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citation codes
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  • Sec. 47-A as introduced by Sec. 3 of U.P Act No. IX of 1933 ran as follows:47-A. Substitution of a new section for Sec. 47-A of Act II
  • U.P Municipalities (Second Amendment) Act (U.P Act No. XIII) of 1942 omitted Sec. 47-A of the U.P Municipalies Act
  • Sec. 38 of the U.P Town Areas Act.4. Sec. 87-A of the U.P Municipalities Act
  • U.P Act No. IX of 1933. By Sec. 5 of U.P Act No. XIII of 1942, Sec. 87-A
  • Secs. 87-A and 47-A of the U.P Municipalities Act (No. IX of 1933),
  • Sub-sec. (13) of the same section of the U.P Municipalities Act
  • Sec. 87-A as introduced by Sec. 9 of Act No. IX of 1933
  • provisions of Sec. 87-A of the U.P Municipalities Act
  • Secs. 87-A and 47-A of the U.P Municipalities Act
  • rule 9 of Schedule I of the Public Health Act,
  • Sec. 88-A(12) of the U.P Municipalities Act
  • Sec. 87-A(12) of the U.P Municipalities Act
  • U.P Municipalities (Amendment) Act (U.P Act
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • Sec. 87-A of the U.P Municipalities Act
  • English Local Government Act of 1933
  • Sec. 5 of the U.P Town Areas Act, 1914,
  • U.P Municipalities Act by U.P Act
  • U.P Municipalities Act (Act
  • U.P Municipalities Act
  • Public Health Act, 1875.
  • Amending Act of 1964
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sec. 47-A as introduced by Sec. 3 of U.P Act No. IX of 1933 ran as follows:47-A. Substitution of a new section for Sec. 47-A of Act II
  • U.P Municipalities (Second Amendment) Act (U.P Act No. XIII) of 1942 omitted Sec. 47-A of the U.P Municipalies Act
  • Sec. 38 of the U.P Town Areas Act.4. Sec. 87-A of the U.P Municipalities Act
  • U.P Act No. IX of 1933. By Sec. 5 of U.P Act No. XIII of 1942, Sec. 87-A
  • Secs. 87-A and 47-A of the U.P Municipalities Act (No. IX of 1933),
  • Sub-sec. (13) of the same section of the U.P Municipalities Act
  • Sec. 87-A as introduced by Sec. 9 of Act No. IX of 1933
  • provisions of Sec. 87-A of the U.P Municipalities Act
  • Secs. 87-A and 47-A of the U.P Municipalities Act
  • rule 9 of Schedule I of the Public Health Act,
  • Sec. 88-A(12) of the U.P Municipalities Act
  • Sec. 87-A(12) of the U.P Municipalities Act
  • U.P Municipalities (Amendment) Act (U.P Act
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • Sec. 87-A of the U.P Municipalities Act
  • English Local Government Act of 1933
  • Sec. 5 of the U.P Town Areas Act, 1914,
  • U.P Municipalities Act by U.P Act
  • U.P Municipalities Act (Act
  • U.P Municipalities Act
  • Public Health Act, 1875.
  • Amending Act of 1964
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — Shukla, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The reference arises from a writ petition admitted by the Bench and a direction that the Division Bench decision in Bhaiya Lal v. P.N. Tewari (1970 A.L.J. 36) required reconsideration.

The Town Area Committee of Gola Bazar, District Gorakhpur, consisted of nine elected members and one Chairman (total strength ten). One member, Noor Mohammad, died in 1965 leaving a vacancy unfilled. On 19-12-1969 five members gave notice of intention to move a motion of non-confidence against the Chairman. The District Magistrate fixed 19-1-1970 for consideration of the motion. On that date five members were present; the Munsif presided. All five voted in favour. The Presiding Officer, relying on the ruling reported at 1970 A.L.J. 36, declared the motion passed. The minutes recorded that since five members voted in favour and there were only eight members and the Chairman in total, the motion was passed by a majority and carried.

The petitioner filed a writ petition (certiorari and mandamus) to quash the proceedings of the motion of non-confidence dated 19-1-1970 and to restrain the District Magistrate and the State of Uttar Pradesh from interfering with the petitioner's functioning as Chairman. The respondents contested the writ and filed counter-affidavits asserting the presiding officer correctly declared the motion carried because five members constituted the requisite majority.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the phrase "total number of members of the committee" in Sec. 87-A(12) of the U.P. Municipalities Act (as applied to Town Areas) means the total strength of the committee as initially constituted (i.e., including vacancies) or the present strength ("for the time being").
  2. Whether the motion of non-confidence held on 19-1-1970 was valid when five members voted in favour, given the Committee's total sanctioned strength of ten and one existing vacancy.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The expression "total number of members of the Committee" in Sec. 87-A(12) refers to the total strength of the Committee as initially constituted (ten members), not the present strength; therefore a majority of more than half of ten (i.e., at least six) was required to carry a motion of non-confidence.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Presiding Officer properly declared the motion carried because five members had voted in favour and that, in the respondents' view (as stated in the counter-affidavit), constituted a majority of more than half of the total number of the members of the Board/Committee.
  • Learned counsel for the respondents contended that construing "total number" as the petition urges would produce anomalous results — specifically that the quorum required to convene a meeting should align with the majority required to pass the motion; an effective quorum would otherwise be meaningless if it could not produce a valid resolution.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhaiya Lal v. P.N. Tewari, 1970 A.L.J. 36 The Division Bench decision whose correctness was questioned in the reference. It was the subject-matter of the reference; the Court expressed disagreement with its view.
Guardians of Parish of Brighton v. Guardians of Strand Union, 1891 2 Q.B. 156, 167 Shows that different phraseology within the same provision suggests different connotations/intent. Cited to support the inference that differing expressions ("total number" vs "for the time being") were intentionally used to convey different meanings.
Malikarjunarao v. Official Receiver, A.I.R. 1938 Madras 449, 454 Same principle regarding change in phraseology indicating change of meaning. Used to support the construction that "total number" differs from "for the time being".
Manicklall v. S.D. Dabiruddin Ahmad, A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 236, 237 Principle that variation in words within the same statute is significant. Cited as authority for treating the altered wording as deliberate and meaningful.
In re Chundura Venkata Subramanyam Referenced in context with authorities on statutory wording differences. Cited among authorities applying the principle that different expressions bear different connotations.
Duparsuet Huot and Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 80 L. Ed. 591, 594 Legislative history accompanying an amendment can be relevant to meaning of the provision. Cited to justify consulting legislative history to ascertain the mischief and intention behind an amendment.
Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 661 Supreme Court recognition that legislative history may be material to construction. Referred to in support of relying on legislative history to interpret Sec. 87-A.
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 955, 969 Supports taking account of legislative history and purpose in statutory interpretation. Used as authority for considering legislative intent in interpreting amended provisions.
Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 628 Summarises that legislative history, purpose and mischief are proper aids to construction. Quoted to reinforce approach to interpret Sec. 87-A with attention to legislative factors.
Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 743 Supreme Court considered legislative history material when construing a statutory provision. Cited as precedent for examining legislative history of Sec. 87-A.
D.R. Fraser and Co. Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, 1949 A.C. 24 P.C. Change in phraseology in an amending Act presumes a change in meaning. Used to support the presumption that amendment to Sec. 87-A(12) altered meaning deliberately.
Adilabad Municipality v. Mahadeo, A.I.R. 1967 A.P. 363 Explains modes by which statutes in pari materia and subsequent statutes may assist interpretation. Relied on to justify looking at related statutes and subsequent amendments ("parliamentary exposition").
Newhaven Local Board v. Newhaven School Board, 1885 30 Ch. D. 350 Interpreted "one-third of the full number" as requiring reference to full membership (not reduced by resignation) when assessing quorum. Cited to illustrate that "full/whole number" is commonly used to denote total prescribed membership for quorum purposes.
Pyare Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. Allahabad 6047 Single Judge decision supporting interpretation that "total number" means total strength. Relied on as earlier authority of this Court consistent with the interpretation adopted here.
Jamshed Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Civil Misc. Writ No. 2332 of 1962 (4-10-1962) Single Judge decision supporting the "total strength" interpretation. Listed among single judge decisions the Court accepted as supporting its view.
Mangla Prasad v. District Magistrate, Civil Misc. Writ No. 2924 of 1968 (19-5-1969) Single Judge decision interpreted "total number" as total membership. Cited as further support from this Court's single judge decisions.
Shyamoadda v. Abani Mahan, A.I.R. 1951 Calcutta 420 High Court decision interpreting the expression "whole number". Referred to as supporting authority from other High Courts for the Court's interpretation.
Sukhdeo v. Arrah Municipality, A.I.R. 1956 Patna 367 High Court decision on meaning of "whole number". Cited as additional High Court authority consistent with Court's construction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of textual, historical and purposive reasoning as follows:

  1. Textual distinction: The Court observed that within Sec. 87-A different sub-sections use distinct expressions — sub-secs. (2) and (12) refer to "total number of members of the board/committee" while sub-sec. (13) refers specifically to "total number of members of the board for the time being." The deliberate use of differing expressions within the same section suggests differing meanings. The Court relied on authorities for the proposition that such variations are intentional and meaningful.
  2. Semantic conclusion: From the textual distinction the Court concluded that "total number of members of the board" (without the qualifying words "for the time being") denotes the total membership as originally constituting the Board (i.e., full sanctioned strength), whereas the phrase with "for the time being" would include casual vacancies.
  3. Legislative history: The Court examined the legislative history. It noted that when Secs. 87-A and 47-A were first introduced by U.P. Act No. IX of 1933, the requisite number for a non-confidence resolution was described with the words "for the time being." The U.P. Municipalities (Second Amendment) Act (U.P. Act No. XIII of 1942) amended Sec. 87-A(12) to substitute the words "more than half of the total number of members of the Board" (omitting "for the time being"). The Court treated this amendment as deliberate and significant, indicating a legislative intent to equate the number required to pass a motion with the total number constituting the Board (i.e., the full strength).
  4. Subsequent amendments and in pari materia statutes: The Court noted that a later amendment (U.P. Act No. XXVI of 1964) explicitly inserted "for the time being" in sub-sec. (13) to specify quorum, while leaving sub-sec. (12) unaltered. This contrast reinforced the conclusion that the Legislature intended different meanings in the two sub-sections: "for the time being" where vacancies should be accounted for (quorum), and "total number" where the full sanctioned membership should be considered (majority to carry a motion).
  5. Addressing the respondents' anomaly argument: The respondents argued that the petitioner's construction could produce an anomaly because quorum for convening should correspond to the majority required to carry the motion. The Court rejected this, explaining that quorum concerns commencement of the meeting while majority concerns the state of membership at the time of voting. The Court gave examples of how numbers present may change during a meeting and showed that the two concepts can legitimately differ.
  6. Support from precedents: The Court relied on several single judge decisions of the same Court and decisions from other High Courts that interpreted “whole number” or “total number” in the manner adopted by the Court. It also invoked authorities to justify consulting legislative history and to support the presumption that a change in phraseology effects a change in meaning.
  7. Application to facts: Applying the above construction to the facts — the Committee's sanctioned strength was ten, with one vacancy, so the "total number of members" was ten and a motion would require a majority of more than half of ten (i.e., at least six). Only five members voted in favour on 19-1-1970; therefore the motion did not meet the statutory requirement under Sec. 87-A(12).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the writ petition. It held that the meeting which purported to pass the motion of non-confidence on 19-1-1970 acted in violation of Sec. 87-A(12) of the U.P. Municipalities Act (as applied to Town Areas). The Court quashed the proceedings of the motion of non-confidence (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) and issued a writ of mandamus directing respondents Nos. 1 and 3 not to interfere with the petitioner's functioning as Chairman on the basis of those proceedings. The petitioner was awarded costs against respondents Nos. 1 and 3.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The specific proceedings of 19-1-1970 were declared invalid and set aside; the petitioner remains Chairman for the purposes identified in the writ and the respondents were restrained from acting on the impugned proceedings.
  • Interpretive consequence: The Court adopted and applied the construction that "total number of members" in Sec. 87-A(12) refers to the total sanctioned strength (initial constitution) of the Board/Committee rather than the present strength ("for the time being").
  • Relation to prior authority: The Court stated that it was unable to agree with the view expressed in the Division Bench decision in Bhaiya Lal v. P.N. Tewari (1970 A.L.J. 36) and preferred the earlier single-judge and other High Court authorities cited in support of its construction. The decision thus rejected the reasoning of that Division Bench in the context of the present reference.

Disposition: Petition allowed. Costs to the petitioner against respondents Nos. 1 and 3.

    Mangala Prasad Jaiswal v. District Magistrate

    Shukla, J.:— This case has come to us on a reference made by the Bench which admitted the writ petition and expressed the opinion that the division Bench decision in Bhaiya Lal v. P.N Tewari . 1970 A.L.J 36. required reconsideration.

    2. The admitted facts of the case are that the Town Area Committee of Gola Bazar (hereinafter called the Committee) district Gorakhpur is constituted by nine members and one Chairman. Thus, the total number of the members of the Committee is ten. Out of the said members Noor Mohammad died in 1965 and a vacancy was declared which still remains unfilled. On 19-12-1969 five members of the Committee gave notice of their intention to move a motion of non-confidence against its Chairman (petitioner). The District Magistrate by his order dated 31-12-1969 fixed 19-1-1970 as the date for consideration of the motion of non-confidence. On the date fixed five members of the Committee were present in the meeting. The Munsif, Bansgaon, district Gorakhpur, presided over the meeting. All the five members of the Committee who were present voted in favour of the motion of non-confidence and the Presiding Officer, relying on the ruling reported in 1970 A.L.J 36, declared that the motion of non-confidence was passed. The Minutes of the meeting recorded the result of the voting thus:—

    “Since all the five members namely Sri Hanuman Prasad Sri Ram Rachha Chand, Sri Raj Narain Chand, Sri Nav Ratan Lal and Sri Parag have voted in favour of the motion and there are only eight members and the Chairman, in total, the motion is passed by a majority and it stands carried.”

    3. The petitioner filed this writ petition praying for a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the proceedings of the motion of non-confidence dated 19-1-1970 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) and for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents Nos. 1 and 3 namely the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur, and the State of Uttar Pradesh, not to interfere with the petitioner's functioning as Chairman of the Town Area Committee, Gola Bazar. The writ was contested by the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 3 and a counter affidavit by the Town Area Clerk of Collectorate, Gorakhpur, was filed. It was stated in the counter affidavit that the Presiding Officer had rightly declared the motion of non-confidence as carried because it had been passed by five members, which constituted the majority of more than half of the total number of the members of the Board. The contention of the petitioner, in short, is that the expression “total number of members of the Committee” used in Sec. 87-A(12) of the U.P Municipalities Act as applied to the Town Areas means the total strength of the Town Area Committee and not the present strength thereof. In the present case the total number of members of the Town Area Committee was ten, therefore at least six members were required for carrying the motion of non-confidence against the petitioner. Since only five members had voted in favour of the motion, according to the petitioner, it should have been declared to have failed. It is not disputed that as provided by Sec. 5 of the U.P Town Areas Act, 1914, a Town Area Committee consists of the Chairman and the elected members who shall not be less than nine and more than fifteen as the State Government may by notification in the official Gazette specify. It is also not disputed that the provisions of Sec. 87-A of the U.P Municipalities Act were extended to the Town Areas under Sec. 38 of the U.P Town Areas Act.

    4. Sec. 87-A of the U.P Municipalities Act as applied to the U.P Town Areas reads as under:—

    “Motion of non-confidence against Chairman. Sec. 87-A: (1) Subject to the provision of this section a motion expressing non-confidence in the Chairman shall be made only in accordance with the procedure laid down below:

    (2) Written notice of intention to make a motion of non-confidence in its Chairman, signed by such members or members of the committee as constitute not less than one-half of the total number of members of the committee, together with a copy of the motion which it is proposed to make shall be delivered in person together by any two of the members signing the notice to the District Magistrate.

    …………………………………………………….

    (12) The motion shall be deemed to have been carried only when it has been passed by a majority of more than half of the total number of members of the committee.

    (13) If the motion is not carried by a majority as aforesaid, or if the meeting cannot be held for want of quorum, no notice of any subsequent motion of non-confidence in the same Chairman shall be received until after the expiry of a period of twelve months from the date of meeting.

    (14) No notice of a motion of non-confidence under this section shall be received within twelve months of assumption of office by the Chairman.”

    5. The language of Sec. 87-A of the U.P Municipalities Act is identical except that “Board” is substituted for “Committee”, only Sub-sec. (13) of the same section of the U.P Municipalities Act may be reproduced:—

    “If the motion is not carried by a majority as aforesaid, or if the meeting cannot be held for want of a quorum (which shall be not less than one-half of the total number of members of the board for the time being) no notice of any subsequent motion of non-confidence in the same (President) shall be received untill after the expiry of a period of twelve months from the date of the meeting.”

    (The italicies is ours).

    6. The contention of the petitioner is that the words “total number of members of the board” occurring in sub-sec. (12) of Sec. 87-A mean the total number of members who initially constitute the Board and consequently the existence of any casual vacancy of a particular time is irrelevant for calculating the total number of members for the purposes of sub-sec. (12).

    7. In our opinion there is force in this contention. It will be noticed that in Sec. 87-A itself sub-Secs. (2) and (12) use the words “total number of members of the board” whereas sub-sec. (13) uses the words “total of members of the hoard for the time being.” The use of two different expressions at two different places in the same section suggests that they have different connotations. Prima facie such an alteration would be considered intentional. See Guardians of Parish of Brighton v. Guardian of Strand Union . 1891 2 Q.B 156 167.; Malikarjunarao v. Official Receiver . A.I.R 1938 Madras 449 454., Manicklall v. S.D Dabiruddin Ahmad . A.I.R 1951 Cal. 236 237.; In re Chundura Venkata Subramanyam,5 Applying this principle, the total number of members of the board simpliciter is something different from the “total number of the members of the board for the time being.” While “total number of members of the board for the time being”, must take into account the casual vacancy, the “total number of members of the board” can only mean total number of members initially constituting the Board.

    8. The legislative history of Secs. 87-A and 47-A of the U.P Municipalities Act also leads to the same conclusion. Secs. 87-A and 47-A of the U.P Municipalities Act did not form part of the U.P Municipalities Act (Act No. 2 of 1916) as originally enacted. These sections were introduced for the first time in the U.P Municipalities Act by U.P Act No. IX of 1933. The relevant part of Sec. 87-A as introduced by Sec. 9 of Act No. IX of 1933 was as follows:

    “…………………………………………………….

    (3) If the board shall have adopted by a majority consisting of more than one-half of the members of the board for the time being a resolution expressing non-confidence in its chairman, and if the said chairman or the board within a period of two months after such resolution has been adopted shall received a notice in writing signed by not less than one-third of the members of the board that there is an intention to discuss a motion that the board shall adopt a resolution calling upon the chairman to resign, the chairman shall, at the first meeting held after the expiry of a period of seven days from the date of receipt of such notice, place the said motion before the board at the first item of the agenda for such meeting and shall give the board an opportunity of discussing the motion and voting upon it.

    ………………………………….”

    9. Similarly Sec. 47-A as introduced by Sec. 3 of U.P Act No. IX of 1933 ran as follows:—

    “47-A. Substitution of a new section for Sec. 47-A of Act II of 1916—If a board has adopted, by a majority consisting of more than one-half of the members of the board for the time being, a resolution expressing non-confidence in its chairman (not being an office chairman) and a subsequent meeting has, by a majority consisting as aforesaid, adopted a resolution calling upon him to resign, such chairman shall, within three days of receipt of notice that the latter resolution has been adopted, submit his resignation in the manner prescribed by Sec. 47.”

    10. From the above it would be evident that when Secs. 87-A and 47-A were introduced for the first time by U.P Act No. IX of 1933 the requisite number of the members for adopting a resolution expressing non-confidence in the chairman consisted of more than one half of the members of the Board for the time being.

    11. The U.P Municipalities (Second Amendment) Act (U.P Act No. XIII) of 1942 omitted Sec. 47-A of the U.P Municipalies Act which had been inserted by U.P Act No. IX of 1933. By Sec. 5 of U.P Act No. XIII of 1942, Sec. 87-A as introduced by U.P Act No. IX of 1933 was amended and sub-Sec. (12) was substituted in the following terms:—

    “(12) The motion shall be deemed to have been carried only when it has been passed by a majority of more than half of the total number of members of the Board, and when it has been so carried the provincial Government; shall by notification in the official Gazette remove the chairman, and the chairman shall be deemed to have vacated office with effect from the date of publication of the notification.”.

    12. This clearly indicates that the Legislature was aware of the implication of the words “the total number of members of the board for the time being”, which occurred in Secs. 87-A and 47-A of the U.P Municipalities Act (No. IX of 1933), and presumably with a view to giving greater protection to the President of the Board it equated the number of the members required for passing a motion of non-confidence with the total number of the members constituting the Board. The U.P Act No. XIII of 1942 was promulgated by the Government. It was passed by the Legislature in the same form by U.P Act No. XIII of 1948.

    13. Ordinarily the parliamentary history of a statute is not admissible to construe its meaning, but where a statute has under gone changes by way of amendments, it is not only permissible but of great assistance in the matter of interpretation to examine the legislative history of the provisions. In Duparsuet Huot and Moneuse Co. v. Evans . 80 L. Ed. 591 594. Cardozo, J. speaking about “Equity receiver ships”, remarked;

    “They came into the statute through an amendment proposed when the Bill which was adopted as Sec. 77-B was passing through the Senate. They came there freighted with the meaning imparted to them by the mischief to be remedied and by contemporaneous discussion. In such conditions history is a teacher that is not to be ignored.”

    14. Similar view has been expressed by our Supreme Court, See Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar . A.I.R 1955 S.C 661. and Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar . A.I.R 1962 S.C 955 969.. The rule was thus summed up by Venkatarama Aiyar, J. in Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India . A.I.R 1957 S.C 628 para 6.:—

    “To decide the true scope of the present Act, therefore we must have regard to all such factors as can legitimately be taken into account in ascertaining the intention of the legislature, such as the history of the legislation and the purposes thereof, the mischief which it intended to suppress and the other provisions of the statute, and construe the language of Sec. 2(d) in the light of the indications furnished by them.”

    15. In Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan . A.I.R 1964 S.C 743., before dealing with the question of construction of Sec. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Supreme Court considered it to be material to refer to the legislative history of the section.

    16. Thus, the legislative history of Sec. 87-A of the U.P Municipalities Act itself reveals that the Legislature amended the earlier provision so as to co-relate it with the total number of members of the. Board. The ancestry of the provision strongly suggests that perhaps the intention which inspired the amendment was that the President of the Board should enjoy greater protection and the motion of non-confidence should not be deemed to have been carried against him unless it was passed by a majority of more than half of the total number of the members initially constituting the Board. Where the Amending Act alters the language of the principal, statute, the alteration must be taken to have been made deliberately. See D.R Fraser and Co. Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenu . 1949 A.C 24 P.C.: It would be a sound rule of construction to hold that the change cannot be disregarded as a mere freak of the Legislature. The rule is thus stated by Crawford in his ‘Statutory Construction at page 618—

    “A change in the phraseology creates the presumption that the legislature intended a change of meaning. Indeed, the mere fact that the legislature enacts an amendment is of itself an indication of intention, as a general rule, to alter the pre-existing law.”

    17. In our opinion it is clear on the face of the amended Sec. 87-A(12) that a change in the law as it stood before the amendment was intended.

    18. The Legislative intent of the amending provision in the present case can be ascertained from another fact which is a significant pointer. Statutes in pari materia and later amendments can be sometimes looked into for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the Legislature. In Adilabad Municipality v. Mahadeo . A.I.R 1967 A.P 363. it was observed at page 368:—

    “The rule in regard to construction of the statutes, which are in pari materia need not be confused with other allied rules of construction. In considering what light one statute may throw upon the meaning of another statute, there are three different modes to ascertain what assistance can be derived; firstly, from the statutes, which are in pari materia with the statute under consideration secondly, from the statutes not precisely in pari materia, but which have similar scope on similar subject or which in some way relate to or affect the same subject-matter and thirdly, from subsequent statutes, which are called “Parliamentary expositions” of prior statutes.”

    19. So far as sub-Secs. (12) and (13) of the U.P Municipalities Act are concerned, the Amending Act of 1964 may be regarded as “parliamentary exposition” of the earlier statute. The quorum for holding a meeting convened for the consideration of the non-confidence motion was specifically provided by U.P Municipalities (Amendment) Act (U.P Act No. XXVI of 1964) which by Sec. 49 inserted in sub-Sec. 13 of Sec. 87-A the words “which shall be not less than half of the total number of the members of the Board for the time being”. Even prior to that amendment the same quorum was by implication provided in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 88 which related to business which was required to be transacted by a special resolution. This was, however, made explicit by a definite provision in this regard in the amended sub-Sec. (13) of Sec. 87-A in 1964. Still, the Legislature did not choose to insert the words “for the time being”, in sub-Sec. (12) of the Sec. 87-A. The fact that the Legislature eschewed the use of a similar expression in sub-Sec. (12) irresistibly leads to the conclusion that for prescribing the quorum necessary for passing a motion of non-confidence the legislature intended to refer to the total number of members and not to the members of the Board “for the time being.”

    20. It was contended by learned counsel for the respondents that the construction suggested by the petitioner would lead to anomalous results. It was pointed out that the quorum for holding the meeting for consideration of the motion of non-confidence must be the same as the quorum required for actually passing the motion of non-confidence, because the Legislature could not have intended to provide an ineffective quorum for holding a meeting which would be eventually incompetent to pass a resolution of non-confidence. We are unable to accede to this submission. In our opinion the two things are quite different. The requirements of quorum have to be looked into for the commencement of the meeting. The requirements for passing of a resolution have to be looked into at the time the resolution is put to vote. It is possible that at the commencement of a meeting the number of members present may be barely sufficient to constitute the quorum prescribed in sub-Sec. (13) for holding the meeting, but later more members may arrive and at the time when the resolution of non-confidence is put to vote, more than half of the full membership of the Board may be present as provided by sub-Sec. (12) of Sec. 87-A. The reverse can also happen, that is, at the commencement of the meeting more than half of the total number of members constituting the Board may be present but some of them may leave the meeting and be not present at the time when the resolution of non-confidence is put to vote so that the quorum prescribed under sub-Sec. (12) may not be available. Therefore, the adoption of the construction which we are putting on sub-Sec. (12) will not lead to any anomalous results.

    21. The meaning of the words “total number of members” is quite plain. It can hardly be disputed that the words “total” and “whole” are synonymous. The dictionary meaning of the word “whole” is “total” and vice versa. In fact, the whole members of a Board or a body is a well-known expression and is used to convey the totality of the members provided for a complete constitution of the body. In English statutes also the word “whole” has been used in the sense of total membership constituting: the Board. Sri S.C Khare, the learned counsel for the petitioner, referred us to the English Local Government Act of 1933 and submitted that it co-related the quorum of the local authorities (by Sec. 75 read with parts I to V of the third Schedule of the Act providing for the quorum of the meeting of the different local bodies) with the whole number of members of the Board. He also relied upon an English decision in Newhaven Local Board v. Newhaven School Board . 1885 30 Ch. D. 350.. The facts of that case were that there was a local Board established under the Public Health Act, 1875. The constitution of the Board provided that no action could be taken by the Board unless one-third of the full number of the members of the Board were present at the meeting. The Board consisted of nine members, seven members had resigned. It was held that the two remaining members of the Board were incompetent to transact the business of the local Board. In other words, it was ruled that the quorum for carrying on business was not there, so the members were incompetent to transact the business of the Board. Although the impugned action was upheld in the appeal by virtue of rule 9 of Schedule I of the Public Health Act, which provided that notwithstanding any defect or vacancy in the constitution of the body, the action would be valid, yet the view expressed by the original court namely that no action could be taken except in a meeting in which one-third of the full number of the members of the Board were present, was not overruled in appeal.

    22. The interpretation of Sec. 87-A (12) that we accept is supported by the following three single judge decisions of this Court—

    1. Pyare Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh . A.I.R 1955 N.U.C Allahabad 6047..

    2. Jamshed Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh . Civil Misc. Writ No. 2332 of 1962 decided on 4-10-1962. by Hon'ble Oak, J.

    3. Mangla Prasad v. District Magistrate . Civil Misc. Writ No. 2924 of 1968 decided on 19-5-1969. by Hon'ble Satish Chandra, J.

    23. The division Bench which decided the case of Bhaiya Lal overruled the above three single decisions but with great respect, we are unable to agree with the view expressed in Bhaiya Lal's case and are of the opinion that the interpretation adopted in the three single Judge decisions was sound. We are also fortified in our view by the decisions of the other High Courts which interpreted the expression “whole number.” See Shyamoadda v. Abani Mahan . A.I.R 1951 Calcutta 420. and Sukhdeo v. Arrah Municipality . A.I.R 1956 Patna 367..

    24. For the above reasons we are of the opinion that the meeting of the Town Area Committee, Golabazar, district Gorakhpur, which purported pass the motion of non-confidence against the petitioner on 19-1-1970 acted in violation of Sec. 88-A(12) of the U.P Municipalities Act as applied to the Town Areas. The total number of members of the committee was ten but only five members were present in the meeting and voted in favour of the motion of non-confidence, which was alleged to have been earned. The proceedings of the said meeting were consequently bad in law and liable to be set aside. We, therefore, quash the proceedings of the motion of non-confidence (annexure 5 to the writ petition) and also issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents Nos. 1 and 5 not to interfere on the basis of the aforesaid proceedings with the petitioner's functioning as the Chairman of the Town Area Committee, Golabazar, district Gorakhpur. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The petitioner shall get costs of this petition from respondents Nos. 1 and 3.

    25. Petition allowed.

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    Mangala Prasad Jaiswal v. District Magistrate
    (Sep 8, 1970)