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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • B.N. Katju
  • Asst. Govt. Advocate
  • and K.L. Misra
  • Advocate General
  • L.S. Saran
Judges
  • D.N Roy
  • D.P Uniyal, JJ.
Acts
  • DELHI SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT ACT 1946
  • Section 417, Cr. P. C., Article 134(1)(c)
  • Section 417, Cr. P. C. Article 134
  • provisions of Sub-section (5),
  • Section 149/34, I. P. C.
  • Section 417 Cr. P. C.
  • Section 147 I. P. C.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • B.N. Katju
  • Asst. Govt. Advocate
  • and K.L. Misra
  • Advocate General
  • L.S. Saran
Judges
  • D.N Roy
  • D.P Uniyal, JJ.
Acts
  • DELHI SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT ACT 1946
  • Section 417, Cr. P. C., Article 134(1)(c)
  • Section 417, Cr. P. C. Article 134
  • provisions of Sub-section (5),
  • Section 149/34, I. P. C.
  • Section 417 Cr. P. C.
  • Section 147 I. P. C.
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This application was filed by the State of U.P. under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution seeking a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court. It arose from Criminal Appeal No. 2069 of 1959 and Referred No. 133 of 1959 decided by this Court on 8-1-1960. The opposite-parties (six accused: Tula Ram, Bhagwan Singh, Chandravir Singh, Shyamvir Singh, Yogvir Singh and Rajpal) had been convicted by the trial court for rioting (Section 147, I.P.C.) and for the murder of Babu Deepchand under Section 302 read with Section 149/34, I.P.C. The Sessions Judge referred the case for confirmation of the death sentences of Tula Ram and Bhagwan.

On appeal to this Court, the principal factual dispute was whether the six accused participated in the murder. The Sessions Judge had relied upon the testimony of three eyewitnesses — Brij Lal, Saheb Singh and Bahori Teli — to convict all six. One accused, Yogvir Singh, raised and produced evidence in support of a plea of alibi which the Sessions Judge had rejected. This Court re-examined the evidence, accepted the alibi for Yogvir Singh, concluded that the three eyewitnesses were not worthy of confidence in respect of Yogvir Singh, and that, because their evidence implicated all six equally with no distinguishing features, it would be unsafe to rely upon them for the others. On that basis the Court acquitted all accused. The State then applied for a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a High Court may grant a certificate of fitness under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution in respect of an appellate order of acquittal passed by the High Court itself (i.e., whether the State can avail Article 134(1)(c) to seek a further appeal to the Supreme Court against a High Court's order of acquittal).
  2. Whether the factual findings made by this Court — in particular the acceptance of Yogvir Singh's alibi and the consequent rejection of the three eyewitnesses as reliable — raise a substantial question of law or of general importance such as to justify a certificate under Article 134(1)(c).
  3. Whether the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one, false in all) applies in Indian criminal jurisprudence in a manner that would permit reliance on the same eyewitnesses as to other accused even after discrediting them in relation to one accused.

Arguments of the Parties

Opposite-Parties / Respondents (as described in the opinion)

  • A preliminary objection was taken by the opposite side that Article 134 of the Constitution cannot be availed of by the State to obtain a certificate to appeal against an acquittal granted by a High Court; reliance was placed on State Govt. M. P. v. Ramkrishna, AIR 1954 SC 20, which was said to hold that Article 134 does not provide for an appeal from a High Court's order of acquittal and that there is no constitutional counterpart to Section 417 Cr. P.C.

Applicant — State of U.P. (as represented by the Advocate-General)

  • The application originally contained four grounds. The first ground challenged the Court's finding that Yogvir Singh was at a different place on the date of occurrence, but the Advocate-General did not press that ground and conceded that the alibi evidence in favour of Yogvir Singh had been rightly accepted by the Court.
  • On the remaining points the Advocate-General advanced a threefold submission:
    • (a) The successful alibi of Yogvir Singh should have resulted only in his acquittal and not in the acquittal of the other accused.
    • (b) The three eyewitnesses might have genuinely erred in identifying Yogvir Singh (a possible mistake of identity), and that error does not render them wholly untruthful as to the participation of the other accused.
    • (c) Whether the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus applies in India (i.e. whether discrediting witnesses in respect of one accused necessitates rejecting their testimony in respect of others) raises a substantial question of law fit for consideration by the Supreme Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State Govt. M. P. v. Ramkrishna, AIR 1954 SC 20 Held (as described in the opinion) that Article 134 does not provide for an appeal from a High Court's appellate order of acquittal and that there is no constitutional provision corresponding to Section 417 Cr. P.C. The Court considered this decision but concluded that it did not lay down that a High Court is not empowered to grant a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) from an appellate order of acquittal; the preliminary objection based on this authority was overruled.
State of Madras v. Gurviah Naidu and Co., Ltd., (S) AIR 1956 SC 158 Noted by the Supreme Court to have doubted the earlier decision (Ramkrishna) and to have treated the earlier observations as emphasising restraint in interfering with orders of acquittal on appeals by special leave. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's treatment of the earlier decision to show that the issue was not settled against the grant of certificates by High Courts; the Supreme Court had preferred not to decide the constitutional point and was willing, if necessary, to regularise an appeal by giving special leave.
State Of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer, AIR 1958 SC 61 Quoted as indicating that the Supreme Court has not accepted the proposition that Article 136 precludes interference with High Court findings in judgments of acquittal and that earlier decisions merely emphasised non-interference in particular procedural contexts. The Court cited this authority to show that the Supreme Court's later pronouncements had weakened the finality argument against appellate certificates in respect of acquittals and that interference by the Supreme Court under its powers remained available.
Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, (S) AIR 1957 SC 614 Supreme Court classification of witnesses into three categories (wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable) and related principles about coping with single witness evidence and the need for corroboration when witnesses are not wholly reliable. The Court applied these principles to assess the three eyewitnesses: because they were demonstrably unreliable in respect of Yogvir Singh (whose alibi was proved), and because there was no independent corroboration, the Court found it unsafe to rely upon their testimony as to the other accused and declined to treat the case as one involving a substantial question of law suitable for a certificate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two main strands: (A) the constitutional and statutory question whether a High Court can grant a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) in respect of its own appellate order of acquittal; and (B) the evidentiary/factual determination whether the case raised a substantial question of law fit for the Supreme Court's consideration.

(A) Scope of Article 134(1)(c) vis-à-vis Section 417 Cr. P.C.

The Court examined the text of Article 134(1)(c), noting that it provides for appeals to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence of a High Court "if the High Court ... certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court." The Court observed that the proviso to Article 134(1)(c) allows the High Court to establish conditions when granting a certificate but does not contain a rule forbidding the High Court from granting such a certificate in respect of an appellate acquittal.

The Court contrasted Article 134(1)(c) with Section 417 Cr. P.C., which governs appeals by the State from orders of acquittal passed by courts other than High Courts and lays down specific procedural conditions. Section 417, being directed to appeals to High Courts from subordinate courts, does not address appeals to the Supreme Court from High Court acquittals. Therefore, the Court concluded that Section 417's considerations are not applicable to Article 134(1)(c) and that the existence of no direct counterpart to Section 417 in Article 134(1)(c) does not imply the High Court lacks power to grant a certificate from an appellate order of acquittal.

The Court examined authorities relied upon by the parties (including Ramkrishna and subsequent Supreme Court treatment) and determined that prior pronouncements did not establish a binding rule that the High Court is powerless to grant such a certificate. Accordingly, the preliminary objection that the State could not avail Article 134 was overruled.

(B) Application of evidence-law principles to the facts

On the facts, the Court carefully re-evaluated the alibi evidence produced by Yogvir Singh and concluded that the Sessions Judge had wrongly rejected it; the alibi was accepted as "complete and reliable" and made Yogvir Singh's participation impossible. The Court then examined the three eyewitnesses' testimony. Because those three witnesses implicated all six accused equally and offered no distinguishing detail between Yogvir Singh and the others, and because they were demonstrably false with respect to Yogvir Singh, the Court held that it would be unsafe to accept their evidence about the other accused.

The Court applied the Supreme Court's framework in Vadivelu Thevar for assessing witness reliability: witnesses fall into categories of wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, or intermediate. For intermediate witnesses, courts should seek independent corroboration. The Court observed that where witnesses are shown to be false or doubtful with regard to one accused, there can be no corroboration of such witnesses by other witnesses of similar doubtful character. In the present case independent corroboration of the three eyewitnesses was lacking.

The Advocate-General's contention that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus raised a substantial question of law was considered. The Court noted that the maxim had never been held to apply in Indian law in such a way as to dictate the outcome here and that this was not a novel constitutional question requiring Supreme Court determination: the matter turned on factual appraisal and application of established principles on witness assessment.

Because the decision to acquit depended solely on the evaluation of the evidence and factual findings — and did not involve any substantial question of law or question of general importance — the Court concluded that this was not a fit case for grant of a certificate under Article 134(1)(c).

Holding and Implications

FINAL RULING: The petition by the State for a certificate of fitness under Article 134(1)(c) was rejected.

Implications:

  • The High Court overruled the preliminary contention that Article 134 cannot be invoked by the State to obtain a certificate to appeal from a High Court's order of acquittal, but nevertheless refused to grant the certificate on the facts of this case.
  • The direct practical effect is that no certificate under Article 134(1)(c) was given and therefore no appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to such a certificate will follow from this application; the acquittals previously entered by this Court remain undisturbed by this petition.
  • The Court explicitly treated the controversy as one of fact and witness evaluation rather than as presenting any new or substantial question of law of general importance; accordingly the decision does not purport to create a new precedent on any novel point of constitutional law beyond the Court's reasoning on the inapplicability of Section 417 Cr. P.C. considerations to Article 134(1)(c) and the application of witness-assessment principles.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that document.

Show full summary ...

    State v. Tula Ram

    1. This is an application by the State of U. P. under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India for a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court. It arises out of Criminal Appeal No. 2069 of 1959 of this Court connected with which was Referred No. 133 of 1959, decided by us on 8-1-1960. The appeal was by the opposite-parties against their conviction and sentence for rioting under Section 147 I. P. C. and for the murder of one Babu Deepchand a practising Mukhtar of Sodabad in the district of Mathura under Section 302 with the aid of Section 149/34, I. P. C. The reference was made by the Sessions Judge for the confirmation of the death sentence of Tula Ram and Bhag wan.

    2. The circumstances relating to the murder, and the evidence bearing upon the alleged crime of the accused, were dealt with by us in our judgment of 8-1-1960 and need no re-statement for the disposal of this application. That Babu Deepchand had been murdered admitted of no doubt. The question was whether the murder was committed by the opposite-parties Tula Ram and Bhagwan Singh, Chandravir Singh, Shyamvir Singh, Yogvir Singh and Rajpal. The learned Sessions Judge relied upon the evidence of three witnesses Brij Lal, Saheb Singh and Bahori Teli in coming to the conclusion that all these six accused were the perpetrators of the crime.

    These three witnesses implicated the six accused inclusive of Yogvir Singh equally in the crime and they assigned particular role having been played by them. The accused denied their guilt and pleaded that they had been falsely implicated. Yogvir Singh raised a plea of alibi, and he produced a volume of evidence in support of that plea. The learned Sessions Judge rejected the evidence of alibi. When we heard the appeal we went into the evidence with care with the assistance of learn-

    ed counsel for the parties and we came to the conclusion that the evidence of alibi was wrongly rejected and that that evidence was so complete and reliable that the participation of Yogvir Singh in the crime was a matter of impossibility. We also came to the conclusion that the eye-witnesses were not witnesses of truth and we observed :

    "In a case of this nature where Brij Lal, Saheb Singh and Bahori Teli witnesses are demonstrably false witnesses with regard to Yogvir Singh we would not be justified in accepting their evidence with proper measure of confidence with respect to the others. Undoubtedly there is nothing, to distinguish their evidence in the case of Yogvir Singh from the case of the others. It would be extremely unsafe to rely upon their evidence."

    3. In that view of the matter we acquitted all the accused.

    4. A preliminary objection has been taken be-fore us by the other side, namely, that Article 134 of the Constitution cannot be availed of by the State; and reliance has been placed upon a decision of the Supreme Court in State Govt. M. P. v. Ram-krishna, AIR 1954 SC 20. tn that case it was observed that Article 134 does not provide for an appeal from a judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court, if the High Court has on appeal reversed an order of conviction of an accused person and has ordered his acquittal, and that, in other words, there is no provision in the Constitution corresponding to Section 417, Cr. P. C. and such an order is final, subject, however, to the over-riding powers vested in the Supreme Court by Article 136 of the Constitution.

    4a. That decision was subsequently noticed by the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Gurviah Naidu and Co., Ltd., (S) AIR 1956 SC 158. In that case it was contended before the Supreme Court that the appeal was not maintainable as the High Court had no jurisdiction to grant a certificate ot fitness for appeal against acquittal under Article 134 in view of the earlier decision of the Supreme Court referred to above. The Supreme Court, in effect, doubted the earlier decision and observed that the earlier decision was a decision by a Bench of three Judges and not that of a Constitution Bench, that there the appeal was by special leave, and that the observation in the earlier decision that there was no provision in the Constitution corresponding to Section 417, Cr. P. C. was obviously made to emphasise that the Supreme Court should not in an appeal by special leave, interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court merely for correcting errors of facts or law.

    The Supreme Court preferred not to express any opinion as a Constitution Bench as to the validity of the certificate given by the High Court in that case, and observed that even if it had assumed, without deciding, that the certificate was wrongly given, the Supreme Court would be willing, if it were necessary, to regularise the appeal by giving special leave to appeal.

    5. The decision in (S) AIR 1956 SC 158, came to be noticed by the Supreme Court in State Of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer ., AIR 1958 SC 61, where it was observed that the decision in (S) AIR 1956 SC 158, referred to above, negatived the contention that under Article 136 interference by the Supreme Court with findings of High Courts in judgments of acquittal is not intended and that that decision merely emphasised that the Supreme Court should not in appeal by special leave interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the High Court merely for correcting errors of fact or law.

    6. That being the existing position so far as the Supreme Court is concerned in relation to the scope of Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution as applicable to an appellate order of acquittal by a High Court, we have for ourselves examined the scope of that Article and we have also examined Section 417, Cr. P. C. Article 134 as far as is relevant for our purposes provides as follows :

    "134 (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court

    (a) .....

    (b) .....

    (c) certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court :

    Provided that an appeal under Sub-clause (c) shall lie subject to such provisions as may be made in that behalf under el. (1) of Article 143 and to such conditions as the High Court may establish or require".

    7. Upon a plain reading of these provisions it is clear that even after the judgment of acquittal passed in appeal by the High Court, the High Court may, in a fit case where a substantial question, of law is involved, grant a certificate to the State under Article 134(1)(c). There is nothing in these provisions which forbids the High Court from granting the certificate of fitness in a case where a substantial question of law has been decided by it and where the question is such that an authoritative decision by the Supreme Court over it becomes necessary either because of conflict of existing decisions by different courts or because of any other factor which the High Court may deem as substantial or of great general importance.

    The proviso to Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution does not regulate the grant of a certificate by High Court except that it envisages that while granting a certificate the High Court may lay down certain conditions; and when an appeal is filed before the Supreme Court, the appeal shall be subject to the conditions as the High Court may establish or require.

    8. Section 417 Cr. P. C. is as follows :

    "417. Appeal in case of acquittal. -- (1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present appeal to the High Court from an origi-nal or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court.

    (2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (XXV of 1946), the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from the order of acquittal.

    (3) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to ap-

    peal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.

    (4) No application under Sub-section (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal.

    (5) If, in any case, the application, under Sub-section (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under Sub-section (1)."

    9. The section provides for an appeal to the High Court from original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any court other than a High Court, and it lays down the conditions where such an appeal can be made. Section 417 does not at all apply to the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court from an original or an appellate order of acquittal passed by the High Court. Clearly, therefore, considerations relevant for Section 417 Cr. P. C. have got no applicability to the considerations relevant for Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution.

    It cannot therefore be said that because Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution does not contain any provisions corresponding to Section 417, Cr. P. C., Article 134(1)(c) does not empower the High Court to grant the necessary certificate from an appellate order of acquittal passed by the High Court even where the case is considered a fit one for a certificate. We are therefore of the opinion that AIR 1954 SC 20 does not lay down that the High Court is not empowered to grant a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution from an appellate order of acquittal passed by it, in a case where the High Court thinks that the matter is fit enough to go to the Supreme Court. The preliminary objection must therefore be overruled.

    10. To support the present application four grounds have been stated in it. The first ground challenges our finding that Yogvir Singh was on the date of occurrence at Udaipur and not at the place of occurrence and that he could not therefore have participated in the crime. This ground has not, however, been pressed by the learned Advocate General. Indeed, he conceded that the evidence on the plea of alibi has rightly been accepted by this Court. On the other points raised in the petition the learned Advocate General, however, made a threefold submission :

    (a) That the success of Yogvir Singh in establishing his plea of alibi should have resulted in his acquittal alone and not in the acquittal of other accused persons;

    (b) the eye-witnesses cannot be said to have departed from the path of truth and it is quite possible that when they deposed about the participation of Yogvir Singh in this crime, they have made genuine mistake about his identity; and

    (c) the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not applicable to India and this raises a substantial question of law for consideration by the Supreme Court.

    11. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has never been held to apply to India; and it is not a question which has for the first time to go before the Supreme Court for re-affirmation.

    12. The murder of Babu Deepchand was alleged by the eye-witnesses to have taken place just before sunset. The eye-witnesses further stated that they had known all the six accused from before. They assigned particular role having been played by them. For instance, Brij Lal stated :

    "The six accused present in court and two others whose names I do not know were holding Babu Deepchand to the ground"
    .

    12a. He also stated : "Yogvir accused was present and participated in the murder".

    13. To similar effect had been the statement of Saheb Singh and Bahori Teli. Bahori Teli had stated :

    "I saw the six accused present in court and two others whom I did not know. One unidentified person had a cycle and the remaining seven dragged Deepchand deceased to the arhar field of occurrence. They threw him down on the ground. Tula Ram was holding him down by his hand while two unidentified persons and Bajpal were holding the deceased down by his feet and the remaining four accused were holding him down by his head and hands"
    .

    13a. Saheb Singh had stated :

    "We rushed shouting. On our arrival we saw that at the scene of occurrence in the arhar fields the six accused present in court and two others whom I do not know were holding Babu Deepchand to the ground. Tula Ram shouted to finish Deepchand deceased soon. Then Bhagwan Singh accused gave a gandasa blow on the neck of the deceased,"

    13b. Further on he stated :

    "The backs of the assailants were not on my side. ..... The six accused present in court had not covered their faces. None of the assailants had covered their faces."

    14. In view of the statements reproduced above, and in view of the plea of alibi established by Yogvir Singh, it cannot be urged that Yogvir Singh's name had been taken by the witnesses on account of any mistaken identity and that the witnesses did not depart at all from the path of truth.

    15. In Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, (S) AIR 1957 SC 614, their Lordships of the Supreme Court classified witnesses into three categories, namely, (1) wholly reliable, (2) wholly unreliable, and (3) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. Under the first category of proof, the court should not have any difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way. It may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of intercst-edness, incompetence or subornation.

    Again, there is no difficulty in the second category of proof and the statement of a witness wholly unreliable must be rejected for all purposes. It is in the third category of proof, namely, where the witness is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable that the difficulty arises. And in such cases the court seeks corroboration from some independent evidence or from circumstances. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in this decision, as a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character.

    Where the nature of the testimony of a witness who is not wholly reliable requires corroboration courts, as a rule of prudence, insist on corroboration from independent evidence. There can be no corroboration of a false or doubtful witness by another witness of the same character. And where independent corroboration was lacking, as in the present case, the State cannot urge that the three eye-witnesses although not worthy of belief in the case of Yogvir Singh whose alibi was proved to the hilt should be believed in the case of the other five accused despite the witnesses having implicated all the six accused equally in the crime.

    We have indicated our reasons at some length in order to justify our conclusion that it is not at all a fit case where a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution should be granted. The ease depended only upon determination of facts in the light of evidence produced. It did not involve any question of law, much less any substantial question or of general importance. Consequently we reject this petition.

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    Comments

    State v. Tula Ram
    (Mar 9, 1960)