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  • provisions of the U.P (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947.15. Petition allowed.
  • Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, the principal
  • Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 (Act
  • Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947.11.
  • Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947.
  • Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • provisions of the U.P (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947.15. Petition allowed.
  • Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, the principal
  • Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 (Act
  • Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947.11.
  • Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947.
  • Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion by Tandon, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns house No. 1213, Bagh Muzaffar Khan, Agra, formerly owned by Shri Shadi Ram Loomba (a retired engineer). Shri Loomba had locked the house and gone to Bombay in July 1953, though his luggage remained inside. On 23 July 1953 the District Magistrate of Agra (Shri J.M. Raina) issued an order requisitioning the house purportedly under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947. The requisition order directed that possession be handed over within 16 days and that possession be delivered to Shri Randhir Singh, Magistrate 1st Class. The requisition order included a statement that Shri Loomba did not need the accommodation, referring to an earlier letter where he had agreed to let the house on rent.

No prior notice to Shri Loomba before requisition appears in the record. Possession was handed to Shri Randhir Singh, who occupied the house. Shri Loomba complained to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the matter was referred to the District Magistrate; an understanding was later reached that the house would be released from requisition when Shri Randhir Singh was transferred. Shri Loomba sold the house to the petitioner (Bhargava), who claimed authority to pursue de-requisition matters.

After Shri Randhir Singh's transfer, the house was occupied by Shri D.D. Mahey. On 30 May 1956 the petitioner applied for de-requisitioning, consenting that Shri Mahey might remain while posted in Agra. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer recommended de-requisitioning, but the District Magistrate refused on 2 September 1956 stating he was "not in favour of derequisitioning the house as successors of Shri Mahey may feel some difficulty in getting the house." The petitioner then represented to the Government, which declined to de-requisition. The petitioner challenged the original requisition order and subsequent orders by way of the present petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the requisition under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 was validly made by the District Magistrate (i.e., did the order show the District Magistrate's opinion that requisition was necessary for a public purpose)?
  2. Whether the requisition came to an end by reason of the understanding reached in May 1954 (or thereafter) so as to render continued requisitioning unlawful?
  3. Whether the requisition contravened the proviso to Section 3 by failing to provide suitable alternative accommodation to the owner who was in actual occupation?
  4. Whether the direction to deliver possession to a person other than the District Magistrate (i.e., direct delivery in favour of an officer) was lawful under Section 3?
  5. Whether the requisition was discriminatory (implicating Article 14) or violative of the petitioner's right to hold property under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The requisition order of 23 July 1953 was illegal because there was no public purpose justifying requisition of the house.
  • Alternatively, the requisition had effectively ended in May 1956 when the District Magistrate agreed to de-requisition the house; continued requisition thereafter was illegal.
  • The requisition violated the proviso to Section 3 because no suitable alternative accommodation was provided to Shri Loomba, who was in actual occupation.
  • The order improperly directed delivery of possession to a person other than the District Magistrate, which was not contemplated by Section 3.
  • The requisition was discriminatory and contravened Article 14 and infringed the petitioner's right under Article 19(1)(f) to hold property.

Respondents' / State's Arguments

  • The State contended that the requisition was lawfully made under Section 3 and that the necessary opinion of the District Magistrate that requisition was necessary for a public purpose should be inferred from the fact that the house was requisitioned for a public purpose.
  • The State relied on allegations of shortage of residential accommodation at Agra to support the necessity of requisition.
  • An affidavit by R.D. Saxena (Chief Inspector Rent Control, Agra) was filed, but it did not expressly assert that the District Magistrate had formed the requisite opinion of necessity.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis focused primarily on the statutory requirements of Section 3 of the U.P. (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 and the adequacy of the requisition order dated 23 July 1953.

Step-by-step reasoning:

  1. Identification of statutory conditions: The court identified two essential conditions under Section 3 for a valid requisition: (a) the District Magistrate must be of the opinion that it is necessary to requisition the accommodation, and (b) the requisition must be for a public purpose. Both elements are required for the exercise of the power.
  2. Examination of the requisition order: The court examined the text of the 23 July 1953 order and found it merely stated that the accommodation was requisitioned "for public purposes" and that it was made "in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 3." The order did not record that the District Magistrate was of the opinion that it was necessary to requisition this particular accommodation for a public purpose.
  3. On the inference of the requisite opinion: The court rejected the contention that the mere statement that the accommodation was requisitioned for a public purpose or evidence of shortage of housing could substitute for an express or manifest finding that the District Magistrate formed the opinion of necessity required by the statute. The court emphasized that the element of necessity in the District Magistrate's opinion is as essential as stating the requisition is for a public purpose.
  4. Evidence and affidavits: The affidavit filed did not assert in clear terms that the District Magistrate had actually formed the requisite opinion. The court also noted that actions of Shri Raina (such as agreeing to de-requisition upon transfer of the incumbent officer) tended to contradict any suggestion that he had maintained an unalterable opinion of necessity.
  5. Conclusion on validity: Because the order did not demonstrate that the District Magistrate was of the opinion that requisitioning the accommodation was necessary for a public purpose, the requisition failed to satisfy an essential statutory precondition and was therefore illegal and defective.
  6. Delay and Article 226: The court considered the delay in moving the petition but observed that where a fundamental right (here, the right to property) is involved, delay may not be a bar. Moreover, the court noted continuous agitation against the requisition by Shri Loomba and the petitioner and prior assurances about release of the property, which mitigated the delay objection.

Holding and Implications

PETITION ALLOWED; the requisition order and subsequent orders were quashed.

Holding (core ruling): The court held that the requisition order dated 23 July 1953 failed to show that the District Magistrate formed the requisite opinion that it was necessary to requisition the accommodation for a public purpose as required by Section 3 of the U.P. (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947. Consequently, the requisition was illegal and defective. The court quashed the requisition order dated 23 July 1953, the District Magistrate's order dated 2 September 1956, and the State Government's order dated 15 February 1957.

Direct consequences and remedies ordered:

  • The respondents were directed to restore possession of the house to the petitioner within two months.
  • The petitioner was awarded costs against the respondents.
  • The court expressly stated that this order would not prejudice any right the District Magistrate may have to deal with the accommodation under the provisions of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947.

No broader precedent was announced by this decision beyond the direct effect on the parties; the court limited its reasoning to the statutory requirement that the District Magistrate's opinion of necessity must be shown for a valid requisition under Section 3.

    Jagdish Narain Bhargava v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others Opp.-Parties.

    Tandon, J.:— The facts giving rise to this petition are briefly these:

    2. The dispute is with respect to house no. 1213 situate at Bagh Muzaffar Khan, Agra, which belonged formerly to one Shri Shadi Ram Loomba, who was an engineer but retired from service sometime prior to 23rd July, 1953. In July 1953 he went to Bombay, where his son was in service after locking this house. His luggage nevertheless remained in the house. On 23rd July, 1953 the District Magistrate of Agra, who then was Shri J.M Raina;, requisitioned the said house purporting to act under Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947. This section provides that:—

    ‘If, in the opinion of the District Magistrate it is necessary to requisition any accommodation for any public purpose he may, by order in writing, requisition such accommodation and may direct that the possession thereof shall be delivered to him within such period as may be specified in the order.”

    3. One of the provisos in the section further provides that:

    “No accommodation which is in the actual occupation of any person shall be requisitioned unless the District Magistrate, is further of opinion that suitable alternative accommodation exists for his needs or has been provided to him.”

    4. In the present case, admittedly, Shri Loomba was not provided with any alternative accommodation. The order passed by the District Magistrate was as follows:—

    “In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 (Act No. XXV of 1947) as amended from time to time and extended upto Sept. 30, 1954, I.J.M Raina, IAS, District Magistrate, Agra, requisition house no. 1213 situate at Bagh Muzaffar Khan, Agra, for public purposes and order that within 16 days of the date of service of this order on the occupants of the premises all moveable property of the occupants be removed and the premises handed over to Shri Randhir Singh Magistrate 1st Class.

    5. It is further ordered that the owner Shri Shadi Ram Loomba, Retired Engineer, in view of his letter dated 16-6-1953 to Shri J.D Sharma agreeing to let it out on rent does not actually need the accommodation for his own use, and also does not need an alternative accommodation in lieu of this house.

    ………………………….”

    6. It does not appear that any notice was sent to Shri Loomba prior to the requisition of the house. After the requisition order had been made the possession of the house was handed over to Shri Randhir Singh, Magistrate 1st Class, who then occupied it for his own residence. When Shri Loomba came to know of these developments, he applied to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer complaining against the said requisition. The matter was referred to the District Magistrate also and ultimately an understanding appeared to have been reached between Shri Loomba, on the one hand, and the District Magistrate, on the other, wherefore Shri Loomba did not press his application and the District Magistrate in his turn approved that the house would be released from requisition upon Shri Randhir Singh's transfer from Agra. Shri Loomba sold the house to the petitioner and according to the latter he also authorised him to act on his behalf in all matters ancillary to de-requisition of the house. The trouble arose once again after the transfer of Shri Randhir Singh when, contrary to the understanding given by the District Magistrate on 13th May, 1954 for the release of the house on Shri Randhir Singh's transfer, it was occupied by one Shri D.D Mahey, a Judicial Officer. On 30th May, 1956 the present petitioner again applied to the District Magistrate asking for the de-requisitioning of the house but at the same time giving his consent to Shri Mahey to continue in the house so long as he remained in Agra. This application was recommended by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to the District Magistrate to effect the de-requisition of the house but the District Magistrate did not approve it on 2nd September, 1956 by the following short order:

    “Seen. I am not in favour of derequisitioning the house as successors of Shri Mahey may feel some difficulty in getting the house.”

    7. The petitioner next represented to the Government in the matter of derequisitioning the house. He also suggested that after de-requisitioning the District Magistrate will be free to deal with it under the U.P (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 but the Government declined to de-requisition.

    8. The petitioner's contention in this petition, therefore, is that no public purpose existed to justify the requisition of the house which consequently is illegal. Alternatively, it is contended that the requisition came to an end in May 1956 when the District Magistrate had agreed to de-requisition the house; its continued requisitioning under the circumstances is illegal. The validity of the requisition is further attacked on the ground that suitable alternative accommodation was not provided to Shri Loomba as, however, was necessary in view of the before mentioned proviso in Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, and again on the ground that the delivery of possession was directed in favour of a person other than the District Magistrate, which was not contemplated by Sec. 3. The requisition is also attacked on the ground of being discriminatory therefore contravened Art. 14, also, that it was in contravention of the petitioner's right to hold property guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The relief asked is for the quashing of the requisition order dated 23rd July, 1953 as also the subsequent orders by the District Magistrate dated 2-9-1956 and 15th February, 1957.

    9. It being the case of the respondents also that they are in possession of the house by virtue of the requisition under Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, the principal question to be decided in this case is whether the said requisition was validly made by the District Magistrate. Neither the fact that on 13th May, 1954 an understanding had been reached between the District. Magistrate and Shri Loomba postponing the de-requisition of the premises until the transfer of Shri Randhir Singh from Agra nor the subsequent application by the petitioner agreeing to the continued occupation by Shri Mahey during his stay at Agra, will make any difference in the above position because on either occasion the grievance of Shri Loomba and later of Shri Bhargava was and continued to be against the validity of the requisition. They all along continued to agitate against the legality of the order dated 23rd July, 1953 though they were willing to concede, that Shri Randhir Singh and Shri Mahey might not be immediately dispossessed.

    10. Reverting therefore to the order of requisition, Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, under which the requisition was made, required two conditions to be fulfilled for the validity of that order. Under this section the District Magistrate has power to requisition any accommodation for a public purpose if it is so necessary in his opinion. The two conditions, therefore, are, firstly, that it is necessary in his opinion to requisition an accommodation and, secondly, that it is necessary to do so for a public purpose. It does not appear from the order dated 23rd July, 1953 that Shri Raina, under whose signature it was made, was of the opinion that it was necessary to requisition the accommodation for a public purpose. The order simply sated that the District Magistrate had in exercise of his powers under Sec. 3 of the Act requisitioned it for a public purpose. The fact of requisition for a public purpose alone is borne out by the order, but the other condition for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Sec. 3, namely, the opinion of the District Magistrate that it is necessary to requisition any accommodation for a public purpose is nowhere stated in it. From the order, as it is, one is unable to deduce that Shri Raina was, in fact, of the opinion that the requisition of the house was necessary for a public purpose. The fact that the requisition itself was stated to be for a public purpose will not help to fill the gap; because Sec. 3 contemplates not only that the requisition is made for a public purpose but further that it is so necessary in the opinion of the District Magistrate. The element of necessity or the fulfilment of that condition is as necessary as the fact of requisition itself for a public purpose in order to be fortified by Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947.

    11. It was also contended by the learned Standing Counsel that the fulfilment of this condition should necessarily follow from the fact that the house had been requisitioned for a public purpose. In this connection he also referred to the allegations, according to which there was shortage of house accommodation at Agra and provision for suitable residential accommodation for public purpose was necessary. While shortage of accommodation may be a reason for holding that a particular accommodation is necessary to be requisitioned for the purpose of residence of public officers, it cannot itself be proof of the existence of the requisite opinion held by the District Magistrate. The affidavit by R.D Saxena, Chief Inspector Rent Control, Agra, too has not claimed in so many words that Shri Raina was in fact of the opinion that it was necessary to requisition the accommodation. Even the fact that Shri Raina declined to give up possession of the house forthwith on the representation of Shri Loomba against the de-requisition is of no help to the respondents. It cannot serve to show that Shri Raina was actually of the opinion that it was necessary to requisition the house for a public purpose. In fact Shri Raina's agreeing to de-requisition the house on the transfer of Shri Randhir Singh from Agra tended to suggest in the opposite direction.

    12. In my opinion, therefore, it is not possible to read in the requisition order dated 23rd July, 1953 that Shri Raina was really of the opinion that it was necessary to requisition the house for a public purpose. It being so the requisition failed to comply with one of the essential pre-requisites of Sec. 3 of the U.P (Temp.) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947. The requisition order under the circumstances is illegal and defective.

    13. The question that next arises is whether this Court will in spite of the delay with which this petition was moved be willing to exercise its powers under Art. 226. Ordinarily delay in coming to the Court may be a good ground for refusing to interfere, but where the fundamental right of a subject is concerned the Court will not permit the above consideration to intervene. More so where, as in the present case, the evidence is that Shri Loomba and, after the sale, the petitioner have been continuously agitating against the validity of the impugned order and they had actually been assured at one time that the property will be released.

    14. In view of the fact that the requisition itself has been held to be illegal and as a result of that finding the continued possession of the respondents over the house in question is continuing infringement of the fundamental right of property of the petitioner, he is entitled to a direction for the quashing of the said order. Again in the view of the matter, it is unnecessary for deciding this petition to enter into other grounds urged on behalf of the petitioner. In the result the petition succeeds. The order of requisition dated 23rd July, 1953 and of the District Magistrate dated 2nd September, 1956 and of the State Government dated 15-2-1957 are quashed. The respondents are further directed to restore back the possession of the house to the petitioner within two months. The petitioner will get his costs from the respondents. This order, however, will not prejudice the right, if any, of the District Magistrate to deal with the accommodation under the provisions of the U.P (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947.

    15. Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Jagdish Narain Bhargava v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others Opp.-Parties.
    (Oct 27, 1958)