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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922) (hereinafter referred
  • Section 41(1) or Section 28(ii)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  • provisions contained in Section 149 or Section 150,
  • Act of 1961 applies because of Section 297(2)(d)(ii),
  • Section 10(5A)(d), Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
  • Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • SECTION 148 INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • Indian Income-tax Act of 1922
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • Section 297(2)(d)(ii)
  • Section 149(1)(b)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922) (hereinafter referred
  • Section 41(1) or Section 28(ii)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  • provisions contained in Section 149 or Section 150,
  • Act of 1961 applies because of Section 297(2)(d)(ii),
  • Section 10(5A)(d), Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
  • Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • SECTION 148 INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • Indian Income-tax Act of 1922
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • Section 297(2)(d)(ii)
  • Section 149(1)(b)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a partnership firm that had been the sole selling agent of the Kanpur Cotton Mills (a branch of British India Corporation Ltd.). On 23 March 1955 the petitioner entered into an agreement with Kailash Nath Agrawal which recorded that the petitioner owed Rs. 8,39,351 to the corporation and that the corporation desired the petitioner’s resignation as selling agent and the appointment of Kailash Nath Agrawal or his nominee. The agreement contemplated liquidation of the petitioner’s debt by retaining a portion of the new agent’s commission. The petitioner resigned that day and the corporation accepted the arrangement. The record shows that M. K. Brothers (a firm associated with Kailash Nath Agrawal) undertook to pay off the outstanding unsecured debts by retaining amounts from its selling agency commission and made various payments (including Rs. 12,500 in the period ending 21 June 1955, Rs. 50,000 annually for several years, and Rs. 33,333 in a later year). At some point the corporation wrote off Rs. 3,92,200 as a bad debt on 13 November 1959, representing part of the larger sum of Rs. 5,50,000 due from the petitioner.

In assessment proceedings for earlier years the Income-tax Officer and appellate authorities differed about the taxability of amounts related to the agency termination; earlier litigation resulted in the Tribunal reducing an assessment to Rs. 12,500 and this court approved the Tribunal's view for the assessment year 1956-57. For later years (1957–58 to 1960–61) the assessments and a reference in this Court on related questions were noted as pending.

On 25 March 1966 the Income-tax Officer issued a notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for assessment year 1960–61; those proceedings were quashed by this Court because the Income-tax Officer had not applied his mind to the correct previous year. On 27 July 1968 a fresh notice under Section 148 was issued for the assessment year 1961–62. The respondents indicated that these proceedings sought to tax Rs. 3,92,200 in the hands of the petitioner; the petitioner challenged the proceedings by an Article 226 petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction to initiate reassessment proceedings under Section 148 read with Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect of Rs. 3,92,200.
  2. Alternatively, if the proceedings are held to be referable to Section 147(b), whether they are barred by limitation under Section 149(1)(b).
  3. Whether the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (specifically Section 41(1) or Section 28(ii)(c)) apply to tax the Rs. 3,92,200, or whether the corresponding provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (notably section 10(5A)(d) and section 10(2A)) must be applied.
  4. Whether, on the facts, the sum of Rs. 3,92,200 written off by the corporation can be treated as (a) "income chargeable to tax" for the purposes of invoking the machinery of the 1961 Act under section 297(2)(d)(ii), and (b) as compensation or other payment due to or received by the petitioner under section 10(5A)(d) of the 1922 Act or as an amount attracting section 10(2A) of the 1922 Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner disputed the application of Section 41(1) and Section 28(ii)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to the sum of Rs. 3,92,200.
  • The petitioner contended there was no jurisdiction in the Income-tax Officer to initiate the reassessment proceedings under Section 148 because the officer did not have "reason to believe" that income had escaped assessment; the petitioner averred it had no knowledge of the corporation's write-off and had not omitted or failed to disclose any material facts.
  • The petitioner argued that, if any substantive provision were to be applied, it would be the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 rather than the 1961 Act.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The respondents argued that the petitioner was liable to tax in respect of Rs. 3,92,200 under Section 41(1) or Section 28(ii)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  • They contended that the 1961 Act applied because of section 297(2)(d)(ii) (a savings provision allowing notices under Section 148 where income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment and no proceedings under section 34 of the repealed Act were pending).
  • In the counter-affidavit the respondents denied the petitioner's allegation that it had no knowledge of the writing off of the bad debt; otherwise the record does not identify specific material relied upon by the Income-tax Officer to demonstrate a "reason to believe".

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Baroda Traders Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1965] 57 I.T.R. 490 (Guj.) Authority for the proposition that Section 10(2A) is attracted only where (inter alia) the business in which the loss/expenditure or trading liability was incurred is in existence during the previous year in which the subsequent receipt is sought to be added. The court relied on this authority to conclude that Section 10(2A) could not be invoked because the selling agency of the petitioner had already been terminated and there was no evidence of an allowance/deduction for the relevant loss or liability in prior assessments.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in structured stages, applying statutory tests and factual findings as recorded in the petition and the respondents' counter-affidavit.

  1. Jurisdiction under Section 148 / Section 147(a):
    • Section 147(a) allows reassessment if the Income-tax Officer has "reason to believe" that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment by virtue of an assessee's omission or failure to make a return under Section 139 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts.
    • The court emphasized that such a "reason to believe" must be based on some material before the officer. On examining the record, the court found no reference to any material indicating the petitioner had defaulted or omitted to disclose material facts in respect of the Rs. 3,92,200.
    • The petitioner had averred it had no knowledge of the corporation’s write-off, that the write-off was done without its consent or knowledge, and that it was not communicated to the petitioner; the respondents' filings did not point to material establishing the officer's reason to believe. On that basis the court held the conditions of Section 147(a) were not shown to be satisfied and that the notice dated 27 July 1968 was without jurisdiction.
  2. Alternative basis — Section 147(b) and limitation:
    • If the proceedings were treated as referable to Section 147(b), the court noted the period of limitation of four years prescribed by Section 149(1)(b) and concluded that the proceedings would be time-barred.
  3. Applicability of the 1961 Act via Section 297(2)(d)(ii):
    • The respondents argued that section 297(2)(d)(ii) of the 1961 Act permitted use of the 1961 Act machinery for escaped income relating to assessment years after 31 March 1940 where no section 34 proceedings under the 1922 Act were pending. The court accepted that no such proceedings were pending, so section 297(2)(d)(ii) could come into play as to procedure.
    • However, the court held that section 297(2)(d)(ii) only imported the assessment machinery of the 1961 Act and could not be used to impose a substantive liability to tax where none existed previously; the phrase "any income chargeable to tax" presupposed an existing liability to tax. Therefore, the court concluded that neither Section 28(ii)(c) nor Section 41(1) of the 1961 Act could be invoked to create a tax liability in the present case.
  4. Analysis under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 — section 10(5A)(d):
    • Section 10(5A)(d) deems certain compensation or other payments due to or received by an agent in connection with termination or modification of agency to be profits and gains of business.
    • The court examined whether the Rs. 3,92,200 written off by the corporation could be treated as "compensation or other payment due to or received by" the petitioner. It found the amount represented part of a larger debt due from the petitioner that had not been paid by the petitioner and which the agreements contemplated would be liquidated by M. K. Brothers. The corporation’s subsequent write-off as a bad debt could not be construed as compensation or payment due to or received by the petitioner. Accordingly, section 10(5A)(d) did not apply.
  5. Analysis under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 — section 10(2A):
    • Section 10(2A) applies where an allowance or deduction had been made in computing profits for a year in respect of a loss/expenditure or trading liability, and subsequently an amount is received in respect of that loss/expenditure or benefit accrues by remission/cessation.
    • The court found no evidence that the Rs. 3,92,200 related to any loss or expenditure that had been allowed or deducted in computing the petitioner’s profits in any assessment. There was also no evidence that any benefit derived from the write-off related to a trading liability for which an allowance had been made.
    • Moreover, relying on Baroda Traders Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, the court noted that section 10(2A) requires the business in which the loss or liability was incurred to be in existence during the previous year in which the receipt is sought to be taxed; the petitioner’s selling agency had already been terminated, so that precondition was not satisfied.
    • Therefore, section 10(2A) could not be invoked on the facts before the court.
  6. Conclusion of analysis:
    • Having found no material to justify the Income-tax Officer's "reason to believe" under Section 147(a), that the alternative limitation bar applied, and that neither the 1961 Act provisions nor the corresponding 1922 Act provisions could be invoked to tax the Rs. 3,92,200, the court concluded the petitioner was entitled to relief.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed and the notice dated 27 July 1968 issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1961–62 and the proceedings consequent thereto are quashed.

Direct consequences:

  • The reassessment proceedings initiated by the notice of 27 July 1968 are void for want of jurisdiction (on the record before the court) and are quashed.
  • The petitioner is entitled to its costs.

Broader implications:

  • The court emphasized that section 297(2)(d)(ii) of the 1961 Act brings the assessment machinery into play but does not create a substantive tax liability where none previously existed; the character of the income must permit taxation in the first instance.
  • The opinion applied existing principles (including the cited Baroda Traders authority) to the specific facts and did not purport to lay down a novel principle of law beyond the statutory interpretation and application evident in the reasoning. No broader new precedent beyond the court's application of these provisions on the facts was asserted in the judgment.

    Sharma & Co. v. Income-Tax Officer, Circle Ii, B-Ward, Kanpur.

    1. The petitioner applies under Article 226 of the Constitution for relief against proceedings initiated by a notice under Section 148, Income-tax Act, 1961.

    2. The petitioner is a partnership firm. It was the sole selling agent of the Kanpur Cotton Mills, a branch of the British India Corporation Ltd. On March 23, 1955, it entered into an agreement with Kailash Nath Agrawal. The agreement recited that it was not in a position to continue the selling agency in accordance with the wishes of the British India Corporation and that it owed Rs. 8,39,351 to the said corporation, and that in the circumstances the corporation desired its resignation from the selling agency and to appoint instead Kailash Nath Agrawal or a business unit controlled by him. The amount owed by the petitioner to the corporation was to be liquidated by the corporation by retaining out of the commission earned by the new selling agent a specified amount to be adjusted against those dues from time to time. On the same day, March 23, 1955, the petitioner informed the corporation of the agreement and tendered its resignation as sole selling agent. Simultaneously, Kailash Nath Agrawal also wrote to the corporation on March 23,1955, referring to this agreement and requested the corporation to appoint M. K. Brothers, a firm of which he was a partner, as sole selling agent. The corporation, on that same day, communicated its acceptance of the petitioner's resignation and of the terms contained in the agreement for the appointment of Kailash Nath Agrawal or his nominee as selling agent and the manner of liquidation of the amount due from the petitioner to the corporation. On March 26, 1955, the board of directors of the corporation, after giving credit for the security of Rs. 1,00,000 provided by the petitioner and the price of 292 bales belonging to it, noted :

    "M. K. Brothers had undertaken to pay off gradually the outstanding unsecured debts of Rs. 5 1/2 lakhs due by Messrs. Sharma & Company to the extent of 1/7th of their selling agency commission or Rs. 50,000 per annum whichever is greater until the debt was cleared."

    3. During the period ending June 21, 1955, M. K. Brothers paid Rs. 12,500 to the corporation towards the liquidation of the aforesaid amount.

    4. In assessment proceedings against the petitioner for the assessment year 1956-57 the Income-tax Officer treated the amount as assessable under Section 10(5A)(d), Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, on the footing that it was received by the petitioner as compensation for the termination of the selling agency. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, on appeal, took the view that Rs. 4,50,000 was assessable as compensation accruing to the petitioner. In second appeal, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal set aside this finding and restored the figure of Rs. 12,500. And on reference made to this court, the view taken by the Tribunal was approved.

    5. During the previous years relevant to the assessment years 1957-58 to 1959-60, M. K. Brothers paid Rs. 50,000 annually to the corporation on the same account and similarly a sum of Rs. 33,333 during the previous years relevant to the assessment year 1960-61. These amounts were also assessed for those assessment years under section 10(5a)(d) as representing part of the compensation for termination of the agency. A reference is pending in the matter in this court.

    6. On March 25, 1966, the Income-tax Officer issued a notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to the petitioner for the assessment year 1960-61 (the relevant previous year being the accounting year July 8, 1959). The petitioner says that during the reassessment proceedings, it came to know that a sum of Rs. 3,92,200 out of the aforesaid sum of Rs. 5,50,000 had not been paid by M. K. Brothers and it had been written off on November 13, 1959, by the corporation as a bad debt. The Income-tax Officer intimated that he proposed to assess the petitioner under Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect of that amount for the assessment year 1960-61. The petitioner challenged the proceedings by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The proceedings were quashed on the ground that the Income-tax Officer had failed to apply his mind as to what should have been the true "previous year" in which the amount fell for consideration.

    7. On July 27, 1968, the Income-tax Officer issued a fresh notice under Section 148, this time for the assessment year 1961-62. It is not disputed by the respondents that the proceedings so initiated are intended to tax the amount of Rs. 3,92,200 in the hands of the petitioner. The entire argument before us on behalf of the respondents is that the petitioner is liable to tax in respect of that amount either under Section 41(1) or Section 28(ii)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The petitioner disputes the application of those two provisions and contends in addition that there was no jurisdiction in the Income-tax Officer to initiate the proceedings under Section 148.

    8. The first question is whether the Income-tax Officer acted within his jurisdiction in initiating the proceedings under Section 148. A notice under Section 148 is issued for making an assessment or reassessment pursuant to Section 147. Section 147(a) provides for such assessment or reassessment if the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under Section 139 for any assessment year to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year. The essential basis for such a proceeding is a default by the assessee. Either he has omitted or failed to make a return of all his income chargeable to tax or has omitted or failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. For the Income-tax Officer to have reason to believe that the assessee was guilty of such default, there has to be some material before him on the basis of which he can have such reason to believe. On an examination of the record before us, we are unable to find reference to any such material. Indeed, the respondents do not say anywhere in their counter-affidavit that the Income-tax Officer had such reason to believe. The petitioner has clearly stated in paragraph 15 of the writ petition that before the reassessment proceedings consequent to the notice dated March 25, 1966, it has no knowledge that Rs. 3,92,200 had been written off by the corporation in its account books as a bad debt, that the "write off" was made without its consent or knowledge and it was not communicated to the petitioner by the corporation. In paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit the respondents merely deny the correctness of the averment. In paragraph 32 of the writ petition, the petitioner affirms that it has not been guilty of any omission or failure to make any disclosure in respect of the sum of Rs. 3,92,200, and in paragraph 33 the petitioner specifically states that the Income-tax Officer could have no reason to believe that any part of its income in the assessment year 1961-62 had escaped assessment or that it was guilty of any omission or failure to disclose fully or truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. The respondents, in paragraph 21 of their counter-affidavit, merely reply that there is no material on the record to support the petitioner's allegation that it had no knowledge of the writing off of the bad debt by the corporation. After weighing the material carefully it seems to us that the respondents have failed to establish that the conditions of Section 147(a) are satisfied. In the circumstances, we hold that upon the record before us no justification has been shown by the respondents for initiating the impugned proceeding by the notice dated July 27, 1968, and consequently that proceeding must be held to be without jurisdiction.

    9. Alternatively, if it is considered as a proceeding referable, to Section 147(b), then having regard to the period of limitation of four years prescribed by Section 149(1)(b) the proceeding is barred by time.

    10. Even if we assume that the conditions of Section 147(a) are satisfied, is the petitioner liable to tax in respect of the amount of Rs. 3,92,200 under Section 28(ii)(c) or Section 41(1) ? The petitioner contends that neither provision of the Act of 1961 can be invoked, because, if at all, it is the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922 which can be applied. The respondents, on the contrary, say that the Act of 1961 applies because of Section 297(2)(d)(ii), which provides:

    "297. Repeals and savings.--(1) ......

    (2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922) (hereinafter referred to as the repealed Act),--......

    1(d) where in respect of any assessment year after the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1940,--......

    (ii) any income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment within the meaning of that expression in Section 147 and no proceedings under section 34 of the repealed act in respect of any such income are pending at the commencement of this Act, a notice under Section 148 may, subject to the provisions contained in Section 149 or Section 150, be issued with respect to that assessment year and all the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly."

    11. There is no dispute that no proceedings under Section 34 of the Act of 1922 were pending on the commencement of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and, therefore, it is possible to say that Section 297(2)(d)(ii) would come into play. But, it must not be forgotten that when Section 297(2)(d)(ii) declares that a notice under Section 148 may be issued and "all the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly", it refers merely to the machinery provided by the Act for the assessment of escaped income. It cannot be employed for the purpose of imposing liability to tax where none existed before. The opening words of that provision, that is, "any income chargeable to tax" presuppose that the income which is sought to be assessed is already subject to tax liability. In our opinion, the petitioner is right in the contention that neither Section 28(ii)(c) nor Section 41(1) of the Act of 1961 can be invoked in the present case,

    12. We consider next whether the corresponding provisions, section 10(5a)(d) and Section 10(2A) of the Act of 1922, can be invoked. section 10(5a)(d) provides :

    "Any compensation or other payment due to or received by,--......

    (d) any person, by whatever name called, holding an agency in the taxable territories for any part of the activities relating to the business of any other person, at or in connection with the termination of his agency or the modification of the terms and conditions relating thereto :

    shall be deemed to be profits and gains of a business carried on by the............person.............and shall be liable to tax accordingly; and the tax on such compensation or other payment shall, if the assessee so elects, be computed at the average of the rates of income-tax and super-tax applicable to his total income for the three years immediately preceding the previous year in which the compensation or other payment was due or received."

    13. Can the amount of Rs. 3,92,200 written off by the corporation in its books be said to be "compensation or other payment due to or received by " the petitioner ? The amount represents part of the larger sum of Rs. 5,50,000 due from the petitioner to the corporation. It has not been paid by the petitioner, and the agreements and the communications of March 23, 1955, contemplated its liquidation by M. K. Brothers. Apparently, that was not found possible and, therefore, the corporation wrote off the amount as a bad debt. We fail to see how this can be construed as compensation or other payment due to or received by the petitioner. Neither was it due to or received by the petitioner nor was it compensation or other payment at or in connection with the termination of the sole selling agency formerly held by the petitioner. Learned counsel for the respondents has been unable to satisfy us that the provisions of section 10(5a) are attracted.

    14. As regards section 10(2A), it provides :

    "Where for the purpose of computing profits or gains under this section, an allowance or deduction has been made in the assessment for any year in respect of any loss, expenditure or trading liability incurred by the assessee, and, subsequently, during any previous year, the assessee has received, whether in cash or in any other manner whatsoever, any amount in respect of such loss or expenditure or has obtained some benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of remission or cessation thereof, the amount received by him or the value of the benefit accruing to him shall be deemed to be profits and gains of business, profession or vocation and to have accrued or arisen during that previous year."

    15. Plainly, this provision is attracted provided an allowance or reduction has been made while computing the profits or gains of a business, profession or vocation in the assessment for any year, the allowance or reduction being made in respect of any loss, expenditure or trading liability incurred by the assessee. Further, the amount subsequently received by the assessee, which is sought to be charged by reason of Section 10(2A), must have been received in respect of that loss or expenditure or must amount to a benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of remission or cessation thereof. There is no evidence before us that the amount of Rs. 3,92,200 relates to any loss or expenditure actually allowed or deducted when computing the profits or gains of the assessee in the assessment for any year. Nor is there anything to show that any benefit derived by the assessee from the writing off of that amount is related to a trading liability for which an allowance or reduction has been made in any such assessment. Further, to invoke Section 10(2A), it appears necessary that the business in which the loss, expenditure or trading liability was incurred, should be in existence during the previous year in which the subsequent receipt is sought to be added as the assessee's profits. See Baroda Traders Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1965] 57 I.T.R. 490 (Guj.). Upon the facts before us, that cannot be said when the selling agency enjoyed by the petitioner had already been terminated.

    16. In the circumstances, we hold the petitioner is entitled to relief.

    17. The petition is allowed. The notice dated July 27, 1968, issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1961-62 and the proceedings consequent thereto taken against the petitioner are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to its costs.

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    Comments

    Sharma & Co. v. Income-Tax Officer, Circle Ii, B-Ward, Kanpur.
    (Sep 22, 1971)