. But the notice under Section 111(g) is necessary for determining the lease even if it is determined by forfeiture. Similarly, notice is necessary under Section 111(h) read with Section 106 of the Act. In my opinion, it makes no difference whether the lessee himself renounces the character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming in himself or puts another person in possession of the property through whom the character of the lessee as such is renounced and a title is set up in him as well as in that third person. In my opinion, the lease was not properly determined and was still subsisting and the suit could not have been decreed without determining the lease. The suit fails on this ground alone. In the result the appeal is allowed and the decrees and judgments of the lower courts are set aside. Parties shall bear their own costs throughout.

    11. The appellant was directed to deposit the security amount at the rate of Rs. 15/- per month on 7-5-1965 by this court. It will be possible for him to recover the amount in excess after adjusting the rental amount at the rate of Rs. 100/- per year or Rs. 8/5/4 pies per month.

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    Comments

    Daya Ram v. Chiraunji Lal And Another
    (Nov 19, 1976)