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Case Number

Second Appeal No. 3858 of 1962, against judgment of First Civil J., Kanpur, D/- 6-7-1962

Attorney(S)

M.N. Shukla
K.C. Saksena

Judges

S.S Dhavan, J.

Acts

Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Jageshwar Prasad (landlord), filed a suit against the respondent, Shyam Behari Lal, seeking recovery of Rs. 1,440 as arrears of rent under an alleged agreement of tenancy. The defendant denied the existence of any tenancy agreement and raised other pleas not material to this appeal. The plaintiff relied on a prior finding by a Court of Small Causes (in an earlier rent suit) that there was an agreement of tenancy between the parties, and argued that that finding operated as res judicata in the present suit. The Additional Munsif, Kanpur, decided the question on its merits, held that the plaintiff had not proved an agreement of tenancy, and dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court confirmed that decision. The plaintiff appealed again to the present court in a second appeal, raising the legal issue of whether the Small Cause Court's earlier finding operates as res judicata in the subsequent suit filed in a Civil Court.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the finding of a Court of Small Causes, in a prior suit by the landlord that there was an agreement of tenancy between the parties, operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit by the landlord for recovery of rent for a different period but under the same agreement, when the subsequent suit is filed in a Civil Court.
Whether the decision of a Small Cause Court, for purposes of res judicata, is governed by Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (with its requirement that the earlier decision be by a Court competent to try the subsequent suit) or by the general principles of res judicata (which require only that the former Court was competent to try its own suit), including any exception for courts of exclusive jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The prior finding of the Small Cause Court in the earlier suit — that there was an agreement of tenancy between the parties — operates as res judicata in the subsequent suit and therefore the respondent cannot deny the tenancy in the later proceedings.
Implicitly, the appellant relied on the view that the Small Cause Court's finding should be treated as final and conclusive for res judicata purposes.

Respondent's Arguments

Counsel for the respondent argued that Section 11 of the CPC applies only under the specific conditions set out in that Section, and since those conditions are not present in this case the earlier decision cannot operate as res judicata.
More broadly, the respondent relied on authorities (from several High Courts) holding that decisions of the Small Cause Court do not operate as res judicata in subsequent suits because of the competency requirement in Section 11 of the CPC.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, AIR 1953 SC 33	The Supreme Court's articulation that Section 11 of the CPC imposes a limitation on the general rule of res judicata applicable to "suits" while the general principle of res judicata governs judgments of courts of exclusive jurisdiction. Specifically, when a plea of res judicata is founded on general principles, it is sufficient that the Court which decided the former case had competent jurisdiction to decide that case; it need not also have jurisdiction to try the later suit.	Adopted by the court as the controlling principle: the court relied on this decision to hold that decisions of courts of exclusive jurisdiction (including the Small Cause Court, as characterised in the opinion) are governed by the general principles of res judicata rather than the twofold competency requirement of Section 11.
Bhagwan Dayal v. Reoti Devi, AIR 1962 SC 287	Cited for the proposition that Section 11 of the CPC is attracted where the matter was not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court which delivered the judgment proposed to operate as res judicata.	Cited to support the court's position that Section 11 does not apply to decisions of courts having exclusive jurisdiction; the decision was used to emphasise the test of exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction.
Unspecified Supreme Court decision, AIR 1962 SC 633	The provided opinion states that in AIR 1962 SC 633 the Supreme Court observed that in a suit where conditions imposed by Section 11 are not fulfilled it is not permissible to fall back on the general principles of res judicata.	The court explained that this observation was made in a case on its face governed by Section 11 and was not intended to modify the principles applicable to courts of exclusive jurisdiction; thus the court did not treat AIR 1962 SC 633 as displacing Raj Lakshmi Dasi and allied authorities regarding exclusive jurisdiction.
Jankirama Iyer v. Nilakanta Iyer, AIR 1962 SC 833	This decision was listed among authorities cited to the court. The provided opinion did not extract or state a specific rule or principle from this case in detail.	The court read this decision among others but stated that the controversy was concluded by the view of the Supreme Court expressed in the cited Supreme Court cases; no distinct, case-specific application beyond that general reliance was specified in the provided opinion.
Gokul Mandar v. Pudmanund Singh, (1902) ILR 29 Cal 707 (PC)	Cited among authorities; the provided opinion did not state a particular rule or principle taken from this decision.	The court indicated it had read this decision but did not identify a specific application in its reasoning beyond listing it among consulted authorities.
Raja Simhadri Appa Rao v. Ramachandrudu, (1904) ILR 27 Mad. 83	Cited among authorities; the provided opinion did not summarise a distinct principle from this case.	Considered among older authorities; no specific application in the court's reasoning was set out in the provided opinion.
Rukmini v. Rayaji Dattatraya, ILR 48 Bom 541; AIR 1924 Bom 454	Cited among authorities; no explicit rule from this decision was reproduced in the provided opinion.	The court read the decision but did not cite a case-specific application in its reasoning within the provided text.
Bodlu Bhonja v. Mohan Singh, ILR 30 All 717; AIR 1917 All 203	Cited among authorities; the provided opinion did not specify the principle relied on from this decision.	Listed among precedents considered; no discrete application described in the opinion.
Nakched Chaudhari v. Sukdeo Chaudhari, AIR 1930 All 430	Cited among authorities; the provided opinion did not set out any particular rule from it.	The court acknowledged the decision among others but did not identify a direct application in the opinion's reasoning.
Misser Raghubardial v. Sheo Baksh Singh, (1883) ILR 9 Cal 439 (PC)	Cited among authorities; the provided opinion does not state a particular principle derived from it.	Considered together with other older authorities; the opinion does not indicate a specific, individual application.
Dulare Lal v. Hazari Lal, AIR 1914 All 220	Cited among authorities; the provided opinion did not extract or state a specific rule from this case.	Read and considered by the court but no specific application is set out in the judgment as provided.
Shakfra (Shakfra) Bibi v. Nandan Rai, AIR 1922 All 241	Cited among authorities; the provided opinion did not summarise a distinct principle from this decision.	Listed among the cases read by the court; no particular application was described in the provided extract.
Sarju Prasad v. Mahadeo Prasad, AIR 1932 All 483	Cited among authorities; the provided opinion did not identify any specific rule taken from this decision.	Included among the authorities considered; the court did not rely on a discrete point from this case in the written reasoning excerpt provided.
Firm Ashar Lal Ramdeo v. Firm Ganeshiram Jagarnath, AIR 1952 All 540	Cited among authorities; the provided opinion did not summarise a particular principle from it.	The court acknowledged the decision among several authorities; no case-specific application was detailed in the opinion excerpt.
Newton v. Official Trustee of West Bengal, AIR 1954 Cal 506	Cited among authorities; the provided opinion did not state any explicit rule or principle drawn from this decision.	Listed among decisions examined by the court; the provided opinion does not identify a specific application of this precedent.
43 Ind App 91 : AIR 1916 PC 78 (Privy Council)	Cited by the court as a historical reminder that the foundation of the doctrine of res judicata was laid by Indian jurists (prang nyaya). The opinion quotes this decision to underscore the indigenous origin of the principle.	Used in the opinion to support a historical observation: the court invoked it to note that the doctrine was recognised in Indian jurisprudence before the adoption of Latin terminology.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following sequence, based strictly on the statements in the provided opinion:

The court began by examining the text of Section 11(1) CPC, particularly the phrase "in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit," and explained the ordinary meaning: for a former decision to operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, the court which gave the earlier decision must be competent not only to try the earlier suit but also to try the later one.
The court observed that the twofold competency requirement in S.11 arises from the hierarchical nature of the judicial system, and it prevents a decision of an inferior court from barring the jurisdiction of a superior court. Thus S.11 imposes a limitation on the general rule of res judicata as applied to "suits."
The court contrasted S.11 with the wider general principles of res judicata (as understood outside the restrictive language of S.11). Under the general principle, it is sufficient that the court which decided the former case had competent jurisdiction to decide that case; there is no requirement that it also have jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit.
The court identified an exception to the twofold competency restriction in S.11: decisions of courts having exclusive jurisdiction over a particular class of matters operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings, even if the exclusive court would not be competent to try the later suit. The rationale is that allowing re-hearing of a matter decided by an exclusively competent court would destroy the exclusivity conferred by statute.
The court then addressed whether the Small Cause Court falls into the category of a court of exclusive jurisdiction. It examined relevant provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act — noting (as stated in the opinion) that Section 15 excludes many suits from the Small Cause Court's cognizance, Section 16 provides that suits cognisable by a Small Cause Court shall not be tried by any other court within local limits, and Section 27 makes a decree or order of a Small Cause Court final. The court concluded that these provisions confer a restricted but special and exclusive jurisdiction on the Small Cause Court.
Applying the principles from Supreme Court jurisprudence (notably Raj Lakshmi Dasi and Bhagwan Dayal), the court held that because the Small Cause Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction over certain classes of suits, the general principles of res judicata (requiring only that the prior court had jurisdiction to hear its own suit) apply to its decisions rather than the narrower S.11 twofold competency test.
The court rejected the respondent's contention that the word "suit" in the Code and in Supreme Court pronouncements necessarily imports the twofold competency restriction into proceedings of courts like the Small Cause Court. The court explained that many tribunals and revenue courts deal with matters of a civil character but exercise exclusive jurisdiction conferred by statute, and the Supreme Court has treated their decisions as capable of operating as res judicata on general principles.
The court illustrated the practical absurdity that would follow if a Small Cause Court's decision did not operate as res judicata: a landlord might obtain a favourable finding in a Small Cause Court in a dispute about the relationship of landlord and tenant, but in a subsequent suit in a Civil Court the tenant could be free to relitigate the issue, producing contradictory findings and undermining exclusivity and finality.
On this basis the court concluded that the prior finding by the Small Cause Court — that there was an agreement of tenancy between the parties in the earlier suit — was conclusive in the later suit and therefore operated as res judicata in the present proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED.

The court allowed the second appeal, set aside the decision of the lower appellate court, and decreed the appellant's suit for recovery of rent, including costs throughout. The court expressly held that the finding of the Small Cause Court in the earlier suit — that there was an agreement of tenancy between the appellant and the respondent — is conclusive in the present suit (i.e., it operates as res judicata).

Implications:

The direct effect is that the appellant's suit for recovery of rent succeeds: the decree is entered in his favour and costs are awarded to him throughout.
The court's legal holding clarifies that decisions of the Small Cause Court (characterised in the opinion as exercising restricted but exclusive jurisdiction under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act) are governed by the general principles of res judicata and can operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings, notwithstanding the twofold competency restriction in Section 11 CPC which applies to suits generally.
The opinion reasons that this approach avoids anomalous and contradictory results that would otherwise arise if Small Cause Court decisions lacked res judicata effect in later proceedings; the opinion relied on Supreme Court authorities to reach this conclusion.
The court did not state that it was creating a novel, separate precedent eschewing prior law; rather, it treated the decision as an application and clarification of existing Supreme Court authorities (notably Raj Lakshmi Dasi and related decisions) to the position of Small Cause Courts.

Note: All information in this summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. Where the opinion listed precedents without extracting a specific rule from them, this summary indicates that the provided opinion did not state a distinct rule or the particular application of those decisions.

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Lala Jageshwar Prasad v. Shyam Behari Lal .

1. This is a landlords second appeal from the concurrent decisions of the courts below dismissing his suit for the recovery of rent from the defendant respondent. It raises an important question of law concerning the application of the principle of res judicata to the findings of a Court of Small Causes. The appellant Jageshwar Prasad filed this suit against Shyam Behari Lal for the recovery of Rs. 1440 as arrears of rent on the basis of an agreement of tenancy. The defendant resisted the suit and denied that there was any contract of tenancy between him and the plaintiff. He also raised a number of other pleas which it is not necessary to consider in this appeal. The plaintiff contended that the finding of the Small Cause Court, in his previous suit for the recovery of rent from the defendant for an earlier period, that there was an agreement of tenancy between the parties, operated as res judicata in the present suit and the defendant could not be permitted to deny the tenancy. This plea was overruled by the Additional Munsif, Kanpur who decided this question on merits, and held that the plaintiff had not proved the agreement of tenancy between him and the defendant. He dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court confirmed this decision and the plaintiff has come to this Court in second appeal.

2. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has argued that the view of the courts below that the finding of the Small Cause Court. In the previous suit that there was a contract of tenancy between the parties does not operate as res judicata in the present suit is erroneous. On the other hand, it has been argued on behalf of the respondent by Mr. K.C Saxena that Section II of the CPC will apply only under certain conditions specified in the Section, and as these are not present in this case the earlier decision cannot operate as res judicata. The question of law involved in this appeal is whether the finding of the Small Cause Court, in a suit by the landlord for recovery of rent from the tenant, that there is an agreement of tenancy between the parties, operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit by the landlord for the recovery of rent for a different period but under the same agreement, filed in a Civil Court. The answer to this question depends upon whether the decision of the Small Cause Court, for purposes of res judicata is governed by the provisions of Section 11 of the CPC or by the general principles of res judicata. The relevant words of S. 11(1) are as follows:

“(11) Res Judicata:— No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.”

3. The vital words for the purpose of the present controversy are “in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit.” They mean that in order that a decision may prevent a re-hearing of the same matter by another Court, the Court whose decision is to operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit must be competent to hear not only the suit in which the decision was given but also the one in which it is to operate as res judicata. The reason for imposing the second condition lies in the nature of our judicial system which consists of a hierarchy of subordinate Courts, and it was evidently felt that the decision of a Court of inferior status cannot bar the jurisdiction of a Court of superior status, and only the decision of a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction alone will be potent enough to prevent another Court from hearing the same disputes between the same parties. The words “competent to try the subsequent suit” incorporate this principle.

4. But this condition of competency to try the subsequent suit is imposed by Section 11 of the CPC and not by the general principle of res judicata. This principle is wider in its scope than Section 11 which applies to “suits” only. The general principle, Eke Section 11 of the CPC, requires that the Court whose decision is to operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit should be competent to hear its own suit, but unlike Section 11, it does not require that it should be competent to hear the subsequent suit as well. However, the restrictive condition, imposed by S. 11, of the two-fold competency of the Court whose decision is to be operated as res judicata does not apply to Courts with exclusive jurisdiction, If the previous decision, was delivered by a Court which has exclusive Jurisdiction to hear the matter before it that is, if no other Court could have heard that matter, its verdict will operate as res judicata in any subsequent proceedings even if it was not competent to hear the subsequent suit. The reason for this exception is that the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Court by law will cease to be exclusive if a matter decided by it is permitted to be re-heard by another Court. Therefore, the decisions of the revenue court, the Land Acquisition Court, or any other court, in a matter which it has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide will bar a subsequent hearing of the same matter by a Civil Court.

5. The question is whether the decision of a Small Cause Court, for the purpose of res judicata, is subject to the condition of twofold competency imposed by Section 11 of the CPC or a single competency to hear its own suit as required by the general principles of res judicata. The question arises in this way. On the one hand a Small Cause Court has exclusive Jurisdiction to try certain classes of suits and therefore its decisions should be governed by the general principles of res judicata as in the case of other Courts of exclusive jurisdiction; but on the other hand the proceedings before it ore a “suit” and therefore the conditions imposed by Section 11 of the CPC should govern its decision, as regards res judicata, as in other suits. Which is to be, the wider general principle of res Judicata, or the restricted provision of S. 11 that is the question. Some courts have taken the former view, and others the latter.

6. A large number of decisions were cited before me. Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, AIR 1953 SC 33; Bhagwan Dayal v. Reoti Devi, AIR 1962 SC 287; Jankirama Iyer v. Nilakanta Iyer, AIR 1962 SC 833, Gokul Mandar v. Pudmanund Singh, (1902) ILR 29 Cal 707 (PC), Raja Simhadri Appa Rao v. Ramachandrudu, (1904) ILR 27 Mad. 83; Rukmini v. Rayaji Dattatraya, ILR 48 Bom 541 : (AIR 1924 Bom 454); Bodlu Bhonja v. Mohan Singh, ILR 30 All 717 : (AIR 1917 All 203); Nakched Chaudhari v. Sukdeo Chaudhari AIR 1930 All 430 Misser Raghubardial v. Sheo Baksh Singh, (1883) ILR 9 Cal 439 (PC); Dulare Lal…Defendant v. Hazari Lal…Plaintiff ., AIR 1914 All 220; Shakfra Bibi v. Nandan Rai, AIR 1922 All 241; Sarju Prasad v. Mahadeo Prasad, AIR 1932 All 483; Firm Ashar Lal Ramdeo v. Firm Ganeshiram Jagarnath AIR 1952 All 540; Newton v. Official Trustee of West Bengal, AIR 1954 Cal 506.

7. I have read each one of these decisions carefully. But in my view the controversy is concluded by the view of the Supreme Court expressed in the cases cited above.

8. The principle of res judicata as applied to courts of exclusive jurisdiction was enunciated in Rajlakshmi Dasi's case, AIR 1953 SC 33 thus:

“The condition regarding the competency of the former Court to try the subsequent suit is one of the limitation engrafted on the general rule of res judicata by S. 11 of the Code and has application to suits alone. When a plea of res judicata is founded on general principles of law, all that is necessary to establish is that the Court that heard and decided the former case was a Court of competent jurisdiction. It does not seem necessary in such cases to further prove that it has jurisdiction to hear the later suit. A plea of res judicata on general principles can be successfully taken in respect of judgments of Courts of exclusive jurisdiction, like revenue Courts, land acquisition Courts, administration Courts, etc. It is obvious that these Courts are not entitled to try a regular suit and they only exercise special jurisdiction conferred on them by the statute.” (p. 40).

9. I understand this observation to mean that the general principles of res judicata will govern the decision of every Court which is not entitled to try a regular suit, but has a special exclusive jurisdiction conferred on it by law to hear and decide certain matters. This, in my opinion, will include the decision of the Small Cause Court which has a restricted but special jurisdiction which however is exclusive. Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act enjoins that a Court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of a large variety of suits which are specified in the second Schedule of the Act, and also restricts its pecuniary jurisdiction. Section 16 of the Act provides in effect that “a suit cognisable by a Court of Small Causes shall not be tried by any other Court within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the former Court.” S. 27 provides in effect that a decree or order made by a Court of Small Causes shall be final. The effect of these three sections is to confer on the Small Cause Court a restricted but special jurisdiction which is exclusive, and make its decisions final. In my opinion its decisions for the purpose of res indicata are covered by the observation of the Supreme Court above.

10. In AIR 1962 SC 287 the Supreme Court observed that Section 11 of the CPC is attracted if the matter was not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court which delivered the judgment which is to operate as res judicata. It follows that if the Court has exclusive jurisdiction S. 11 will not apply to its decision. The decision in that case was of the revenue Court but the test of exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction was emphasised and intended to be of universal application.

11. In AIR 1962 SC 633 the Supreme Court observed that in a suit where the conditions imposed by S. 11 are not fulfilled it is not permissible to fall back on the general principles of res judicata. This observation was made in a suit which was, on the face of it, governed by Section 11 of the CPC and was not intended to apply to decisions of Courts with exclusive jurisdiction. It is significant that the Supreme Court did not modify the principles, enunciated by them in the earlier two eases, governing the decisions of Courts with exclusive jurisdiction. For these reasons, I am of the opinion that as the Small Causes Court has a restricted, but exclusive jurisdiction conferred on it in a certain class of suits, its finding on an issue which it was competent to decide will operate as res judicata.

12. Mr. K.C Saxena argued vehemently that the Supreme Court has held that S. 11 aplies to suits, and as the Small Cause Court as jurisdiction to try suits of a civil nature, S. 11 will apply to its decisions. I do not agree. The word “suit” has not been defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or by the Supreme Court. I do not think a rigid definition of the word is possible or even desirable. Many proceedings before the revenue Court are really civil suits which, but for the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on that Court, would be triable in the Civil Court but the Supreme Court has held that the decisions of the revenue Court in these suits will operate as res judicata even in civil suits which the revenue Court is not competent to hear. In fact the Supreme Court has applied the general principles of res judicata to all courts with an exclusive jurisdiction and has made no exception in the case of the Court of Small Causes.

13. In considering the scope of the doctrine of res judicata, we must bear in mind the general principle on which it is founded. This principle, which is called by its Latin name of res judicata and which was evolved and developed by the jurists of ancient India under the title of prang nyaya (“previous decision”), prevents a party from re-agitating a dispute which has already been decided between the parties. We must bear in mind that the principle is not a technical doctrine but based upon equity, justice, and common sense. Its object is to prevent endless litigation and the repeated harassment of a party which has obtained a decision from a court of competent jurisdiction in its favour after a fair hearing. But if the decision of a Small Cause Court in a matter which it is competent to decide cannot operate as res judicata, it will lead to strange results. Suppose a landlord files a suit for the recovery of Rs. 1,000 as rent from the tenant who pleads in defence that there was no agreement of tenancy and no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, and the Court finds that such a relationship does exist and decrees the suit. Suppose further that the tenant again defaults in payznent of rent and the landlord files another suit for rent—this time for the recovery of Rs. 1050. Now he has to go to the Civil Court because the amount involved excludes the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court, but the tenant, unless prevented by the principle of res judicata, will be at liberty to deny once again the relationship of landlord and tenant and the Court will be free to hold that no such relationship exists. Suppose further that a third suit is filed this time once again in the Small Cause Court; now that Court will be faced with two conflicting findings—its own and that of the Civil Court. I do not think that S. 11 was intended to lead to such absurd results.

14. For these reasons I am of the opinion that the finding of the Small Cause Court in the previous suit for the recovery of rent that there was an agreement of tenancy between the appellant and the respondent is conclusive in this suit.

15. Learned counsel for the respondent asked me to follow several decisions of the Punjab, Nagpur and Patna High Courts in which it was held that decision of the Small Cause Court does not operate as res judicata because of Section 11 of the CPC. With very great respect to all these decisions, which I have read with the respect and care that they deserve, I think the view of the other courts that the Small Cause Court being a court of exclusive jurisdiction, its decision is governed by the general principle of res judicata, is correct.

16. Before leaving this case I would like to mention that though the doctrine of res judicata was evolved by Indian jurists under the title of prang nyaya yet due to 200 years of British tutelage, many of us have not heard of prang nyaya and use instead of the Latin phrase, res judicata, though few of us know Latin or can pronounce this phrase correctly. It was left to the judges of the Privy Council in one of their judgments—reported in 43 Ind App 91 : (AIR 1916 PC 78) to remind us that the foundation of the principle of res judicata was laid by Indian jurists. I cannot help observing that as an Indian judge I feel somewhat small when I have to employ a Latin phrase, which I barely understand, for expressing a legal principle for which a perfectly good Sanskrit equivalent is available. I agree with the view that we should have no complexes against the English language which I think has a creative role to play in this country, But must we continue to employ Latin phraseology even when it is no longer necessary? Today we have an official Sanskrit text of the English Constitution, but inconsistently enough we continue to repeat Latin Phrases, parrot fashion. I respectfully suggest that the Law Commission might take up the task of preparing a glossary of legal phrases derived from ancient texts which will gradually replace the existing Latin phrases. I allow this appeal, set aside the decision of the lower appellate court, and decree the appellant's suit for recovery of rent with costs throughout.

CJ/NR/G.G.M

17. Appeal allowed.

Lala Jageshwar Prasad v. Shyam Behari Lal .

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Respondent's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Lala Jageshwar Prasad v. Shyam Behari Lal .

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