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  • S. 33 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act.
  • Sec. 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act
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  • S. 33 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act.
  • Sec. 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Full Bench)

Factual and Procedural Background

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the opinion provided.

Two suits, arising out of an alleged breach of an agreement dated 1-4-1953, were instituted in Gorakhpur. Suit No. 6 of 1956 was filed by Lala Bulaki Dass against Jai Narain Har Narain, Jainarain and Har Narain seeking Rs. 22,000 as refund of advance money and consequential reliefs. Suit No. 599 of 1956 was filed by the firm Jai Narain Har Narain against firm Sohan Pal Munna Lal and L. Bulaki Dass claiming Rs. 5,000 for alleged breach of the same agreement.

Suit No. 599 of 1956 was transferred to the court of the Civil Judge, Gorakhpur and the two suits were consolidated and decided by a single common judgment dated 30-4-1957. Separate decrees were prepared in the two suits. The trial court decreed Suit No. 6 in favour of Bulaki Dass for Rs. 14,202/7/- and dismissed Suit No. 599.

The defendants in Suit No. 6 (Jai Narain Har Narain, Jai Narain and Har Narain) filed First Appeal No. 307 of 1958 in this Court against the decree dated 30-4-1957. They did not file any appeal against the decree dismissing Suit No. 599 of 1956. A preliminary objection was raised that because no appeal was filed against the decree in Suit No. 599 the judgment of 30-4-1957 had become final and First Appeal No. 307 of 1958 was barred by res judicata. The preliminary objection was referred to a Full Bench for opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the judgment dated 30-4-1957 (the common judgment disposing of consolidated Suit No. 6 of 1956 and Suit No. 599 of 1956) had become final so as to operate as a bar of res judicata to First Appeal No. 307 of 1958.
  2. Whether Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) creates a bar of res judicata in the instant appeal, given that an appeal was not filed against the decree passed in one of the consolidated suits (Suit No. 599 of 1956).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments (as recorded)

  • Mr. Jagdish Swarup, representing the respondent in the first appeal, contended that the question which had become res judicata was whether the defendants-appellants had committed breach of the agreement dated 1-4-1953, and that this question (already answered by the trial court) could not be reopened in the first appeal.
  • He relied on a number of authorities (including Zaharia v. Debia, Dakhni Din v. Syed Ali Ashghar, Mohammad Mohtashim v. Joti Prasad and others) which, according to his submission, supported the proposition that where consolidated suits are decided by a common judgment but separate decrees, an appeal against one decree may be barred if no appeal is taken against the other decree.

Other Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellants' written submissions beyond the fact that the appellants filed First Appeal No. 307 of 1958 challenging the decree dated 30-4-1957.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
L. Janakirama Iyer v. P.M. Nilakanta Iyar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 633 That res judicata in suits is governed by Section 11, C.P.C.; the Court cited it as authority for the proposition that Sec. 11 is the relevant provision for res judicata in suits. The Court relied on the principle to frame its inquiry under Section 11 C.P.C. when assessing whether the instant appeal was barred.
Mt. Lachhmi v. Mt. Bhulli, A.I.R. 1927 Lahore 289 F.B. Held that res judicata is created by a judgment/decision and not by a decree; estoppel arises from the decision of the matter in controversy. The Full Bench relied on this authority to support the proposition that the operative factor is the decision (judgment) and not the mere existence of a decree.
Narhari v. Shanker, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 419 Affirmed that the determining factor for res judicata is the matter in controversy and the judgment/decision rather than the decree. The Court treated Narhari as a governing Supreme Court authority supporting the view that a judgment (decision) — not a decree — creates the bar of res judicata.
Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 338 Considered in relation to whether earlier authorities (like Narhari) remain good law; raised the question whether res judicata could be treated as created by decrees in some circumstances. The Full Bench held that Badri Narayan Singh does not depart from Narhari and does not undermine the proposition that res judicata is created by a judgment/decision.
Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar (Smt), A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1332 Discussed principles as to when a decision in one appeal may operate as res judicata in another; considered authority on consolidation/appeals and res judicata. The Court observed that Sheodan Singh does not overrule Narhari and that its principles are distinguishable on facts; the Bench concluded it did not change the general proposition that res judicata arises from a judgment/decision.
Bhagwan Sahai v. Daryao Kunwar, A.I.R. 1963 Alld. 210 Example of consolidated suits disposed of by one judgment where appeals in some suits were dismissed and the effect was argued to create res judicata. The Full Bench distinguished the case on its facts (where appellate courts had in effect affirmed the trial court's decision by the dismissal of related appeals) and treated it as not controlling the instant matter.
Panchanada Velan v. Vaithinatha Sastrial, 1906 I.L.R. 29 Mad. 333 Authority from Madras High Court considered on the question whether a final adjudication in one of consolidated suits can bar an appeal in another. Cited as part of the Madras view supportive of not treating an unappealed decree in a consolidated case as automatically creating res judicata where the common judgment is appealed.
Kusum Lata v. Kampta Prasad, A.I.R. 1965 Alld. 280 Decision where a consolidated hearing and acceptance of a decree by one party was held to invoke Section 11 C.P.C.; interpreted the bar of res judicata under facts where one party submitted to trial court findings. The Full Bench distinguished Kusum Lata on facts (noting in Kusum Lata the respondent had accepted the trial decision), and declined to follow it as directly applicable to the instant case.
Zaharia v. Debia, 7 A.L.J.R. 861 F.B. Held that where two suits are tried together and disposed of by one judgment with separate decrees, an appeal against one decree only may be barred by the unreversed decree in the other suit. The Full Bench disagreed with the Zaharia principle for reasons stated in the opinion and declined to follow it in the present circumstances.
Dakhni Din v. Syed Ali Ashghar, 7 A.L.J.R. 995 A decision following Zaharia v. Debia on similar lines. The Full Bench declined to follow the reasoning of this decision, aligning instead with the view that res judicata is created by a decision/judgment rather than a decree.
Mohammad Mohtashim v. Joti Prasad, A.I.R. 1941 Alld. 277 Case in which two suits disposed of by a single judgment produced apparent inconsistency of decrees; appellate treatment led to a conclusion of res judicata. The Full Bench stated respectfully that it could not agree with the decision, treating it as operating on the assumption that res judicata is created by a decree.
B. Shanker Sahai v. B. Bhagwat Sahai, A.I.R. 1946 Oudh 33 Full Bench question: whether incompetency of an appeal in one of consolidated suits amounts to acceptance of the judgment so as to create res judicata. The present Full Bench noted that the view in B. Shanker Sahai has been overtaken by later Supreme Court authority (Sheodan Singh) and found the two cases distinguishable.
Raja Syed Ahmad Ali Khan Alavi v. Hinga Lal, A.I.R. 1947 Oudh 74 Oudh decision addressing whether judgments causing dismissal or abatement of appeals can operate as res judicata for subsequent suits. The Full Bench considered it distinguishable on facts and not controlling the present conclusion.
Papammal alias Muthu Karupayyee Ammal v. Meenammal, A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 139 Madras High Court authority forming part of a consistent view that an appealed common judgment should not be barred by unappealed decrees in consolidated cases. The Full Bench cited this with other Madras authorities as supportive of the stance that the object of the appeal being to get rid of the adjudication means an unappealed decree should not automatically bar the appealed judgment.
Subbish Udayar v. Karuppiah Odayar, 1965 I.L.R. 1 Mad. 57 Another Madras decision cited in support of the Madras view on consolidated suits and appeals. Used to illustrate the consistent Madras approach favouring the bench's conclusion.
Sarah Abraham v. Pyli Abraham, A.I.R. 1959 Kerala 75 Kerala High Court decision aligning with the view that an unappealed decree in a consolidated case should not necessarily create res judicata against an appeal from a common judgment. Cited as a supporting authority for the Full Bench's conclusion.
Deepal v. Parshwanath Digamber Jain Vidayalaya..., A.I.R. 1956 Rajas. 166 Held that estoppel/res judicata is created by judgment and not decree, following Narhari v. Shanker. Adopted by the Full Bench as consistent with its approach that the judgment/decision, not the decree, creates res judicata.
Bai Chanchai v. Bai Suraj, A.I.R. 1963 Guj. 198 Gujarat High Court holding in line with the judgment-not-decree rule. Cited as an authority consistent with the Full Bench's view.
Isup Ali v. Gour Chandra Deb, A.I.R. 1923 Cal. 496 Calcutta High Court decision adopting a view similar to Zaharia (i.e., treating unreversed decree as binding). The Full Bench expressly disagreed with the reasoning of this Calcutta decision for the reasons given in the opinion.
Sumi Debi v. Pranakrushna Panda, A.I.R. 1956 Orissa 68 Orissa High Court dissented from Narhari and held Sec. 11 C.P.C. would bar an appeal where consolidated suits were decided by a common judgment and an appeal was not filed against one decree. The Full Bench rejected the Orissa approach and reaffirmed reliance on Narhari and the judgment/decision principle.
Dhani Singh v. Sri Chandra Choor Den, A.I.R. 1924 Pat. 823 Patna decisions cited which proceeded on the view that res judicata is created by decree. The Full Bench noted these decisions but did not accept their premise, declining to follow them on that ground.
Mrs. Gertrude Oates v. Mrs. Millicent B. Silva, A.I.R. 1933 Pat. 78 Patna decision cited in the same line as other Patna cases. The Full Bench recorded these authorities but did not accept their decree-based approach to res judicata.
Raghunandan Singh v. Soudhagya Sundari Devi, A.I.R. 1948 Pat. 191 Another Patna precedent cited relevant to the decree-based approach. Not accepted by the Full Bench for the present proposition.
B. Vishwnathan v. Abdul Walid, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1 Interpreted Explanation 1 to Section 11 C.P.C. regarding the meaning of "former suit". Quoted by A.K. Kirti, J. to support the view that in consolidated suits the concepts of "former" and "subsequent" suits lose significance for a trial court; used to support reasoning about treatment of the leading record.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench proceeded by first identifying the statutory test in Section 11, C.P.C. and then interpreting the relevant language. The Court emphasized that Section 11 refers to a matter having "been heard and finally decided" and that the provision operates by reference to a decision or judgment, not merely to the existence of a decree.

Key analytic steps the Court took (as given in the opinion):

  1. The Bench observed that the consolidated suits were disposed of by a single common judgment dated 30-4-1957, though separate decrees were drawn in each suit.
  2. The Court distinguished between a decree and a judgment/decision: it held that the operative bar of res judicata arises from a matter having been "heard and finally decided" — that is, from a decision — and not from the mere existence of a decree. The Court expressly relied on Mt. Lachhmi v. Mt. Bhulli and Narhari v. Shanker for this proposition.
  3. Because the appellants had filed First Appeal No. 307 of 1958 against the trial court's decree dated 30-4-1957, the judgment was under challenge and therefore sub judice; it had not become final. The Court concluded that insofar as the common judgment was being appealed, it could not be said to be a "finally decided" matter capable of operating as res judicata.
  4. The Court reviewed a number of authorities cited by the respondent and by others. It distinguished and disagreed with cases that appeared to treat an unreversed decree in one of consolidated suits as automatically creating res judicata against an appeal in another (e.g., Zaharia v. Debia, Dakhni Din, certain Patna and Calcutta decisions). Conversely, it accepted authorities and decisions (including Madras and other High Court decisions, and some provincial decisions) that sustained the judgment-not-decree approach.
  5. The Bench explained that if, in an alternative factual pattern, the appeals arising from consolidated suits had been heard in the same appellate court and one of those appeals had been finally decided affirmatively by that court, then res judicata might be invoked (as in the facts of Sheodan Singh). But those circumstances did not exist here.
  6. A.K. Kirti, J. added reasons emphasizing the significance of the appellate forum and pecuniary jurisdiction: when consolidated suits are decided by a single trial court but appeals lie to different appellate courts (or courts of non-coordinate jurisdiction), the decision of an intermediate appellate court cannot operate as res judicata in the appeal pending in a different higher court which is competent to hear the surviving appeal. Thus, the ability of an unreversed decree to operate as res judicata depends on the appellate context and whether a judgment has become final.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Answer: The judgment dated 30-4-1957 has not become final and First Appeal No. 307 of 1958 does not stand barred by res judicata.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that First Appeal No. 307 of 1958 may be heard on its merits; the trial court's common judgment of 30-4-1957, being under challenge by appeal, is not finally decided for purposes of Section 11, C.P.C., and therefore cannot be invoked as a bar of res judicata.
  • The Court placed emphasis on the principle that res judicata is founded on a prior decision/judgment having been finally decided, not simply on the existence of a decree. The Full Bench applied existing authorities (notably Narhari v. Shanker and Mt. Lachhmi v. Mt. Bhulli) to sustain this view and distinguished cases which proceeded on a decree-based approach.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a sweeping new rule beyond the stated holding; it reasons from and applies prior authorities and distinguishes contrary decisions on their facts and appellate contexts. Therefore, the immediate practical consequence is procedural: the appeal is not barred and proceeds; no broad departure from the cited authorities is announced beyond the analysis given.
Question answered.

End of summary — prepared strictly from the text of the opinion provided.

    Jai Narain Har Narain v. Bulaqi Das

    (Jagdish Sahai, J. for himself Gangeshwar Prasad, S.N Singh and Rajeshwari Prasad, JJ.:—) It would contribute to a clear understanding of the question referred to us for our opinion if the following facts are given.—

    2. Suit No. 6 of 1956 of the court of the Civil Judge, Gorakhpur, was filed by Lala Bulaki Dass (plaintiff) against (1) Jai Narain Har Narain (2) Jainarain and. (3) Har Narain (defendants) In this suit Lala Bulaki Dass, plaintiff, claimed Rs. 22,000/- from the defendants by way of refund of advance money given by him to the defendants along with interest and damages on the allegation that the agreement dated 1-4-1953 between the parties had been breached by the defendants.

    3. Suit No. 599 of 1956 of the Munsif's court, Gorakhpur, was filed by Firm Jai Narain Har Narain against (1) Firm Sohan Pal Munna Lal and (2) L. Bulaki Dass. The plaintiff in this case (Firm Jai Narain Har Narain) claimed a sum of Rs. 5,000/- from the defendants, firm Sohan Pal Munna Lal and Bulaki Dass on the allegation that the agreement aforesaid had been breached by them.

    4. Suit No. 599 of 1956 was transferred to the court of the learned Civil Judge, Gorakhpur. The two suits were consolidated and disposed of by one common judgment, which is dated 30-4-1957.

    5. Suit No. 6 of 1956 was decreed for a sum of Rs. 14,202/7/- against Jai Narain and Har Narain. Suit No. 599 of 1956 was dismissed.

    6. The learned Civil Judge further directed that the main judgment (the one he pronounced) “will remain on the record of suit No. 6 of 1956” and “a copy of this be placed on the record of suit No. 599 of 1956 to serve as judgment.

    7. In the two suits separate decrees were prepared.

    8. Jai Narain Har Narain, Jai Narain and Har Narain filed First Appeal No. 307 of 1958 in this Court against the decree of the learned Civil Judge dated 30-4-1957. They, however, did not file any appeal against the decree passed in suit No. 599 of 1956 dismissing that suit.

    9. When First Appeal No. 307 of 1958 came for hearing before B.D Gupta, J. and one of us (A.K Kirty, J.), a preliminary objection was taken that as no appeal was filed against the decree dismissing suit No. 599 of 1956, the judgment dated 30-4-1957 had become final and first appeal No. 307 of 1958 stood barred by res judicata.

    10. The learned Judges referred the question of res judicata to a Full Bench. This is how the matter has come before us.

    11. In each of the two suits eight issues were struck. The same are given below:—

    “1. (Suit No. 6 of 1956). Whether plaintiffs purchased any Gur through the commission agency of the defendants at Basti, if so, how much?

    2. What was the rate of commission payable by the plaintiff to the defendants and under what conditions was it payable?

    3. Whether the defendant committed breach of contract in not despatching Gur to Agra according to the plaintiff's instructions, if so, its effect?

    4. Whether the defendants failed to sell the Gur in question at Chauri Craura in spite of the instructions of the plaintiff, if so, its effect?

    5. Whether the defendants have sold the goods both of Chauri Chaura and Basti and have misappropriated the sale proceeds? If so, its effect?

    6. How much Gur has been dispatched by the defendants from Chauri Chaura.

    7. To what amount of refund as damages is the plaintiff entitled?

    8. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?”

    “1. (Suit No. 599 of 1956). Whether the suit is barred by Sec. 69 of the Partnership Act?

    2. Whether the plaintiff purchased 1962 maunds of Gur at Basti for the defendants, if so, whether that was part of the transaction of purchase of Gur at Chauri Chaura, if so, its effect on the suit?

    3. Whether the defendants had agreed to pay to plaintiff expenses under head Kha to Na detailed in para. 3 of the plaint?

    4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim interest, if so, at what rate and how much?

    5. Whether the plaintiff sent 500 maunds of Gur by train?

    6. Whether the defendants in May, 1953 instructed the plaintiffs to sell the Gur at Chauri Chaura or to send them by goods train to Agra, if so, its effect on the suit?

    7. When did the plaintiffs sell the Gur in suit and what was the price received for it?

    8. To what relief are the plaintiffs entitled?”

    12. As the issues themselves show no issue was common to both the suits.

    13. Mr. Jagdish Swarup, who has appeared for the respondent in the instant first appeal, contends that the matter which has become res judicata is that the defendants-appellants had committed the breach of the agreement dated 1-4-1953 and that question cannot be gone into again in this first appeal.

    14. Issue No. 3 of suit No. 6 of 1956 dealt with the question of the breach of the agreement. The learned Civil Judge recorded the following finding on it:—

    “As agents of Bulaki Dass it was the duty of Jai Narain Har Narain to send the goods to Agra as directed by Bulaki Dass. If they did not send the goods they committed breach of the contract of agency. The effect of it would be that Jai Narain Har Narain would be liable to compensate to Bulaki Dass for the loss suffered by him by this breach. I decide this issue accordingly.”

    15. With regard to issues Nos. 6 and 7 of suit No. 599 of 1956, the learned Civil Judge said that “the point covered under these issues were answered under issues Nos. 3 and 5 of suit No. 6 of 1956,” On these issues he ultimately held that “considering all these things I do not think that any auction was made on 1-2-1956 of any Gur of Bulaki Dass. Jai Narain Har Narain had created a false pretext to support their claim that Gur of Bulaki Dass remained all along with them and also to support the claim of suit No. 599 of 1956. I think that these people sold the Gur in 1953 for Rs. 24,452/14/-. These issues are decided accordingly.”

    16. On issue No. 8 of suit No. 6 of 1956 and issue No. 8 of suit No. 599 of 1956, the learned Civil Judge held as follows:—

    “In view of the above findings I am of the opinion that Bulaki Dass is entitled to a decree for the recovery of Rs. 14,202/7/-. Jai Narain Har Narain are entitled to no decree in their favour.” With regard to costs, the learned Civil Judge held that “in view of the fact that both of these parties have come out with stories certain portions of which are false I think they should bear their costs of these suits.”

    17. Mr. Jagdish Swamp's contention is that though there was no issue directly on the question of the breach of the contract in suit No. 599 of 1956, issues Nos. 6 and 7 comprehended within them the question as to which party committed the breach.

    18. We have already said earlier that the two suits were disposed of by one common judgment. Inasmuch as the instant appeal has been filed against the decree passed in suit No. 6 of 1956 of the court of the Civil Judge, Gorakhpur, the decision dated 30-4-1957 has been put in jeopardy. It is well settled that where the court is dealing with suit the only ground on which res judicata can be urged against such a suit would be the provisions of Sec. 11, C.P.C and no other. See L. Janakirama Iyer v. P.M Nilakanta Iyar A.I.R 1962 S.C 633.. The same principle would apply to appeals arising out of suits.

    19. We have, therefore, to see whether there is any thing in Sec. 11, C.P.C, which creates the bar of res judicata in the instant appeal. That provisions, so far as relevant for our purposes, reads:—

    “No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally derided by such Court. (Italicised by us).

    Explanation I.— The expression “former suit” shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto.

    …………………………….”

    20. As the words “has been heard and finally decided by such Court” in Sec. 11, C.P.C, would show it is a decision which creates a bar of res judicata and not a decree. In fact Sec. 11, C.P.C, does not speak of a decree at all.

    21. All that could be done to get rid of the judgment dated 30-4-1957 has been done, as it has been appealed against. For that reason it has not become final. The decree in suit No. 599 of 1956 may have become final not having been appealed against but that would not make the judgment final. The result of consolidating the two suits was to combine the controversies in the two suits into a single controversy and to make the proceedings of the suits a single proceeding. That controversy and that proceeding was concluded by means of the judgment dated 30-4-1957 and inasmuch as that judgment has been put in jeopardy, it (that judgment) cannot operate as res judicata. Before Sec. 11, C.P.C can apply, the matter in controversy must have been “finally decided”. Inasmuch as the decision is sub-judice in appeal, it cannot be said that the matter has been finally decided.

    22. The principle of res judicata is based upon the maxim that “no one shall be vexed twice over the same matter”. In Mt. Lachhmi v. Mt. Bhulli A.I.R 1927 Lahore 289 F.B. it was held that “res judicata is either estoppel by verdict or estoppel by judgment (or record), and, there is no such thing as estoppel by ‘decree’…………….. The determining factor is not the decree but the decision of matter in controversy.” It was further observed that “where two suits, having a common issue, are, by consent of parties or by order of the Court, tried together, the evidence being written in one record and both suits disposed of by a single judgment, can it be said that there have been two distinct and independent trials?”

    23. In Narhari v. Shanker A.I.R 1953 S.C 419. the decision in Mt. Lachhmi v. Mt. Bhalli was approved and it was observed as follows:—

    “As has been observed by Tek Chand, J. in his learned judgment in ‘A.I.R 1927 Lah. 289 (H)’, mentioned above, the determining factor is not the decree but the matter in controversy. As he puts it later in his judgment, the estoppel is not created by the decree but it can only be created by the judgment.”

    24. It has been contended that the proposition that res judicata is created by a judgment or a decision and not by a decree is no longer tenable in view of the decisions in Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh A.I.R 1962 S.C 338. and Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar (Smt) A.I.R 1966 S.C 1332..

    25. In Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, Narhari v. Shanker was cited. The Supreme Court while dealing with Narhart's case observed:—

    “The learned Counsel for the appellant relied on the judgment of this court in Narhari v. Shanker in support of his contention that the judgment in Election Appeal No. 7 cannot operate as res judicata in this appeal. That case is distinguishable on facts and is with respect to the interpretation of Sec. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure……………………. We are therefore of opinion that both in view of the facts of the case and the provision of law applicable to that case, that case can be no guide for determining the question before us in this appeal.”

    26. In Sheodan Singh v. Daiyao Kunwar the case of Mt. Lachhmi v. Mt. Bhulli was cited before the Supreme Court. The learned Judges observed:—

    “We need not consider the correctness of these rival views as they raise the question as to whether one decision or the other can be said to be former, where the two suits were decided by the same judgment on the same date. This question does not fall to be decided before us and we do not propose to express any opinion thereof. But the Nagpur decision is of no help to the appellant, for in the present case res judicata arises because of earlier decision of the High Court in appeals arising from suits Nos. 77 and 91. Panchanada Velan v. Vaithinatha Sastrial 1906 I.L.R 29 Mad. 333. and Mst. Lachhmi v. Bhulli, are similar to the Nagpur case and we need express no opinion as to the correctness.”

    27. Therefore, neither of the two Supreme Court cases mentioned above departs from the view taken by that Court in Narhari v. Shanker. Nor do these two cases overrule Mt. Lachhmi v. Mt. Bhulli or the proposition that the bar of res judicata is created by a judgment or a decision.

    28. If the appellants in the instant appeal had also appealed against the decree passed in suit No. 599 of 1956, and in that appeal the judgment passed by the trial court had been confirmed by this Court then it could be contended that the instant appeal was barred by res judicata because in that case the decision of the trial court would stand affirmed by this Court and the case would have been similar to Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar (Smt) . In the present case no appeal had been filed against the decree passed in suit No. 599 of 1956 and this Court has not affirmed the judgment dated 30-4-1957. It is therefore difficult to see as to how there is a bar of res judicata in this case.

    29. The position is that the instant appeal has been filed against the decree passed in suit No. 6 of 1956 and the decision dated 30-4-1957 having been challenged in this appeal, has become sub-judice and is no longer final. The decision having been put to jeopardy, there is no decision left on the basis of which it can be contended that there is in existence a bar of res judicata.

    30. Mr. Jagdish Swarup also placed reliance upon Bhagwan Sahai v. Daryao Kunwar A.I.R 1963 Alld. 210. That case is distinguishable as its facts would show. Bhagwan Sahai, the appellant in that case, brought suit No. 37 of 1950 against Smt. Daryao Kunwar for a declaration that he and his son Ch. Sheodan Singh were owners of the properties in suit and for possession. Shortly afterwards he filed suit No. 42 of 1950 against Smt. Daryao Kunwar and one other person claiming the price of the crop which stood on some Sir and Khudkasht plots on the allegations that Smt. Daryao Kunwar had cut and misappropriated the Kharif crop standing on those plots even though she had no right, title or interest in the same.

    31. During the pendency of the aforesaid suits, Smt. Daryao Kunwar also instituted suits Nos. 77 and 91 of 1950, against Bhagwan Sahai and his son Ch. Sheodan Singh. Suit No. 77 was for the recovery of the price of her share of the crops grown on some Sir and Khudkasht plots. In suit No. 77 of 1950 Smt. Daryao Kunwar claimed the relief of permanent injunction for restraining Bhagwan Sahai and Ch. Shivdan Singh from letting out the Sir and Khudkasht plots without her consent.

    32. The two suits of Bhagwan Sahai were filed in the court of the Civil Judge, while the two suits of Smt. Daryao Kunwar were filed in the court of the Munsif. Smt. Daryao Kunwar's suits were transferred to the court of the Civil Judge and air the four suits were consolidated and tried together with the consent of the parties and were disposed of by a common judgment, though a separate decree was prepared in each suit.

    33. In all the four suits, five issues were common. One of the common issues related to the respective rights of the parties to the property in suit. The finding of the learned Civil Judge on this common issue was that Smt. Daryao Kunwar was entitled to the properties claimed by Bhagwan Sahai, in suit No. 37 of 1950. The learned Civil Judge, therefore, dismissed that suit. He decreed suit No. 91 of 1950 in its entirety and suit No. 42 of 1950 and suit No. 77 of 1950 in part. He, however, granted to Smt. Daryao Kunwar permanent injunction restraining Bhagwan Sahai from letting out the suit plots without her consent.

    34. Bhagwan Sahai preferred first appeals Nos. 365 and 366 of 1951 in the High Court against the decrees passed in suits Nos. 37 and 42 of 1950. He also filed civil appeals Nos. 452 and 453 of 1951 in the court of the District Judge against the decrees in suits Nos. 77 and 91 of 1950. The appeals before the District Judge were transferred to the High Court. This court rejected appeal No. 453 of 1951 on 9th of October, 1953 as barred by time. It also dismissed appeal No. 452 of 1951 on 7th of October, 1955 on account of failure of Bhagwan Sahai to apply for translation and printing of the record as required by the Rules of Court. On the basis of the dismissals mentioned above, it was argued that first appeals Nos. 365 and 366 of 1951 be dismissed as the main question involved therein, that is, the title of Smt. Daryao Kunwar to the suit property had become final on account of dismissal by this Court of appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 of 1950. The Full Bench hearing the case distinguished the case of Narhari v. Shanker on the ground that in that case there was only one suit and held that first appeals Nos. 365 and 366 of 1951 were barred by res judicata. In Bhagwan Sahai's case the High Court had affirmed the decision of the trial court while dismissing civil appeal No. 453 of 1951 as barred by time and civil appeal No. 452 of 1951 on the ground of want of prosecution. This case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable.

    35. Reliance was also placed upon Kusum Lata v. Kampta Prasad A.I.R 1965 Alld. 280.. In that case a wife had filed a suit against her husband for judicial separation under Sec. 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act and the husband had filed a petition under Sec. 9 of the Act against the appellant for the restitution of his conjugal rights. The proceedings were consolidated and common evidence was recorded in both the cases which were disposed of by a common judgment. The trial court dismissed both the petitions. The wife appealed to the District Judge against the dismissal of her petition, while the husband did not file any appeal against the dismissal of his case. The District Judge dismissed the appeal filed by the wife and she brought a second appeal in the High Court which was heard by Beg, J. Beg, J., while dealing with the question of res judicata on account of the husband not filing an appeal against the dismissal of his petition observed:—

    “The decrees in two proceedings are still separate………………………………………… In the present case, the respondent husband has submitted to the decree against him and did not challenge the findings upon which his suit was dismissed.

    ……………………………. The failure of the respondent's suit for restitution of conjugal rights necessarily meant the success of a ground for judicial separation. In my opinion, the requirements of Sec. 11, C.P.C are fully satisfied in this case. The Bar of res judicata, under Sec. 11, C.P.C operated against the respondent on patent facts which are apparent from a bare perusal of the judgments of the courts below.”

    36. With great respect to Beg, J. we are unable to agree with him. The bar of res judicata is not created by a decree, but by a decision. In any case Kusum Lata's case is clearly distinguishable also on facts. There the husband had accepted the decision of the trial court. In the present case Jai Narain Har Narain, Jai Narain and Har Narain have not accepted the decision of the learned Civil Judge inasmuch as they have filed first appeal No. 307 of 1958.

    37. The next case on which reliance is placed is Zaharia v. Debia 7 A.L.J.R 861 F.B.. In that case two suits were filed which were tried together and disposed of by one judgment, but a separate decree was prepared in each of the two cases. An appeal was preferred against the decree in one of the suits only. It was held that the appeal would be barred by the other decree which stood unreversed and was binding upon the appellants.

    38. Reliance was also placed upon Dakhni Din v. Syed Ali Ashghar 7 A.L.J.R 995.. In this case the learned Judge followed the decision of this Court in Zaharia v. Debia.

    39. Mr. Jagdish Swarup also cited before us Mohammad Mohtashim v. Joti Prasad A.I.R 1941 Alld. 277.. In that case Lala Joti Prasad had brought suit No. 48 of 1936 for recovery of a certain sum of money on the basis of a promissory note executed by Sayid Mohammad Mohtashim and Sayid Mohammad Mohtarim. Sayid Mohammad Mohtashim and Sayied Mohammad Mohtarim filed suit No. 488 of 1934 against Lala Joti Prasad under S. 33 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. The two suits were disposed of by a single judgment. In suit No. 48 of 1934 the court came to the conclusion that a certain sum of money was due by the debtors to the credit and a declaratory decree under Sec. 33(2) was given to the debtors. In suit No. 48 of 1936 the trial court came to the conclusion that the identical sum of money found due in the other case was due to Lala Joti Prasad from the debtors.

    40. Sayid Mohammad Mohtashim and Sayid Mohammad Mohtarim filed a first appeal in the High Court, against the decree passed in suit No. 48, but they did not file one against the decree passed in suit No. 488 of 1934. A division Bench of this Court held that the appeal filed in the High Court stood barred by res judicata.

    41. With great respect to the learned Judges, who decided the three cases mentioned above, we are unable to agree with them. In our opinion, they proceeded on a wrong assumption that res judicata is created by a decree.

    42. Cases from other courts were also cited before us.

    43. The two cases from Oudh Are: B Shanker Sahai v. B. Bhagwat Sahai A.I.R 1946 Oudh 33. and Raja Syed Ahmad Ali Khan Alavi v. Hinga Lal A.I.R 1947 Oudh 74.. In the first of these two cases the main question referred to the Full Bench was: “where two suits between the same parties involving common issues are disposed of by one judgment but two decrees, and an appeal is preferred against the decree in one but it is either not preferred in the other or is rejected as incompetent, does the matter decided by the latter decree become res judicata, so that it cannot be reopened in appeal against the former?”. The learned Judges constituting the Full Bench answered the question by saying that “the incompetency of the second appeal does not amount to a finding that the judgment is accepted as correct.”

    44. In the second Oudh Case the question was whether a judgment abating a second appeal on the ground that the necessary parties were not before the Court will operate as resjudicata as regards question decided by the first appellate court in a subsequent suit between the same parties. It was held by the Division Bench, hearing the case that it would be so barred.

    45. It is true that the view taken in B. Shanker Sahai v. B. Bhagwat Sahai is no longer good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar (Smt) . The facts of that case were however different from those before us. The other Oudh case is also distinguishable on facts because that is not a case of common judgment in the consolidated cases.

    46. The three cases of the Madras High Court that have been cited before us are:— Panchananda Velan v. Vaithinatha Sastrial, Papammal alias Muthu Karupayyee Ammal v. Meenammal A.I.R 1943 Mad. 139. and Subbish Udayar v. Karuppiah Odayar alias Pichai Odayar 1965 I.L.R 1 Mad. 57..

    47. It seems to be the consistent Madras view that the object of the appeal being in substance to get rid of the very adjudication which is put forward as constituting res judicata that adjudication in the other connected suits, which had become final not being appealed against, should not be held to bar the appeal.

    48. Kerala High Court in Sarah Abraham v. Pyli Abraham A.I.R 1959 Kerala 75. took the same view that we are taking in this case.

    49. In Deepal v. Parshwanath Digamber Jain Vidayalaya Maha Mantri Sri Gulabchand A.I.R 1956 Rajas. 166. Wanchoo, C.J and Dave, J. following the decision in Narhari v. Shanker held that it is not the decree which creates estoppel but it is the judgment only which can be available for a successful plea of res judicata. The same view was taken in Bai Chanchai v. Bai Suraj A.I.R 1963 Guj. 198. by the Gujarat High Court.

    50. The only decision of the Calcutta High Court that has been cited before us is Isup Ali v. Gour Chandra Deb A.I.R 1923 Cal. 496.. The view taken in this case is similar to one taken in Zaharia v. Debia.

    51. For the reasons for which we have disagreed with the view taken in Zaharia v. Debia, we disagree from the view taken in the abovementioned Calcutta case.

    52. In Sumi Debi v. Pranakrushna Panda A.I.R 1956 Orissa 68. the Orissa High Court dissented from the decision in Narhari v. Shanker on the ground that not being a decision of the Supreme Court of India it was not binding upon them and held that Sec. 11, C.P.C would bar an appeal when in two consolidated suits, disposed of by a common judgment appeal was not filed against the decree passed in one of the suits.

    53. We are unable to agree with the Orissa High Court because as already pointed out earlier we are of the opinion that the bar of res judicata is not created by a decree but by a decision or judgment.

    54. Three cases of the Patna High Court were cited before us. They are: Dhani Singh v. Sri Chandra Choor Den A.I.R 1924 Pat. 823., Mrs. Gertrude Oates v. Mrs. Millicent B. Silva A.I.R 1933 Pat 78. and Raghunandan Singh v. Sm. Soudhagya Sundari Devi A.I.R 1948 Pat. 191..

    55. These cases proceeded on the footing that the bar of res judicata is created by a decree, a view which, with great respect, we have not been able to accept.

    56. In view of what we have said above we answer the question referred to us by saying that the judgment dated 30-4-1957 has not become final and that first appeal No. 307 of 1958 does not stand barred by res judicata.

    57. A.K Kirty, J.:— I fully agree but respectfully desire to add some additional reasons as they occur to me.

    58. As held by the Supreme Court in B. Vishwnathan v. Abdul Walid A.I.R 1963 S.C 1., the expression “former suit” by the Explanation 1 to Sec. 11. C.P.C denotes a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in which the bar of res judicata is raised whether or not it was instituted prior thereto. In cases of consolidated suits, heared simultaneously and decided by a common judgment, the expressions, former suit’ and 'subsequent suit’ and the question of the competency of the court which decided the ‘former suit’ to try the ‘subsequent suit’ lose their significance and importance, at least in so far as the trial court is concerned. If at all, the suit in which the common but leading judgment is pronounced and in the record of which the said judgment is placed as an integral part thereof can be said to be the ‘former suit’. So far as the trial court is concerned, which was competent to try both the suits, a question of res judicata can hardly arise. Even if technically such a question is considered to be capable of being raised, the material decision or finding in the suit, which, as indicated above, is to be treated as the ‘former suit’, will operate as res judicata in the other suit.

    59. Literally, Sec. 11, C.P.C applies only to suits and not to appeals. Almost all the courts in India, including the Supreme Court, have, however, held that it applies to appeals as well. Now when two or more suits are consolidated and decided by a common judgment and appeals are filed against the decrees passed in all the suits and in the same court, no question of res judicata can really arise if the appeals are also heard and decided simultaneously. Difficulties, however, arise when one of such appeals is either heard and decided separately or for want of prosecution or for some other reason is dismissed and the decision of the court below stands confirmed as a result thereof. The bar of res judicata will under those circumstances be applicable to the other surviving appeal or appeals. This, as I understand, is the legal position which emerges out of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar (Smt) . In such cases applying the principles that an appeal is a continuation of the suit and that the decision in the “former suit” is the decision which is prior in point of time, title difficulty is to be confronted with, the “subsequent suit” being within the competence of the same Court.

    60. The position, however, cannot be the same when appeals arising from the different consolidated suits do not lie in the same court or courts having equal or coordinate jurisdiction. As in the instant case, although two consolidated suits are decided by a civil Judge, because of pecuniary jurisdiction an appeal against the decree in one may lie in the Court of the District Judge, whereas the appeal against the decree in the other may lie only in the High Court. Now, if, under such circumstances, the appeal in the Court of the District Judge is decided first, the decision of the District Judge cannot, in my opinion, operate as res judicata in the appeal in the High Court. The decision of the District Judge may be treated as the decision in the “former suit” but the appeal in the High Court, even if it is treated as the “subsequent suit”, certainly is not one which the District Judge is competent to decide. Therefore Sec. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure can neither be invoked nor applied. The legal position would be the same whether an appeal which lay in the Court of the District Judge was filed and decided after hearing or dismissed for want of prosecution or such similar reason or it was not filed at all.

    61. For the above reasons also, the preliminary objection of the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be accepted and the question referred to this Bench must, as held by my brother, J. Sahai, be answered in the negative.

    Question answered.

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